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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This work takes up urban historian Lewis Mumford’s concern for the 
phenomena of planned and imposed ordering of human life and societies. Mumford 
(and others) suggests the problem consists in the use of external plans, technologies 
(and media) to manipulate, dominate, and even coerce forms of life. It is seen at its 
worst in war, and even forced systems like Nazism and Stalinism. But these phenomena 
also take more attractive and seemingly enriching forms. We will focus (along with 
Daniel Boorstin and Umberto Eco in their own way) on forms which have massively 
developed in 20th and 21st century society: market and consumer saturation, shaped by 
dominating mass electronic media. This situation is developed imaginatively, and 
inventively, yet problematically, in Jean Baudrillard’s theory of Hyperreality –a 
critique of the Western hyper-consumer and media saturated world. But his methods 
and pictures are not followed here. We take up a very different approach and diagnosis; 
This approach has become increasingly multidisciplinary: phenomenological, 
praxeological, anthropological, and philological. We build it up in a reading of human 
lifeworlds in philosophers Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and 
anthropologist Tim Ingold. This work does not go in for a picture of language (and 
cinema) as a system of signification, but as Ludwig Wittgenstein describes it, as tools 
always already involved in forms of life. We also offer a unique characterization of 
corporeal imagining and the imaginative creation of lifeworlds, paving the way for 
what is described as philological resistance: this resistance is seen in the development 
of a certain praxeological philology and fully realized in the 20th century author J. R. R. 
Tolkien’s mythopoeic concerns. We focus particularly on what we call the double-
transfer: the cyclic structure between human artistry and life-world building, each 
shaped by the other. We endeavor, along with Mumford and others, to counter 
colonization and find various less manipulated and un-coerced forms of life, and their 
informal organizing structures. We examine in detail Tolkien’s literary and philological 
project; and the 20th and 21st century’s first art form –cinema. Through the 
philosophical exploration of cinematic craft in Gilles Deleuze, and in the craft of 
Terrence Malick we see, and are taken up in, the inextricable relationship between how 
we make, what we make and how we live everyday life. 
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Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself, 
and then comes to resemble that picture. 
 
IRIS MURDOCH 
 
 
Here’s to the future.  
The only limits are the limits of your imagination.  
Dream of the kind of world you want to live in;  
Dream out loud, at a higher volume. 
 
BONO 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So Joseph went after his brothers, and found them at Dothan. 
They saw him from a distance, and before he came near to them, they 
conspired to kill him. 
They said to one another, ‘Here comes this dreamer. 
Come now, let us kill him and throw him into on the pits; then we shall say 
that a wild animal has devoured him, and we shall see  
what will become of his dreams.’ 
 
GENESIS 37: 17B-20 
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INTRODUCTION:  
THE DYNAMO, THE VIRGIN  
AND THE EVALUATIVE CONCERNS  
OF HUMAN IMAGINING 
 
 
  1 
 
The Paris Universal Exposition of 1900 was a grand celebration of the 
technological achievements of the 19th century and a dazzling showcase for the tools of 
progress in the coming 20th century –the new age of the machine. The expo boasted 
bio-diesel engines running on peanut oil, Edison’s Kinetiscope and Gaumont’s debut of 
film with sound, moving sidewalks, escalators, the world’s largest refracting telescope 
and wireless telegraphy. But of all the marvels on display, it was the electric dynamo 
that troubled the American humanist and historian Henry Adams (1838-1918) in his 
prescient essay “The Dynamo and The Virgin”. Adams was bewildered that nothing in 
his 19th-century classical education prepared him to comprehend what he stood before 
in the great hall of the dynamos. “In these seven years [since the Chicago World’s Fair 
of 1893] man had translated himself into a new universe which had no common scale 
                                                
1 Photograph by William Henry Goodyear (1846–1923), first curator of fine arts at Brooklyn 
Museum (1899–1923). Online collection of his 1900 World’s Fair photographs found at 
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/brooklyn_museum/sets/72157604656089762/> 
 2 
of measurement with the old. He had entered a supersensual world, in which he could 
measure nothing except by chance collisions of movements imperceptible to his senses, 
perhaps even imperceptible to his instruments, but perceptible to each other, and so to 
some known ray at the end of the scale.”2 “The Dynamo and the Virgin” is part of the 
well-known collection of essays by Adams entitled The Education of Henry Adams 
(1907).  
Adams, the great grandson of the second President of the United States of 
America, John Adams, and grandson of the fourth President John Quincy Adams, 
opens Education with the closing of  “the old universe” of his forefathers in 1844 and 
the dawning of a new one –symbolized in the opening of the Boston and Albany 
Railroad– which would only leave fragments of the old order of things in its wake.3 Far 
from poetic exaggeration, one cannot underestimate the radical alteration to daily life 
Adams laments. More technological and social change occurred in the last 50 years of 
the 19th century than in the previous thousand. Adams learned to see the dynamo as 
more than simply ‘technology’ –indeed the dynamo was the most expressive symbol of 
ultimate energy, force, and infinity in the modern world. The nearest example to that 
truly metaphysical force of 1900, says Adams, was the cross of Constantine in 310 A. 
D. and its millennium-and-a-half presence throughout Europe. No, this was not the 
cross of Puritan America to which Adams referred; it was the ancient cross of the Old 
World whose force was felt in the mystery of the Virgin goddess, a universal 
primordial life force the church fathers recognized as theotokos, the God bearer. 
“Symbol or energy, the Virgin had acted as the greatest force the Western world ever 
felt,” Adams later says, “and had drawn man’s activities to herself more strongly than 
                                                
2 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (New York: The Modern Library, 1931), 383-384; the 
comment ‘these seven years’ is in reference to the 1893 Chicago’s World Fair. 
3 Henry Adams, ibid., 5. 
 3 
any other power, natural or supernatural, had ever done; the historian’s business was to 
follow the track of the energy;” he continues to formulate, “to find where it came from 
and where it went to; its complex source and shifting channels; its values, equivalents, 
conversions.”4 It was this creative and literally life shaping and life giving energy –the 
same creative energy which gave forth the great cathedral at Chartres, “the highest 
energy known to man”, says Adams– that was threatened by the new power and 
energies symbolized by the machine.  
Criticism of this shift in cultural dominance and importance sensed by Adams 
should not be mistaken for luddism; this is a matter far deeper and broader than the 
simple distrust of complex tools. “In the symbol of the Dynamo,” notes Leo Marx, 
“Adams represents an industrial society that threatens, as no previous society has 
threatened, to destroy the creative power [of humanity] embodied in the Virgin.”5 Even 
the silent mechanical power of the dynamo, and the force it was capable of unleashing, 
was more than simply the sum total of its mechanical components. The symbolized 
powers and significance of the machine go beyond anything purely mechanical. 
Lacking the vocabulary, Adams can only describe the deeper element of this complex 
phenomenon as a ‘metaphysical’ quality that required awe, reverence, and even prayer.6 
These are responses at quite a different level to that of the technological. 
Now, taken alone, Adams’ quixotic observations of the machine’s substitution 
for the divine, and mechanical power for creative energy in the West, may seem 
tantamount to histrionics; however, Adams is not alone in sensing a phenomenon far 
more complex than the rapid development and use of, and dependence on, new 
mechanical tools. From the late 19th century to the mid 20th this epochal shift, and the 
                                                
4 Henry Adams, ibid., 388-389. 
5 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 349. 
6 Henry Adams, ibid., 380. 
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question of its ethical and broadly human trajectory, come up in their own way, in the 
works of such diverse figures as John Ruskin, Marcel Proust, William Morris, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, J. R. R. Tolkien, Martin Heidegger, Lewis 
Mumford, Daniel Boorstin, Michel de Certeau and Jean Baudrillard –all of whom will 
be voiced in the following pages. And so, it is the quality of this epochal shift, and the 
ethical and human trajectories within this new economy7, with which this work is 
deeply concerned. By further investigating the effects of this complex phenomenon –
including the relationships between power and creativity, order and organizing, the 
subsequent demands on everyday life levied by the emerging economy of consumption 
and communication made possible by mass industrial technology, and how others have 
articulated that phenomenon throughout the 20th century– the picture of a particular set 
of ethical concerns emerges. Primarily, I will characterize some of the concerns in this 
work as those provoked by a world dominated by the aims of the technological 
colonization of everyday life. What is meant by this characterization will be unpacked 
chapter by chapter, but what is at stake are the evaluative concerns about a trompe 
l’oeil ethic behind this ever expanding technological colonization. 
These evaluative concerns demand theological reflection. However, when we 
consider how slight the move is between, on the one hand, the discussion of 
colonization and decolonization that is introduced in Chapter 1, and on the other, the 
theological language of evil and redemption in the work of J. R. R. Tolkien, we can see 
how this thesis develops a certain way to speak theologically in a materialist economy 
of consumption and mass communication. As Charles Winquist points out in Desiring 
                                                
7 Unless stated otherwise, the use of the word “economy” will be from its Greek origin, oikonomia, 
which means management of the house. Certain forms that will occur and reoccur are the 
economy of consumption, the economy of communication, and the economy of economics. 
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Theology, in a post-Christian West “there is no sanctuary for theological reflection.”8 
The thesis, then, will respond to a world dominated by the aims of the technological 
colonization of everyday life with a tactical theology, as suggested by Winquist, that 
“works within, through, and against the strategies of dominant discursive practices.”9 
This tactical use of theology is similar in character to Michel de Certeau’s descriptions 
in The Practice of Everyday Life. De Certeau uses the examples of immigrant life 
practices (such as North Africans living in France) subverting dominant forms of life, 
and the practices of colonized indigenous populations (North Africans living under 
French colonial rule) who have been inverted, subverted and transformed through the 
imposition of a colonizing culture.  
Two different sorts of roles played by people in this colonized society are 
characterized in his distinction between strategy and tactics. (A.) Strategy is built on 
the rational calculation and manipulation, or control, of life ways in a ‘mapped’ place. 
It is the Cartesian attitude of “a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, 
a scientific institution)” which coercively postulates and delimits place thereby 
allowing for “the mastery of place over time”; the control of place through panoptic 
transformation of other practitioners into ‘objects’; a knowledge only made possible by 
control.10 (B.) Tactics by contrast, are modalities of practices that resist being defined 
by place (they resist the ordering of the warp yarn), and stand in guerilla resistance to 
the more “technocratic (and scriptural) strategies” that conform to prescribed models in 
the creation of place.11 Tactics are nomadic and weak; they make space for the making 
                                                
8 Charles E. Winquist, Desiring Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 127. 
9 Charles E. Winquist, ibid., 127. 
10 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 36. 
11 Michel de Certeau, ibid., 29. 
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of life and the growth of organization. Tactical space is always the space of the power-
less ‘other’. 12 
As suggested by de Certeau, and appropriated by Winquist, the following 
chapters will tactically insinuate theological uses in the varied spaces of the dominant 
technological and material economy of the 21st-century West. Indeed, the theological 
concerns overlap with the emerging ethical concerns that arise when considering the 
ordering and the organizing of human forms of life in a post-industrial age of 
consumerism and the hyper-proliferation of electronic media. Implicit too, are 
necessary preliminaries to a tactical theology which properly incorporate and build on 
the relationships between who we are as human beings, what and how we craft and 
build up, and how we dwell meaningfully and in meaningful spaces. This work is 
informed by a vision of the Good (and all its implicit theological background), and also 
rests firmly in understandings of the doctrines of creation, humanity and givenness. 
One principal theological question animating this investigation, then, is: Why do we 
need to be engaged in the arts? The simple answer is that what is identified as our 
greatest threat –our powers to imagine, make and craft– is also our greatest hope. When 
Tolkien says in 1931, “we make still by the law in which we’re made”, there is an 
implicit understanding that ignoring our call to be creators does not negate that call.13 
And here too there is an implicit theological vision. 
Chapter 1 begins with a structural metaphor, or perhaps better a synecdoche –
the city. On the one hand, the city stands as the quintessential example of human 
imaginative and active powers, yet on the other, human beings have had an ambivalent 
and at times tenuous relationship with ‘the city’ and all it implications. Life in the city 
has taken innumerable forms, across the evaluative spectra of good and bad and evil, 
                                                
12 In Christ’s teaching and example the powerless is also sought and cultivated. 
13 J. R. R. Tolkien, “Mythopoeia,” in Tree and Leaf (London: Harper Collins, 2001), 87. 
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genuine and ersatz and so forth. The holy scriptures of the Judeo-Christian tradition, in 
fact, begin in a garden and end in the divine city of New Jerusalem, passing through a 
series of cities whose lifeworlds embody varying moral, imaginative, and religious 
qualities, and their ways of life: Sodom, Jericho, Jerusalem, Babylon, Athens, Rome 
and ultimately the holy city of New Jerusalem. Simplifying the scene, it will soon 
become apparent through the work of American humanist Lewis Mumford that in the 
city we see two broad tendencies in tension: to organize the patters of life (life ways 
and communities developing naturally), and to order them (through a consolidation and 
application of power). And central to that tension is the relationship between human 
beings and technology. With the tension further aggravated in an industrial age of 
mechanical reproducibility, Daniel Boorstin and Umberto Eco broaden our 
understanding of the 20th-century implications for daily life. Indeed, as we will see, the 
story is thoroughly muddled when we reach the age of mass-produced media and mass-
consumed things –including the anesthetic use of art and what we’ve come to call 
entertainment. 
There is perhaps no 20th-century figure more dramatic in his pronouncements, 
and controversial in his findings about an age of electronic media and mass production, 
than Jean Baudrillard –to whom Chapter 2 turns. Baudrillard is a complicated figure 
who conceptually and rhetorically extends the complex story explored in Chapter 1. He 
begins his career as a Marxist sociologist who then, after his radical disillusionment 
with Marxian philosophy and struggle after the failures of the 1968 student riots in 
Paris, turns towards a radical post-Marxian nihilist critique of the post-World War Two 
West and what he sees as its calamitous mass consumer and mass media culture. His 
pronouncements culminate in the nebulous and hyperbolic term Hyperreality, which 
was famously bastardized into meteoric fame and fortune in the 1999 film The Matrix. 
 8 
In The Matrix, we are confronted with a hyper-sleek, neo-noir reality which we soon 
find to be nothing more than a simulation, fabrication, and representation of the world 
(a fictional city in fact), meant to cover over the wasteland of the real and the secret 
imprisonment of human beings by machines. Much time will be spent in Chapter 2 
attempting to unpack what leads up to and is entailed by Baudrillard’s conception of 
Hyperreality; however, as will soon be apparent, the concept proves to be far too 
theoretical and is built upon principles it purports to reject. 
Chapter 3, then, is concerned with a new methodological approach 
(philosophically, anthropologically and sociologically) to help make sense of this ever-
complicating set of phenomena. It also constitutes a departure from the theoretical 
games of Jean Baudrillard, moving towards more grounded methods and tools for the 
re-articulation of a more complex historical phenomenon, gleaned from the work of 
Mumford, Boorstin, Eco, and even in some of Baudrillard’s earliest writings. And it 
gives a better-grounded approach to Tolkien and Malick in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 
is a brief look at three scholars (Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Tim 
Ingold) whose work represents a methodological approach to world –which redraws 
body/world and body/perception characterizations. My application of this methodology 
is not purely ‘phenomenological’ per se, but is focused on broadening and deploying 
the richness of what has been characterized as Lebenswelt, the lifeworld, and what that 
characterization implies for the questions that have been raised thus far. One major 
feature of this new methodology is captured in Michel de Certeau’s previously 
mentioned The Practice of Everyday Life. Although the ‘whole’ of Manhattan Island 
could be seen from the 110th floor of the old World Trade Center in New York City, 
says de Certeau, that totalizing view removes the observer from the ‘grasp of the city’ –
the earthed practices which shape its avenues, alleyways and shops. Very similar to 
 9 
Lewis Mumford, de Certeau is highly suspicious of what he calls the ‘concept city’ –a 
product of the voyeuristic (scopic) desire to step outside the human body’s concrete and 
mobile encounter with the everyday in the attempt to transform the “bewitching world” 
into text to be read with the “celestial eye of the gods”.14 “The panorama-city”, warns 
de Certeau, “is a ‘theoretical’ (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose 
condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices.”15 This 
reference, then, succinctly summarizes the wrongheaded picture –also exemplified in 
later Baudrillard’s concept of Hyperreality– from which Chapter 3 moves away. 
Suggestively we could say that Chapter 3 is a return to bodies and to forms of life. In 
agreement with De Certeau, we want walkers of the labyrinth, not voyeurs; de Certeau 
organizes a return to the “dark space” below –to the practitioners, the walkers, the 
bodies. Only there, he says, can we begin to reclaim “an ‘anthropological,’ poetic and 
mythic experience of space”.16 In The Practice of Everyday Life, however, tactical 
“walkers” and their tactical experience of space, both poetic and mythic, are 
strategically written over by imposing and controlling maps. As described by the great 
Argentine essayist Jorge Louis Borges, it is the map that replaces and becomes the 
territory of the Empire. De Certeau describes this phenomenon as the colonization of 
space.17 Inspired by this delineation made by de Certeau, a new characterization of 
Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’ phenomenon is made use of in Chapter 3 and beyond –the 
colonization of human forms of life. 18 
                                                
14 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 92. 
15 Michel de Certeau, ibid., 92-93. 
16 Michel de Certeau, ibid., 93; Ian Buchanan notes in Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist (London: 
Sage, 2000) that although reference to Lefebvre is limited to one footnote (p.205 n.5) it is 
‘momentous’. “From this point of view as well,” notes de Certeau, “the works of Henri Lefebvre 
on everyday life constitute a fundamental source.” We might also note that Lefebvre was an early 
influence on Baudrillard. 
17 Michel de Certeau, ibid., 121. 
18 Michel de Certeau, ibid., 121. 
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As a result of this profoundly different explication of the problem and the 
presentation of a different methodology, the imaginative wall of Cartesian fictions 
(mind/body dualism and subject/object relations) is breached and the possibilities of 
response break wide open.  Chapter 4, then, explores the theologically profound, 
historical and imaginative philology of J. R. R. Tolkien (1898-1972). The chapter 
continues to draw us further into a new way of exploration, here especially built up 
from a unique and complex philological / philosophical / anthropological picture of the 
corporeal imagination and its involvement in everyday life.19 Traces of Tolkien’s 
broad and different characterization of a philology, and his approach to how human 
beings imagine, create and live, surfaces in Neapolitan philosopher Giambatista Vico 
(1668-1744), the imaginative philosophical philology of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-
1900), and the philological craft and politics of the pre-Raphaelite, and Arts and Crafts 
Movement founder, William Morris (1834-1896). It also connects readily with the kind 
of approach we built up with Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Ingold in Chapter 3. Each in 
their own way testify to a particular brand of praxeological recovery of meaningful 
forms of life inextricably and primordially linked to the complex fabric of day-to-day 
living, which calls us to confront, resist and transform the colonization of the world 
around us. Tolkien’s mythopoeic resistance to colonization, also, situates him well 
within the broader nexus of concerns voiced by Adams in “The Dynamo and the 
Virgin”. And finally, in Chapter 5, the matter is taken up within the context of the first 
great art form of an age of mechanical reproducibility –cinema. The great two-volume 
work on cinema, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image by 
Gilles Deleuze, is connected back to the methodology presented in Chapter 3; and the 
                                                
19 As this rather clumsy set of characterizations suggests, this is a very diverse phenomenon noted 
and investigated in many disciplines; however, for brevity in this introduction let us call it 
philological –which is the term taken up in chapters 4 and 5. 
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American Director Terrence Malick –who himself did philosophical work on 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, and even met Heidegger and translated a 
work by him– is lifted up as an example of this broad philological practice at work in a 
media age. 
The current situation in the West is particularly characterized by the uncertainty 
and plurality of all embracing markets and new forms of communication. The 
economies of hyper-capitalism –ecologically unsustainable– seem to be built on 
marketing-machines pushing ever-new market formed types of work, carries and goals; 
and ever new forms of entertainment to fill voids of ‘boredom’ in lives that have been 
over-colonized by consumer media. Not simply things, or activities, but ‘Lifestyles’ 
(and a vast array of products and paraphernalia to support those lifestyles) are sold. 
Even God is offered in the language and trappings of entertainment and carrier goals. 
These seemingly benign –and even seemingly enriching– image machines are built up 
using practices which in the last century were turned to the purposes of not so benign 
(and often visibly ugly) systems of ordering: for example, turning people into Nazis, or 
following Communist totalitarian dreams. In Lewis Mumford, however, we find that 
this kind of concern with effects of technology on human living goes back quite a long 
way. Certainly the imposition or ordering by colonization and war goes right back to 
the beginnings of recorded civilization. But it is this 21st century phenomena of life 
colonized by consumerism and mass media that is of central concern here.  
As will become apparent, the varied expressions of post-industrial consumer 
media turn out to have multiple uses which can be evaluated. When we evaluate these 
varied expressions they can be seen to be sometimes good and person developing, 
sometimes devaluing of people, and sometimes colonizing them. They may be 
dehumanizing and they can be surely evil. They can also perform anesthetic functions 
 12 
or they can have an entertainment function –sometimes these are difficult to 
distinguish. Some forms of entertainment can be useful and benign but some can also 
be devaluative. The word is a tricky one. All of which, however, are related to the 
double transfer of media to do this work. 
In the spirit of Jacques Ellul we can say that this concern with forms of life, and 
the their values, is also a religious question. Both as simply human, and as religious 
people, we must attend to and engage with this world, and with other people, in the 
practices of daily living. In this, crafts and arts, like those of imaginative literature and 
cinema, properly engaged with the other practices of life, can play their own distinctive 
roles. Literary, cinematic and television work, accompanied and complemented by 
reflective and imaginative philology, phenomenology and anthropology, can challenge 
and resist colonizations; such art can clarify, explore and foster rebuilding and (in 
Mumford’s terms) reorganization of people, life ways, and societies. 
This, then, is not an argument that can be demonstrated in proofs. Rather than 
looking for a Q.E.D. (quod erat domonstrandum) at the end of this work, we might 
rather find Q.E.F. (quod erat faciendum), as Euclid did to distinguish exemplar 
‘constructions’ from the demonstration of logic in the proof. This work does not have a 
‘linear’ form. Rather than the mapped journey of a navigator it is the trace of a 
wayfinder –giving each form of life its proper attention. That is the ultimate character 
of this work. Its theology is appropriate to such wayfinding; and its style and manner is 
similarly appropriate. 
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Chapter 1 
LIFE IN THE TROMPE L’OEIL CITY 
 
“To believe, therefore, that human culture has reached a marvelous final culmination in the modern 
metropolis one must avert one’s eyes from the grim details of the daily routine. And that is precisely 
what the metropolitan denizen schools himself to do: he lives, not in the real world, but in a shadow 
world projected around him at every moment by means of paper and celluloid and adroitly manipulated 
lights: a world in which he is insulated by glass, cellophane, pliofilm from the mortifications of living. In 
short, a world of professional illusionists and their credulous victims.” 
 
LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY20 
 
Cities –from their beginnings as small mud hut hamlets to the growth of the 
expansive megalopolis– are a central part of and determinate in how human beings 
have come to socially organize and order human life. As a central and unifying 
phenomenon in the history of civilization, we use the metaphor of the city –both 
historically and mythically– as an expression of human wonder, human hope, and 
human ills. However, when we begin to excavate exactly what is the relationship 
between how human beings organize life –through specific cultic, artistic, economic 
and private life practices– and how human beings order their life –by means of 
managing, classifying and directing social expressions– a tension begins to emerge. 
Initially, we can sense the trace of this tension in the distinct origins and uses of the 
words themselves. To ‘organize’ (in its verbal form) is of Middle French origin 
meaning to give an organic structure to.  Deriving from the classical Latin ‘organum’ 
via the ancient Greek noun ‘organon’ (from which we get ‘organ’) the meaning of the 
word through the ages has been applied to tools, instruments –both mechanical, such as 
an instrument of war or music, and natural, such as an instrument of sense and faculty– 
and the common modern usage of a bodily organ. To organize human life then is to 
                                                
20 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: 
Harcourt, 1989), 546. (emphasis mine) 
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gather as a means of action or operation with the purpose of carrying out some specific 
function or functions.21 
 Tension arises when we obscure and obfuscate that ‘the city’ (a precarious 
generalizing term, and here partially ‘metaphorical’, or better, synecdochtal, whose 
problematic use will be addressed in this chapter) is not only how human beings 
organize but also how they order human forms of life. The use origins of the English 
word ‘order’ are uncertain according to the Oxford English Dictionary. The noun has 
its roots in the classical Latin ‘ordin’ perhaps related to the cognate ‘ordiri’ which 
meant to lay a warp before weaving; there is also the classical Latin ‘ordo’ (which 
survives today as the rarely used noun) meant to row a group of the same profession, 
social class, rank and position. The weaving example is quite elucidating here since the 
warp yarn is that pre-woven form through which the weft yarn is woven to make cloth. 
The classical Latin ‘ordo’ then, which has a much more specific technique-derived 
definition in the OED –if the weaving use of the word is taken to be originary that is– 
denotes “a thread on the loom” (the warp yarn) before weaving begins. In this way a 
working picture emerges: to order human life is to literally pre-scribe the form in 
which human life gathers, weaves and shapes. 
 Now, of course, etymology does not determine correct usage –nor correct 
metaphors– but by breaking these unique words open a trajectory for the dissertation 
comes forth. Crudely, these often intertwining traces are detectable in the rubrics of 
‘power’ and ‘creativity’. These words immediately cease to be informative, however, 
since their own lexical baggage accompanies them; nevertheless, this is the place to 
                                                
21 Oxford English Dictionary ; American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd ed., (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993). It is revealing to note that the word “organ” shares the same Indo-
European root *werg- with work, wrought and orgy. The modern English word “orgy” comes to us 
by way of the Greek ‘orgia’ used to denote secret rites and worship. The connections between 
labour, craft, and cultic practice, revealed in the Indo-European *werg- and what this has to do with 
the metaphor of ‘the ersatz city’, will be unpacked further in the course of the dissertation.  
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start. This uneven break in civilization –between how human beings ‘organize’ and 
‘order’ forms of life22 and how it manifests in practices of ‘power’ or ‘creativity’– is 
taken head on in the work of American historian Lewis Mumford. As will soon become 
evident, Mumford links strong evaluative critiques to these radically different pictures 
in light of the maturation of human civilization through history and the role 
‘technology’ plays in that development. I will draw on Mumford’s work, then, to 
further elucidate the meaning of these two activities in relation to human living. 
 
LEWIS MUMFORD: TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 
Lewis Mumford’s The City In History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its 
Prospects (1961) is a complex historical investigation uncovering the social forces 
behind urban development in Western civilization, and does an admirable job 
identifying the truth and folly in any attempt to parse the tension between the 
organizing and ordering inherent in cities. “In seeking the origins of the city,” says 
Mumford –whose work is heavily indebted to Scottish biologist, botanist and urban 
theorist Sir Patrick Geddes– “one may too easily be tempted to look only for its 
physical remains. But as with the picture of early man, when we center on his bones 
and shards, his tools and weapons, we do less than justice to inventions like language 
and ritual that have left few, if any, material traces.”23 As with many species of animals, 
human beings are fundamentally social creatures whose gathering must have originated 
as an instinctive act. As human beings, however, we are not simply ‘social’ creatures in 
the cosmopolitan sense of the word, but, as will be noted in the later work of Martin 
                                                
22 Here, the term ‘forms of life’ is a reference to the whole of the daily activities of a people. This 
term is drawn from its use by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (which echoes the 
characterization of ‘lifeworld’ [Lebenswelt] introduced by Edmund Husserl and developed in their 
own ways by Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, et al.) and will be further unpacked and 
used prominently in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
23 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 5. 
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Heidegger, human beings are fundamentally social creatures with a primordial 
relationship to nature and the cosmos. So, as Mumford points out, the first evidence of 
human communal gathering seems to be centered on cultic practices which allowed 
people to articulate better this ineffable relationship between themselves, their craft, 
nature and the mysteries of the cosmos –rituals for birth and death, dream interpretation 
and the observance of seasons. These archaic gatherings were probably temporary 
meetings centered on cairns or caves. However, as the forms of life of the social group 
became more diversified and complex, so did their dwellings. As people began to share 
common social heritage, temporary gatherings gave way to hunting camps, then to 
permanent hamlets, perhaps centered on a shrine containing some powerful relic, and 
these eventually grew into villages to meet the developing needs of the community. 
With the birth of the city then, the “many functions that had heretofore been scattered 
and unorganized were brought together within a limited area, and the components of 
the community were kept in a state of dynamic tension and interaction.”24  
While expansive, Mumford’s study holds the tension between the uniqueness of 
specific peoples and the particularity of place, without neglecting the common human 
event that is the city. On the level of ‘city as human event,’ Mumford notes an 
unforeseen element which emerges in the social development of the city. As a means of 
expressing sacred and secular power, the city also became the site of ordering human 
life and “beginning as a representation of the cosmos, a means of bringing heaven 
down to earth, the city became a symbol of the possible.”25 The importance of what it 
means to say that cities are not only how human beings organize (or organically gather) 
but also how we order human forms of life is painfully transparent when examined 
briefly in a specific historical example –the traumatic collision of civilizations and 
                                                
24 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 31. 
25 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 31. 
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subsequent European colonization26 of the New World in the sixteenth century. 
Anthropologist Jack Weatherford offers an illuminating historical anecdote. 
On October 2, 1491, the city of Santa Fé (Holy Faith) was founded on the plains 
outside of Granada, the last Moorish stronghold in Spain, by the monarchs Ferdinand 
and Isabella as a military base from which the siege of the Alhambra would take place 
over the course of the next year. The rectangular shaped city had two major streets that 
formed a cruciform pattern with a plaza in the center. “When Columbus and the 
subsequent conquistadores arrived in America,” says Weatherford, “they used the plan 
of Santa Fé for virtually every city they founded.”27 Since the practice of the new 
European invaders was to build cities and center power in those places already 
inhabited, however, the common practice of Spanish colonization in the Americas was 
to raze existing cities and impose a new order based on a new urban design. This new 
urban design, Santa Fé, was a working metaphor for the consolidation of Spanish 
European order –both sacred and secular– in the New World. Great Mesoamerican 
cities such as the puma-shaped Cuzco and the Aztec Tenochtitlán (the city on the lake) 
–organized and ordered by their own unique expressions of life– were erased and 
written over like a palimpsest. The memory of this systematic reordering of the New 
World urban landscape still survives in place names such as Santa Fé de Bogotá, 
Colombia, Santa Fé del Rosario, Argentina, and even Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the 
United States. Weatherford’s stark examples vividly reveal that there is indeed much at 
stake in how humans ‘order’ or ‘organize’, and they stand as a reminder that any 
                                                
26 While appropriate meanings already begin to come forth in this example, the term ‘colonization’ 
will be taken up in greater detail and put to use in an alternative methodology later in the 
dissertation. 
27 Jack Weatherford, Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the World (New York: 
Fawcett Columbine, 1988), 230. 
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discussion of an imposed order qua colonization is accompanied by enormous ethical 
concerns.  
Mumford also notes many historical examples of imposed order. The first such 
example in The City in History is the centralization and crystallization of urban space in 
the citadel. Early on, the citadel centralized previously scattered and decentralized 
village economies that sometimes spread throughout entire valley and regional 
systems.28 Far from simply a symbol of military power, the citadel centralized wealth 
(economic power) and provided religious meaning (the power of meaning) as a 
reflection of the cosmos. Throughout history these examples take on different 
expressions but function in the same way. Whether in expressions of Baroque power 
through an architecture which led to, among other things, a new planning emphasis 
placed on streets and traffic rather than neighborhoods, or in the depressed Coketown, 
completely colonized and ordered by late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
capitalism, the result is the same: human forms of life can be disconnected from one 
pattern of living and forcibly shaped to conform to another.  
This ‘disconnect’ is felt in Mumford’s critique of regional planning in The 
Culture of Cities (1938).  Mumford critiques the ‘Oblomovs’29 of architecture and 
planning who evade reality, make “idle pictures and diagrams”, and construct 
“buildings outwardly without roots in their landscape”.30 Here Mumford’s language 
echoes the semiological language of signification (and in some ways anticipates the 
semiological concerns of Umberto Eco and Jean Baudrillard, who will be discussed 
later), but with a significant twist. On the one hand Mumford displays an obvious 
concern for what Gale Carrithers describes as Mumford’s contention “against signs 
                                                
28 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 34, 35. 
29 A Russian literary character who exemplifies superfluous living. 
30 Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 375, 404. 
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banefully divorced from referents”.31 When the plan (sign) has no connection to 
‘reality’ (referent) on the ground then the results can be disastrous to forms of life. 
However, Mumford is not a semiologist; rather than trading in signs and referents, 
Mumford is a historian deeply concerned with human life practices. Proper planning 
aligns geography and economy with “human purposes”, says Mumford, “[…] what is 
planned is not simply a location or an area: what is planned is an activity-in-an-area or 
an area-through-an-activity.”32 Mumford’s attention to life practices and forms of life 
over and against systems of correlation will increasingly play a crucial role in the 
discussion of order and organizing. 
In The City in History, after thirteen chapters of detailed anthropological, 
sociological, and historical unpacking of the development of urban space, Mumford 
introduces the ‘new’ economic force of capitalism, and the dramatic effects this new 
epoch has had, and continues to have, on urban development. “The growth of the 
commercial city,” says Mumford, “was a slow process, for it met with resistance in 
both the structure and the customs of the medieval town . . . But the final result of 
capitalism was to introduce the modes of the market place, in a universal form, into 
every quarter of the city: no part of it was immune to change, if this could be brought 
about at a profit.”33 The new emphasis on reordering to support the emerging needs of 
capitalism –leading to a rapid decrease in rural living and increase in urban 
populations– “found their ideal expression in new city extensions” notes Mumford.  As 
early as the seventeenth century these new city extensions, from lot to avenue, were 
treated “as abstract units for buying and selling, without respect for historic uses, for 
                                                
31 Gale H. Carrithers Jr., Mumford, Tate, Eiseley: Watchers in the Night (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1991), 27. 
32 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 376, 379. 
33 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects, 411. 
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topographic conditions, or for social needs.”34 Mumford then further unpacks the 
complex origins and developments of this tension between the forces of organization 
and the new epoch of imposed order on the urban landscape of Western European and 
American cities by addressing the advent of technological advancement. What makes 
the character of this new epoch particularly pervasive and different from preceding 
epochs, says Mumford, is the coupling of capitalism with the new technological 
advancements of the first and second industrial revolutions.35 “Whether our scientific 
technology should be controlled and directed for the purposes of life, or whether life 
shall be regimented and repressed in order to promote ceaseless expansion of 
technology”, warns Mumford whilst pondering the future of ‘city’ in the West, “is one 
of the main questions before mankind today.”36 These evaluative concerns will continue 
throughout Mumford’s work and will become more evident over the course of this 
chapter. It is the intent of this dissertation to explore these values –both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’– associated with the colonization of human forms of life and to see how these 
values are further complicated in an age of media and virtual technologies. 
 
TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION: A HOPEFUL ARCHAEOLOGY 
Lewis Mumford reminds us that it takes spectacles far less dramatic than the 
invasion of a colonizing army to reorder the life practices of a city. A prolific writer, 
Mumford’s first great study was the prescient investigation Technics and Civilization 
                                                
34 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 421. 
35 Mumford places the first dramatic tell of technological advancement in the thirteenth century –
the rise of the clock in the town square. The clock “is a piece of power-machinery whose ‘product’ 
is seconds and minutes [. . .]. In terms of the human organism itself, mechanical time is even more 
foreign [. . .]. Abstract time became the new medium of existence. Organic functions themselves 
were regulated by it . . . [and a] generalized time-consciousness accompanied the wider use of 
clocks: dissociating time from organic sequences . . .”. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), 15-17. Again, Mumford’s emphasis here on the 
disconnect of the human organ / organism / organization of organic functions from the ordering 
of human life is connected to the wider theme of my study. 
36 Lewis Mumford, ibid., Graphic Section IV: Plates 63-64. 
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(1934). “During the last thousand years”, says Mumford, “the material basis and the 
cultural forms of Western Civilization have been profoundly modified by the 
development of the machine.”37 Rather than focusing on the modern limited industrial 
term ‘technology’, Mumford favors the term technic, for which he excavates broad 
meaning from the Greek ‘techne’, in an attempt to reveal it as historically situated in a 
complex lifeworld. Technics, says Mumford, greatly concerned with the associated 
values, “are the results of human choices and aptitudes and strivings, deliberate as well 
as unconscious . . . [they exist] as an element in human culture and [they promise] well 
or ill as the social groups that exploit [them] promise well or ill.”38 Inspired by the work 
of his mentor Sir Patrick Geddes, Mumford constructs Technics and Civilization around 
a complex archaeology –best described as an “over-lapping and interpenetrating 
phases” of ‘the machine’.39 ‘The machine’ goes beyond simple technological artifacts. 
“When I use the term ‘the machine’ I shall employ it as a shorthand reference to the 
entire technological complex. This will embrace the knowledge and skills and arts 
derived from industry or implicated in the new technics, and will include various forms 
of tool, instrument, apparatus and utility as well as machines proper.”40 Although 
“mechanization and regimentation are not new phenomena in history: what is new is 
the fact that these functions have been projected and embodied in organized forms 
which dominate every aspect of our existence.”41 Certainly, Mumford suggests, other 
civilizations in history –the Chinese, the Arabs, the Greeks, the Romans– have all had 
access to and achieved a high level of “technical proficiency” without succumbing to, 
                                                
37 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), 3. 
38 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 6. 
39 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 109. 
40 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 12. (emphasis mine) 
41 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 4. (emphasis mine) 
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or being dominated by, technological aims.42 Only a civilization like ours, dominated 
by the aims of technics –a point which will be addressed later– would use archeological 
evidence of past technology, such as the 2006 publicity over the Antikythera 
Mechanism,43 to support the myth of mechanical and technological progress. “They had 
machines”, argues Mumford of other civilizations, “but they did not develop ‘the 
machine.’ It remained for the people of Western Europe to carry the physical sciences 
and the exact arts to a point of no other culture had reached, and to adapt the whole 
mode of life to the pace of the capacitates of the machine.”44  
Mumford’s genealogy of ‘the machine’ reveals that the mechanization of the 
West was not simply imposed upon life practices through sweeping societal events such 
as the industrial and second industrial revolution, but is a far more complex 
phenomenon “developing steadily for the last seven centuries [. . .]. Men had become 
mechanical”, Mumford points out, “before they perfected complicated machines to 
express their new bent and interest”.45 Certainly, any attempt to view the mechanization 
of the West as an event imposed from the outside is complicit in the problem. Mumford 
then, is concerned with “a reorientation of wishes, habits, ideas, goals” –the role of ‘the 
machine’ in the life practices of Western Civilization.46 From the clock to Protestant 
ethics and, eventually, to capitalism, in the human habits and forms of life which 
                                                
42 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 4. 
43 The Antikythera Mechanism is a second century B.C.E. tool comprised of cogs and wheels used 
as a solar, lunar, planetary and astrological calendar which could also calculate eclipses. The 
language found in a December 1, 2006, Associated Press article is very telling. “It was a pocket 
calculator of the time. . . . We have the latest technology available to understand this mechanism, 
yet the technological quality in this mechanism puts us to shame . . .The design of the mechanism 
is very wonderful, making us realize how highly technological the ancient Greek civilization was.” 
Without any attention to the manner in which the Antikythera Mechanism (or better Antikythera 
Tool) functioned within the lifeworld of the Greek civilization, broad sweeping comparisons and 
similarities are made between the way technology functions in our civilization and theirs. While this 
is just one example it certainly represents a standard mode (e.g. Associated Press) in which 
technological history, and knowledge is disseminated. 
44 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 4. 
45 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 3. (emphasis mine) 
46 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 3. 
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created new abstractions and calculations in a quest for greater power, lay the 
foundations for ‘the machine’.47 Speaking of the rise of capitalism, Mumford says, 
Capitalism turned people from tangible to intangible: its 
symbol, as Sombart observes, is the account book: ‘its life-
value lies in its profit and loss account.’ . . . it tended to replace 
the direct ‘economy of needs’ and to substitute money-values 
for life-values. . . . One abstraction re-enforced the other. . . . 
In time, we were more at home with abstractions than they 
were with the goods they represented. . . . Men became 
powerful to the extent that they neglected the real world of 
wheat and wool, food and clothes, and centered their attention 
on the purely quantitative representation of it in tokens and 
symbols: to think in terms of mere weight and number, to 
make quantity not alone an indication of value to the 
mechanical world picture.48  
 
This eotechnic phase, as Mumford calls it, is an era of complex social, political and 
economic preparation of life practices which expansively runs from roughly the 10th to 
the mid 18th century (and a delayed climax in 1850’s America).49 The most long lasting 
legacy of the eotechnic phase was the emergence of a “rift between the mechanization 
and humanization, between power bent on its own aggrandizement and power directed 
toward wider human fulfillment”.50 
Mumford marks 1750 as a significant threshold for industry –led by the use of 
coal, iron and steam– “to consolidate and systematize the great advances that had been 
made. . . . [in which] a new phase, with a different source of power, different materials, 
different social objectives [took hold]. This second revolution multiplied, vulgarized 
and spread the methods and goods produced by the first . . . its success could be gauged 
                                                
47 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 9-106. 
48 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 23-25. 
49 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 111. 
50 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 150. 
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only in terms of the multiplication table.”51 This paleotechnic phase, the second technic 
wave, says Mumford, roughly lasts till the dawn of the turbulent twentieth century. It is 
a period in Western history characterized by Mumford as a disastrous interlude in 
which the dark abysses of a “quantitative conception of life”, regulated through 
conflict, stimulated by power and guided by a blind doctrine of progress, were 
explored.52 Human gains were small during this phase, says Mumford, life was starved 
and struggled for existence, workers were degraded and nature was destroyed. 
 The third and final wave in Mumford’s archeology is the nascent neotechnic 
phase, which marks the thirty years of the 20th century. Mumford’s articulation of the 
neotechnic phase must be approached with both caution and interest by the 21st century 
reader. Written before the Second World War, Mumford displays a certain amount of 
hope and naïveté, which he abandons and later radically redacts in The Myth of the 
Machine series (1967, 1970), written during the Cold War. Mumford explains, 
behind this wave, both in technics and in civilization, are 
forces which were suppressed or perverted by the earlier 
development of the machine, forces which . . . tend toward a 
new synthesis in thought and a fresh synergy in action. . . . 
[T]he machine ceases to be a substitute for God or an orderly 
society; and instead of its success being measured by the 
mechanization of life, its worth becomes more and more 
measurable in terms of its own approach to the organic and the 
living.53  
 
Whereas the rise of the machine was the rise against the organic and living, Mumford 
sees the organic and living profoundly changing and ‘assimilating’ the machine through 
our absorption of its largely negative historical lessons (e.g. “objectivity, impersonality, 
                                                
51 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 151. 
52 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 210. 
53 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 5. 
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neutrality”).54 “With the neotechnic phase”, says Mumford, “… the scientific method, 
whose chief advances had been in mathematics, took possession of other domains of 
experience: the living organism and human society also became the objects of 
systematic investigation [. . .].  [I]nstead of mechanism forming a pattern for life, living 
organisms began to form a pattern for mechanism.”55 The final chapters of Technics 
and Civilization are put to the test in the ensuing decades and are taken up with great 
ferocity in his final magnum opus, The Myth of the Machine series. Gale H. Carrithers, 
Jr. describes Mumford’s transition best: 
What occasion, what evil day, what question prompted The 
Myth of the Machine? . . . The mass killings driven by Axis 
paranoia and megalomania, the mass killings aerially 
engineered by the Allies in a “logic” of war abhorrent to 
Mumford, the loss of the one of the only two children in the 
Mumford’s nuclear family to infantry operations in what 
Mumford throughout deemed a just and necessary war of 
defense against totalitarianism, thirty-five years of life . . . 
Mumford had come to recognize that technological myth 
tends to reinforce itself.56 
 
In the two volume The Myth of the Machine Mumford identifies a radical difference 
between the Biotechnic and the Megatechinic and how both fall under the shadow of 
the Megamachine. 
 
BIOTECHNIC VS. MEGATECHNICS AND THE MEGAMACHINE 
Mumford’s earliest articulations of the organic and creative human activity 
called biotechnics –and which are to be understood here as a largely positive value in 
his characterization– are in the form of a broad sketch that lacks detail. In Technics and 
                                                
54 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 363-433. 
55 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 216. 
56 Gale H. Carrithers Jr., Mumford, Tate, Eiseley: Watchers in the Night (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1991), 78. (emphasis mine) 
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Civilization Mumford briefly notes that the biotechnic age, what he hopefully believed 
was the impending move from the paleotechnic to neotechnic period in human history, 
was just on the horizon. In Cultures in Cities (1938), the follow up to Technics and 
Civilization, Mumford argued that this early twentieth century biotechnic shift was “in 
the same embryonic state that capitalism and mechanism were in the seventeenth 
century”.57 Before World War Two, Mumford hopefully claimed that biotechnics 
represented a shift in civilzation away from a historically infantile and then adolescent 
political economy of the machine –which resulted in dehumanizing beliefs and 
practices– towards an embrace of more humane and organic modes of living. “As John 
Ruskin put it”, says Mumford, “There is no Wealth but Life; and what we call wealth is 
in fact wealth only when it is a sign of potential or actual vitality. . . . [C]reative activity 
is finally the only important business of mankind, the chief justification and the most 
durable fruit of its sojourn on the planet. . . . [U]nless we socialize creation, unless we 
make production subservient to education, a mechanized system of production, 
however efficient, will only harden into a servile byzantine formality, enriched by 
bread and circuses.”58 Although Ruskin’s characterization is broad it certainly, and 
clearly, makes known Mumford’s positive evaluation of biotechnics and the ethical 
centrality of human creative activity. After World War Two, however, Mumford’s 
hopeful, if not near ‘idyllic’ conception of biotechnic went through radical revision. 
                                                
57 Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 32; With 
great prescience, Mumford says that it is capitalism and war which are the greatest obstacles to 
moving forward with biotechnics. cf: Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 353.  
 After World War Two, President Dwight D. Eisenhower again brought this ominous duo –
this time described as a Military Industrial Complex– to the attention of the American public 
during his January 17, 1961 farewell address. President Eisenhower warned of “an immense 
military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total 
influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every 
office of the Federal government.” (the complete speech can be found in Appendix 1) 
The American Presidency Project, “Dwight D. Eisenhower Farewell Radio and Television address 
to the American People January 17, 1961,” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12086&st=&st1=. (emphasis mine) 
58 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 378, 410. 
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Mumford refines his characterization of human technics in his two-volume 
work The Myth of the Machine (1967, 1970). In the first volume, Tehnics and Human 
Development (1967), he broadens his definition of biotechnics –originally described as 
a new stage in the history of human technics– to include “man’s total equipment for 
life”: of which “tool-technics” are but a “fragment”.59 This move towards a more 
originary understanding of the Greek techne is true to Mumford’s focus on human 
activity and practices. “To consider man, then, as primarily a tool-using animal,” says 
Mumford in the introduction, “is to overlook the main chapters of human history. . . . 
[T]he primary locus of all his activities lies first in his own organism and in the social 
organization through which it finds fuller expression. . . . [T]hus, technics, at the 
beginning, [were] broadly life-centered, not work-centered or power-centered.”60 
The problem is the ‘mechanization of humanity’ through totalitarian technics, or 
megatechnics, by the complex political economy of the megamachine.61 
As with the re-characterization of biotechnics, however, one should not too 
quickly think that megatechnic, nor the ominous sounding megamachine, are abstract 
entities that Mumford paints with broad strokes. Mumford roots these conceptions in 
history providing sufficient historical detail to bring these abstractions down to earth. 
The origins of the megamachine are found, not in the Industrial Revolution, says 
Mumford, but in the dawn of civilization itself and the first inclination towards the 
ordering of “an archetypal machine of human parts” as a mirror of the Cosmic order –
                                                
59 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1967), 7. 
60 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 9. (emphasis mine) Here Mumford’s insight significantly, although not 
directly, aligns his work with Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Tim Ingold. All of 
whom will be brought into the conversation in Chapter 3, and whose insight stands in contrast 
with Jean Baudrillard and his picture of hyperreality. 
61 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 237. 
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the Divine Kings of the ancient world.62 Although the name complicates understanding, 
Mumford’s ‘megamachine’ becomes a metaphor for the abstract ordering of a human 
lifeworld –literally the mechanization of humanity. The genius of Mumford’s move is 
to situate the mechanization of humanity at the dawn of civilization itself. The ethical 
dilemma of organizing, ordering and tool use is a primordial condition of human 
existence. The megamachines of the ancient Divine Kings, says Mumford, represent the 
archetype for all future complex ‘machines’; rather than mechanical components, the 
megamachine is made of human components –“political and economic, military, 
bureaucratic and royal . . . aided by the discipline of astronomical science and 
supported by the sanctions of religion [. . .]. This was an invisible structure composed 
of living, but rigid, human parts”.63 Megatechnics –the technical equipment of a 
megamachine– is “the currently accepted picture of the relation of man to technics . . . 
marked by his invention of tools and weapons for the purpose of achieving mastery 
over the forces of nature . . . in which he will have not only conquered nature, but 
detached himself as far as possible from the organic habitat.”64 This dominant ‘picture’ 
must be challenged by a properly rearticulated description. In The Culture of Cities, 
Mumford gives an early description of the historical trajectory of mechanized human 
technics evidenced, he says, in “ravaged landscapes, disorderly urban districts, pockets 
of disease, patches of blight, mile upon mile of standardized slums, worming into the 
outlying arms of big cities, and fusing with their ineffectual suburbs. In short: a general 
miscarriage and defeat of civilized effort.”65 At the heart of this blight, Mumford later 
points out, are the practices of mapmaking and abstract planning –technics of power– 
                                                
62 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 11, 12, 163ff; also see Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its 
Transformations, and Its Prospects, 55-93. 
63 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development, 188-189. 
64 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 3. 
65 Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities, 8. 
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which lack care for “social meaning” and the complicated “realities of life”. 66 This 
problematic trajectory and its practices, then, are at the heart of the ethical concerns of 
this investigation. 
One fundamental analysis we can derive, then, from Lewis Mumford is that not 
only is the very nature and character of ‘city’ changing, but the demands of change on 
the human lifeworld are dramatically pronounced and also form the deteriorations and 
losses in that overall lifeworld. As Mumford so lucidly points out, certainly the 
changing nature and character of ‘city’ has a radically negative effect on what it means 
to be human being. In fact, Mumford notes in volume two, The Pentagon of Power 
(1970), that “there is little doubt that at least in most industrially developed countries 
the Megatechnic Complex is now at the height of its power and authority, or is fast 
approaching it.”67 Mumfordian biotechnic approaches to human ordering and 
organizing, therefore, that will remain relevant throughout this study as 
characterizations of modes of resistance are, in his words, “web of life”, “complex 
interplay”, “harmonious adjustment”, and “ecological balance”.68Although speculative 
and incomplete, in Mumford’s biotechnic we leave any claim of luddism behind. As we 
will later see in the work of J. R. R. Tolkien in Chapter 4, Mumford sees two possible 
trajectories for human technological use: one is in service of power, order and 
domination; but the other possibility is in service of the imaginative, organic and 
expansive possibilities for forms of life. However, we are still left with the problem and 
must endeavor to go further. 
It should be clear by this point that Lewis Mumford seeks to characterize major 
human/social/civilization changes which have been, and are currently, taking place. 
                                                
66 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 375. Mumford’s inclusion of mapmaking and abstract planning is 
mentioned in anticipation of the work of Tim Ingold in Chapter 3. 
67 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, 346. 
68 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 256. 
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This change is not value neutral, but can be –and often is– explicitly harmful to human 
beings (and nature as a whole) in a variety of ways and whose ‘anti-life’ mapping and 
planning should be resisted at every turn. We must now ask the first of many questions: 
how does this increased emphasis on ordering manifest itself in our 21st-century 
Western context and what effect does it have on human organizing and human life 
practices? In other words, what harm is it doing? What losses, devaluing and suffering 
occur in its wake? More explicitly, the door is now opened to investigate what I will 
continue to refer to as the ‘colonization’ of human lifeworlds and human imagining. 
More questions emerge: what colonizing and reordering pressures are thrust upon the 
organizing (organic) life practices of everyday human life in the 21st-century West? 
Why should we resist, and what can be done to resist? These themes will be explored 
through a variety of key characters: Daniel Boorstin, Umberto Eco, Jean Baudrillard, 
Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tim Ingold, J. R. R. Tolkien, Gilles Deleuze, 
and Terrence Malick –all of whom take up these similar themes in their work and point 
to a variety of resistances in some cases. Before moving on to possible modes of 
resistance, however, we must first pursue the unique problems posed by Mumford’s 
phenomenon of mechanized human ordering in our post-industrial age of electronic 
media. This second line of questioning –the ersatz, the fake, and the hyperreal– will 
further complicate the issues raised thus far by Mumford. To this end I will examine 
Daniel Boorstin’s ‘unreal’ pseudo-event and Umberto Eco’s journalistic investigation 
of ‘hyperreality’ in America. However, to begin, a more focused meditation on a 
historically contingent phenomenon may help to elucidate this emerging question: the 
Petit Hameau of Marie Antoinette. 
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PETIT HAMEAU: FOLLY AND THE ERSATZ VILLAGE 
Nestled among the grand edifices of Versailles is a bucolic garden stage set 
known as Petit Hameau. Constructed by architect Richard Mique and painter Hubert 
Robert for Marie Antoinette, Petit Hameau was a working hamlet of twelve cottages 
complete with a mill, farmhouse, bakery, dairy, henhouse, aviary and dovecote. During 
the last years of her reign, milkmaids drew milk from docile handpicked cows (washed 
clean so as not to offend the 18th-century aristocratic sensibilities of the dauphine and 
her entourage) into monogrammed pails, and made butter in porcelain churns. In the 
larger historical context of 18th-century ornamental farms (ferme ornée), however, Petit 
Hameau was not a unique occurrence. “Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth 
century,” says Willam Howard Adams, “we are repeatedly faced with subtle illusions 
and manipulation of reality in the French garden. Real trees became stage props, and 
artificial lakes became rivers.”69 Furthermore, Marie-Antoinette’s hameau is not even 
an original design but is a copy of one built by the Prince de Condé, and as a ferme 
ornée it is much less extravagant than those built by the Duc d’Orléans, the Comtesse 
de Provence and the Duc de Chartres, which boasted windmills, dairies made of marble 
and Greco-Roman temples dedicated to a variety of Romantic ideals.70  
This was not a folly, in a specific architectural sense of the term, since the 
Hameau was not frivolous at the expense of the practical; albeit working at a limited 
output, with a scarce population, it was a ‘working’ hamlet where people lived, 
produced and consumed.71 However, in terms of being an actual ‘country hamlet’ we 
                                                
69 William Howard Adams, The French Garden: 1500-1800 (London: Scholar Press, 1979), 121. 
70 Antonia Fraser, Marie Antoinette: the Journey (London: Phoenix, 2002), 246. 
71 The official website of the Chateau de Versailles makes the point to include in the description of 
La Hameau de la Reine, “Contrairement aux idées reçues, ce Hameau n'était pas une création 
d'opérette. C'était une véritable exploitation agricole, dirigée par un fermier, dont les produits 
alimentaient les cuisines du Château.”; Chateau de Versailles, “La Hameau de la Reine,” 
http://www.chateauversailles.fr/fr/123_Le_Hameau_de_la_Reine.php. (emphasis mine) 
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must press the question, what about the Petit Hameau was ersatz, and does it matter; 
can it be harmful? According to the OED, to call the Petit Hameau ersatz is to say that 
it is both an imitation of a genuine artifact –an object which is also judged to be an 
inferior imitation. The Hameau may have been a working farm but it most certainly 
was not genuinely rustic (it was aged to appear rustic) nor was it genuinely a Norman 
hameau (it was not built to suit the Norman lifeworld) on which it was modeled. The 
cottages were constructed with “lattice windows and stucco made to imitate worn, 
cracked brickwork and half-timbering.”72 Inside, rooms were far from rustic;73 designed 
with all the comforts and luxury of the Petit Trianon and Versailles, Petit Hameau 
afforded scaled luxury whilst providing an Elysium from the privileged confines of the 
French royal palace and indeed the ‘modest’ Petit Trianon itself.  
While there is no room to investigate the complex biography of Marie-
Antoinette nor the socio-political situation of late 18th-century France, it is important to 
note that, ironically, construction of Petit Hameau was indebted to the later writings of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and Claude-Henri Watelet. 
Biographer Joan Haslip suggests that although Marie-Antoinette probably never read 
Rousseau, his exaltation of “the charms of rural life” was one influential voice (in a 
complex nexus of influences) which made English gardens and Arcadian villages quite 
                                                
72 Antonia Fraser, Marie Antoinette: the Journey (London: Phoenix, 2002), 247; In many ways, this 
kind of illusory construction anticipates temporary movie studio sets or even the themed villages of 
Disney and Epcot which are built to recreate, with great detail, a particular time and place. 
73 William Howard Adams provides some information about the interior of other similar faux 
villages in The French Garden: 1500-1800 (London: Scholar Press, 1979). “The tiny jewel rooms of 
the rustic thatched cottage at Rambouillet, the Chaumière de Coquillage, were completely covered with 
the most intricate and refined shell work, inlaid in delicate mosaic. Among Le Rouge’s plates there 
is a plan for a garden farm building, complete with an inviting hay loft suitable for amorous 
rompings. When the door was opened, however, as if one had stumbled upon a vision in a magic 
forest created by the Brothers Grimm, the unsuspecting visitor was confronted with the interior of 
a richly appointed tent such as that of a Roman general on an Eastern campaign, embellished with 
banners, armour, and other antique military appointments” (122). 
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the fashion among the aristocracy of the time.74 To mention Rousseau here is, of course, 
quite significant in light of what has already been said by Mumford. Rousseau’s later 
work developed a deep suspicion of sophisticated and civilized (urban) society; he 
believed that the gradual abandoning of the simple solitary life corrupted the Natural 
man and argued for a return to more ‘natural’ (and morally ‘better’) forms of life. “I ask 
which –civilized or natural life– is the more liable to become unbearable to those who 
experience it?”, wrote Rousseau.75 In many ways this echoes Mumford’s call to return 
harmonious models of human living which more resemble “living organisms and 
organic complexes (ecosystems)” and better reflect the complex interplay of 
lifeworlds.76 If indeed the Petit Hameau is indebted to Rousseau –and here it seems to 
be reasonable to assume so– then this turn towards a ‘bucolic’ form of life may 
function as a possible ‘de-colonizing’ tactic. 
It seems Marie Antoinette may have sincerely believed she embraced these 
ideals. “Life there,” says Antoinia Fraser, “clearly represented some attempt at finding 
a lost paradise.” Biographers Haslip and Fraser both note one classic example pointing 
to the dauphine’s sincere embrace of the pastoral life. When Marie turned thirty in 
1785 she no longer wore the elaborate wigs, jewelry and dress of the aristocracy, 
wearing only simple white muslin dresses and a straw hat. This now generates yet 
another evaluative question –one that may be unique to an ‘ersatz’ setting: while there 
may be some historical evidence to suggest that Petit Hameau functioned as a ‘real’ 
natural escape for Marie Antoinette, as extolled by Rousseau, did it also serve to further 
entrench her into an artificiality removed from the realities of French suffering? 
                                                
74 Joan Haslip, Marie Antoinette (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 137. 
75 Jean-Jaques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality (London: Penguin, 1984), 97. 
76 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, 395. 
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Haslip notes one critique by the Marquis de Bombelles who wrote, “A lot of 
money has been spent on giving the Queen’s ‘hameau’ the aspect of poverty. By 
spending a little more, Her Majesty would have been able to improve the conditions of 
those who are really poor within a radius of twenty miles or so and turn their hovels 
into decent homes … to imitate in a place given over to amusements the unfortunate 
existence of your fellow beings seems a somewhat heartless thing to do.”77 Quite 
contrary to the writings of late Rousseau, Petit Hameau did not simply function as an 
escape from the ‘corrupt’ luxury of Versailles and the Petit Trianon, into a more 
virtuous natural setting, it also served –however naïvely and unintentionally– as an 
escape from the realities of the actual (‘real’) impoverished French countryside. 
Herein lies the rub: were the ferme ornée, specifically the Petit Hameau, a 
harmless or harmful expression of late 18th-century French aristocratic life? On a more 
fundamental level the rather banal question of whether or not Petit Hameau was a ‘real’ 
or spurious hameau is a central concern. Fundamentally, questions of ‘real’ or spurious 
immediately bring to mind the nature of reality and problematically its ‘representation’, 
truth and illusion –questions which go back, in the Western philosophical tradition, to 
Anaximander and Heraclitus. The recipe is now thoroughly complicated. With 
Mumford the question of the colonization of human lifeworlds was raised; now, with 
the Petit Hameau, we introduce the question and possibility of the ‘real’ or ‘spurious’ 
character of colonization.   How do things become ersatz –and why can that be harmful 
to human forms of life? Is the pursuit of aspect –a trompe-l’oeil ethic as suggested by 
the Marquis de Bombelles– an illusory endeavor and/or morally reprehensible? And 
more broadly speaking in anticipation of Tolkien, what is the complex relationship 
between the kind of fantasy designed to flee from everyday reality, often with 
                                                
77 Joan Haslip, Marie Antoinette (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 137-138. 
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detrimental effects such as Marie Antoinette’s Hameau, versus escaping a spurious 
‘reality’ into a true or real fantasy, and the life practices that occur in both? Obviously, 
many larger questions are left unanswered. Some answers begin to unfold, however, 
through an engagement with a monograph situated at a unique moment in Western 
civilization –Daniel Boorstin’s The Image. 
 
DANIEL BOORSTIN’S MASS MEDIA CONSUMER-VILLAGE(S) 
“It is only a short step from exaggerating what we can find in the world to exaggerating our power to 
remake the world. Expecting more novelty than there is, more greatness than there is, and more 
strangeness than there is, we imagine ourselves masters of a plastic universe. But a world we can shape 
to our will –or to our extravagant expectations– is a shapeless world.”78 
 
With an increase in mass reproductive technology, mass produced commodities, 
and mass communication arts, the trajectory and ethical concerns of technics described 
in the work of Lewis Mumford is greatly complicated in unexpected ways. This unique 
phenomenon in human history is the subject of American historian Daniel J. Boorstin’s 
groundbreaking work The Image: or, What Happened to the American Dream (1961).79 
Begun as an essay examining a critical juncture in American history and the history of 
mass communication –the first televised U.S. presidential debate between John F. 
Kennedy and Richard Milhous Nixon in 1960, and subsequently the effects of the 
televised event on the American culture– a central aim of The Image is to investigate 
the broader effects of what he terms the ‘Graphic Revolution’ of the 19th century on 
20th century American society. 80 “By a giant leap”, argues Boorstin, “Americans 
                                                
78 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 
118. 
79 The book is also known by its alternate subtitle, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. 
80 See Godfrey Hodgson’s Obituary for Daniel Boorstin in the Guardian Monday March 1, 2004 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,3604,1159014,00.html. In the majority of 
Baudrillard scholarship, Boorstin is commonly overlooked as a primary influence on Baudrillard, 
but William Merrin notes that The Image is a critical source for Baudrillard’s Consumer Society. 
 36 
crossed the gulf from the daguerreotype [photograph] to color television in less than a 
century.”81 Consequently, Americans were thoroughly unprepared for the effects of this 
radical transformation of daily life. The rapid growth in technological advancement 
meant that the “ability to make, preserve, transmit, and disseminate precise images –
images of print, of men and landscapes and events, of the voices of men and mobs”– 
not only transformed the manner in which we craft and disseminate information, but 
subsequently, has also transformed the manner in which we live our everyday lives.82 
Technological themes found in Boorstin’s work relevant to this discussion, then, are the 
nature of copying and fabrication in an industrial age; and specifically the nature of 
copying as relevant to mass communication. But Boorstin goes far beyond these in his 
examination of the uses and influences of technology in a culture. Especially significant 
are the forms and effects of image reproduction, and the practices associated with it, on 
daily life; this includes, but is not limited to, the possibilities of the manipulation of 
people and societies –a point in common with the questions and concerns of the ersatz. 
In Boorstin’s The Image, then, both the concerns raised by Lewis Mumford about 
technology and its effects on human lifeworlds, and the problems and questions raised 
by the ersatz Petit Hameau now converge.83  
Rather than being concerned with built environments and their effects, however, 
Boorstin finds the information infrastructure and its effects on the architecture of the 
human imagination at least as (and maybe more) relevant to the transformation of 
                                                
81 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 13; Daguerreotype is an early photographic method developed by Louis 
Deguerre which works by exposing an image directly onto the polished surface of a silver coated 
plate. The patent was awarded in 1839 and was the preferred method of exposure before the 
advent of the collodion process around 1850 which was the precursor to the gelatin emulsion 
exposure. 
82 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 13; It should be noted that there is a broad and complex meaning 
behind Boorstin’s use of the term ‘image’ that will be discussed shortly. 
83 It should also be noted, in anticipation of what is to come in Chapter 2, Boorstin’s investigation 
is treated in a much more limited and specific manner, and with greater historical complexity 
compared to what we will find with Jean Baudrillard’s hyperreality. 
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everyday life. What is unique about Boorstin’s investigation –and germane to this 
study– is that he takes his critique off the map of traditional political economy, 
targeting a wholly new epochal menace. “It is not the menace of class war, or ideology, 
of poverty, of disease, of illiteracy, of demagoguery, or of tyranny,” he says, “ [. . .] it is 
the menace of unreality.”84 For Boorstin, this “thicket of unreality” (which will be taken 
up in yet another way in Chapter 2), created from the world of our own making, as he 
says, separates America [and by implication, all who are influenced in these ways by 
America] from the facts of everyday living.85 America, says Boorstin, falls victim to 
these illusions because of extravagant and excessive expectations born from, what he 
perceives to be, the belief that Americans are masters of their environment.86 It should 
be pointed out, however, that these expectations of extravagance and excessiveness (a 
characterization noted by Umberto Eco in his collection of essays, Travels in 
Hyperreality) also have a direct link to the nature of industrialization, mass production 
and mass consumption rather than to simply an intrinsic quality of a people; the scale of 
the problem seems to be sui generis to the practices of this specific historical epoch.87 
Whatever the origins of excess may be herein is the root of the issue Boorstin seeks to 
explore –Americans are deceived because they expect more than the world can 
offer.88 To further compound the problem, this illusion making, says Boorstin, has 
become the business of America: a country of ‘consumers’ rather than ‘citizens’. 
A central driver of this phenomenon of ‘unreality’ is a flood of pseudo-events, 
brought into being through a particular brand of communication and entertainment 
                                                
84 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 240. (emphasis mine)  
85 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 3. 
86 As recently as March 23, 2010, this language was alive and well in President Barack Obama’s 
claim during the signing into legislation of a monumental healthcare bill that Americans shape their 
own destiny … it is their character. 
87 In fact “America” could be regarded as a symbol –with the spread of globalization, 
industrialization, and mass media. 
88 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 4. 
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practices made possible by the technological leap of the before-mentioned ‘Graphic 
Revolution’. 89 In many ways Boorstin’s ‘pseudo-event’ is a synthetic phenomenon. 
“Verisimilitude”, says Boorstin, “took on a new meaning . . . vivid image came to 
overshadow pale reality.”90 Such pseudo-events are convenient, graspable and easily 
digestible; they seek to become the standard of knowledge and spawn other events in 
kind; they are also characterized by a production value that implies reproducibility, 
power and profit. 91 Our concerns with these phenomena are closely related to the 
ethical concerns raised about the tromp l’oiel ethics plaguing the Petit Hameau. They 
contribute to the tyranny of a complex collection of fabricated and commodifiable 
social productions –made possible during an age of mass image production 
(photography, television, and cinema)– which must be addressed to understand the 
pervasive nature of the pseudo-event.  
 
                                                
89 This critique of ‘unreality’ should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the radio and 
television industry. The critique was originally made by esteemed American journalist Edward R. 
Murrow’s October 15, 1958 ‘wires and lights’ speech before the Radio-Television News Directors 
Association in Chicago: “Our history will be what we make it. And if there are any historians about 
fifty or a hundred years from now, and there should be preserved the kinescopes for one week of 
all three networks, they will there find recorded in black and white, or color, evidence of 
decadence, escapism and insulation from the realities of the world in which we live. I invite 
your attention to the television schedules of all networks between the hours of 8 and 11 p.m., 
Eastern Time. Here you will find only fleeting and spasmodic reference to the fact that this nation 
is in mortal danger. There are, it is true, occasional informative programs presented in that 
intellectual ghetto on Sunday afternoons. But during the daily peak viewing periods, television in 
the main insulates us from the realities of the world in which we live. If this state of affairs 
continues, we may alter an advertising slogan to read: LOOK NOW, PAY LATER.”; 
Radio-Television News Directors Association, “Industry Leaders: Edward R. Murrow Speech,” 
http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media_items/edward-r.-murrow-speech998.php. (emphasis mine) 
90 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 13. 
91 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 39-40. 
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THE NEWS LEAK AND THE QUIZ SHOW 
Boorstin offers a few –dated yet still relevant– concrete examples, which give 
insight into the workings and character of the pseudo-event. He calls the ‘news leak’ an 
example of the pseudo-event par excellence.92 This form of  “cloaked news” is an 
elaborate, intentionally orchestrated, and organized way of disseminating what is 
supposed to be information, interjecting formative or leading questions or even offering 
loosly founded suggestions into the public sphere. These ‘leaks’, says Boorstin, are 
organized around dinners between state officials and select members of the media who 
gather together –almost ritualistically under a well defined set of rules– to ‘pass’ 
information. What are simple truths, proclamations of policy, hopes or un-truths, is 
always unclear. The reporter, who lives in a “penumbra between fact and fantasy”, is 
then tasked with “a way of weaving these threads of unreality into a fabric that the 
reader will not recognize as entirely unreal”.93 Boorstin cites the March 26, 1955, New 
York Times headline which read: “U.S. Expects Chinese Reds to Attack Isles in April; 
Weighs all out Defense.” A few days later, however, a counter headline was written: 
“Eisenhower Sees No War Now Over Chinese Isles.” Boorstin reveals the source of the 
contradiction. In the first story, the Chief of U.S. Naval operations offered an off-the-
record ‘opinion’ to Washington reporters at a dinner like the one described earlier. Of 
course, the fact that it was simply opinion was either not known or could not be 
revealed by the reporter. The second story did not come from President Eisenhower 
himself but from his Press Secretary who had a greatly differing ‘opinion’ from the 
Chief of Naval Operations over the matter. However complicated, and archaic, this 
process is certainly only further complicated in the current media environment. 
Boorstin asks a question whose relevance persists: was there any real news here at all?  
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While the transformation of media techniques over the last fifty years and the 
effects of the global rise of 24-hour news media cannot be pursued here, Boorstin’s 
question, magnified under the scope of history, is far deeper and more troubling than 
might have been initially considered in 1961.94 As Boorstin himself points out, the rise 
of the pseudo-event has confused the ‘roles’ of actor and audience. Between the rise of 
so-called reality television and reality celebrities, camera phone news reporting, 
personal ‘soundtrack’ devices like the iPod, publicity stunts such as the recent ‘Balloon 
Boy’95 hoax in the States, advertising, chat shows, and documentaries, (the list could go 
on quite long), mass media has a daily effect on how we see and participate in everyday 
living. The trajectory of this everyday phenomenon has precedent.  
Boorstin cites the relationship between the popularity of the ‘quiz-show’ format 
in 1950’s America and the Presidential debates of 1960.96 Not ‘debates’ in the sense of 
the great Lincoln-Douglas debates of the 19th century –these made-for-television events 
were “clinical examples”, says Boorstin, of how the pseudo-event is “made, why it 
                                                
94 A relevant case in point is the controversial reporting by Judith Miller of the New York Times on 
suspected WMD in Iraq. Miller was responsible for ten erroneous New York Times articles leading 
up to the Iraq invasion of 2003. Most notorious were her December 20, 2001, article “An Iraqi 
Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites”, based on the testimony of the now 
discredited ‘Curveball’ informant; the September 7, 2002 article “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies 
Quest for A-Bomb Parts”, which quotes ‘unnamed’ American officials and intelligence experts; 
and her April 2, 2003, article “Illicit Arms Kept till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to 
Assert”, which was written without actually talking to the ‘source’.  
95 On October 15, 2009, in Fort Collins, Colorado, USA, the parents of 6-year-old Falcon Heene 
reported that he had floated away in a 20 foot in diameter homemade helium balloon. Although 
unverified, every major news outlet in America quickly covered the incident. The balloon rose to 
altitudes of 7000 feet and traveled fifty miles before landing. However, after landing, the balloon 
was found to be empty; Falcon was soon found in the attic of the Heene house. Once featured on 
the reality television show Wife Swap –allegations soon arose that the event was a publicity stunt 
after Falcon revealed that it was done “to get a show” on CNN. 
96 Especially significant here is the Twenty One quiz show scandal of 1958 involving the intellectual 
media darling and professor of English at Columbia University, Charles Van Doren. After a 
record-winning streak, being featured on the cover of Time magazine, and appearing on major news 
networks it was revealed that the Twenty One quiz show was fixed; Van Doren was given the 
answers before hand by producers Jack Barry and Dan Enright. The scandal and its significance to 
the American public was the subject of the 1994 film Quiz Show directed by Robert Redford. 
Redford explores effectively the relationship between entertainment, corporate interests, and mass 
communication in 1950’s America.  
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appeals, and of its consequences for democracy in America.”97 Indeed, the only real 
thing a two-and-a-half minute answer given for the camera reveals about the 
qualifications of being President of the United States is an emphasis on pseudo-
qualifications, Boorstin laments.98 Famously, the first critical debate was decided by 
‘image’. When polled, the viewing public believed Kennedy won the day not because 
he was the better debater, (indeed Nixon stuck close to the points and refuted many of 
Kennedy’s claims), but because Kennedy looked spry, and energetic addressing the 
viewing audience whilst Nixon looked pale, tired and unshaven.99 Ultimately, because 
of the nature of the television ‘quiz-show’ format, “the television-watching voter was 
left to judge, not on issues explored by thoughtful men, but on the relative [perceived] 
capacity of the two candidates to perform under television stress.”100 This problem is 
now further complicated as we have no doubt entered a phase in American history 
where a new form of ‘Presidential branding’ may now become the norm. Barack 
Obama’s campaign of ‘hope’ was branded with his own logo (fig. 1) and greatly 
popularized with an iconic ‘silk screen’ image (fig. 2) –no doubt reminiscent of the folk 
branding of Che Guevara (fig. 3).101 Boorstin anticipates this broader ‘shift’ in the 
effects of the pseudo-event on daily life in his characterization of image-thinking. 
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101 See Naomi Klein, “Naomi Klein on how corporate branding has taken over America,” The 
Guardian, January 16, 2010, Guardian.co.uk, Culture, Books, 
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Because of the tactical similarity between the Shepard Fairey ‘Obama-Hope’ print and the Jim 
Fitzpatrick ‘Heroic Che’ print, how they function in a consumer society should be taken up with 
greater detail. While there is no room here to follow that trajectory the 2008 documentary 
Chevolution, directed by Lois Lopez and Trisha Ziff, is an excellent place to start. 
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 fig. 1 fig. 2 fig. 3 
 
THE VALUE OF THE IMAGE 
Up to this point, the pseudo-event has been treated as a phenomenon of, and 
problem with, facts. Boorstin, though, continues to develop the pseudo-event into the 
world of value we are confronted with “pseudo-ideals”, or what he more effectively 
calls the Image.102 However problematic and idiosyncratic the term may be, the 
importance of noting the phenomenon of the pseudo-ideal is to unpack the power of the 
commodifiable ‘image’ and its ability to shape and transform the everyday world –for 
good and ill. Ultimately, says Boorstin, “the Graphics Revolution has produced new 
categories of experiences” which go beyond empirical reliance on “common-sense tests 
of true and false”.103  Boorstin explains that the pseudo-ideal is possible when 
normative guides or markers such as ‘tradition’, ‘reason’, and ultimately ‘God’ no 
longer serve as the guiding star of a society because a society can easily shape itself 
with “synthetic, believable, passive, vivid, simplified, and ambiguous” images.104 To 
echo Henry Adams, the most extreme and theologically significant result is that even 
the power of God is replaced by a commodifiable ‘image’ in American society, says 
Boorstin; planned to be reported and believed in, experience of God is offered up as 
pseudo-event, the biggest celebrity of all, who is viewed like a television show –at 
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leisure.105 And if the proper image can ‘sell’ God, a president, a car, a suit, and perhaps 
even a lifestyle, Boorstin notes, “why can it not make America herself –or the 
American Way of Life– a saleable commodity all over the earth?”106 One major sign of 
the tyrannical image “is, of course, the rise of advertising” and its influence over 
American society since the second-industrial revolution.107  
It should be pointed out, however, that Boorstin is not trying to equate 
advertising to ‘propaganda’. On the contrary, Boorstsin wants to distinguish the 
‘pseudo-event’ from propaganda, which he connects (rather naively I might add) 
solely to totalitarianism and totalitarian societies.108 Propaganda, he says, is mis-
information dependent on emotional appeal used to manipulate and control. 
Propaganda is outright falsehood while the pseudo-event is the ambiguity of truth. 
There is “honesty” in the pseudo-event based on the desire for facts and the need to be 
educated; while propaganda replaces facts with opinion and inflammatory conjecture. 
In short, while propaganda is a matter of over-simplification, the pseudo-event, says 
Boorstin, is a matter of over-complication. This point becomes muddled, though, when 
we consider the practices of corporate and personal branding. While there is no room to 
adequately examine topic propaganda, it should at least be noted that propaganda, 
public relations and advertising techniques share a common heritage detailed more 
closely in Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion (1922) and Edward Bernays’ Crystallizing 
Public Opinion (1923). As Iain Munro points out in Information Warfare in Business, 
many contemporary advertising and public relations principles and techniques are 
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specifically based on the work of Edward Bernays in the 1920’s and 1930’s.109 
Specifically relevant to this conversation is that Bernays –whose most notorious reader 
was Josef Goebbels– claimed that if human communication was reduced to a 
mechanical process of simple stimulus and response through the use of stereotypes, 
images, clichés and ‘brands’ in mass media, then human opinion could be modified on 
a grand scale. Indeed, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky famously take this more 
cynical view in their 1988 text Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the 
Mass Media. Chapter one of that text, entitled A Propaganda Model, begins with this 
declaration: “The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and 
symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, 
and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will 
integrate them into the institutional structures of a larger society. In a world of 
concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role requires 
systematic propaganda.”110 This perspective to the situation, with its broad sweeping 
proclamation of systematized propaganda, goes far beyond the scope of Boorstin’s 
‘image’ and would require a belief in quite a sinister conspiracy of activists. The 
distinguishing aspect for Boorstin, then, is that, rather than a sinister ‘plot’, he finds 
examples of the pseudo-event in banal cultural practices such as tourism, the cult of 
celebrity, and publishing. Even more problematic than an organized conspiracy of 
control is how the pseudo-event finds its way into the very fabric of American values. 
Whether we are speaking of a ‘public-image’ or a corporate brand, Boorstin’s 
characterization of the image is the same: the image is “a value-caricature, shaped in 
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three dimensions, of synthetic materials.”111 There is a distinction in Western industrial 
societies –not always clear– between what is presented in the public sphere and what is 
really happening on the ground. And this is the first point Boorstin makes; the image 
(like the pseudo-event) is synthetic. The image is also very believable. Hyperbole is 
made to seem a convincing truth through the strategic use of superlatives balanced with 
understatement.  So, in this Steinway piano ad from 1920 (fig. 5, certainly a product of 
Bernays’ influence), we see the synthetic image of the piano being associated with the 
image of timeless piano playing: The Instrument of the Immortals. Whereas only 20 
years earlier –while the association with past greatness is still made in the copy– the 
focus is on the piano itself (fig. 4). This shift from “brand-name” to “name-brand” puts 
the emphasis on the consumable brand rather than the product. “This is quite a natural 
way to distinguish commodities in the age of the celebrity and the best seller”, argues 
Boorstin.112 
   
 fig. 4 Steinway Ad. circa 1900 fig. 5 Steinway Ad. circa 1920 
Because the image is supposed to be “congruent with reality”, it can also be called 
‘passive’; the producer of the image –the company, person or institution– merely needs 
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to fit the projected image rather than strive towards it. “Once the image is there,” says 
Boorstin, “it commonly becomes the more important reality, of which the corporations 
conduct [or persons, nations, etc.] seems mere evidence; not vice versa.”113 There of 
course is a range of the ‘passive’ that should be considered. While some passive images 
are easily lived into and sustained, other ‘passive’ images can only work through the 
use of force and the centralization of power. Such is the example in Nazi Germany or 
the Soviet Union. The Passive image is aided when the image is both simplified and 
ambiguous. It should both be simpler than the object it represents and it should become 
something to everyone. This fixation on image, however, breeds a climate of what 
Boorstin calls image-thinking. 
Image-thinking is in some ways a more problematic, yet no less prescient, 
concept. Problematic because in many ways image-thinking is characterized, in 
contrast, by what it displaces –‘ideals’.114 Principally, we might say that ideals are 
values –rooted in tradition, history or God, and grounded in and informed by the 
practices of everyday living; and they in turn form our practices. Ideals are those 
characteristics of everyday living which “we actively strive towards, not what we fit 
into.”115 Ideals have a claim on us –we serve them. Image-thinking, however, is a type 
of consumer thinking about everyday life in which images are consumed to serve 
whatever purposes we choose.  
Ultimately, we have thoroughly underestimated the effects of advertisement on 
everyday living, says Boorstin.116 We might be tempted to think that it would be 
problematic to make too much of image-thinking, but the implications –while not 
totalizing in a conspiratorial sense– are broad and pervasive. In fact Naomi Klein takes 
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up this type of ‘consumer thinking’ in No Logo (2000). Klein, however, describes this 
phenomenon as a type of ‘colonization’ –an interesting characterization that was noted 
in the introduction and will be taken up in Chapter 3.117 The problem is further 
complicated when the more contemporary ‘post-branding’ technique of lovemarks is 
also considered. Invented by Saatchi & Saatchi CEO Kevin Roberts, lovemarks is an 
advertising technique aimed at producing an unreasonable passion and loyalty 
towards a product.118 Clearly the situation is rapidly growing out of control. These 
issues –from Mumford’s concern with the built environment to Boorstin’s concern with 
the architecture of the human imagination– are taken up in yet another way by Italian 
scholar Umberto Eco who introduces a new term for us to consider: Hyperreality. 
 
UMBERTO ECO TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY 
In 1975, Italian polymath Umberto Eco published an essay translated as Faith in 
Fakes (Il costume di casa 1973, Dalla periferia dell'impero 1977, Sette anni di 
desiderio 1983) which is, as he describes it, “a journey into hyperreality, in search of 
instances where the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must 
fabricate the absolute fake”.119 The essay is part of a larger collection of essays 
published in the U.S. as Travels in Hyperreality (1986). While the collection is 
insightful, only the initial essay will be used to further the explanation of the 
phenomenon. Eco goes far beyond Boorstin in development, thinking and observation 
concerning the ‘copy’ / ‘reproduction’ –which is ersatz, fake, illusory, or even 
hyperreal. In the eruditic spirit of Alexis de Tocqueville and with the ironic and 
buffoonish innocence of National Lampoon’s Clarke W. Griswald, Eco journeys 
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through the American landscape and uncovers a unique phenomenon –not unlike what 
Lewis Mumford and Daniel Boorstin have attempted to articulate before him– an 
American obsession with simulacra and counterfeit realities. The essay, originally 
written as a series of articles, has the feel of a travelogue. New insights and realizations 
can be traced along the landscape; the destination cannot be guessed from the point of 
departure. The essay is not intended to be academic but spontaneous, “personal”, 
“emotional” and “political” –that is the way it will be approached.120  
Eco’s essay begins with a visit to an exhibit of holographs in New York City. 
Some banal and others erotic, these virtual representations prompt Eco to comment. 
“Holography could prosper only in America, a country obsessed with realism, where, if 
a reconstruction is to be credible it must be absolutely iconic, a perfect likeness, a ‘real’ 
copy of the reality being represented.”121 What is it about the American lifeworld that 
nourishes Eco’s contemplation about ‘the real’, copies, and representation? Eco cannot 
resist offering a brief semiological explanation –which incidentally echoes concerns 
Mumford has voiced about the American lifeworld– to help make sense of this 
confusing phenomenon. “To speak of things that one wants to connote as real, these 
things must seem real. The ‘completely real’ becomes identified with the ‘completely 
fake’. Absolute unreality is offered as real presence. The aim . . . is to supply a ‘sign’ 
that will then be forgotten as such: The sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the 
distinction of the reference, the mechanism of replacement.”122 As mentioned before, 
this bears a striking similarity to Mumford’s concerns about the larger phenomenon of 
‘signs’ being divorced from their ‘referent’ that often occurs when planners create maps 
and plans on paper with no knowledge of the actual life practices and terrain of the 
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space.123 Like Mumford, Eco is a historian with an attention to complexity and 
particularity. He is far from dramatic and sweeping in his semiological pronouncements 
(unlike those of Baudrillard), however, there is here certainly an active, pervasive and 
very real phenomenon of American forms of life that must be sussed out. “There is, 
then, an America of furious hyperreality,” claims Eco, “which is not that of pop art, of 
Mickey Mouse, or of Hollywood movies. There is another, more secret America (or 
rather, just as public, but snubbed by the European visitor and also by the American 
intellectual [of the 1970’s]); and it creates somehow a network of references and 
influences that finally spread also to the products of high culture and the entertainment 
industry.”124 It is this ‘secret America’ that Eco continues to explore, but it is the 
nascent ‘network of reference and influences’ that haunts Eco’s tempered investigation 
and which we will keep in mind in the following chapter. Continuing, Eco says the 
hyperreality phenomenon can be identified by two slogans of American advertising: 
Coca-Cola’s “the real thing”, and the everyday use of the term “more” –in the sense of 
‘extra’ or ‘an-other’. Eco’s journey in search of hyperreality is a search, he says, “of 
instances where the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must 
fabricate the absolute fake . . . and falsehood is enjoyed in a situation of ‘fullness’, of 
horror vacui.”125  
 
MUSEUMS AND DUPLICATION 
Eco pursues these questions through an investigation of what can only be 
described as an American museographical obsession.126 He progressively explores a 
vast array of kitsch museums such as the LBJ Presidential Library, the Museum of the 
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City of New York, Old Beth Page Village, a variety of Wax Museums, houses 
(Xanadu) and inns (The Madonna Inn) that function as kitsch museums, ‘real’ 
museums (J. Paul Getty Museum), and finally imitation cities and spaces like Disney 
(land and world) and Marineland. He continually describes this American obsession –or 
at least makes an anological parallel– to the European Wunderkammer or ‘cabinets of 
curiosity’. America’s Wunderkammer sensibility suggests, “there is a constant in the 
average American imagination and taste, for which the past must be preserved and 
celebrated in full-scale authentic copy; a philosophy of immortality as duplication.”127 
Eco is suspicious of a connection between American economic interests, the American 
obsession for simulacral reproduction and its roots in the Old World. There is then to be 
noted a link between the “ravenous consumption of the present”, says Eco, and “the 
‘past-tizing’ process . . . in its alternate process of futuristic planning and nostalgic re-
morse.”128 Ultimately, questions similar to those raised by Marie Antoinette’s Petit 
Hameau begin to emerge when Eco turns his attention to more complex sites such as 
Old Bethpage Village. 
A fully working reconstructed mid-nineteenth century Long Island, New York 
village, Old Bethpage Village has echoes of Petit Hameau filtered through the kitsch 
museums of America. According to the official website: 
The “209-acre village includes an assortment of homes, farms 
and businesses . . . Buildings are selected based on their 
architectural detail and historic significance. The goal is to 
establish a representative sampling of historic structures. . . . 
After buildings were moved to the village, they were carefully 
restored to a specific point in their history, and the lives of the 
former occupants thoroughly researched. Each structure has 
been scrutinized for clues to its role in community life, and 
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authentic hardware, shingles and glass sought –with the help of 
wills, deeds, and inventory lists– so the structures could be 
authentically furnished (in some cases with pieces original to 
the building).129  
 
According to another website, the village recreates its historical atmosphere by 
“illustrating agricultural, domestic and commercial activities through the actual practice 
of crafts and skills . . . costumed interpreters . . . [who] portray farmers, teachers, 
storekeepers, blacksmiths, civic leaders, and the others who made up a community of 
the mid-1800’s.”130 Again, while sympathetic to the aims of this working museum, Eco 
–who is more concerned with the anecdotal potential of the village– adds another level 
of intrigue to the investigation: to claim that the village is reconstructed “as it was” is 
genetically impossible. The variety of sheep they would have had in those days, he 
points out rather loosely [in 1975], had black noses and no wool and were genetically 
bred out. Although eco-archeologists have attempted to revive the breed the National 
Breeders Association has met them with resistance. Eco asks, “who are the real 
falsifiers of nature?”131 So, with Old Bethpage Village we are confronted with many 
familiar issues which arose with an investigation of Petit Hameau: questions about 
authenticity, closeness, and exactness of copies, simulations and representations. 
However, rather than being reserved for a ‘noble’ few, Old Bethpage Village is a 
democratized simulation, created –not for a Rousseauian escape from the cities of men– 
but for mass consumption and entertainment. 
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 Up to this point it seems that what is of value is an authenticity of information 
over the authenticity of the thing itself; an authenticity of the visual over an authenticity 
of the historical.132 Like Mumford and Boorstin, however, Eco continues to resist a 
totalizing picture of the hyperreality phenomenon. What we are left with then is a 
complex picture of ‘competing’ cultural phenomena in America. There is certainly 
what can only be described as a hyperreality, or hyperrealities, in the American 
landscape. Eco’s hyperreality is an American obsession with substitutes for the real –
more real than real– built on excess and fullness, consumption and nostalgia. But Eco 
also identifies a complex system of ‘resistance’ to hyperreality built upon notions of 
‘real cities’ and ‘living architecture’ and a strong (philological) sense of history and 
depth to the world around us. Eco further complicates the matter with his visit to the J. 
Paul Getty Museum in Malibu, California. 
 
The Seeds of Semiological Confusion 
The Getty Museum obeys the ‘rules’ of modern notions of art museum, says 
Eco –of which Wright’s Guggenheim Museum is the model. An aseptic exterior is 
filled with authentic works of art.133  It is a wonder then that Eco balks at the “drearily 
authentic pictures”.134 The bewildered curator of the Getty Museum is in a quandary: 
how do you authentically display the past in a hyperreal setting like the surrounding 
Los Angeles? Can it ever be divorced from its proper lifeworld, and associated life 
practices, and be understood in the same way? “It’s easy to give a neutral setting to 
visitors who can breath in the Past a few steps away,” Eco protests, “who reach the 
neutral setting after having walked with emotion, among venerable stone. But in 
California, between the Pacific on one hand and Los Angeles on the other, with 
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restaurants shaped like hats and hamburgers, and four-level freeways with ten thousand 
ramps, what do you do?”135 It is actually the parts of the museum the curator is most 
embarrassed about which piques Eco’s interest. An imaginatively yet carefully 
reconstructed Villa of the Papyruses of Herculaneum. Not necessarily better than the 
‘real thing’ but certainly “more” than the original, to use Eco’s loaded word, since the 
original Villa is still buried near Vesuvius. Eco is taken aback by the Getty Museum’s 
attempts to “reconstruct a credible and ‘objective’ past.”136 And herein lies the rub for 
Eco. An investigation that began in “irony” and “repulsion”, as he describes it, now 
raises significant questions about “The Real”, the authentic and what it means to say 
“The Fake” in the activities and practices of human living. If a museum were to cast a 
statue from a 5th-century B.C. Greek original –what is “Fake” about it and how is it any 
different than a Roman copy of a 5th-century B.C. Greek original?137 What if we found 
the original ‘mould’ and cast in it?138 Or a more contemporary example may suffice. 
Marcel Duchamp’s original readymade artwork Bicycle Wheel only existed as a 
photograph since the original 1913 work was lost. Duchamp reconstructed it in 1951. 
Does this ‘perfect’ reconstruction abate the fetishistic desire for the original? If so, the 
copy ceases to be “The Fake” and becomes the original, says Eco.139 Daniel Boorstin 
has already made much of this concern in his pseudo-event but Eco brings new insight 
to the problem and reveals the problem to be much broader than the pseudo-event had 
anticipated. 
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ROBOT CITIES 
As is evident with the Roman copies of Greek originals, questions about the 
authentic, ‘the Real’, and what it is to be a ‘fake’ are not solely a post-industrial 
phenomenon. Eco, however, sees something new (and sinister?) in the American 
pursuit and uses of imitation –“Amusement cities”.140 Eco initially notes that a city like 
Las Vegas is indeed an “amusement city” but because it is not an “absolute fake” –it is 
a “real” city with residents, industry and commerce141– he shifts his gaze. Strange 
occurrences like “ghost towns” (both those ‘archeologically’ real and those invented) 
which thrive in accordance with the Western myth; themed villages and so called “wild 
territories”; places like Disneyland and the mega Disneyworld (larger than the island of 
Manhattan) –“the quintessence of consumer ideology” and the Sistine Chapel of 
hyperreal America142– take simulation into a new category of problems only possible in 
a world where industrialism and capitalism (and now post-industrialism) have a firm 
hold on the everyday comportments of human living.  “The pleasure of imitation, as the 
ancients knew, is one of the most innate in the human spirit,” says Eco, “but here we 
not only enjoy a perfect imitation, we also enjoy the conviction that imitation has 
reached its apex and afterwards reality will always be inferior to it.”143 Eco describes 
Disneyland as “the city that imitates a city”; what is radical about some place like that 
is not simply its production of the illusion but its stimulation of the desire for the 
illusion –a phenomenon which spreads pandemically like a virus through channels of 
entertainment and mass consumption. And what is to be made of the more ‘natural’ 
                                                
140 Umberto Eco, ibid., 40. 
141 Umberto Eco, ibid., 40. Thirty years later, this phenomenon is even more radically problematic 
than the idea of a dedicated “Amusement city” and will be addressed further in the following 
Baudrillard chapter. 
142 Umberto Eco, ibid., 43, 48. 
143 Umberto Eco, ibid., 46. 
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Marineland type animal parks where children and adults alike go to see whales, 
dolphins and seals ‘perform’? Unlike the wax museums where “all is sign but aspires to 
seem reality”, ponders Eco, “in the Marinelands all is reality but aspires to appear 
sign.”144 What is this curious relationship between the industry of entertainment and 
American living? Is it really as isolated and confined to ‘entertainment use’ as Eco 
would hope? Although written in the early 1970’s –what seems like a life age away– 
his writing even at the time makes a case for the pervasive problem of an illusory ethic 
evident in the Petit Hameau. Thirty years on, how deep does this problem run? 
 
THE ‘FOLLY’ OF THE ERSATZ CITIES: WHAT IS AT STAKE? 
One purpose of this chapter has been to provide a clearing –as meager as it may 
be– in the hopes of illuminating a central challenge to all those who fall under the ever 
globalizing umbrella of 21st-century Western techno-capitalism and its ersatz cities. As 
is clear from Mumford, Boorstin, and Eco, political economy of this type goes far 
beyond gadgets, entertainment and bling: it trades in practices, values and forms of life 
–the very structure of reality itself– and in the self-serving hopes (and it at least partly 
succeeds) of modifying the world in its own image. We have also seen the fundamental 
role mass media and communications have had in colonizing the imaginations and life-
forms of people and creating a mass consumable and profitable ersatz city. The ersatz 
city carries these devaluing possibilities in two directions: on the one hand there is 
simple self-deception, and on the other there is domination, along with the devaluing of 
life in service of power. These possibilities exist in both totalitarian and democratic-
capitalist societies. As Lewis Mumford has identified (and later supported by Boorstin 
and Eco), there is a certain emphasis on the reordering of life space and life-forms to 
                                                
144 Umberto Eco, ibid., 52. 
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support the emerging needs of capitalism, consumer addiction, and the desire to possess 
the unique, the rare, or the lost. In the hopes of better articulating this historically 
situated phenomenon we will now turn to a radical thinker and divisive figure –Jean 
Baudrillard (1929-2007). While problematic and extreme in a certain French style, 
Baudrillard is insightful and revealing in his extremity. Baudrillard sees the problem 
like no one else and has his finger on a particular form of corruption –the corruption of 
authentic and poetic life practices, and the human relationship to anything beyond the 
‘material’ –a relationship to the ineffable and the symbolic. 
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Chapter 2 
DISNEYFICATION 
AND THE PROBLEM OF 
JEAN BAUDRILLARD’S HYPERREALITY 
 
"Somebody was trying to tell me that CDs are better than vinyl because they don't have any surface 
noise. I said, 'Listen, mate, life has surface noise." 
 
ATTRIBUTED TO JOHN PEEL 
 
 
An engagement with the work of Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) affords the 
opportunity to ask a question which ties the problems raised by Marie Antoinette’s 
Petit Hameau back to Lewis Mumford’s concerns about human technics and his 
conclusions in The City in History, Daniel Boorstin’s unreal ‘pseudo-event’ in The 
Image, and Umberto Eco’s vertigo-like Travels in Hyperreality: what effects do a 
pervasive political economy of mechanical reproduction,145 the rapid growth of the 
media industry over the past 50 years, and the emerging medium of virtuality have on 
the complex dynamics of organizing and ordering human living raised by Mumford and 
further complicated by Marie Antoinette’s ‘ersatz village’? Baudrillard’s project and 
genre is radically different to what was encountered in chapter one, however. While 
Mumford, Boorstin, and Eco are all grounded in a historical, and activity-based 
analysis of the problem at hand, Baudrillard is quick to move, to generalize, and is far 
more dramatic in his pronouncements. Although he begins with traditional Marxian and 
Neo-Marxian critiques, Baudrillard’s work becomes increasingly wild and speculative. 
However, now that the questions have been asked in chapter one, Baudrillard’s 
                                                
145 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2004), 59, 65-66. Hegarty notes 
that Baudrillard takes Benjamin’s premise that an age of mechanical reproduction fundamentally 
“changes the nature of a work of art” but is highly suspicious of Benjamin’s conclusions that 
mechanical reproduction would offer “a new site of cultural struggle . . . the masses would know 
and then change reality”. Rather, Baudrillard applies Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media –
specifically the concept that the “medium is the message”– to his own developing analysis. 
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rhetorical tactics both raise what is at stake and in some ways make them better known. 
To begin, we can say that a political economy of mechanical reproduction makes it 
possible to reproduce the Petit Hameau experience on a scale previously unimaginable 
to pre-industrial and pre-capitalist societies. Rather than such an experience being 
reserved for the dauphine and her entourage, now a massive percentage of the Western 
world can regularly ‘escape’ into a complex and functional, albeit spurious, and 
sometimes and in some ways devalued and harmful world, ordered on the principles of 
money and profit for the purpose of consumption (during work and leisure).  
Similar to Eco’s critiques of amusement cities like Disneyworld, Baudrillard 
recognizes the unique opportunity Disney theme parks afford in the West to have such 
a Petit Hameau experience. The social microcosm of the Los Angeles Disneyland, says 
Baudrillard, “is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulacra.”146 What 
exactly does Baudrillard mean by the “perfect model” and “all the entangled orders of 
simulacra”? Without answering these questions immediately, we must first observe that 
Baudrillard makes a sleight of hand that can only be attempted in a synthetic age of 
mechanical reproduction; it is a move we must address in order to understand what he 
means by the perfect model and his generalization about the orders of simulacra: 
Disney, he asserts, is a space which only obfuscates the fact that the greater Los 
Angeles urban area is actually the Petit Hameau space. Los Angeles, he says, is 
continually reassured of its ‘reality’ –or as he says, continuously feeds ‘reality’ as from 
a power station and receives a recycled imaginary as from a waste treatment plant – by 
Disneyland’s commodified and branded version of a childish and imaginative space. In 
other words, Los Angeles seems ‘real’ by contrast with the imaginary Disneyland. 
“Disneyland is presented as imaginary”, says Baudrillard, “to make us believe that the 
                                                
146 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1994), 12. 
 59 
rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the America that surrounds it are no longer 
real, but belong to the hyperreal order and to the order of simulation.”147 What is 
‘hyperreal’ and what is ‘simulation’ must still be unpacked, but suffice it to say, a 
strange symbiosis occurs in Baudrillard’s formulation. Los Angeles is not necessarily 
‘hyperreal’ because of Disneyland  (whatever Baudrillard means by this must still be 
deciphered) but feeds and relies on Disney for its sense of ‘the real’.  There is, then, an 
uncanny effect of Disneyfication which occurs in Los Angeles and across the greater 
United States; Disneyfication is a slow and sporadic metamorphosis of the urban 
landscape –driven by a culture and national identity engulfed in consumerism– which 
uses the ‘unreal’ consumer aesthetic and ethic (ways of life and values) of “amusement 
cities” such as Disney as part of its order (or to draw on an earlier image –its warp). 
Baudrillard’s move is dramatic and controversial but nonetheless identifies an emerging 
late 20th-century Western pattern of rampant simulacra (certainly sensed by Mumford, 
Boorstin and Eco) in a technologically driven consumer society, making his work a 
necessary point of reference and a fascinating conversation partner in any further 
discussion on the topic.  
 
BAUDRILLARD: SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE CONTRA SEMIOTIC 
Baudrillard’s thoughts on simulacra, simulation and hyperreality cannot be 
adequately addressed without first understanding his thoughts on the semiotic order and 
its opposition to what he calls ‘symbolic exchange.’ Media theorist William Merrin 
notes in his application of Baudrillard’s work to media theory –Baudrillard and the 
Media– that “readings which focus on [Baudrillard’s] description of the contemporary 
world often overlook or underplay his opposition to it and fail to seriously consider his 
                                                
147 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 12. (emphasis mine) 
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critical concept of the symbolic which serves as the basis of this opposition.”148 
Merrin’s insight into Baudrillard is not novel however, and is supported by the work of 
other Baudrillard scholars such as Mike Gane, Gary Genosko, Charles Levin and Paul 
Hegarty. If Baudrillard’s entire project relies on his essential and specialized use of 
these terms –the symbolic and the semiotic– then they must be unpacked before 
moving on.149  
Gary Genosko reminds us that “the symbolic has taken numerous forms over 
the course of Baudrillard’s theorizing”,150 and therefore this chapter will only be 
concerned with the development of the idea of the ‘symbolic’ during Baudrillard’s 
highly experimental yet productive first decade of theoretical development, beginning 
with his work with Henri Lefebvre on the journal Utopie and its end roughly 
demarcated by La Précession des simulacres in 1978.151 The origin of Buadrillard’s 
‘symbolic’ is heavily indebted to Marcel Mauss’s ethnographic work on the ‘potlatch 
exchange’ in The Gift and George Bataille’s unique reworking of Mauss’s gift 
exchange as a universalized ‘general economy’ in The Accursed Share. Bataille’s 
‘solar’ principle of expenditure says that human beings –like the sun– want to give in 
excess without return. The economy of capitalism was an artificial ‘order’ that is 
imposed and learned, thus ‘colonizing’ (my term here) and suppressing our primordial 
                                                
148 William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 11. (emphasis mine). 
Merrin cites the reason for this common misstep in the English-speaking world’s lack of familiarity 
with the symbolic tradition in French thought which includes Durkheim, Mauss, Hubert, Bataille 
and Caillois. 
149 It is important to note that Baudrillard’s sense of ‘symbolic’ and ‘semiotic’ are heavily 
intertwined and any parsing, as with any complex work, is an artifice with the emerging danger of 
sounding tautological. 
150 Gary Genosko, Baudrillard and Signs: Signification Ablaze (London: Routledge, 1994), xx. 
151 La Précession des simulacres was published again in 1981 as the first chapter of Simulacres et 
simulation. By 1981 it seems Buadrillard became confined by the limits presented by his thoughts on  
‘hyperreality’ and from there begins to advance his material from the previous decade in a more 
highly aphoristic style which proves to be unnecessary for our purposes. 
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tendencies.152 Following Bataille, Buadrillard ignores rigorous ethnographic work in his 
broad formulation of the ‘symbolic’, in favor of a unique distillation of the term for use 
in a rhetorical genre. Douglas Kellner notes, “Bataille and Baudrillard presuppose here 
a contradiction between human nature and capitalism. … [they] are presenting a 
version of Nietzsche’s ‘aristocratic,’ ‘master morality,’ in which value articulates an 
excess, an overflow and an intensification of life energies.”153 At its most general, 
Baudrillard’s ‘symbolic’ is an operational nexus of primitive (pre-capitalist) exchange 
based on “an incessant cycle of giving and receiving at odds with accumulation, 
scarcity, production, necessity, surplus and even survival”;154 it functions as a radical 
alternate ‘weaving’ of everyday life, in support of his larger critique of the current 
ordering of human life in the post-industrial West. The rhetorical power of 
Baudrillard’s alternative symbolic economy (literally oiko-nomos: to manage or order 
the house) is that it stands outside of the present ‘economy of economics’. “‘Symbolic 
exchange’ thus emerges as Baudrillard’s ‘revolutionary’ alternative to the values and 
practices of capitalist society”.155 There are problems, however, with Baudrillard’s 
broad-brush approach. 
Anthropologist Robert Hefner points out that Baudrillard’s “ethnographically 
fantastic” analysis runs roughshod over anthropological data and his “romanticized 
symbolic” offers little help to people living in the present world.156 While this critique is 
important to bear in mind, and is certainly valid, Baudrillard’s ‘symbolic’ should not be 
mistaken for a naïve and nostalgic primitivism or cavalier anthropology. We must 
                                                
152 Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989), 42. 
153 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 42, 43. 
154 Gary Genosko, ibid., xv. 
155 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 44. 
156 Robert Hefner, “Baudrillard’s Noble Anthropology: The Image of Symbolic Exchange in 
Political Economy,” SubStance vol. 6 no. 17 (Autumn, 1977): 105-113. 
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remember that Jean Baudrillard is not an anthropologist but a critical theorist, trained in 
sociology, working within the context of European Post-Structuralism, and his notion 
of ‘the symbolic’ is intended to function in a radically different manner than Mauss’s 
study on the potlach. Baudrillard’s symbolic is, as Gary Genosko refers to it, an ‘anti-
semiological’ ‘asignifying imaginary’ which is constructed, not as a nostalgia for 
primitivism but, as an organ of effraction (literally to break open), meant to oppose the 
current ‘economy of economics’ and semiological order.157 What then is the ‘semiotic’, 
which Buadrillard offers the symbolic against, and what does it have to do with 
economy? 
Baudrillard’s definition and use of the ‘semiotic’ is just as cryptic in his 
writings as the before-mentioned ‘symbolic’. The semiotic is a ‘house of order’ 
(economy) –an “institution of total signification” that swallows up everything, in a 
sense, dependent on the mediating term, ‘the real’.158 The mode of representation –the 
sign– and the interaction between multiple signs is taken to be ‘reality’ rather than the 
referents to which they point.159 Here of course is the fatal flaw in Baudrillard’s work 
which will be taken up later in the chapter and in chapter 3: his dependence on a 
correlative understanding of truth and ‘reality’ to make his point of resistance –literally 
sawing off the branch on which he sits. This encompassing semiological order, 
nonetheless, is targeted for effraction by Baudrillard’s symbolic and the alternative 
values of symbolic exchange. The ‘real’ in Baudrillard’s system is “only the 
simulacrum of the symbolic” and “reality as referent” is a “controlled re-creation of the 
                                                
157 To Baudrillard, the potlatch is a form of symbolic social organization at odds with the semiotic 
ordering of our modern economy. Their incongruity is never more evident than in the example of 
the outlawing of potlatch by the Canadian government in 1884. “What bothered the officials was 
the impression of economic waste. The Indian Reserve Commissioner Sproat reported that ‘it is 
not possible that Indians can acquire property, or become industrious with any good result, while 
under the influence of this mania’.” Charles Levin, Jean Baudrillard: A Study in Cultural Metaphysics, 
(Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall, 1996), 279. 
158 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory, 37, 49-67. 
159 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 63. 
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[displaced] symbolic”.160 Far more broad and pervasive than the linguistic and 
epistemological semiotic systems laid out by Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles 
Sanders Peirce in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (although certainly 
dependent upon them), Baudrillard’s semiotic is fed from two sources: a particular 
understanding of the historical trajectory of theories about simulacra beginning with 
Plato’s critique of simulacrum qua images in The Republic part V book X;161 and a 
particular reading of the transformation of Western economics since the Renaissance –
specifically, with a focus on the radical effects of the first and second industrial 
revolutions and the advent of electronic media. 
Historically speaking, the human relationship to the semiotic is exacerbated by 
the second industrial revolution and the advent of mass communication. In The Evil 
Demon of Images (1987), Baudrillard launches into a radical critique of “the perversity 
of the relation between” cinema, media images and technological images and “its 
referent, the supposed real”.162 What must be doubted in a hyperreal world, Baudrillard 
continues, “is the reference principle of images . . . this strategy by means of which 
they always appear to refer to a real world, to real objects, and to reproduce something 
which is logically and chronologically anterior to themselves.”163 At its heart, The Evil 
Demon of Images is fundamentally a critique of realism  as correlation, and judged by a 
“conformity to reality” with a naïve trompe l’oeil hermeneutic –propagated in the 
American (and later broader Western) landscape, says Baudrillard with an ear towards 
                                                
160 Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. Charles Levin (New York: 
Telos Press), 162. Paul Hegarty, ibid., 37. 
161 One problem, in particular, that will be undermined and replaced in Chapter 3 is Baudrillard’s 
deployment and dependence on the conception of the simulacral ‘image-picture’ for his larger 
project.  Baudrillard’s The Evil Demon of Images –perhaps the only one of later Baudrillard works that 
I will cite in my investigation– proves to be a useful dialogue partner because it is a rare focused 
meditation on a particular topic, Simulacra qua ‘Images’. With the term ‘evil demon’ Baudrillard 
makes an implicit (if not explicit) reference to Plato’s The Republic part V book X. 
162 Jean Baudrillard, “The Evil Demon of Images” (paper presented at the first Mari Kuttna 
Memorial Lecture, Sydney, Australia July 25, 1984), 13. (emphasis mine) 
163 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 13. (emphasis mine) 
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Boorstin, by “photographic, cinematic and television images”.164 Once again, 
Baudrillard is heavily dependent on the Platonic conception of simulacra in his critique. 
“The art of representation, then,” says Plato, “is a long way from reality. … [T]his 
maker of images, knows nothing of reality, but only the appearance.”165 Their 
conformity –launching into an ethical critique of this historically new breed of 
‘images’– is “diabolical”.166 However, something is suspicious and even awry in 
Baudrillard’s evaluative critique. 
Here Baudrillard goes beyond Eco’s hyperreal “amusement cities” and speaks 
of the diabolical simulacral nature of hyperreal events such as the eerie similarities 
between the hypothetical movie The China Syndrome released just twelve days before 
the actual Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the U. S. state of Pennsylvania. In this 
case the movie event informed the reading of the actual historical event. What we have 
here is a strange metamorphosis of Boorstin’s pseudo-event. Baudrillard senses 
something far more pervasive than simply ‘fabricated events’; the film version of a near 
nuclear meltdown has an effect on the way in which we consume the ‘media spectacle’ 
of the ‘actual’ near nuclear meltdown –both are simulacra. At this point, more is 
required to make sense of this phenomenon. 
Baudrillard’s response to the Western obsession with ‘image’, as 
representational fidelity, is an unconventional Manichean understanding of simulacra. 
Crudely, what he means by invoking Manichean belief is a pre-Cartesian, ‘irrational’, 
quasi-dualist understanding of simulacra: “What the heretics posited”, says Baudrillard 
speaking of the heretical movement which had a foothold in North Africa during the 
second, third and fourth centuries A. D., “was that the very creation of the world, hence 
                                                
164 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 13-14. 
165 Francis MacDonald Cornford, trans. The Republic of Plato (London: Oxford University Press, 
1945), 328, 331. 
166 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 14. 
 65 
the reality of the world, was the result of the existence of the evil demon. . . . the reality 
of the world is a total illusion”.167 This statement would appear to be self referentially 
incoherent since ‘illusion’ is dependent on the fact that there is something ‘real’ in 
which to deceive or mislead. However, Baudrillard’s rejection of belief in the 
“objectivity of the world” in favor of the conception of illusion is predicated, not on an 
“irreality or non-reality”, but as “a mise en jeu of the real.”168 “The principle 
fundamentally and from the very beginning”, claims Baudrillard, “is that there is no 
objectivity to the world”, only a bringing into play of ‘the real’ –as mise en jeu would 
suggest.169 The function of art, in his Manichean interpretation, is to “posit the power of 
illusion against [a perceived or the idea of] reality.”170 In symbolic economies, art has a 
social occult function: art is a form of magic. The power of representation to correlate 
to ‘real things’ must be in doubt –thus the hope of achieving fidelity is a ‘demonic’ 
endeavor, to Baudrillard, which actually obfuscates rather than illuminates. This 
‘illusory’ understanding / function / use of simulacra is, however, lost through the 
course of history and is usurped by a semiological relationship to the world in which 
ideas of the ‘real’ and of ‘representation’ are made central.171 What is at stake for 
                                                
167 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 43-44. (emphasis mine) 
168 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 44-45. 
169 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 45. 
170 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 53. It should be noted that ‘illusion’ is not used here in a negative sense. 
171 Precisely when this epochal shift occurs is unclear in Baudrillard’s writing. There are two 
separate genealogies of simulation –one centered on the economy of the economic and the other 
related to thinking about, and pictures of, imaging and representation –which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. One must wonder though, if Baudrillard is attempting to reference St. 
Augustine with his invocation of the Manichees, and in some way the complicity of the Western 
Christian onto-theological tradition in the rise of the ‘semiotic’? It is after all Augustine, a former 
Manichee himself, who, in De Dialectica, De Magistro, De Doctrina Christiana, and De Trinitate, rejects 
the dualism of the Persian teaching, and lays the foundation for medieval semiotics (taken up by 
Roger Bacon). Ultimately, a critique of Augustine’s verbum mentis is far too large a project to 
adequately address within the confines of this study.  
While Baudrillard’s conception of “a mise en jeu of the real” and concatenation of signs are offered 
as a compelling alternative to the Augustinian foundations of semiotics in the West, they miss the 
mark. Baudrillard’s ‘anti-Platonic’ and ‘anti-realist’ picture is completely void of the engagement of 
language and thought in Lebenswelt. I will forward a conception of language heavily reliant on 
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Baudrillard will be discussed with greater detail in the next section. As Mike Gane 
points out, Baudrillard confounds the reader with his use of specialized and theoretical 
terms and vocabulary, thus always keeping meaning at bay.172 What is certain is that the 
usurpation of the ‘symbolic’, in favor of the ‘semiotic’, has had disastrous 
consequences on human living because it separates us from our primordial relationship 
with the everyday practices, objects, and world –it is simply ‘unnatural’.173 It is for this 
last reason that, while I will be highly critical of Baudrillard’s characterizations and 
method, my exploration is ultimately sympathetic to his concerns.  
The effect of the domestication of the sign in semiology, argues Baudrillard, is a 
‘dis-enchanting’ materialist notion of ‘the real’ –reality.174 Baudrillard only offers two 
anemic genealogies of the ‘semiotic’ (which will be discussed later in this chapter) in 
attempting to trace the epochal shift from the ‘symbolic’ to ‘semiotic’. What emerges 
from these genealogies is an interrelated picture of a developing Western ‘economy’ of 
consumption and communication. This economy is driven by consumption and the 
advent of mechanized communication techniques, “conceived [and produced] 
according to their reproducibility” says Baudrillard, in a new age of mechanical 
reproduction. These practices and techniques, ordered by semiological calcification, 
become ‘coded’ in late modernity –what Baudrillard calls the age of simulation; now, 
however, we are ahead of ourselves and must first track Baudrillard’s sketches of the 
development of the conceptions of ‘simulation’ and ‘hyperreality’ with greater detail, 
before we move on to a critique. 
                                                                                                                                         
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and J. R. R. Tolkien’s linguistic driven mythopoeia –
both of which critique Augustine’s verbum mentis in their own right– as an alternate ‘response to 
hyperreality’ –one ultimately rooted in the Christian tradition but highly critical of this particular 
vein of thought. 
172 Mike Gane, Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 10. 
173 Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, 41-43. 
174 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 47. 
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EARLY BAUDRILLARD: ‘UTOPIE’ 
 Baudrillard’s gradual development of the conception of the symbolic, and of its 
subsequent destruction in the semiotic175, can be traced through his earliest work with 
the journal Utopie (1967-1978), founded by Henri Lefebvre and a group of radical left 
architects and social critics in 1966, and echoed throughout his earliest works: his first 
monograph The System of Objects (1968) and its follow-up The Consumer Society 
(1970); his departure from Marxian theory in For a Critique of the Political Economy 
of the Sign (1972) and The Mirror of Production (1973); and still later in Symbolic 
Exchange and Death (1976).176 As with any chronology, Baudrillard’s involvement 
with the journal Utopie is not so easily demarcated. Utopie represents almost two 
decades (from 1962/63 to 1978) of influence and struggle with the sociology, 
anthropology, philosophy, economics and political commentary of neo-Marxist Henri 
Lefebvre. In a 1997 interview Baudrillard recalls his acquaintance with Lefebvre as a 
relationship which “nourished” his sociological thoughts; but at the same time 
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symbolic surviving in the ‘radical otherness’ of non-western cultures, from the Aboringinal 
Australians to Islamic culture, and his critique of the west’s historical attempt to incorporate these 
cultures into its own semiotic system through ‘a discourse of difference’ sees the electronic media 
as contributing towards this global homogenization and control.” William Merrin, Baudrillard and 
the Media, 57; Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, trans. James 
Benedict, London: Verso, 1993 111-174. The relationship between the symbolic and the semiotic 
will become more apparent in the following pages but one must ask proleptically, what role does 
neo-liberal economics and emerging globalization proliferated by organizing bodies such as the 
World Trade Organization play in –what Baudrillard might call– the semiotic colonization of the 
non-western world? If the world is indeed becoming ‘flat’, then is it possible to escape the ‘code’ of 
Disneyfication? A better question might be, is it possible for a lifeworld to embrace the technology 
of mass communication but still be organized by other ‘non-western’ principles, as is the case with 
Japan? (see also Baudrillard, The Transperancy of Evil and Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method) 
These questions are directly addressed later in this chapter and they will be unpacked further at 
various points in the dissertation. 
176 Baudrillard’s fourth book The Mirror of Production (1973) will not be included in this treatment, as 
the text involves Baudrillard’s critique of classical Marxism, which goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter. While many of the concepts in Mirror will be referenced in one form or another, I seek 
primarily to track Baudrillard’s idea of Hyperreality and art in an age of ‘mechanical reproduction’. 
Also, Baudrilalrd’s Seduction (1979) will only be addressed in terms of its relevance as a transitional 
period in the development of the fourth order of simulacra and possible modes of resistance. 
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Baudrillard desired to articulate his own critiques of urbanism and everyday life, which 
went against much of Lefebvre’s work.177 Lefebvre was a complicated figure whose 
work was focused on combining the political, economic and philosophical thought with 
studies of everyday life. He was deeply concerned with the predilection in modern 
consumer society to abstract “commodities from any real human context . . . needs and 
desires were increasingly subject to manipulation by outside forces.” 178 One aim of his 
“‘critique’ of everyday life was to restore an authentic relationship between people and 
objects, to make objects more responsive to actual needs.”179 Like most French 
intellectuals, Lefebvre’s work shifted focus after the failure of the May ’68 protests. 
Between 1968 and 1974 Lefebvre’s work was focused on “the significance of urban 
conditions of daily life (as opposed to narrow concentration on work-place politics) as 
central in the evolution of revolutionary sentiments and politics.”180  
Baudrillard too was radically disillusioned after May ’68 and he sought a 
language to make sense of its failures. Later in the ’97 interview Baudrillard contrarily 
admits that “in the end, Lefebvre was never really a reference for me, nor a model”.181 
Baudrillard simply could not adhere to what he describes as Lefebvre’s set rhetoric, 
naïve positions and “phobic” disdain for psychoanalysis and semiology. It would be 
more ‘radical’ thinkers like Marcuse, Foucault and Barthes who helped Baudrillard 
make sense of the failures of the 1968 social upheaval. Baudrillard recalls his Utopie 
days as, “an experimental period . . . [wherein] we tried a bit of everything at the 
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moment.”182 We get a sense of this crosspollination in William Merrin’s description of 
Baudrillard’s earliest ideas on the emergence of the sign and simulation which, he says, 
stems from a concern with “the Marxist critique of consumer society as representing 
not an increase in individual freedom but the penetration of control, constraint and 
alienation throughout everyday life, and to structural and technical analyses of the 
operation of this society and its production of the individual”.183 Some of Baudrillard’s 
more significant essays, such as “Requiem for the Media” (Oct. 1971), “The Mirror of 
Production” (May 1972), “Marxism and the System of Political Economy” (Feb. 1973), 
“Stereo Porn” (Mar./April 1976) and others all found their way into many of his texts. 
“My first books,” notes Baudrillard, “[The System of Objects and The Consumer 
Society] . . . were the hybrid and intertwined results of all these contributions. . . .[A]t 
once a bit serious and traditional, with an experimental tone at the same time.”184  
Baudrillard’s dissertation and first book The System of Objects (1968) highlights 
the birth of the ‘semiotic’ in western societies and the rupturing of the ‘symbolic’ in the 
midst of consumer relationships to objects, goods, and services. With Lefebvre, and 
others at that time, Baudrillard “claimed that the contemporary stage of capitalism is 
distinguished from earlier socioeconomic formations precisely by the increased 
importance of commodity culture within both production and social reproduction –the 
ways in which society reproduces itself in individual thought and behavior.”185 
Although his first book is primarily concerned with the human encounter (for better or 
worse) within a world of objects and signs, Baudrillard is mainly, and problematically, 
concerned with the human subject in relation to an external world of objects and signs. 
This point will be directly addressed and refuted in Chapter 3; however, the ethical 
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concerns which gave rise to The System of Object will continue to be relevant 
throughout my work. Douglas Kellner points them out succinctly: “the thrust of 
Baudrillard’s analysis is that the new technical world of objects leads to new values, 
modes of behavior and relations to objects and to other people.”186 As has been noted, 
The System of Objects is both heavily indebted to Henri Lefebvre’s sociology of 
everyday life and constitutes a radical break from Lefebvre towards the structuralism in 
Roland Barthes187 and the radical social critique of Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt 
School, which Baudrillard says he read early on before they were translated.188 
Ultimately, Baudrillard’s post-1968 experience was marked by a radical 
disillusionment with Marxist critique and its ability to speak to what he saw as the 
unique problems of the times. “In any case,” notes Kellner, “Baudrillard’s analysis 
suggests that the Marxian problematic of revolution is severely undermined in a 
technological society in which change and revolution are integral to the system 
itself”.189 
Baudrillard’s use and extension of Roland Barthes’s semiology in System 
constitutes the unique turn in his work, and so some time should be spent with Barthes. 
At the center of Barthes’s critique is a pervasive and insidious “presumption of 
innocence [in the novel, in everyday social relations, or the image]: something which 
Barthes sees as a characteristic corruption of modern bourgeois society.”190 This 
‘innocence’ is described by Barthes as a “naturalness” with which petit-bourgeois 
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society “dress up” reality to hide harmful ideologies –what Barthes calls “anonymous 
ideology”.191 To Barthes, objects “are taken up not in terms of their use or function but 
primarily to communicate . . . [they] form a kind of language, within which such values 
as use and function become merely rhetorical.”192 This phenomenon is something 
special to an industrial epoch so dependent on advertising, public image and mass 
communication. There is an implicit semiological relationship between objects, images 
and meaning, says Barthes: the connotative (or ‘coded’) element, which functions to 
encode cultural and ideological meaning into the otherwise neutral denotative (‘non-
coded’) form. The denotative form is made up of a signifier and signified.193 The classic 
example Barthes uses in his The Rhetoric of the Image (1964) is the Panzani pasta 
advertising image. Barthes unpacks the hidden meaning behind packages of pasta 
surrounded by fresh red and green vegetables and hung in a fishing net revealing a 
coded structure of meaning.   
Baudrillard’s decade long road to hyperreality begins, Butler argues, when 
Baudrillard takes Barthes’s series of isolated studies and extends the conclusions to 
their limit. He claims that objects only have meaning in relation to other objects, and 
that consumers only desire this sign-object relationship rather than the objects 
themselves. While Baudrillard’s work is problematic on many levels, what is important 
for this study is his identification and contrast of two competing forms of ordering 
and/or organizing (in Mumford’s terminology): consumerism, semiotically ordered, 
over and against patterns of a more authentic human (symbolic) exchange relationship. 
“For Baudrillard”, says Merrin, “the sign is born when [the human activity of symbolic 
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exchange] is broken, a process of the transformation of all relations and meanings into 
signs to be combined, appropriated and consumed.”194 Baudrillard’s development of 
this heavily generalized picture of the death of the symbolic in the emerging fabric of 
consumer sign-objects represents the foundation of all his other work. In his next book 
Baudrillard sets out to identify the role electronic media plays in consumption. 
According to Baudrillard translator Chris Turner, Baudrillard does not consider 
The Consumer Society (1970), originally written on a publisher’s commission, to be on 
the trajectory of his developing theory at the time.195 However, what we do have in The 
Consumer Society is Baudrillard’s first foray into the role electronic media plays in the 
destruction of symbolic exchange through the ubiquity of the semiotic order. Unlike the 
symbolic order –which is not ‘accessed’ like a mainframe or a hard-drive by pre-
industrial and non-western societies but is inhabited, as Hegarty says, “through the 
ambivalence of exchange which is not one of fixed values, separate from its 
enactors”196– the semiotic order provides access to a ‘real world’, emphasized (by the 
semiotic order) to fill the void left by the dissipating symbolic. “For Baudrillard,” says 
Douglas Kellner, “the entire [western] society is organized around consumption and 
display of commodities through which individuals gain prestige, identity, and 
standing.”197 Western society lives consumption, consumes consumption, and speaks 
consumption –it expresses itself as consumption. One unintended (or intended?) 
consequence of this phenomenon is that use-value is undermined by the political 
economy of sign-value. Consumers, he says, no longer relate “to a particular object in 
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its specific utility, but to a set of objects in its total signification.”198 The apparatus of 
electronic mass media is essential then in the social construction of ‘the real’ –literally 
a real-lization of the real– “by translating the symbolic into the semiotic” through the 
matrix of consumption.199 Citing Boorstin, the everyday life of the western world is 
reordered into a “neo-reality of the model”,200 claims Baudrillard, using the blueprint of 
the commodity simulacrum as the organizing principle.  
Baudrillard’s third book, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 
(1972), extends his radical critique of the semiotic to now include the category of ‘the 
real’. As we will see, ‘the real’, then, becomes a ‘key’ to the other ‘ills’ that Baudrillard 
is concerned with. Merrin points out that this may be the most significant and 
overlooked development in Baudrillard’s work, and represents a crucial step in 
understanding what he means by the ‘hyperreal order’.201 Douglas Kellner argues that 
Critique completes Baudrillard’s attempt to extend a neo-Marxist framework and 
extend Marxist political economy. Baudrillard adds ‘sign-value’ to Marxian ‘use-value’ 
and ‘exchange-value’, to supplement what Baudrillard sees as Marx’s misreading (or 
underestimation) of late capitalism.202 The book begins with a critique of the traditional 
empiricist hypothesis of human needs (the ‘hypothesis’ that people are driven by basic 
needs usually supported by lived evidence like food, clothes, and shelter) and the model 
of object use-value (the view that objects are appropriated based on how they are of 
functional-use to us in our lives), to address the problem of sign value covered in his 
previous works, System and Consumer.203 “Far from the primary status of the object 
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being a pragmatic one which would subsequently come to over determine a social value 
of the origin,” says Baudrillard, “it is the sign exchange value (valeur d’echange signe) 
which is fundamental”.204 Use-value is what people theorize about to rationalize the loss 
of symbolic exchange and support the myth of the practical application of the 
commodity. For this reason, Baudrillard says that a theory of objects cannot be based 
on needs but on “social prestations” and “signification”.205 It might be easy to critique 
Baudrillard by saying that he fundamentally misreads Marx or has left Marx altogether; 
but it is important to point out that Baudrillard’s suspicion of use-value and lived-
evidence is not built on a suspicion of practice, but on a suspicion of ideological value 
placed on ‘objects’. “For Baudrillard”, says Mike Gane, “Marx was not sufficiently 
radical in his analysis . . . his conception of communism was trapped within the matrix 
of the cultural order of rationalization and therefore could not be other than its (bad) 
mirror-image.”206 Rather than contrasting use-value with exchange-value, Gane 
continues, Marx should have contrasted symbolic exchange with commodity exchange; 
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in contrast then, “Baudrillard appears more radical, and more primitive”.207 It should be 
clear by now that the striking feature of Baudrillard’s early decade is a radical departure 
from traditional political economic models in favor of what he believes to be the more 
radical critique of semiotic models. 
Baudrillard’s contrast of symbolic exchange to sign exchange highlights his 
emphasis on the erosion and truncation of social relation (and subsequently social 
action), over and against those who, ironically, continue to focus on everyday practice 
as a strategy to confront an emerging post-war consumer society. In Chapter 9 –
“Requiem for the Media”, originally published in Utopie 4 as “Requiem pour les 
media” (1971)– Baudrillard extends Marshall McLuhan’s critique of Marx, to highlight 
the effects of an emerging consumer media culture on this developing western 
industrialized phenomenon.  “[McLuhan] is saying that Marx, in his materialist analysis 
of production, had virtually circumscribed productive forces as a privileged domain 
from which language, signs and communication in general found themselves 
excluded.”208 Baudrillard extends his critique further –going beyond the reorganizing 
neo-reality model originally presented in Consumer– by questioning the category of 
‘reality’ altogether. 
 Rather than simulacra and the semiotic order ‘eclipsing’ or doing away with 
‘the real’, the very notion of an objective, external, concrete reality (in which Merrin 
notes “use value and needs, and the signified and the referent” are included) is critiqued 
as a product of the sign. “Through this mirage of the referent,” Baudrillard says, “which 
is nothing but the phantasm of what the sign itself represses during its operation, the 
sign attempts to mislead: it permits itself to appear as totality . . . and parades about as 
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the reality principle of meaning.”209 The legitimating relationship between the sign and 
the real, and the real and the sign is a vicious circle –their relationship is illusory 
according to Baudrillard.210  
 
BAUDRILLARD’S HISTORICAL GENEALOGY OF SIMULACRA 
In Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) Baudrillard further characterizes the 
problem of ‘the real’ in modern technological information societies, based on “his 
thesis that in societies where symbolic exchange is the dominant principle, cultures do 
not relate to the ‘reality’ of the world but to the world and cosmos in narrative, fable, as 
radical illusion.”211 The book begins with chapters on ‘the end of production’ and ‘the 
order of simulacra’, and continues to makes use of the link between electronic media 
and its effect on a consumer society, which he already began to hint at in The 
Consumer Society and further developed in chapter nine of For a Critique of the 
Political Economy of the Sign, discussed earlier.  
Most significant to Symbolic Exchange and Death is Baudrillard’s historical 
genealogy of the political economy of simulacra, which further complicates his picture 
of simulacra. Although William Merrin praises Baudrillard’s genealogy, from a media 
and communication studies background, for “restoring a historical and philosophical 
dimension that the contemporary field clearly lacks”, it is equally problematic because 
of his attempt to delineate the development of the problem of simulacra according to a 
series of epochs or eras “definable in terms of their dominant simulacral productions 
and their epistemological effects” rather than socioeconomic formations.212 Strikingly 
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similar to Lewis Mumford’s genealogies in Technics and Civilization and The City in 
History mentioned in Chapter 1, Baudrillard’s genealogy of the political economy of 
simulacra begins with its birth in the archaic feudal caste societies of the West, and then 
passes into the age of the counterfeit –a period which Baudrillard says lasts from the 
Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution. This is the first order of simulacra; the 
emancipated ‘modern sign’ is no longer limited nor obligated by feudal social 
constraint but is proliferated by demand; “relieved of every constraint,” says 
Baudrillard, “universally available, the modern sign nevertheless still simulates 
necessity by giving the appearance that it is bound to the world.”213  
The industrial era of ‘automation and the robot’ ushers in the second order of 
simulacra, large-scale production. Here Baudrillard cites Walter Benjamin as the first 
to identify –through his discussion of works of art– “that reproduction absorbs the 
process of production, changes its goals, and alters the status of the product and the 
producer.”214 He also cites Benjamin’s identification of “technology as a medium rather 
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than a ‘productive force’ (at which point the Marxian analysis retreats)” as another 
crucial contribution in the analysis of the order of simulacra. 
The third order of simulacra, simulation, occurs when “[t]echnique as a 
medium gains the upper hand not only over the product’s ‘message’ (its use-value) but 
also over labour power [. . .]. As soon as dead labour gains the upper hand over living 
labour, serial production gives way to generation through models . . . they are no longer 
mechanically reproduced, but conceived according to their very reproducibility.”215 
Unlike the first stage of the counterfeit which necessarily presupposes difference and 
operates on the natural law of value, or the second machine-driven stage of serial 
reproduction which relies on a market law of value, in this stage of the simulacra there 
is no longer ‘imitation’ of models, per se, but a replacement by a structural modular 
code or the structural law of value.  
Baudrillard likens the code –the third order of simulacra which determines the 
ordering system of the law of value– to DNA and makes the parallel (in 1976) that just 
as we cannot escape our DNA so we cannot escape the code. “The great man-made 
simulacra pass from a universe of natural laws into a universe of forces and tensions,” 
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he says, “and today pass into a universe of structures and binary oppositions.”216 
Baudrillard cites Thomas Sebeok’s biosemiological model of the genetic code as the 
“prototype” for all systemic signification, and Jacques Monod’s Nobel Prize-winning 
work on genetic expression, as the myths which drive the ‘code’ of third order 
simulacra. “In fact,” Baudrillard warns, “[Monod’s discourse] is itself a result of the 
never innocent decision to objectify the world and the ‘real’. … [Monod] postulates the 
coherence of a specific discourse, and scientificity is doubtless only the space of this 
discourse, never manifest as such, whose simulacrum of ‘objectivity’ covers over this 
political and strategic speech.”217 Here Baudrillard attempts to cite an epochal 
sensibility which includes authority of science as complicit in the concatenation of the 
sign. Digitality then moves the myth of this information binary ‘code’ from ‘the 
laboratory’ to the banal corners of society. Following Boorstin, reality is selected, 
edited, tested and recomposed; “at the end of this process of reproducibility,” says 
Baudrillard, “the real is not only that which can be reproduced, but that which is always 
already reproduced: the hyperreal.”218 Undergirding this entire ‘scientific’ system, of 
course, is the problematic belief in an objective ‘real’ as a semiological category and its 
corresponding rhetoric. 
 
NIETZSCHE, HYPERREALITY AND DISNEYFICATION 
With the ‘birth of hyperreality’ we must note Baudrillard’s embrace of 
Nietzsche over Marx. As Douglas Kellner describes, after 1976 Baudrillard moves 
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from a more formal structuralism to an extreme variant of “poststructuralist positions 
about language, reference and the absence of ‘the real’ . . .  to dissolve the concepts and 
problematic of social theory and radical politics altogether.”219 It is at this point that any 
remaining concern with the complexities of ‘everyday life’ as a point of reference is 
jettisoned in Baudrillard’s theoretical framework. “Down with all hypotheses that have 
allowed belief in a real world” Baudrillard proclaims aphoristically citing Nietzsche in 
Symbolic Exchange and Death.220 Subsequently, this move puts Baudrillard in a 
radically different position from even Nietzsche himself. As has been highlighted thus 
far, Baudrillard’s work from 1968 to 1976 is a gradual move away from the 
conventional Marxian understanding and critique of political economy and, as Mike 
Gane says, an abandonment of “the hope of social revolution on the model of 1789 or 
1917”.221 As mentioned earlier, Baudrillard, like many intellectuals at the time, was 
disillusioned with the failures of the May 1968 protest and general strike in France and 
with the ultimate silence of Marxist leaders such as Louis Althusser, who notoriously 
critiqued student protesters as forwarding an infantile leftism. “Baudrillard moves from 
Marx to Nietzsche as a more prescient thinker,” Gane later says, “and argues that there 
subsequently ensues a crisis in the culture which comes to affect all levels: science, art, 
technology, politics.”222 Baudrillard’s most apparent shift to a lyrical style and nihilistic 
framework happens in Seduction (1979) –gone are the scholarly referencing apparatus 
and sociological theory in favor of more rhetorical literary and artistic allusions.223 In 
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The Precession of Simulacra (1978), Paul Hegarty and Mike Gane have suggested that 
Baudrillard’s newly developed four orders of simulacra is an allusion to Nietzsche’s 
“collapsing the ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ worlds” and the pattern of perceived access to the 
real in the Twilight of the Idols aphorism How the ‘Real World’ Finally Became a 
Fable.224 Hegarty makes the link between Nietzsche and Baudrillard apparent. 
“Simulation is the contemporary form of imagining there is a true reality. Nietzsche, 
like Baudrillard, insists there have only ever been different ways of making such a 
mistake”.225 Hegarty, however, is generous in aligning Baudrillard so close to 
Nietzsche. Douglas Kellner correctly suggests that Baudrillard is not such a close 
reader of Nietzsche and only draws on him stylistically and rhetorically.226 However 
close or disingenuous a reader of Nietzsche Baudrillard is, he turns from a social theory 
with any concern for everyday life towards “what Habermas calls the ‘dark writers of 
the bourgeoisie’ and a specifically French Bohemian and Nietzschean tradition which 
extends from Baudelaire through Bataille . . . Gide and Sartre, and appears in Blanchot, 
Klossowski, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard and others.”227 How then does 
Baudrillard move from a particularly structuralist theory of the simulacra and extend it 
into the perpetual complexities of the marketplace and the social fabric of the first 
world West? 
Jean Baudrillard’s first text devoted to the topic of Hyperreality is Simulacra 
and Simulation (1981) (a collection of essays written for the journal Traverses) –the 
most famous of which is “The Precession of Simulacra” (1978). A highly problematic 
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William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media, 38-42; Mike Gane, Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty, 
15, 37-38. However, since this chapter is concerned with Baudrillard’s development of 
Hyperreality, I will not pursue this rhetorical device any further. 
224 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory, 52; Mike Gane, ibid., 15. 
225 Paul Hegarty, ibid., 154; cf: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufman, trans. 
Walter Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), §553 thru §586. 
226 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 91. 
227 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 91-92. 
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text on the surface, Simulacra and Simulation “avoids all resort to referencing and 
empirical substantiation” and, along with Seduction (1979), represents a radical stylistic 
shift in Baudrillard’s work.228 The essay is difficult to read and even more problematic 
to understand. However, we should not be deceived by Baudrillard’s pataphysical229 
surface play. As Mike Gane sympathetically points out in Jean Baudrillard: In Radical 
Uncertainty, “there is as yet no analysis of Baudrillard’s writing which is adequate or 
altogether convincing”.230 Based on Gane’s assertion, I will draw from Simulacra and 
Simulation, and more specifically its first chapter, “The Precession of Simulacra”, as 
the last great work in Baudrillard’s first decade of theoretical development “replete 
with sociological and philosophical language that comes through from Baudrillard’s 
formative period”,231 rather than dismiss the text as a break from his earlier work. 
Consequently, it must also be said that Simulacra and Simulation represents the first 
great book of Baudrillard’s ‘nihilism’ of the Hyperreal. Baudrillard develops yet 
another genealogy of the simulacrum, which includes a fourth order of simulacra: 
hyperreality, which is linked to the problem of representation, and offers an 
engagement with Nietzsche’s ‘wager on representation’ that is traditionally grounded 
on a higher reality and humanity’s ability to ‘mediate’ the real through 
                                                
228 Mike Gane, Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty, 24. 
229 Pataphysics is a nonsensical pseudo-philosophy, adopted by Baudrillard, meant to parody the 
theory and methodology of modern science. The term was coined by Alfred Jarry, best know for 
the play Ubu Roi (1896). 
230 Mike Gane, ibid., 24. 
231 Mike Gane, ibid., 24. Gane’s work is important because, in an attempt to rescue Baudrillard 
from critiques of racism, sexism and absurdity, Gane identifies the totalizing language of 
hyperreality as an attempt by Baudrillard to highlight the radical gestalt shift of lost relation which 
occurs in the West under the rule of the semiotic. Gane reminds the reader that it is Baudrillard’s 
“view that writing should not aim to capture the real world, but should exist as its poetic 
challenge.” Mike Gane, foreword to Mass Identity Architecture: Architectural Writings of Jean Baudrillard, 
by Francesco Proto (Chichester: Wiley-Academy), x. For example, rather than a proto-fascist 
hyperbole and polemical spin, Baudrillard’s attack against the “artificial memory” of the 1978 NBC 
mini-series HOLOCAUST as the “restaging of extermination” is the only radically anti-fascist 
stance to take. (Baudrillard 1994, 49-51) This is one of the radical problems presented by 
hyperreality and will be addressed in the project as a whole. 
 83 
representation.232 In this genealogy Baudrillard moves beyond the simple determinacy 
of the code mentioned earlier; and by the forth order of simulacra, ‘the real’ –a product 
of the semiotic order– is itself simulated through the apparatus of electronic media. The 
epoch of Hyperreality emerges when it is no longer the difference between the 
simulation and the real that is of concern (as it was with Eco), but it is the 
disappearance of the real into the simulation, and a simulation of simulation organizes 
the world. To Baudrillard, this goes far beyond a ‘local’ phenomenon; hyperreality is 
a total system of signification. 
Baudrillard’s radical extension of the hyperreal into the American landscape – 
and through much of Western Europe by means of capitalist expansion since the end of 
the Second World War– appears to be on an entirely different order than anything 
Mumford, Boorstin or Eco ever envisaged. Returning to Baudrillard’s critique of Los 
Angeles by way of Disneyland it is easy to situate the role the code of consumption and 
the phantasmagoric commodity plays in the ‘Disneyfication’ of the city. 
‘Disneyfication’ is by no means a fiction; “Disney’s image as an icon of American 
culture is consistently reinforced through the penetration of the Disney empire into 
many aspects of social life.”233 The monorail at the Bush airport in Houston, Texas, and 
the underground monorail system connecting the U. S. Capital to the Dirksen and Hart 
Senate Buildings are modeled after Disney’s234; malls model their retailing strategy 
                                                
232 Jean Baudrillard, The Procession of Simulacra, 5. The genealogy of the ‘image’ simultaneously 
develops and contradicts (in so far as he jettisons any notion of a history of political economy) his 
order of simulacra in Symbolic. Baudrillard, begins with 1) the “reflection of a profound reality”, also 
called the sacramental order, then becomes 2) a masking of reality, also called the maleficence 
order, 3) there then emerges an absence of reality in ‘representation’, also called the order of 
sorcery and finally 4) there is no relation to reality nor does it belong to the order of appearances –
“it is its own pure simulacrum” and the order of simulation. (Jean Baudrillard, The Precession of 
Simulacra, 5.) This fourth order is called hype rr eal i ty . 
233 Henry A. Giroux, The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 1999), 86-87. 
234 On Track –The Disney Trains: This is How We Roll, March 16, 2007 Houston Airport System 
Newsroom, http://www.fly2houston.com/0/178336/0/1906D1934/. 
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after Disney’s “themed environments”; New York’s famous West Forty-Second Street 
Times Square –including studios for Disney-owned news corporation ABC– have been 
largely renovated by the Parent Company;235 none is more disturbing, however, than the 
model American town built and run by Disney –Celebration, Florida.  
The first of its kind in a “branded world”, residents of Celebration live “the 
fully branded experience” and, for Disney, represent the achievement of the “ultimate 
goal of lifestyle branding: for the brand to become life itself”, as Naomi Klein argues in 
No Logo.236 Celebration, Florida, is quite simply a ‘branded village’.237 Celebration is 
thoroughly an ordered colony of the Disney Empire and something far more insidious 
than Naomi Klein’s “branded village”. Although the image and likeness of Mickey 
Mouse is prohibited in Celebration –the village is the brand. With Celebration it is no 
longer the difference between the simulation of a town and a real town (as Eco judged 
it) but, in Baudrillard’s terms, it is the disappearance of a real town into the simulation; 
Celebration is a ‘hyperreal village’. Here, however, we begin to make the turn. 
Celebration is a terribly complex situation to unpack. While it certainly shows signs of 
‘hyperreality’, as described by Eco and Baudrillard, Celebration is a thriving lifeworld 
replete with its own set of complex practices. Whilst the branded village of Celebration, 
Florida, affords the opportunity to examine Baudrillard’s hyperreality from the ground 
                                                
235 Henry Dubroff, “Disney Makes Times Square Safe for Mickey,” The Denver Business Journal, May 
2, 1997, Online edition, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/1997/05/05/newscolumn1.html; Herbert 
Muschamp, “A Palace for a New Magic Kingdom, West 42d St.,” The New York Times, Theater, 
Architecture View, May 11, 1997, Online edition, 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0F12F93B540C728DDDAC0894DF494D81
&n=Top%2fNews%2fBusiness%2fCompanies%2fDisney%2c%20Walt%2c%20Company; Bill 
Carter, “Part ABC Studio, Part Disney Billboard,” The New York Times, Theater, Architecture 
View, May 11, 1997, Online edition, 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0F12F93B540C728DDDAC0894DF494D81
&n=Top%2fNews%2fCompanies%2fDisney%2c%20Walt%2c%20Company. 
236 Naomi Klein, No Logo (New York: Picador, 2000), 152-155. 
237 Naomi Klein, ibid., 182. 
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in the hopes of seeing Baudrillard’s concerns in a more empirical way there is no room 
for that investigation here. 
 
TOWARDS A NEW METHODOLOGY 
Not only do the problems and questions of the ersatz, as originally highlighted 
in Marie Antoinette’s Petit Hameau, arise in a phenomenon like Celebration; but its 
existence can arguably be seen as an exposed nerve on the American landscape, 
revealing a far greater problem –the relationship between hyperreality and 
consumerism. ‘Disneyfication’ is a term used to identify a much larger phenomenon in 
the West, described in great detail by Lewis Mumford in The City in History. While the 
growth of capitalism helped the West overcome the limitations of the medieval 
economy, “capitalism tended to dismantle the whole structure of urban life and place it 
upon a new impersonal basis: money and profit.”238 As the growth of urban landscapes 
and the creation of new cities coincided with the growth of capitalism, argues 
Mumford, “the nature and the purpose of the city had been completely forgotten”.239 
New city extensions under capitalism –often built for the sake of capitalist interests 
rather than human needs and activities– were treated as consumable and digestible 
abstract units built for the purpose of advancing personal profit and gain.240 “This 
metropolitan world, then,” says Mumford, “is a world where flesh and blood are less 
real than paper and ink and celluloid.”241 Similar to Boorstin’s conclusions regarding 
the pseudo-event and technological advancements, Mumford extends Boorstin’s 
critiques by making connections between an obfuscation of ‘the real’ and the emerging 
capitalist urban landscape. In general, Baudrillard’s own historical geneaology draws 
                                                
238 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects, 416. 
239 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 419. 
240 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 421-426. 
241 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 547. (emphasis mine) 
 86 
heavily from Mumford’s view of the city in human history. However, how far can we 
follow Baudrillard in particular?  
The questions and problems raised by Jean Baudrillard (and anticipated with 
greater historical and anthropological detail by Lewis Mumford, Daniel Boorstin and 
Umberto Eco) are both historically relevant, and pose potentially ominous ethical and 
theological dilemmas, and therefore are cause for concern and response. Baudrillard 
offers a unique articulation of a specific historical phenomenon, and an equally enticing 
possibility of response through a recovery of the poetic and religious as forms of 
tactical resistance towards the ordering of human lifeworlds. However, the challenges, 
which are general, but which in Baudrillard’s case are framed by his process of 
extending Marxian critiques of consumerism, and the post-structuralist critique of 
semiotics, to the entire fabric of Western civilization, are legion. Baudrillard is brash, 
broad sweeping, and admittedly experimental with his work. On the one hand, we are 
faced with the imprecision of a broad brushstroke and, on the other, we must address 
Baudrillard’s unique attempt to provide an all-consuming and total critique of the 
problems of global marketing practices (its ideologizing, propagandizing, power and 
control-seeking) and consumer activities, by saying that it is, in effect, the entire ‘pitch’ 
which is faulty and any specific tactics we try to implement as forms of resistance 
ultimately fall impotent. Ultimately, Baudrillard’s assessment of late 20th-century 
Western civilization –along with Mumford and Boorstin– can profitably be developed 
in a new, different framework and approach. 
Far from a simple rejection of Baudrillard, the following chapters build upon 
the fault-lines that have been pointed out thus far and constitute a radical reworking of 
Baudrillard’s assessment of the scene and his subsequent critique. Aside from 
Baudrillard’s highly idiosyncratic ‘way’, there are several points in his work that must 
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be addressed; it is from these points where I will levy a re-articulation of hyperreality. 
Broadly speaking, Baudrillard’s dependence on a ‘platonic-cartesian’ formulation of 
picturing and criticism is of fundamental importance in my critique of his work. How 
good is his picture of ‘representation’, ‘simulacra’, and more generally, 
‘simulacrization’? Although he begins with Marxian and neo-Marxian critiques, 
Baudrillard’s most dramatic pictures are largely theoretical imaginings drawn from 
Plato, Descartes, and structural linguistics. Certainly Umberto Eco suffers from a 
similar ‘cartesian’ picturing, stemming from his particular use of linguistics, but yet, 
Eco’s pronouncements are based on first person investigations and Eco resists building 
them up into a metaphysics. Baudrillard’s ‘platonic-cartesian’ picturing of human 
beings also leads to a crucial and fundamental misstep in his developing thesis during 
his first decade of work. Fundamentally, Baudrillard’s picture of the totalizing ills of 
hyperreality are only possible because of his faulty anthropology of human living and, 
subsequently, of the role of the human imagination (sometimes absent, other times 
totally colonized) in the activities of everyday life. Rather than moving on to any direct 
response to ‘hyperreality’, the task of the next chapter will be to introduce a new 
methodology and approach towards this unsettling characterization of the ‘hyperreality 
phenomenon’, and a re-articulation of the greater ethical issues at stake. 
Andrew Ross’s investigation of the complex lifeworld of Celebration already 
shows that in order to make any further use of Baudrillard’s hyperreality insights a new 
methodological approach will be necessary to re-articulate the phenomenon and the 
complications of hyperreality. When we seek to examine and re-conceive hyperreality 
from the ground, the variables are far too many: the human lifeworld is far too complex 
for the ‘cool logic’ of the ‘code’ to be made to stick. With that said, there are some very 
real ethical issues at stake. The problem of hyperreality is fundamentally an anti-human 
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phenomenon to Baudrillard, which separates us from true human living as pictured in 
‘symbolic exchange’. Essentially, Baudrillard argues that we are prevented from 
living a true human life because of the hyperreal ordering principle. This 
truncation is directly related, then, to a manner in which late-capitalist societies 
(specifically the U. S. A. where an estimated 70% of the nation’s wealth comes from 
consumer spending) are ordered through the logic of consumerism; and meaning 
becomes normative through the logic of mass communication.242 However, the question 
remains: how viable and satisfactory is Baudrillard’s picture of hyperreality as an 
evaluative device? Because of his idiosyncratic dependence on ‘platonic-cartesian’ 
pictures of representation, signification and truth, and his lack of on the ground 
applicable examples, Baudrillard fails to adequately characterize human forms of life 
thus weakening his ability to speak to complex lifeworlds. It is for these reasons that a 
new approach and methodology is now needed. 
                                                
242 David J. Lynch, “Consumer spending at 71% of GDP as other sectors shrink,” USA Today, 
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consumer-spending_N.htm; PBS Newshour, “Holiday Shopping Brings Economic Concerns into 
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Chapter 3 
THE COLONIZATION OF HUMAN LIFEWORLDS: 
A QUESTION OF METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
 
 
This chapter will concern itself with 1) outlining a brief history of what might 
be anachronistically called the philosophical ‘return’ to human bodies, the complexity 
of lifeworlds (Lebenswelt), and human forms of life (Lebensform), specifically focusing 
on the work of Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein and contemporary 
anthropologist Tim Ingold in the hopes of 2) uncovering a problem far more invasive 
and ominous than previously articulated in chapters one and two, and laying out the 
scaffolding for a new methodological approach in the hopes of highlighting possible 
forms of resistance. Roughly divided into two unequal parts, or movements, this 
chapter constitutes ‘the turn’ away from Baudrillard’s rhetorical and nihilistic 
theoretical games towards a re-articulation of the complex historical phenomenon 
we’ve gleaned from the work of Lewis Mumford, Daniel Boorstin, Umberto Eco, the 
example of Marie Antoinette’s Petit Hameau, and even in Baudrillard’s earliest work. 
This chapter will specifically focus on crafting a new characterization of this 
‘hyperreality’ phenomenon; I will describe this characterization as the colonization of 
the human imagination and human forms of life. 
 
LEBENSWELT: BODIES-IN-THE-WORLD 
 
 To methodologically speak of a ‘re-turn’ to bodies-in-the-world is to presuppose 
that there ever was a turn away. In the modern philosophical tradition, the turn away 
from the body-in-the-world towards a mis-characterization of detached rational 
cognition as the sole arbiter of truth judgments is credited to the 17th-century French 
philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). Briefly, to speak of a ‘Cartesian’ philosophy 
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is to advocate an erroneous emphasis on the division of the ‘res cogitans’243 (the 
thinking thing) and the physical world (res extensa, which includes the corporal). In the 
Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition, Cartesian philosophy methodologically argues that 
the former is the only reliable faculty to make truth judgments because it is viewed as 
‘non-physical’ and, while subject to error, is incorruptible in a metaphysical sense. The 
hope of this rationalist tradition was “to provide philosophy with the exactness of 
mathematics” and was built on the belief that “simply by operating according to the 
appropriate method [the mind] can discover the nature of the [external] universe.”244 In 
Descartes’s own words we can hear this mathematical metaphysics and its problematic 
aim. “These long chains of reasoning, each of them simple and easy . . . have given me 
an occasion for imagining that . . . there is nothing so far distant that one cannot finally 
reach nor so hidden that one cannot discover. . . . and thus make ourselves, as it were, 
masters and possessors of nature.”245 In the Cartesian subject/object characterization of 
the universe everything is epistemologically present and knowable to the thinking 
subject through the proper cognitive method. This ‘Cartesian’ dichotomy of a non-
physical mind (res cogitans) extending out into a world of ‘things’ (res extensa) 
became a calcified presupposition in Western philosophy for the next three hundred 
years, and even surfaces in the French Structuralism (which draws heavily on a science 
of signs or semiology) that greatly influenced Baudrillard’s move away from Henri 
Lefebvre. However, as Gilbert Ryle points out, “it would not be true to say that the 
official theory derives solely from Descartes’ theories, or even from a more widespread 
                                                
243 The term Cogtio or ‘the thinking mind’ comes from Descartes epistemological dictum ‘cogito ergo 
sum’ (I think, therefore I am) –a statement with broad sweeping implications– found in both his 
Discourse on the Method (1637) and Principles of Philosophy (1644). 
244 Samuel Enoch Stumpf, ed., Philosophy: History and Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 236. 
245 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations of First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress 
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anxiety about the implications of seventeenth-century mechanics”.246 Ryle goes on to 
provide a succinct historical genealogy of the modern problem: 
Scholastic and Reformation theology had schooled the 
intellects of the scientists as well as of the laymen, 
philosophers and clerics of that age. Stoic-Augustinian theories 
of the will were embedded in the Calvinist doctrines of sin and 
grace; Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the intellect shaped 
the orthodox doctrines of the immortality of the soul. 
Descartes was reformulating already prevalent theological 
doctrines of the soul in the new syntax of Galileo. The 
theologian’s privacy of the conscience became the 
philosopher’s privacy of the consciousness, and what had been 
the bogy of Predestination reappeared as the bogy of 
Determinism.247 
 
In the late 19th and early 20th century a particular strand of Western philosophy 
(specifically in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger) argued that the 
subject/object problem was not simply a ‘modern’ problem but was as old as 
metaphysics itself. One of Nietzsche’s philosophical concerns was with what he saw as 
the philosophically academic tendency towards detached rational problems; Nietzsche, 
instead, sought to return philosophy to the “true and urgent problems of life.”248 
Nietzsche’s writings stylistically and radically undermined the presuppositions of 
rational academic discourse with his use of poetic language, anecdotes and metaphors 
in his writings. In his first major work, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche 
articulates what he sees as the fundamental problem in the Western philosophical 
tradition –a dichotomy between the rational and aesthetic experience. He explains that 
the ‘aesthetic vision’ of the archaic Greek world manifest in the worship of the gods 
Dionysus (the god of aesthetic revelry) and Apollo (the god of rational order who 
                                                
246 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 24. 
247 Gilbert Ryle, ibid., 24. 
248 Cf: November 20, 1867 letter from Friedrich Nietzsche to Erwin Rohde. (emphasis mine) 
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balanced their daily existence) was suppressed by the Hellenic culture of Socrates and 
his student Plato.249 “The artist, we say, this maker of images, knows nothing of the 
reality, but only the appearances”, says Plato.250 Indeed, in his The Republic, Plato goes 
so far as to say that poets are to be kicked out of the Republic of the philosopher king.  
Although the Western metaphysical tradition can be traced back to Socrates and 
Plato, Nietzsche certainly had the metaphysics of German philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) in mind as he wrote. Kantian philosophy (by way of modifications by 
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), specifically Kantian metaphysics and Kant’s critical 
theory of knowledge, is precisely the ‘academic’ philosophy detached from everyday 
living that Nietzsche opposes. Specifically, it is Kant’s division of the noumenal 
(timeless) world of “things-in-themselves” and phenomenal world of “things-as-they-
appear” (which we know through our senses and which separate us from the timeless 
noumena) that is most problematic to a philosopher like Nietzsche so concerned with 
an everyday world of action. “All philosophers share this common error”, derides 
Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human (1878, 79, 80).251 “Automatically they think of 
‘man’ as an eternal verity, as something abiding in the whirlpool, as a sure measure of 
things. Everything that the philosopher says about man, however, is at bottom no more 
than a testimony about the man of a very limited period. Lack of a historical sense is 
the original error of all philosophers.”252 
Martin Heidegger also viewed the rationalist tendency and the ‘Cartesian’ 
subject/object dichotomy as part of the larger Western metaphysical tradition –
however, Heidegger also considered Nietzsche within that problematic tradition. The 
                                                
249 The greatest assault is laid out in chapters xxiv, xxxv and xxxvi of Plato’s The Republic. 
250 Plato, The Republic, trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford (London: Oxford University Press, 
1945), 331. 
251 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Human, All Too Human,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter 
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basis of Heidegger’s philosophy was a “destruction of the history of philosophy” with 
the express purpose of investigating and recovering the “question of the meaning of 
Being”.253 His approach to the problem was a return to the question of “fundamental 
ontology” –the lack of this approach to ontology was ultimately Nietzsche’s greatest 
handicap. Dermot Moran succinctly articulates Heidegger’s concerns: “Heidegger 
rejected traditional metaphysical approaches to the question of Being as having 
misunderstood the nature of beings by understanding them as ‘things’ [. . .]. 
Heidegger’s central insight is that traditional metaphysical understanding is actually a 
sedimentation of a kind of everyday set of assumptions about reality”.254 Like 
Nietzsche, Heidegger saw the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as the key exemplar of the 
Cartesian subject/object dichotomy in the modern tradition. “Kant adopts this definition 
of the ego as res cogitans in the sense of cogito me cogitare except that he formulates it 
in a more fundamental ontological way. He says the ego is that whose determinations 
are representation in the full sense of repraesentatio. . . . The ego is a res, whose 
realities are representations, cogitations. . . . Representations are determinations of the 
ego, its predicates.”255 Here Heidegger brings to our attention once more the integral 
relationship between the Western metaphysical tradition and the tradition of simulacra 
or representation particularly important to this dissertation. Heidegger’s philosophical 
project is immense, and parts of it will be unpacked with greater detail in the pages to 
                                                
253 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2006), 195,196. Walter Biemel 
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follow –in the process, we will address the topic of simulacra in the hopes of re-
characterizing its role in the human lifeworld with this new methodology. 
 What follows, then, is a brief look at three scholars (Martin Heidegger, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and Tim Ingold) whose work represents a methodological approach to 
world –which redraws body/world and body/perception characterizations– that will be 
deployed in the remaining chapters. This coming together of related methodologies is 
both A) anti-‘Cartesian’ and B) increasingly interdisciplinary. This chassis is also to be 
found in the abandoned doctoral dissertation of filmmaker Terrence Malick: The 
Concept of ‘World’ in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Wittgenstein that is now only 
known from a passing assertion in the introduction to his translation of Heidegger’s 
Vom Wesen Des Grundes.256 Malick notes, “the ‘world’, on [Heidegger’s] definition, is 
not the ‘totality of things’ but that in terms of which we understand them, that which 
give them measure and purpose and validity in our schemes. [. . .]. [T]he ‘world’ is 
meant to be that which can keep us from seeing, or force us to see, that what we have is 
one. Heidegger’s concept is quite like Kierkegaard’s ‘sphere of existence’ and 
Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’”.257 For this reason, the methodology is not purely 
‘phenomenological’ –in the tradition of Brentano and Husserl– per se, but is focused on 
broadening and deploying the richness of what has been characterized as Lebenswelt, 
the lifeworld, and what that characterization implies for the questions that have been 
raised thus far. Finally, this move should not be seen as a step back –historically 
speaking– from the post-structuralist and post-modern problems raised in Baudrillard’s 
                                                
256 It should be noted that while Kierkegaard was part of Malick’s original dissertation proposal he 
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made use of a laying-out of ‘existence-spheres’ which are in effect forms-of-life and of-being-a-
person. 
257 Terrence Malick, introduction to The Essence of Reasons, by Martin Heidegger, trans. Terrence 
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work. Indeed, this move is to say that an ‘alternate route’ forward –one not considered 
in Baudrillard’s work– may enliven our understanding of ‘hyperreality’ and better 
grasp its ethical implications for the 21st-century world. 
 
HEIDEGGER: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD 
One central concern in the work of Martin Heidegger is the phenomenological 
task of returning to ‘things themselves’ by getting underneath the philosophical 
constructions we put upon them. Heidegger proceeds by developing what he calls a 
fundamental ontology, a phenomenological (and in its own way ontological)258 
investigation of basic deep structures of human being-in-the-world with others; and 
with and through that, of other ‘modes of being’ that are there disclosed. As part of this 
investigation he seeks to exhume Greek thinking about Being, entities and their 
relationship to unhiddenness –that is what ‘opens’ entities to us and makes our 
‘dealings’ (Umgang) in the world and with entities possible. 259  First and foremost, 
fundamental ontology is concerned with what it means to be a human person living in 
the everyday world. As Being-in-the-world (In-der-welt-sein), human persons are inter-
connected to world and things in the world; we are inextricably linked –ontologically– 
in a nexus of continual concern with our everyday dealings. Heidegger says, “the world 
is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein, with the disclosedness of the 
world, the ‘world’ has in each case been discovered too.”260 Involved entities (what 
Heidegger calls ready-to-hand) are unhidden in relation to the use and concerns of 
human beings. And one further key to the more complex patterns of human living is 
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understanding the human person’s ability to project (entwurf) its own possibilities of 
Being-in-the-world through its practices, including those of art and technology –not as 
a pre-conceived ‘plan’ but as a fundamental and primordial part of what it means to be 
a human person always already involved in the world. 
 
THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD  
AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF WORLD 
 
 In order to describe the character of Being-in-the-world Heidegger must initially 
re-articulate the philosophical character of ‘world’ (which he describes as the 
worldhood of the world) and its phenomenological structure –that is what it is, to 
experience world as world. Of significance to Heidegger is how the concept of ‘world’ 
is something so seemingly trivial that the Western philosophical tradition (from 
Socrates and even including Nietzsche) has largely taken it for granted, and 
misconceived world.261 This taking for granted and misconception of ‘world’ has 
problematically led to artificial distinctions placed between subject and objects, and self 
and world (e.g. Cartesian dualism) –which Heidegger seeks to demonstrate to be false. 
Of concern to Heidegger, then, is how “traditional ontology operates in a blind alley” 
                                                
261 It should be noted that there is strong evidence to suggest that Heidegger’s characterizations of 
Being and Dasein in Being and Time is greatly influenced by Eastern philosophical and religious 
thinking; more specifically, as Richard May makes the strong argument in Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, 
was his exposure to German translations of Daoist classics and Zen Buddhist texts. Fully 
embracing this influence may or may not be cited as a motivation for what has been described as 
the ‘turn’ (or more literally, but not necessarily more accurately, ‘reversal’) in Heiddeger’s work (die 
Kehre) after the publication of Being in Time. William Richardson, S. J., in Heidegger: Through 
Phenomenology to Thought, originally, and controversially, describes this in terms of Heidegger I and 
Heidegger II. There is no room or time to fully explore that particular reading of his work; what 
will be said about my approach to Heidegger’s turn is that: 1) As Father Richardson suggests in a 
new preface to his book, this ‘shift’ has been largely overstated and should be approached as a 
going deeper into what Heidegger began in Being and Time; 2) if there is a ‘change’ or ‘reversal’ to be 
considered, I follow Hubert Dreyfus’ suggestion, in his Fall 2007 UC Berkley lectures on 
Heidegger, available online, that Heidegger’s turn was simply a recognition that to speak of Dasein 
‘broadly’ was a mistake and rather there are differently situated characterizations of Dasein to be 
made; 3) these two points make a satisfactory account of Heidegger’s growing emphasis on 
dwelling without overstating the differences, per se, between dwelling and activity. 
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when trying to describe the world’s ‘worldhood’.262 In taking into account entities, or 
things in the world, ‘world’ is something already presupposed. This act of presupposing 
world in this traditional way results in a taking into account of ‘things’ (substances) in 
the world by assigning value-predicates to self-sufficient beings (i.e. the subject names 
objects removed from their involved world) and results in the de-worlding of things, 
says Heidegger. “The concept of world, or the phenomenon thus designated, is what 
has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy.”263 In the Western tradition, then, 
‘to be’ is to ‘be’ a substance (res), which Heidegger calls presence-at-hand 
[Vorhandenheit] and because it deprives the world of its worldhood is not suitable for 
Dasein.264  
Rejecting this ‘atomistic’ view of things in ‘the world’, worldhood as such, in 
Heidegger’s more holistic characterization, takes Dasein’s (there-being) Being-in-the-
world as always already involved in a structure of significance as primary. Rather than 
accepting the traditional characterization of ‘Things’ (res), Heidegger returns to the 
original Greek term for things –pragmata– “that is to say, that which has to do with 
one’s concernful dealings (praxis)”.265 The Greeks, however, and here Heidegger means 
particularly Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, left this term “obscure” and understood 
pragmata as proximal substances or “mere Things”. In the hopes of recovering the 
originary character of pragmata, Heidegger deploys the term equipment (das Zeug). 
Heidegger calls the Being of equipment –as a thing always “in-order-to”– readiness-to-
hand (Zuhandenheit).266 Heidegger calls the ‘sight’ by which Dasein grasps and deploys 
the structure of equipment in its everyday concernful dealings circumspection 
                                                
262 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 94. 
263 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 165. 
264 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 67, 94. 
265 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 96-97. 
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(Umsicht). What Heidegger means to imply with Umsicht is that Dasein and readiness-
to-hand are taken up together in everyday concerns. The totality of this manifold 
structure Heidegger calls “significance”.267 Over and against the traditional Western 
philosophical tradition, our involvement always and already in and with a world of 
significance –taking up activities and practices in order to take a stand on our own 
Being– ‘is’ the structure of the worldhood of the world.  
The whole of these relations, everything that belongs to the structure 
of the totality with which the Dasein can in any way give itself 
something to be understood, to signify to itself its ability to be, we 
call significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. This is the structure of what we 
call world in the strictly ontological sense. …World is a 
determination of the Dasein’s being. This is expressed from the 
outset when we say that Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. The 
world belongs to the Dasein’s existential constitution. World is not 
extant but world exists.268  
 
The phenomenon of the world, then, is characterized as a “meshing” of the worldhood 
of the world and the structure of Dasein’s equipmental relations –that is, Dasein’s 
‘coping’ with being-in-the-world through skills and practices. Although the primordial 
structure of Dasein and its interconnected relationship with the other two modes of 
Being, present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, will be further unpacked, world and Dasein 
should be further characterized in its relation to ‘other’ Daseins. 
 
MITSEIN AND MITDASEIN 
 
As an essential part of his characterizations of the existential structure of Dasein 
–“who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness”– Heidegger emphasizes a critical 
equiprimordial, multi-personal and social component in his phenomenology.269 
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Although some philosophers have criticized Heidegger for not giving a greater 
emphasis to this social component, “Heidegger seeks to show that while there are a 
plurality of centered disclosing activities, these activities presuppose the disclosure of 
one shared world.”270 In division one, chapter four, of Being and Time, the social sphere 
is not to be interpreted as an additional aspect of Dasein but is an existential 
characteristic of Dasein –which Heidegger calls Mitsein (being-with) and Mitdasein 
(Dasein-with).271 Of significant importance to Heidegger is revealing the character of 
everydayness –the “they”, or as Hubert Dreyfus translates it “the one”– in Dasein’s 
being-with.  
Heidegger begins by posing the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein and exploring a 
phenomenologically adequate answer.  The ‘who’ of the everyday Dasein must be 
considered in its proximal environment; Dasein is absorbed in the world. Rather than a 
present-at-hand self sufficient ‘substance’, in the tradition of Plato and Descartes, the 
who of Dasein is the being who takes a stand on its own Being in and with the 
everyday concerns and activities of the world. This existence in-the-world, on which 
Dasein takes a stand, is always already shared or public. When considering the work-
world of the craftsman, as Heidegger does, the Being of Dasein is proximally situated 
in relation to the equipment the craftsman uses and the ‘Others’ for whom the work is 
done, and also by whom the work is received.272 By ‘Other’, however, Heiddeger wants 
to be clear “we do not mean everyone else but me …” but rather “the world is always 
the one that I share with Others.”273 Heidegger is clear on this point: when we say 
Being-in-the-world, the world of Dasein is a Mitwelt (with-world) and Being-in, per se, 
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is always a being-with other Daseins –and so the Being of Dasein must be 
characterized as Mitdasein (Dasein-with). In this way, the very structure of what it 
means to be a human being is to ever be there-being-with; and the world of Dasein, 
says Heidegger, is lived as a with-world.274 The existential structure of Dasein and of 
‘Others’ always ever is equiprimordially situated in, with, and for others. Somewhat 
similar to Sorge (care) –which is seen in the comportment which Dasein has towards 
equipment ready-to-hand– Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s Being towards ‘other’ 
Dasein as Fürsorge or solicitude. 
 
BEFINDLICHKEIT, VERSTEHEN AND DIE REDE 
Existentially, the Being of Dasein, says Heidegger, is disclosed spatially in-the-
world as a ‘there-Being’. The ‘there’ in Heidegger’s description means that to be 
human is to be specifically situated in a ‘location’, both proximally present and being 
towards the distant (more accurately, our thereness implies that the ‘distant’ is less 
remote or Entfernheit) in all our trajectories and concernful dealings in everyday life. In 
taking its ‘there’ with it, the existential-ontological structure of Dasein is such that it 
brings its disclosedness with it in its proximal activities. The ‘there’ of Dasein means 
that “it is itself the clearing [Lichtung]”275 and “only for an entity which is existentially 
cleared in this way”, says Heidegger, “does that which is present-at-hand [that which is 
hidden and inaccessible] become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark.”276 To 
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275 Hubert Dreyfus points out that in Lichtung [Licht means light and Lichtung is literally a clearing in 
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borrow a helpful description from Hubert Dreyfus, the existential-ontological structure 
of Dasein moves in-the-world as a field of disclosure.277  
Being-there is equiprimordially constituted as Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and das 
Rede –the latter articulates both Befindlichkeit and Verstehen in everyday proximal 
activity. What this means is that the existential everydayness of Dasein, situated in a 
nexus of cares in-the-world, is constituted by, and manifested in, these particular 
phenomena. Being-there as Befindlichkeit –‘the state in which one founds oneself’– is a 
recognition of ‘our’ attunement (die Stimmung) to the phenomena of our everyday cares 
of being-in-the-world and with and through that, our attunement to ‘the world’. 
Contrary to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation [state-of-mind] however, 
Befindlichkeit is not a subjective mental activity nor is die Stimmung an exclusively 
subjective psychological “inner-state”. Stimmung implies a far more corporal and 
holistic mode of being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s word choice here is, as always, 
provocative and revealing; Stimmung literally means the tuning of an instrument.278 
According to Heidegger, then, “the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition 
reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to die 
Stimmung”.279 Stimmung runs deeper and wider than rationalist notions of ‘cognition’ –
indeed, all forms of ‘cognition’ grow out of, and build on, Stimmung. Alternatively, 
Hubert Dreyfus points out that die Stimmung is not to be interpreted as a “third-person, 
objective behavior”.280 Rather, die Stimmung is a situational-in-the-world comportment 
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in a public nexus –as Being-in-the-world– which reveals.281 Said differently, die 
Stimmung encompasses our own directedness/adaptation/behavior towards, in relation 
to, and involvement with, our everyday concerns and the ‘entities’ involved in them. 
Because die Stimmung, as a mode of revealing, is not something ‘we have’ but is 
always something ‘we are in’ –as Dermot Moran claims, “a way the world itself 
appears”– we can never rise above nor detach from ‘the world’ in order to gain insight. 
Heidegger calls the recognition of the situated disclosure of Dasein grundstimmung –a 
recognition of ‘thrownness’.282 We are thrown into a situated nexus of beliefs, practices 
signs and symbols; this everyday Stimmung “determine not just what we do but how 
things show up for us.”283 
Verstehen –the second way of Being-in-the-world by which Heidegger 
characterizes the equiprimordial constitution of Dasein in its ‘there’ and often 
translated into English as ‘Understanding’– is not to be confused as primarily a 
cognitive state. “It might be said that understanding [as achievement, Verständnis] is a 
type of cognition and, correspondingly, understanding [as act, Verstehen] is a specific 
type of cognitive comportment.”284 However, Being-there as understanding is the 
projection [Entwurf], or literally the throwing, of Dasein into the possibility of its 
Being-in-the-world, and thereby and therewith, the ‘possibility-aspect’ and ‘possibility-
dimension’ of ‘world’. “In the projecting [Entwurf] of the understanding [Verstehen], 
entities are disclosed in their possibility.”285 This point is significant to note, as 
Verstehen will continue to play a crucial role in the unfolding of the dissertation. In his 
Being and Time, Heidegger explains that Verstehen is the condition by which human 
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there-beings project the possibilities of being. “It is the condition of possibility for all 
kinds of comportment, not only practical but also cognitive”.286 Understanding is not 
only the unveiling of Dasein’s possibility but it is the unveiling of Dasein as the 
possibility it projects. “As projecting,” Heidegger says, “understanding is the kind of 
Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities.”287 Understanding, as 
existentially primordial projection, is the claim that the there of Being is inextricably 
tied, not only to its comportments, but also more importantly to the possibilities of 
Being.  
Although Heidegger does not spell it out, principally, we can say that 
Verstehen also brings to light the primary involvement of the human imagination 
in our everyday lives. How we will comport ourselves, the equipment we will craft, 
and who we will be are dependent on human imagining such possibilities. Beyond 
simple logical contingency, this characterization is a far deeper and ontologically more 
originary concept of possibility. Heidegger says, “[the Human being] is in every case 
what it can be and in the way in which it is its possibility . . . as projecting, 
understanding is the kind of Being of [the Human being] in which it is its possibilities 
as possibilities.”288 As we move forward and play out this move, then,  it is important to 
note that the projection of possibilities by a there-Being –who is existentially-
ontologically characterized by those possibilities– in modes of revealing, disclosing, 
and unconcealing are indeed a central feature to Dasein because there is a fundamental 
existential relationship between who we are, how we comport ourselves and the manner 
in which we dwell in-the-world. 
                                                
286 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems in Phenomenology, 276. 
287 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 185. 
288 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 183-184. 
 104 
Finally, das Rede is the third specialized Heideggarian feature of the 
equiprimordial constitution of Dasein in its ‘there’. Rede is far deeper and more varied 
than basic linguistic ‘discourse’ (as Macquarrie and Robinson gloss it). Heidegger, 
however, uses das Rede to show the ontological foundation of language by first 
establishing a necessary link between Befindlichkeit, Understanding and hermeneutical 
concerns which arise from signification. Rede (literally talk) is glossed by Dreyfus as 
‘telling’ and includes various non-linguistic senses of the English ‘tell’ to deliberately 
accentuate the inclusion of its non-linguistic deployment in Heidegger’s usage. Dreyfus 
points out that in English the transitive function of ‘to tell’ implies the ability to 
distinguish. The ability to distinguish or make sense of a variety of phenomena and 
equipment (das Zeug) is a knowledge acquired through use and activity. “In complex 
domains”, says Dreyfus, “one does not have words for the subtle actions one performs 
and the subtle significations one articulates in performing them.”289 So, like Befindl 
ichkeit and Verstehen, das Rede discloses the ‘thereness’ of Being-in-the-world. Das 
Rede, however, also allows for ‘thereness’ to be Articulated (note capital A) verbally, 
through language, by “attaching words to significations” in a variety of life practices.290  
Rather than being “the sum total of all the words printed in a dictionary”, verbal 
language (die Sprache) exists in-the-world (dwells) with Dasein before being expressed 
as a disclosure of signification.291 Dasein dwells in language. Rather than a 
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characterization of language as the sum total of tonal expressions which correspond to 
abstract ideas or entities, “language is used in a shared context that is already 
meaningful, and it gets its meaning by fitting into, and contributing to, a meaningful 
whole”.292 Without the ‘shared context’ –which cannot be overlooked when articulating 
the significance of das Rede– verbal communication would be reduced to the Cartesian 
fallacy of an isolated subject/mind passing information on to another isolated 
subject/mind discussing a tertiary object.293 Heidegger says, 
communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, 
such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the 
interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a 
[Mitbefindlichkeit] and a co-understanding. In [das Rede] Being-with 
becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is 
unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and 
appropriated.294 
 
Heidegger goes on to point out that as constituent of Being-in-the-world das Rede 
partly originates ‘outside’ (not to be understood in the ‘Cartesian’ sense) as the ‘making 
known’ of Befindlichkeit, which is the recognition of our attunment [die Stimmung] to 
                                                                                                                                         
unveiled, that a word accrues to each of these meanings.”(Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems, 208-
209) 
292 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 219; Dreyfus’s language must be taken to task here. Anticipating the 
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phenomena in-the-world.295 And, as we will see, Verstehen is once again principally 
involved and drawn upon in this ‘making known’ / ‘recognition’. This is not to say that 
‘outside’ implies its origination external to a subject, but rather, communication of the 
‘thereness’ of Being –through the ‘disclosure’ of features of our Umwelt– is 
inextricably linked to the proximal nexus of existential concernful dealings and 
equipmental significations. “That is”, Dreyfus says that among its other uses, “Dasein 
uses language as a tool to point out aspects of its shared world.”296 This is highlighted 
by two possibilities which arise from das Rede: hearing and silence, both of which are 
contrasted to ‘idle talk’ [Gerede].  
 Hearing, a basic necessity for linguistic das Rede, discloses the link between 
das Rede and Verstehen. Heidegger points out that hearing, rather than being pictured 
as the exclusive claim of the subjectivity of an isolated listener, is about being-in-the-
world with others. “Being-with”, he says, “develops in listening to one another 
[Aufeinander-hören]”.297 Even more primordial is hearkening [Horchen] which is the 
hearing –not of abstract sounds but– of sounds Dasein is situated in-the-world with. 
Rather than the general or abstract, a ‘noise’ or a ‘sound’, I hear the fan of my 
computer spinning, the truck’s engine revving, the keys of my computer being struck; I 
hear my office mate asking me a question, and hearken to the call for help, I act 
accordingly, and so on. I not only hear but I exist in and with what I hear; and 
furthermore, I verstehe what I am hearing. As mentioned previously, verstehen “is not a 
mode of cognition but the basic determination of existing.”298 To hearken is not simply 
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to register but to transform or add to Dasein in a way that wasn’t with Dasein before. It 
is always involved, and involved in action and practices. 
Heidegger also claims that keeping silent is a possibility of das Rede. This 
raises the question; how can silence be a possible expression of discourse299 [das Rede]? 
If human discourse reveals the possibility of being (that is Verstehen) and the state in 
which one finds oneself (that is Befindlichkeit), then, as Heidegger puts it, reticence to 
enter into discourse ‘speaks’ –and discloses– volumes. Of course reticence is not the 
only form of silent expression. It is certainly possible to find little ‘reticences’ in one’s 
bodily and facial expressions. And often lovers or friends are able to be silent and still 
be-with, expressing a great deal. In order to make his point more clearly, Heidegger 
contrasts silence with a new term –Gerede– to describe a loquaciousness that buries 
understanding under the trivial; it is an ‘everyday’ talk that ‘uproots’, and ‘cuts off’, 
and is closely related to our ‘fallennes’300. Gerede [literally translated by Macquarrie 
and Robinson as ‘idle talk’] could be best described as Rede which does not dwell. 
“Idle talk . . . is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein’s understanding”, 
Heidegger says, “when that understanding has been uprooted.”301 Great care must be 
made in the explication of Gerede since a strong sense of value judgment could, and 
has been, associated with this concept. Heidegger begins his discussion of Gerede by 
pointing out that it should not be associated with “a ‘disparaging’ signification”: 
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300 ‘Fallenness’ is a particularly important but problematic description in Sein und Zeit. In the pull of 
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must be played out further. 
301 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 214. (emphasis mine) 
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Gerede “constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and 
interpreting”.302 And yet, when this phenomenological analysis is situated in the context 
of being-in-the-world the results could be (and have been) otherwise. Questions 
abound. What kind of people, what kind of art, what kind of writing slips into Gerede? 
The simple answer is that we all do slip into Gerede and quite often, especially in the 
company of others, for the pull of the ‘everyday’ leads to a getting lost in ‘what one 
does’. What does Gerede look like in the lived world? Nevertheless, there is a 
debilitating superficiality and quality of alienation inherent in Gerede which merits an 
attentive phenomenological reading. Communication is the expression of das Rede. 
Heidegger says this occurs on two levels: first, communication on an everyday level 
allows for general understanding however, the primordial structure of Being-with 
articulated in das Rede is glossed over in everyday communication. Mitbefindlichkeit is 
greatly impoverished and Dasein’s ability to ‘hearken to’ is truncated as superficiality 
permeates Dasein’s nexus of signification –and as a result, Dasein’s Being. Because of 
the interpenetrating relationship of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and Being-with, this 
existential uprooting is the distortion of (or perverting of) “the act of disclosing 
[Erschliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen] [. . .]. Ontologically this 
means”, he later says, “that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is –as Being-in-
the-world– cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being 
towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in.”303 In short, 
deception and triviality –even unorganized and unintentional– affects us ontologically.  
                                                
302 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 211. 
303 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 213-214. 
 109 
 
ἀλήθεια, τέχνη, AND THE QUESTION CONCERNING ‘REALITY’ 
Questions raised in the Baudrillard chapter concerning an independent and 
verifiable reality (now seen in the larger tradition of post-Cartesian demands for ‘proofs 
of the external world’) are intimately related to previously addressed (‘linguistic’) 
concerns surrounding the nature of the sign. As already mentioned, Heidegger’s 
ultimate critique of the semiological view of the sign is the position “that signifying is 
an ontologically basic relation” between signifier and signified.304 Heidegger’s overall 
picture of Being-in-the-world and Being-there effectively dismantles Baudrillardian 
picturing in principle and in detail. In contrast to that view of signification, Heidegger 
(and similarly Wittgenstein as we will soon see) sees the sign as an item of das Zeug 
whose meaning is imbedded in a particular activity, which in turn, is situated in a 
complex nexus of concernful dealings In-der-Welt. Following this phenomenological 
reading of the sign, Heidegger similarly reconsiders the philosophical question 
concerning the problem of reality along with the problem of Truth. This account 
unfolds from what has already been described about Being-In as such. 
Previously, Heidegger has insisted on the originary relationship of Dasein 
(Being-there) as In-der-Welt-Sein (Being-in-the-world). Hubert Dreyfus says, “human 
beings are never directly in the world; we are always in the world by way of being in 
some specific circumstances.”305 This situatedness is never split between a subject and 
an object which would betray the previously mentioned necessary relationship of the 
concernful dealings of Dasein and equipmental entities. What follows from this nexus 
is a radical hermeneutics of Being which re-evaluates spatiality and ultimately what 
constitutes reality. 
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The question begins with considering what is the ‘There’ (Da) in the notion of 
Being-there (Dasein)? What are the implications of ‘there’? Does ‘there’ imply a 
specific locality in a relationship between a subject and object? Doesn’t the noun 
‘there’ suggest a division between ‘here’ and ‘yonder’? Heidegger says, “Dasein begins 
its ‘there’ along with it. If it lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is 
essentially Dasein”.306 In a latter essay, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, he develops 
this idea when he refers to being-there and spatiality: “to say that mortals are is to say 
that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and 
locations. And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their very 
nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going through spaces we do not give 
up our standing in them.”307 Heidegger develops the situatedness of Dasein in the 
originary notion of Lichtung in Sein und Zeit. 
Lichtung is another difficult Heideggarian term to translate –not because its 
meaning is elusive (Lichtung carries a double meaning: it literally means a clearing in 
the forest but it also refers to the illumination or lighting [Licht] that clearing allows in) 
but in the way the term is applied. Lichtung is an aspect of the situatedness of Being-
there as Being-in-the-world situated in specific circumstances. Ontologically –and by 
this I mean “the existential-ontological structure of this entity”, as Heidegger refers to 
it308– Dasein, as In-der-Welt-Sein is Lichtung. “Only for an entity which is existentially 
cleared in this way,” Heidegger claims, “does that which is present-at-hand become 
accessible in the light [Licht] or hidden in the dark.”309 There is no ontological break or 
split (subject/object) between Dasein and entities In-der-Welt.  
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As has been highlighted, Dasein, as In-der-Welt-Sein, is inextricably linked, 
ontologically, to an everyday nexus of concernful dealings; and in this, to all the 
things/features that are involved in them. Any discussion, however, of a human being’s 
inter-connection to the world and the things in the world must necessarily turn towards 
an epistemological discussion of reality and truth. Heidegger offers a highly critical 
examination, undermining, and in effect dismantling the ‘Cartesian’ and Kantian 
traditions previously mentioned. To begin, “Heidegger wants to reformulate and 
thereby dissolve the philosophical problems concerning the possibility of knowing an 
independent reality.”310 The ‘problem of reality’ is inherited from the philosophical 
principle and pictures of knowing through perception (noein) built up within an overall 
picture of ‘separated’ ‘subject’ (or consciousness) and ‘object’ (‘thing’) that are 
supposedly related by ‘representations’ / ‘images’ which are ‘in’ the subject.311  In 
Heideggarian terms, this ‘picturing’ uproots occurrent objects from their equipmental 
nexus of everyday comportments. This ‘idle’ tendency is compounded by the 
(‘Cartesian’) philosophical project to ‘prove’ this uprooted Reality external to the 
observer-subject. Heidegger wants to demonstrate, however, that “to have faith in the 
Reality of the ‘external world’, whether rightly or wrongly; to “prove” this Reality for 
it, whether adequately or inadequately; to presuppose it, whether explicitly or not . . .  
presuppose a subject which is proximally worldless or unsure of its world, and which 
must, at bottom, first assure itself a world.”312 The ‘scandal of philosophy’, Heidegger 
asserts, is the repeated attempt –or the very conception of an attempt– to prove the 
                                                
310 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 246. 
311 As has been noted earlier, Baudrillard is highly critical of this picturing (e.g. ‘the semiotic’) 
however much of his own picture of resistance (‘the symbolic’) and his diagnosis of the ‘problem’ 
(‘hyperreality’) are dependent on this characterization. 
312 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 250. (Heidegger’s use of quotations and emphasis) 
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existence of an external, independent and verifiable reality. There have only ever been 
variations of this problem. 
Attempts to solve such a ‘problem’ range from realism, which privileges the 
ontic reality of objects which correspond to representations or images through some 
judgment of verisimilitude, to idealism and the internal accessibility of objects (to a 
subjective consciousness) in an otherwise external Reality (‘object’ ‘things’) in the res 
cogitans.313 The inherent fallacy of this project is a misunderstanding of Dasein and In-
der-Welt-Sein. “Part of the trouble”, Dreyfus says, “is that the tradition does not 
distinguish between the ‘world’ (universe) as a totality of objects and the world as the 
organized equipment and practices in which Dasein is involved, indeed, in terms of 
which Dasein defines itself.”314 We need to understand why Dasein “has the tendency 
to bury the ‘external world’ in nullity ‘epistemologically’ before going on to prove 
it”?315 Dreyfus notes Heidegger’s use of ‘Curiosity’ [neugier] –a form of ‘falling’ 
associated with gerede– to highlight the essential fallacy traditional ontology makes in 
a discussion of reality. This fallacy originates by privileging an uprooted notion of 
perception and claims that “ultimate reality is made up of context free independent 
substances.”316  
 Understanding the susceptibility of Dasein to falling and its impact on a 
discussion about reality is vitally important, as “intelligibility” is relative to Dasein; 
apart from Dasein there is no intelligible or unintelligible.317 The articulation of the 
                                                
313 The use of this term by Heidegger, beginning in the introduction of Sein und Zeit, is a reference 
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chapter. 
314 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 248. 
315 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 250. 
316 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 246. See also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 214-217. 
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world –through das Rede318– involves the emergence of reality. This is what Heidegger 
means when he says, “the world is disclosed essentially along with the Being of 
Dasein; with the disclosedness of the world, the ‘world’ has in each case been 
discovered too.”319 However, this does not imply that occurrent entities only ever ‘are’ 
when they are in relation to Dasein as das Zeug. Heidegger is very specific in pointing 
out “the fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not 
signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as 
that which in itself is.”320 Reality is dependent upon the intelligibility of Dasein but 
what is Real ‘is’, with or without Dasein. 
 Inevitably, this discussion of Reality and the Real in relation to Dasein directly 
relates to a discussion of ‘truth’. As with the problem of ‘Reality’, Heidegger hopes to 
undermine the traditional notion of ‘truth’ as the correspondence between the thinking-
assertion of an occurrent subject and, or very often, an occurrent object.321 Heidegger’s 
fundamental trajectory throughout his Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) is to question the 
underlying picture of the subject-object relationship and resituate our understanding of 
Dasein on the continuum of Being –which has been done thus far. To the question of 
‘truth’, then, Dasein ‘is’ that being which presupposes there is truth because the there-
being ontologically resides primordially ‘in the truth’ –“[‘truth’] is a kind of Being 
which belongs to Dasein”.322 However, because of ‘falling’ the “state of [Dasein’s] 
                                                
318 “The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any 
appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it 
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319 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 247. 
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321 The tradition of the adaequatio intellectus et rei from Parmenidies, and Aristotle to Aquinas and 
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Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’.”323 This seemingly contradictory logic must be 
unpacked further. Walter Biemel reminds us that to say that Dasein is ‘in the truth’ is 
not to say that Dasein ‘possesses’ truth but that Dasein is situated to ‘disclose truth’ 
“thus making entities available to itself, inquiring about them, explaining them, forming 
them and so on”.324 This inextricable relationship between Dasein, disclosedness, and 
‘truth’ is of fundamental importance to Heidegger’s re-description of ‘truth’ –or more 
accurately, his recovery of what he believes to be a primordial understanding of ‘truth’ 
as ‘unhiddenness’, or aletheia (ἀλήθεια), found in the fragments of Heraclitus.325 
“Heidegger’s aim”, Biemel reminds us, “is by no means to provide merely a more 
literal translation [of aletheia] but, on the contrary, to bring into view the experience 
which is associated with this phenomenon.”326 Heidegger’s aim of recovering the 
forgotten meaning of aletheia can be found in Heraclitus: “logos is declared to be that 
which tells us how it is with things –the foolish forget it; it sinks back into hiddenness 
for them.”327 Heidegger connects this originary picture of ‘truth’ as ‘illumination’, the 
play between unhiddenness and hiddenness, between light and dark, back to Dasein in 
the previously mentioned Lichtung. This ‘clearing’ makes truth claims possible; for 
Heidegger, the basic character of Dasein is disclosedness.328 
On a more ordinary level then, truthful assertions are simply part of the vast 
array of das Zeug, which functions as scaffolding in Dasein’s attempt to make sense of 
the world. The relationship between assertion and ‘occurrent object’ “gets its meaning 
and its ability to refer by being embedded in a set of shared practices –practices that 
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make meaning and reference possible as long as the practitioners dwell in them.”329 
How then is un-truth possible? Dreyfus points out two possibilities. On a practical 
level, one source of untruth can be attributed to the misuse or un-skilled use of 
assertions as das Zeug. However, on an existentially primordial level, because Dasein is 
‘falling’ it always runs the inevitable risk of ontologically being-in a state of untruth or 
concealedness. For instance, the ‘idle’ use of assertions occurs when “we try to 
stabilize such evidence and preserve it in language beyond the time and place in which 
it occurs.”330 
In the later writings of Maritn Heidegger, both Art and Technology are 
identified as two possible, related, but very different modes of unconcealing (revealing) 
the hidden truthfulness of entities. Heidegger –along with Baudrillard, Mumford and 
Boorstin (as well as Tolkien and Malick)– is similarly concerned with the emerging 
role of mechanization in the early 20th century and its effects on what it means to be a 
human being. For him, art is a mode of revealing grounded in the everyday practices of 
being-in-the world. Through art, not only do we reveal entities as Being-in-the-world 
truthfully, but later Heidegger argues the only authentic way for Dasein (there-being) to 
comport, to live, to practice is to dwell poetically (ποίησις / poïesis), bringing forth 
from hiddenness what is not yet present. We dwell as poetic beings whose craft is 
ontologically bound to who we are and the kind of world we live in. As a practiced 
craft and an expression of technical skill (τέχνη / techne), Heidegger compares and 
contrasts art with another  mode of revealing –technology.  
Heidegger reminds us that technology does not simply do something; it is a 
mode of revealing: because of this involvement with us, it shapes the way we live, and 
take in the world. Reminiscent of what has already been said by Lewis Mumford and 
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Jean Baudrillard, technology is not to be viewed merely, or even mainly, as instrument 
or means but rather as essential to the manner in which we relate to other entities, to the 
world and to each other. When we live and reveal technologically there is always the 
possibility –though not a necessity– of what Heidegger calls enframing (Gestell). 
Enframing is a mode of disclosure that reveals everything as Bestand: the 
transformation of our craft, ourselves and the world into things to be used, a thing-
resource or ‘stock’ to be utilized, commodified, harvested and bulldozed. Through 
enframing we come to see and use everything as usable, commodifiable stock and 
become alienated from our existential state of dwelling.  
The manner in which human beings are as mortals, says Heidegger, is dwelling. 
At our most primordial, dwelling comes to pass in our preservation of what he calls the 
fourfold. The fourfold is the poetic unity of earth, sky, divinities (or what Heidegger 
calls “the holy sway of the godhead, [who] appears in his presence or withdraws into 
his concealment”), and mortals –in each, says Heidegger, “we are already thinking of 
the other three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the 
four.” 331 Our poetic unity is related to what he calls die Stimmung or a recognition of 
‘our’ attunement to the phenomena of our everyday cares of being-in-the-world. As a 
primordial mode of revealing die Stimmung is not something ‘we have’ but is always 
something ‘we are in’ –“a way the world itself appears” as well as a how-we-are, and a 
way-we-are. In very basic terms we can say that we get tuned up through our 
sensitivity, our letting be and bringing forth. This primordial poetic state is in 
fundamental contrast with the state that ‘sees’ only technological usability and 
commodifiable stock. And so, we enter a new epoch of human existence, laments 
Heidegger. In this new epoch we are threatened by the possibility that we may be ‘cut 
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off’ from more primordial and meaningful modes of disclosure and ways-of-being. 
While similar in concern with Baudrillard’s ‘age of simulation’ and ‘hyperreality’, 
Heidegger’s concerns are far more grounded and workable in everyday activities. 
 We move, now, from phenomenology concerned with human being and living 
to phenomenology concerned with human forms of life particularly concerned with 
language. Many of Heidegger’s characterizations about Being-in-the-World, language, 
and lifeworld, find resonance in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who may best 
be described in this context as a ‘linguistic phenomenologist’. In anticipation of J. R. R. 
Tolkien’s work in Chapter 4, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is particularly 
useful in further articulating the relationship between language use, human activities, 
and forms of life.  Like Heidegger, Wittgenstein believes that the philosophical 
problem of self and world can be addressed through a description of language use in 
everyday comportments. These “language-games” will allow us to move beyond some 
of the more problematic elements in Heidegger while maintaining his 
phenomenological insights regarding meaningful forms of life. The two share 
perspectives on embodied people and living in the world, perspectives which free them 
from Cartesian and other distortions. 
 
WITTGENSTEIN: FORMS OF LIFE 
Like an image out of Lewis Mumford’s work, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-
1951) imagines language as a labyrinth-like city. A maze of old houses, some in a state 
of disuse, with a mix of newer homes all surrounded by newly developed 
neighborhoods and boroughs all orderly and uniform.332 There are even vast sections of 
the city which are forgotten and covered over –abandoned in favor of contemporary 
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uses and/or razed by an emerging order like the fate of the Aztec Tenochtitlan or the 
puma-shaped Inca city of Cuzco. This description of human living as being embedded 
within the complex weave of life, as Fergus Kerr describes it, and the acquisition of 
language, meaning, and a sense of world in human activity, is not only a direct 
challenge to the Cartesian subject/world dichotomy and the pictures of language, 
knowledge and human living which have emerged from that dichotomy, but are also 
closely tied to the picture of human living and world previously mentioned and built up 
in the work of Martin Heidegger. Indeed, Wittgenstein says, “to imagine a language 
means to imagine a life-form” [eine Lebensform]; speaking a language is part of a 
complex and historically contingent social nexus of human comportments and 
practices.333 “To equate the self with the world of experience”, says Fergus Kerr 
speaking of Wittgenstin’s later work, “is a radical way of bringing it out into the open, 
so to speak, without eliminating it. The ‘I’ is not hidden in the head; it is the world 
viewed.”334 In contrast to the external Forms of Plato, Descartes’s Cogito and Kant’s 
noumenon, Wittgenstein cryptically says, “essence [das Wesen] is expressed in 
grammar.”335 What Wittgenstein means by these obviously highly specialized uses of 
‘grammar’ and ‘language’ must be unpacked further to see how his work aids in the 
critique put forward in this chapter and plays a role in the development of a new 
methodology. 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s response to the presuppositions 
of Cartesian dualism, the metaphysics of presence, and false pictures of reference, 
shows how truth and meaning is understood through the study of language and how 
language functions in human living. The Investigations begin with a critique of a 
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particular characterization of language found in the fourth century Confessions of St. 
Augustine: 
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly 
moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the 
thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to 
point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily 
movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the 
expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of 
other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses 
our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding 
something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their 
proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to 
understand what objects they signified [quarum rerum signa 
essent]; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I 
used them to express my own desires.336 
 
In this example, says Wittgenstein, we are clearly confronted with a traditional picture 
of language as words that correlate to meaning and stand as representations for external 
objects.337  Fergus Kerr points out in Theology After Wittgenstein that Wittgenstein 
“must have known that, in electing to start his book with a conception expressed by 
Augustine, he was invoking the decisive representative of that interweaving of 
metaphysical anthropology with Christian faith that remains the background of modern 
Western thought.”338 In contrast, Wittgenstein bids us to imagine a different scenario 
altogether: 
I send someone shopping, I give him a slip marked “five red 
apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the 
drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a 
table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the 
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series of cardinal numbers –I assume that he knows them by 
heart– up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an 
apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.339  
 
This banal example is deployed to draw attention back to what is given in human 
existence. “Language is a conversation that is interwoven with the characteristic 
activities of human life.”340 Wittgenstein notes, there is no need to speculate as to the 
nature of words and meaning; we are only concerned with how the words are “used” –
how they are embedded, in this case, in the particular activity of ‘shopping’. A word’s 
particular usage within the day-to-day existence and activity is what Wittgenstein calls 
grammar. Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation reveals the oversimplified and 
assumed picture of language that is handed down to us.341 It is this oversimplified 
picture that is the source of misunderstanding and wrong headed philosophical pictures 
of the world. 
Wittgenstein’s investigation of language use is aided through the distinguishing 
description “language-games”. “Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game is clearly 
to be set over and against the idea of language as a system of meaningful signs that can 
be considered in abstraction from its actual employment.”342 What he intends by his talk 
of “language-games” is to re-characterize language, both its acquisition and 
deployment, as an activity woven into the daily comportments and practices of human 
living. “When we look at such simple forms of language”, says Wittgenstein, “the 
mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears.”343 
Reminiscent of Heidegger’s das Zeug and das Rede, Wittgenstein imagines words as 
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tools in a tool-box to be deployed for use (sometimes skillfully and other times not so 
skillfully) in the appropriate activity –such as selecting and purchasing ‘five red 
apples’.344 In contrast, Augustine’s description of a child’s language acquisition, says 
Wittgenstein, presupposes that the child has his own language, albeit ‘foreign’, in 
which he ‘thinks’ or ‘talks to himself’ in his attempts to correlate the words of the 
‘new’ language to objects and actions.345 Rather than simply a discussion of language, 
then, Wittgenstein contrasts these two scenarios in order to re-imagine a conception of 
self (in the world).  All of this is to say that language acquisition and use are not 
isolated activities but are “embedded in the significantly structured lives of groups of 
active human agents”346 –within the complex weave of human living. 
Like Heidegger’s das Zeug, Wittgenstein’s picture of language-games is built 
up from the question: “What are signs?”347 As Wittgenstein describes in his preliminary 
study for the Philosophical Investigations entitled The Blue and Brown Books, 
language games are a rejection of the generalizing tendency to treat the meaning of 
words as images (or ‘things’) that ‘correlate’ to the word. Rarely, Wittgenstein says 
later on, do we use language according to a strict ‘calculus’ of rules; in radical 
contradistinction, language-games disclose the originary concern with the ways in 
which we use signs:348  
The foundation of the ability to play a game lies in training; 
the ability to play it is mastery of a technique. Playing games 
is a human activity, and its existence presupposes common 
reactions, propensities, and abilities. The ‘gap’ between rules 
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and their application, which is bridged by training and 
familiarity with the practice of playing, is in plain view.349 
 
Rather than being hidden in minds or laid over ‘things’, Wittgenstein’s language 
investigation reveals how meaning, knowledge, and use are all tied up and embedded 
into the ‘teeming swarm’ of human activity –into daily life.  
Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, in their different ways, help to provide the 
scaffolding for a new methodological approach into the problems of hyperreality and 
the other varied problems emerging. Far from a retreat from the postmodern 
questioning raised thus far via Eco and Baudrillard, the concern in the first part of this 
chapter has been to rearticulate the incredibly complex character of human being-in-
the-world. There is also an inherent theological question that demands to be addressed: 
in light of the problems discussed thus far, how do we articulate the nature of ‘true’ 
existence in everydayness? Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenological’ 
approach to living and being a person, and language’s role in this, make room for 
meaningful space, and the ability to craft, discourse, and dwell there. 
 
Part II: 
TIM INGOLD’S MESHWORK PRAXEOLOGY:  
TACTICAL LINES OF WAYFARING, MAPPING AND INHABITATION 
 
Continuing to build upon the alternative methodology already suggested in this 
chapter, I aim to offer a different approach to the questions raised in Chapter 1 and 
subsequently broadened, albeit problematically, in Chapter 2. I will draw on the 
writings of anthropologist Tim Ingold, whose work is endemic of the increasingly 
interdisciplinary nature of scholarship attuned to the complex weave of human forms of 
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life. Principally, I aim to 1) re-characterize many of the early principles behind 
Baudrillard’s hyperreality as constituting a colonization of the human imagination and 
human forms of life; and highlight the importance of 2) the ‘de-colonization’ of the 
human imagination through 3) acts of nomadic guerrilla resistance (of which crafting 
lifeworlds that reveal poetic modes of being and expressing in the world is a part) that 
rupture the fabric of the prosaic colonizing order. To accomplish this response I will 
show that human imagining, often disesteemed and mis-characterized in the Cartesian 
tradition as an inferior image picture faculty of correspondence to an external world, is 
firmly situated at the epicenter of the hyperreality phenomenon because it is a 
comportment integrally related to a broad range of human activities embedded within 
forms of life.  
What I want to highlight, and will subsequently function as a central critique of 
Baudrillard’s early development of hyperreality, is what Baudrillard mis-characterizes 
as the ‘semiotic order’: As has been discussed in part one, to speak of a ‘semiotic order’ 
–the calcification of an ‘external’ structural phenomena (order)– is to mis-characterize 
and violently truncate the human lifeworld. In place of Baudrillard’s ‘semiotic order’ I 
will draw on a much more helpful characterization –of which the human imaginative 
life, expressed in everyday practice, is central– the colonization of the human 
lifeworld. To speak of the colonization of the human imagination (what in fact makes 
hyperreality such an insidious ethical dilema) is not simply the colonization of a mental 
faculty (e.g. the way we think) but is the colonization of the way we creatively live and 
express the everyday in human endeavors. In this way, I hope to jettison the Cartesian 
subject/object dualism implicit in Baudrillard’s structuralism while preserving his 
radical understanding of the effects of hyperreality on human values, judgments and 
activity. Thus, what becomes of central concern is highlighting the loci of ordering and 
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organizing in the activity of human beings in the world. It will be the burden of the 
remainder of this study to highlight the relationship between human activity-in-the-
environment and human imagining –as an activity of rehearsing the possibilities of 
agents-in-the-world.350  
 
A NEW ECOLOGY 
Tim Ingold brings tremendous insight to the relationship between people and 
animals and our attempts to be at home in the world. Not ashamed to say that his 
previous attempt to articulate the meaning of a ‘built’ environment actually contributed 
to the problem, Ingold seeks “a completely new way of thinking about organisms and 
about their relations with their environments; in short, a new ecology”.351 His previous 
attempt resulted, he confesses, in precisely the Cartesian dualist problems discussed 
thus far –“that unlike all other animals, humans live a split-level existence, half in 
nature, half out; half organism, half person, half body, half mind”.352 Ingold’s revamped 
meditation on the topic resembles all that has been said thus far about Heidegger and 
Wittgenstien. Ingold’s rearticulated position is a rejection of Cartesian conceptions of 
the agents of human living as self-contained individuals confronting an external world 
and assimilating it to our formal designs. Rather, Ingold suggests that the world 
becomes a meaningful environment precisely because it is inhabited by ‘agents-in-the-
environment’ or Being-in-the-world.353 
 The starting point for all Cartesian accounts of human attempts to be at home in 
the world is an imagined separation between the perceiver and the world. The perceiver 
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brings significance and meaning to an externally encountered world. Ingold highlights 
this Cartesian imaginary in a quote from anthropologist Clifford Geertz: “man is an 
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.”354 Here Geertz sets 
other animals apart from human beings whose ‘webs of significance’ are to be 
understood as human constructed frameworks of meaning which are “inscribed in a 
separate plane of mental representation” and written over an external world of nature in 
an attempt to have a meaningful relationship with ‘reality’. The essence of this 
‘building perspective’, as Ingold calls it, is that human beings make a world before we 
live in it. This conception of world and what it means to be a human in the world has 
fostered a particularly unhealthy expression of human living.  
 On the other hand, this ‘building perspective’ is most unlike the animal 
lifeworld where there is no concept of ‘nature’ or an ‘environment’ composed of 
‘neutral objects’. Rather, an animal’s ‘environment’ is never untangled from the 
activity of their lifeworld. Ingold draws on the work of German biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll (1864-1944), who was the first to call this tangled weave of a world the 
animal’s Umwelt. Ingold contrasts the ‘building perspective’ with a very similar 
sounding, but substantially different description of Umwelt from Uexküll. “As the 
spider spins its threads,” says Uexküll, “every subject spins his relations to certain 
characters of the things around him, and weaves them into a firm web which carries his 
existence.”355 If the Geertz quote was a description of the self-contained individuals of 
the ‘building perspective’, then Uexküll lends insight into what Ingold characterizes as 
a ‘dwelling perspective’. Although Uexküll is speaking of non-human subjects and 
environments, Ingold turns to phenomenological insight to show that Uexküll’s 
observations are relevant to human living. Principally, Ingold draws on Martin 
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Heidegger (who does away with all aforementioned constructed dichotomies of human 
living and environment), and on his essay “Building Dwelling Thinking”. 
 In “Building Dwelling Thinking” Heidegger probes the relationship between 
building and what it means to be a human being. He begins by rhetorically asking if 
“houses in themselves hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them?”356 If we 
examine the etymology of the German bauen (to build) we find its originary meaning in 
the Old High German buan –to dwell. What then does it mean to dwell? This originary 
meaning is now lost, says Heidegger, but we can sense a ‘covert trace’ of its meaning in 
the German Nachbar, neighbor. The etymology of Nachbar reveals its meaning to us as 
the ‘near-dweller’ (Nachgebauer). Rather than in-activity, to dwell is one of many 
activities we engage in throughout the course of our day. The near-dweller may work 
with me over here but ‘dwells’ over there. What’s more, says Heidegger, bauen reveals 
the nature of our dwelling; the German bauen is etymologically related to bis, be. So to 
say, ich bin (I am) is really to mean I dwell.357 The manner, then, in which human 
beings are (ich bin) on earth as mortals is as dwellers and the manner is which we dwell 
is to cultivate –or as George Steiner suggests, it is an act of ‘conservation’.358 Steiner 
says that for once the English can reveal the complex play on words as does the 
German, to attend (to be present) is to tend to (to care for). Returning to the relationship 
between building and dwelling we must say with Heidegger that, rather than dwelling 
because we build, we build “because we are dwellers”,359 and we build, amongst other 
things, dwellings (e.g. houses / homes). 
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 While it is true that human beings have the ability to ‘envision forms’ before 
they are built –concedes Ingold– it is wrong to think that we ‘construct the world’ by 
virtue of our own ‘conceptions of the possibilities of being’. These ‘conceptions’ of 
world construction would be a return to the representational/correlation view of the 
human imagination as a self-contained and purely ‘mental’ ‘faculty’ within a self-
contained individual who reconstructs, imports, and corresponds conceptual 
representations to an external world. Our immersion in, and handling of, possibilities is 
of a different kind altogether –and with this then goes a different, more realistic, and far 
better picture of imagination. Ingold takes Heidegger’s meditation on dwelling to mean 
“that the forms people build, whether in the imagination or on the ground arise within 
the current of their involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of their practical 
engagement with their surroundings.”360 Borrowing a phrase from Merleau-Ponty –we 
must come to see that the world is the homeland of our thoughts.361 “This envisioning”, 
says Ingold in an attempt to counter such fictions with another form of imagining, “is 
itself an activity carried on by real people in a real world environment”.362 The need 
thus arises to re-characterize human imagining in its various activities –in language, 
intelligence, technology and art– in order to account for and to show its proper place in 
our dwelling-in-the-world. 
Counter to many Cartesian claims about the supremacy of human reason over 
and against an external world, which presuppose that “intelligence is the faculty of 
reason, language its vehicle and technology the means by which a rational 
understanding of the external world is turned to account for human benefit”, Ingold 
makes the bold (if not rhetorical) counter claim that in fact “there is no such thing as 
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technology, or language, or intelligence, at least in pre-modern or non-western 
societies”.363 Rhetorical drama put to the side, we might more clearly say that pre-
modern and non-western societies have built up dramatically different pictures of what 
these particular activities look like. In his chapter “The Poetics of Tool Use”, Ingold 
attempts to rearticulate and re-characterize the nature of these activities from the 
starting point of the ‘dwelling perspective’ of human Being-in-the-world. Ingold first 
investigates what he believes to be the historical fetishizing of language in the West 
along with a certain picture of what language is and how it works. In order to highlight 
a different picture of language, one which ‘dwells’, Ingold proposes yet another 
rhetorical move: what is the difference between music and speaking? What can we 
learn about speech and language when it is situated in a musical phenomenon? Drawing 
on the work of Alfred Gell (1945-1997), Ingold suggests that we may glean insight 
from the ‘song-like’ speech patterns of the Umeda people of Papua New Guinea. The 
Umeda’s song-speech –meaningful expressions of the Umeda lifeworld– echoes 
Merleau-Ponty’s insight “that the words, vowels, and phonemes are so many ways of 
‘singing’ the world” when they are returned to their complex nexus of meaning.364 
When language is considered in light of a ‘dwelling perspective’ –human living in a 
world already teeming with significance– we break the shackles of colonial oppression 
with a characterization of language as ‘wayfinding’ and mapping. Ingold says, that in 
light of a ‘dwelling perspective’ language more resembles poetry or song. Words, like 
tools, “are all embedded within a total pattern of verbal and non-verbal activity, a form 
of life”.365 Meaning in speech is not ready-made but “inheres in the relations between 
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the dweller and the constituents of the dwelt-in world”.366 The differences between 
speech and song then are of ‘degree rather than kind’.  
Here we are reminded of Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s characterization of the 
manner in which words ‘acquire’ meaning. In this essay, Ingold retraces Wittgenstein’s 
critique of the largely Western conception of language acquisition in Philosophical 
Investigations. In the process, Ingold refers us to the difference between mapping and 
maps, wayfinding and navigating, which will be further unpacked in this chapter.  The 
“orthodox view” of language acquisition in the West is dependent on the erroneous 
picture of self-contained minds able to navigate through a world of objects by 
constantly drawing on images inscribed on a mental map.367 However, when we say, 
that “[m]eaning is in the mind, not in the world –it is assigned to the world by the 
subject”, says Ingold, “… there is presupposed a division between a subject, in whose 
mind these representations are found, and an objective world ‘out there’”.368 This 
colonizing picture of language is a recent perspective in human history and one which 
is comprehensively rejected by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations.369  
 Ingold applies this insight to tool use and makes a similar comparison between 
technology, tools and craftsmanship –or technical artistry. Ingold asks, what is the 
difference between learning to use a ‘tool’ and learning to play a musical instrument? 
Indeed, like song, Ingold wants us to see playing a musical instrument as the 
prototypical instance of tool-use in the ‘dwelling perspective’. In a technologically 
literate society, tool use is most commonly accompanied by a theory of tool use –rules 
or algorithms embedded within the head of the tool operator.370 The ‘colonial’ picture of 
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a highly skilled tool operator is someone with 1) a highly detailed rulebook or 
algorithm inside their head and 2) possessing a high level of speed in which they are 
able to access the data. Once again we can draw on Ingold’s map and navigation 
metaphor (by way of de Michel de Certeau) to make sense of this erroneous picture. A 
picture of ‘skilled practice’ as the expert recreation of mental representations stored in a 
rule book or algorithm is dependent on every act being “thought out in advance”; tool 
use in this picture is reduced to a ‘calculus’ of “attention precedes response”.371 
When this picture of tool use is applied practically, however, to a ‘simple tool’ 
such as a lasso –which depends so much on movement and rhythm like the playing of 
an instrument– or driving a car it all begins to break down. By contrast, the skilled 
practitioner “is able continually to attune his movements to perturbations in the 
perceived environment without ever interrupting the flow of action, since that action is 
itself a process of attention.”372 Ingold also draws on his own experience of cello 
playing to make his point. To successfully play a musical instrument one must lose 
oneself in the activity of playing the instrument. When you pause to think, even for a 
fraction of a second, about playing, the music can become rote, imprecise and uneven, 
and one often begins to make mistakes. Ingold says, “this is not to say that I cease to be 
aware, or that my playing becomes simply mechanical or automatic: quite the contrary, 
I experience a heightened sense of awareness, but that awareness is not of my playing, 
it is my playing.”373 Certainly, when the “attention precedes response” view of skilled 
tool-use is applied to activities such as the lassoing of reindeer or playing in an 
orchestra, argues Ingold, these activities become impossible.374 Rather than the 
application of objective knowledge, then, this embodied knowledge, which emerges in 
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a practical examination of music playing or lassoing, is what Ingold calls enskilment –
the inseparable activity of learning and doing situated within the context of practical 
engagement that involves dwelling-in the instrument and the music, or the tool and the 
task. 375  
A reconsideration of both language and tool-use from the starting point of 
human agents-in-the-environment leads to a necessary re-investigation of prejudices 
surrounding dichotomous conceptions of human ‘intelligence’ and ‘imagination’. Once 
again, following the map/navigation metaphor, the rationalist picture of human 
intelligence usually falls along the lines of a cognitive faculty that detaches from 
activity to postulate an external world only to reapply representational constructs –the 
map– to an external world with no meaning. This picture echoes Ingold’s description of 
navigation that travels over the surface and has already been characterized as 
colonization. Alternatively, ‘Intelligence’ in the context of the ‘dwelling perspective’ is 
always involved in activity. A dwelling being “does not encounter stones. He 
encounters missiles, anvils, axes or whatever, depending on the project in which he is 
currently engaged.”376 But what do we call the ‘mental’ activity going on when we are 
not in the current, Ingold asks? Ingold calls this imagination: “the activity of a being 
whose puzzle-solving is carried on within the context of involvement in a real world or 
persons, objects and relations”377 characterized by three points. First, “imagining is an 
activity: it is something people do” within the context or ‘current’ of activity.378 Second, 
the relationship between the ‘projected form’ and the ‘material artifact’ can be 
characterized as rehearsal. And third, imagining is an activity of an ‘agent-in-the-
environment’; it is a particular puzzle-solving within the relational “context of 
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involvement in a real world of persons, objects and relations”.379 Ultimately, Ingold’s 
description and characterization of ‘imagination’ in “The Poetics of Tool Use” proves 
to be too narrow. Ingold’s 2007 book Lines: A Brief History offers more pictures to 
build upon and carry this chapter along. Imagination is an originary mode of dwelling; 
rather than traveling over the colonizing map in the activity of the imagination we 
wayfind along.  
 
COLONIZATION AND LINES OF RESISTANCE 
To begin to characterize the colonization of the human imagination we must 
first jettison any notion of the colonization of an ‘imaginative faculty’ or a battle within 
the ‘minds’ of people; rather it is to talk about the colonization of space (more 
precisely, multiple spaces) and the trajectories within that space. Indeed, imagining is a 
poetic knowing as sensory attunement to “the relational context of the perceivers’ 
involvement in the world . . . by engaging directly, in a practical way, with the objects 
in [an agent-in-the-world’s] surroundings”.380 Imagining is the activity of rehearsing 
and projecting (throwing) the possibilities of agents-in-the-environment. To speak of 
imagining is to speak of dwelling within a lifeworld –an Umwelt, which is the 
environment of human activity, concern and engagement within which ‘agents-in-the-
environment’ craft, use tools, and sing the world with language. In his essay, “Globes 
and Spheres: The Topology of Environmentalism”, Ingold draws out this unique 
characterization of the colonization of the human imagination by contrasting the 
apprehension of the world as ‘sphere’ versus the world as ‘globe’. The conception of 
world as globe is characterized by a view of the world as “pure substance, physical 
matter, presenting an opaque and impenetrable surface of literal reality upon which 
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form and meaning are overlain by the human mind”; the world is known by the 
“cognitive reconstruction” of mental representations –a map.381 The globe is a “tabula 
rasa for the inscription of human history” which is conquered and ordered.382 
Ultimately, “the world as a globe is,” contends Ingold, “a colonial one. It presents us 
with the idea of a preformed surface waiting to be occupied, to be colonized first by 
living things and later by human (usually meaning Western) civilization.”383 (fig. 6) 
Unlike the picture of world as globe, which is all surface and is viewed as something 
separate from the observer-traveler, the sphere is perceived from within and the 
activities from within are guided by a cosmology. Whereas the globe is traveled on and 
over, the sphere –like the Scala Naturale (fig. 7) of Giovanni Camillo Maffei (1564)– is 
traveled through. “Traditional cosmology”, says Ingold,384 “places the person at the 
center of an ordered universe of meaningful relations, such as that depicted by Maffei, 
and enjoins an understanding of those relations as a foundation for proper conduct 
towards the environment.”385  
 
   
  fig. 6  fig. 7 
 lifeworld of the sphere vs. globe to be ‘colonized’ Scala Naturale  
   Giovanni Camillo Maffei (1564) 
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In “To Journey Along a Way of Life: Maps, Wayfinding and Navigation”, an 
essay that builds on the work of de Certeau, is a detailed investigation into the essential 
differences between ‘wayfinding’ and ‘navigation’, ‘mapping’ and ‘map making’. 
Drawing on a classic ethnographic study of Micronesian seafaring, wayfinding, says 
Ingold, is not “following a course from one spatial location to another”; rather, it is “a 
movement in Time, more akin to playing music or storytelling than to reading a 
map”.386 Wayfinding trajectories through the environment –in the case of the 
Micronesian seafarer through the cosmological sphere– are dependent “upon the 
attunement of the traveler’s movements in response to the movements, in his or her 
surroundings, of other people, animals, the wind, celestial bodies, and so on”, says 
Ingold.387 Like listening to music or experiencing a story unfold, Ingold emphasizes 
that “we know as we go, not before we go”.388 Rather than a movement from point-to-
point on a map, trajectories are movements through time; travel, continues Ingold, 
involves a series of openings up and closings off of unhidden surfaces in our 
environment –or what he calls vista regions. “Throughout the voyage [the Micronesian 
mariner] remains, apparently stationary, at a center of a world that stretches around as 
far as the horizon, with the great dome of the heavens above. But as the journey 
proceeds the island of embarkation slips ever farther astern while the destination island 
draws ever closer.”389 Ingold stresses how the world has no ‘surfaces’ in this 
characterization –the trajectories of agents-in-the-environment move through space 
rather than over a surface. 
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Ingold deepens and broadens his description of human trajectories through 
lifeworlds and the phenomenon of colonization in Lines: A Brief History (2007). More 
than simply a history of lines and the nature and production of lines, Ingold is interested 
in the curious “relation between various types of lines and surfaces.”390 More 
specifically, he says regarding the history of Western writing, “the ways in which 
[lines] were understood depended critically on whether the plain surface was compared 
to a landscape to be traveled or a space to be colonized, or to the skin of the body or the 
mirror of the mind.”391 Ingold explores a variety of lines. There are lines made by 
rupturing a surface such as cuts, cracks and creases. There are the ever problematic 
ghostly or imaginary lines, which, although they occupy no physical space per se, have 
physical consequences. These “imaginary but consequential lines” include Aboriginal 
songlines, survey lines, lines that tell stories such as the constellations, and lines of 
energy such as meridian lines in acupuncture and eastern calligraphy. And then, says 
Ingold, there are all sorts of lines which simply “don’t fit”, such as vapor trails, 
lightning forks and scent trails.392  
It is, however, Ingold’s description of ‘threads’ and ‘traces’ that is central to 
Lines. The distinguishing characteristic of ‘threads’ is that they are not drawn on 
surfaces. Ingold’s list includes, but is not limited to: a ball of wool, a skein of yarn, a 
fungal mycelia, a cat’s cradle, roots and rhizomes, a fishing-net, the needle of a conifer, 
a plump-line, an electrical circuit, the leaf of almost any deciduous tree, a suspension 
bridge.393 This description becomes more problematic when Ingold includes Celtic 
knots, south Indian kolam, the looping art Abelam –crafted by the people of the East 
Sepik Province in Papua New Guinea– and zig-zag lines of the Shipibo-Conibo of the 
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Peruvian Amazon. While ‘threads’ naturally occur in nature, Ingold points out that the 
actual “making of threads is a human speciality” and has been argued by some to be the 
most ancient of human arts.394 As we will see with the labyrinth, threads dissolve 
surfaces.  
‘Traces’, then, are “any enduring mark left in or on a solid surface by a 
continuous movement.”395 In turn, these (specifically human) traces can be further 
identified as additive marks “superimposed upon the substrate” and reductive “lines 
that are scratched, scored or etched into a surface”.396 It should be clear now that there 
is no clean delineation between threads and traces (and their respective relationship to 
surfaces). A thread, such as a Celtic knot, is crafted by making a reductive or additive 
mark on some surface –say stone. What must be further unpacked is how the trace is 
transformed into a thread by the very specific line, in this case the Celtic knot. Indeed, 
“each stands as a transform of the other. . . . it is through the transformation of threads 
into traces”, argues Ingold, “that surfaces are brought into being”.397 But perhaps more 
importantly, and in the interests of the dissertation, Ingold says the converse is also 
true. 
 The most archetypal transformation of trace into thread (not just in Western 
civilization, notes Ingold, but in the world) is the labyrinth or maze. Greek, Celtic, or 
Indian, the labyrinth “has remained a powerful image of movement and wayfaring in a 
world of the dead that is believed to lie beneath the surface of the world of quotidian 
experience. . . . [T]he dead have to thread their way through its interstices.”398 When 
entering the labyrinth the traveler moves beneath the mapped surface into a realm only 
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ever known, in part, throughout the duration of the trajectory; the trace is transformed 
into a thread as the surface dissolves, says Ingold.399 Conversely, in stitching and 
weaving “we find the most obvious examples of how surfaces are constituted from 
threads, and of how traces are generated in the process.”400 Ingold notes the etymology 
of ‘line’ from Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary: 
[O]ne of the meanings of the word (the seventeenth and final 
entry in his list) is ‘lint or flax’. Lint is derived from the Latin 
linea, which originally meant a thread made from flax, linum. 
These threads were woven into cloth that we now call linen, 
and that could be used to line garments by providing an extra 
layer of warmth. . . . The verb ‘to weave’, in Latin, was texere, 
from which are derived our words ‘textile’ and –by way of the 
French tistre –‘tissue’, meaning a delicately woven fabric 
composed of a myriad of interlaced threads.401 
 
Similar to knitting and crocheting, stitching is the creation of a surface from a 
continuous line of yarn. “The surface we perceive,” says Ingold, “is not the knot but the 
space taken up by it.”402 This practice, then, is literally the materialization of a surface 
by transforming the thread –in this case the skein of yarn– into a trace. Reminiscent of 
what has already been mentioned in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 1, Ingold 
describes the role of the ‘warp’ and ‘weft’ in weaving. He adds that the ‘line’ on the 
blanket (in this case a Navajo blanket) exists as part of an ordered system which creates 
the “the perception of a continuous line on a coherent surface. . . . [This] gives the line 
the appearance of a trace.”403  
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Although not inclusive of all types, these two kinds of lines, the thread and the 
trace, are significant to human bodies in the world because they shape our relationship 
to world: either by creating surface or by dissolving surface. Ingold next turns to human 
trajectories through the world and what affect these lines have on that activity. In 
chapter three, “Up, across and along”, Ingold investigates the effects of modernity on 
‘the line’. More specifically, Ingold is concerned with the modern fragmentation of line 
–in the fields of travel, mapping, and storytelling– “into a succession of points or dots” 
which has shorn “the movement that gave rise to it.”404 Echoing the work of Lewis 
Mumford, the ultimate consequence of the modern fragmentation of the line has been 
the negative affect on the manner in which we characterize ‘place’: from a complex 
interlaced knot composed in movement and growth to the static node. “To an ever-
increasing extent, people in modern metropolitan societies find themselves in 
environments built as assemblies of connected elements.”405 Here, Ingold reveals that a 
study of ‘lines’ is fundamentally about the manner in which human beings “inhabit” 
and “dwell” and how in practice the modern metropolitan inhabitant can “thread their 
own ways through these environments, tracing paths as they go.”406  
 Drawing on studies of Rudy Wiebe’s comparison of native Inuit conceptions of 
movement and travel with that of the British Royal Navy in Playing Dead (1989), 
Ingold describes two unique modalities of travel (the movement in time through space) 
–the wayfarer and the transport. The most radical and distinguishing characterization 
of the wayfarer, and seafarer for that matter, is that ‘traveling’ is not a “transitional 
activity” but “a way of being”; in contrast, transport is a “destination-oriented” activity. 
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407 Rather than “reduce the activity of walking to the mechanics of locomotion, as 
though the walker were a passenger in his own body” the wayfarer traverses along 
ephemeral “lines of growth” where the traveler is always attentive to the environment, 
and in many cases dependent on attentiveness for survival. In contrast, the transport 
travels across the surface of the environment “in such a way as to leave their basic 
natures unaffected.”408 The transport traveler journeys from point-to-point only to re-
enter the environment at their destination. Ingold will later call this mis-characterization 
of travel an illusion. Not to be mistaken, however, Ingold makes it clear that the 
wayfarer and the transport traveler are not distinguished by technological sophistication 
but by the bond between body and topography. One inhabits the environment; the other 
is largely cocooned from the environment and travels across the surface from point-to-
point-to-point. “Every such line is tantamount to a way of life”, Ingold asserts.409 
 Ingold borrows a description from Henri Lefebvre to conclude –the 
‘meshwork’. Unlike the lines of a network, which Ingold says only join ‘dots’; the 
meshwork is the complex reticulate nexus of life “whose movements weave an 
environment that is more ‘archi-textural’ than architectural” and is constituted by lines 
of ‘entanglement’ rather than the connection of points.410 For this reason, Ingold 
believes wayfaring to be a primordial mode of dwelling for both humans and animals. 
There is, however, a fabricated human ‘equivalent’ to the reticulate meshwork, which 
Ingold calls lines of occupation. This imperial network is “surveyed and built in 
advance of the traffic that comes to pass up and down them. They are typically straight 
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and regular, and intersect only at nodal points of power. Drawn cross-country, they are 
inclined to ride roughshod over the lines of habitation that are woven into it”.411 This 
theme of habitation versus occupation is further developed in Ingold’s examination of 
the relationship between ‘mapping’ and ‘knowing’. 
 There is an originary relationship between archaic ‘maps’ and storytelling, says 
Ingold, making an implicit reference to de Certeau’s tour describers. Such ‘maps’ were 
made to describe journeys –real or mythic– and were only ever intended for contextual 
use. These ephemeral, and often evanescent, traces are quickly discarded when their 
use comes to an end.  Such sketch maps, as Ingold calls them, are not ‘representations’ 
of territories and terrain but ‘re-enactments’ of actual journeys. The trace is often an 
extension of gestures and grows as the narrative grows. 
To get to my house from your house you’ll need to go south on 
Highway 1 –also called MoPac because it follows the old 
Missouri Pacific Railroad line. Take the highway south until 
you cross the river. Once you cross the river you will pass 
three exits. After the third exit get in your right lane because 
the left lane is an exit only. You’ll pass over the green belt and 
then take your next immediate right exit. Turn right at the first 
light. Right again at the next light. Right at the first stop sign. 
You’ll see a sign called Travis Country when you turn. Follow 
the road as it bends to the right, dips down the ravine and back 
up. Your second left at the top of the ravine is High Meadow 
Street. Turn left and the house will be on the next left corner 
with the four trees in the front yard.412  
 
What counts in a sketch map, says Ingold, “are the lines, not the spaces around them. 
… They are drawn along, in the evolution of the gesture, rather than across the surfaces 
                                                
411 Tim Ingold, ibid., 81. 
412 This banal example is used to illustrate Ingold’s point. In the coming chapter on J. R. R. Tolkien 
more mythic and legendary examples, such as the Icelandic Saga of the Volsungs and the Welsh 
Maginogion will become much more relevant.  
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on which they are traced.”413 Citing de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life, in the 
development of modern cartography these travel narratives were fragmented, 
compressed and reconstituted by spatial representations. In the modern map, then, lines 
are drawn across the framed (or contained) surface of the map. The lines on the map 
“signify occupation, not habitation”;414 they represent political boundaries, roads, 
railroads, and etcetera. This vast “network of point-to-point connections”, says Ingold, 
parallels the “destination-oriented transport” traveler.415 What is so significant, here, is 
that “both kinds of lines embody in their formation a certain way of knowing.”416 
                                                
413 Tim Ingold, ibid., 84-85. 
414 Tim Ingold, ibid., 85. (emphasis mine) This news report from the U. S. state of Georgia testifies 
to Ingold’s description. “Hickory Level is one of hundreds of places that have occupie d  spots of 
Georgia’s official road maps until the state un-cluttered the map this year.” 515 small towns –
described as “place holders”– were removed from the official Georgia Dept. of Transportation 
map because they were deemed numerically insignificant.  
WSBTV.com News, “Small Towns Wiped Off State Map,” December 5, 2006, WSBTV.com, 
http://www.wsbtv.com/news/10470431/detail.html (emphasis mine); Also see the 29 August, 
2008, article, Internet maps 'demolish British history', in the Independent.  
Environment editor Michael McCarthy adds yet another level of complexity to Ingold’s 
description. “Churches, cathedrals, stately homes, battlefields, ancient woodlands, rivers, eccentric 
landmarks and many more features which make up the tapestry of the British landscape are not 
being represented in online maps [such as Google Maps], which focus on mere l y  p rov iding  
dri ving di re c t ion s , said Mary Spence, President of the British Cartographical Society.” The 
Independent UK News. “Internet Maps Demolish British History” by Michael McCarthy, August 
29, 2008. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/internet-maps-
demolish-british-history-912333.html 
415 Tim Ingold, ibid., 85, 86. 
416 Tim Ingold, ibid., 87. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Far from a simple discrediting of Jean Baudrillard’s hyperreality, what begins to 
emerge is a new –and in many ways a far more complex and ethically insidious– 
characterization of hyperreality as the colonization of human lifeworlds (both 
intentional and unintentional) through the materialization of surfaces, the occupation of 
space, and the fragmentation/truncation of human trajectories through the world into 
destination and consumption-oriented transportation across the surface of the globe. To 
continue the thread begun in Chapters 1 and 2, my ‘response’ to hyperreality will 
continue to utilize the synecdoche of ‘the city’ to highlight the significant role (the 
centrality even) of human practices and trajectories in the way we inhabit or occupy, 
organize or order everyday life. Pushing the metaphor further, this chapter can be seen, 
in retrospect, as a survey of the complex issues surrounding the construction of ‘new 
developments’ in the city –and especially those developments that demand a remapping 
of the city according to the schematic of its new order. As described by Tim Ingold, the 
colonization of the human lifeworlds is primarily the inscription of an alien order –and 
alien ‘economy’ (literally oikonomia; the rule of the house)– over indigenous modes of 
activity-in-the-environment. In the closing pages of “Up, across and along”, Ingold 
succinctly identifies the phenomenon: 
Perhaps what truly distinguishes the predicament of people in 
modern metropolitan societies is the extent to which they are 
compelled to inhabit an environment that has been planned and 
built expressly for the purposes of occupation. The architecture 
and public spaces of the built environment enclose and 
contain; its roads and highways connect. Transport systems 
nowadays span the globe in a vast network of destination-to-
destination links.417 
                                                
417 Tim Ingold, ibid., 102. 
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Maps and mapmaking over mapping, representation based navigation over wayfinding, 
moving across over moving along, occupation over inhabiting and dwelling, and the 
world as globe over the cosmological sphere; the result has harmful and even 
dehumanizing affects on human bodies, human activities, and lifeworlds. Following the 
model of political colonization we can say that the colonization of human imagining is 
dependent on 1) infrastructure (a new ordering apparatus which begins with the picture 
of world as globe), 2) propaganda (forms of media output which actively attempt to 
manipulate spatial trajectories through the inscription of reflexive responses to the 
newly applied ordering apparatus), and 3) force. Although this alien order is constituted 
by its own particular modes of activity it always stands ‘outside’ (or more precisely, is 
imposed upon) the indigenous environment thus alienating agents form indigenous 
forms of life.  
However, if anything is to be learned from this chapter it is that “life will not be 
contained, but rather threads its way through the world along the myriad lines of its 
relations.”418 Lines of movement and trajectories of activity, which thread and dissolve 
surfaces of control and power, function as acts of resistance. These tactical activities 
are precisely the forms of resistance that must now be pursued. What we learn from 
Ingold is that colonial structures 
are ceaselessly eroded by the tactical manoeuvring of 
inhabitants whose ‘wandering lines’ (linges d’erre) or 
‘efficacious meanderings’ –in de Certeau’s words– undercut 
the strategic designs of society’s master-builders, causing them 
gradually to wear out and disintegrate. Quite apart from human 
beings who may or may not respect the rules of play, these 
inhabitants include countless non-humans that have no heed 
for them at all. Flying, crawling, wriggling and burrowing all 
                                                
418 Tim Ingold, ibid., 103. 
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over and under the regular, linearized infrastructure of the 
occupied world, creatures of every sort continually 
reincorporated and rearrange its crumbling fragments into their 
own ways of life.419 
 
If indeed wayfinding is a primordial mode of dwelling for both humans and animals, as 
Ingold suggest, then we should turn to Ingold’s example of animal wayfinding as a 
form of resistance. However, as we will see in the next chapter on J. R. R. Tolkien, 
central to the colonization of human lifeworlds is the colonization of the human 
imagination. Hence, a consideration of human imaginative practices (of which 
Baudrillard’s work certainly takes account of in the form of electronic media, e.g. 
television, cinema, internet, et. al.) is in order. The task ahead is one of recovery. The 
task is to exhume the role of human imagining in the day-to-day practices of human 
lifeworlds and what role it plays in wayfinding. Indeed, it will be in the exhumation of 
the remnants of modes of being in the world that more resemble the organic (animal) 
resistance described by Ingold that will be central to any resistance to colonization.  
To push the metaphor further, the remaining chapters will excavate forgotten 
and abandoned neighborhoods of ‘the city’ –forgotten modes of inhabiting– and deploy 
their organizing techniques as forms of nomadic guerilla resistance against the complex 
ordering demands presented by postmodern consumerism, and against this newly 
articulated phenomenon of hyperreality. The work of Tim Ingold will remain central to 
an exploration for models of resistance to hyperreality in the remaining pages. We will 
return to Ingold’s study of ‘sketch maps’, ‘storylines’, and ‘wayfinding’ in subsequent 
chapters exploring the mythopoeia of J. R. R. Tolkien (Chapter 4) and also the cinema 
of Terrence Malick (Chapter 5). 
                                                
419 Tim Ingold, ibid., 103. 
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Chapter 4 
J. R. R. TOLKIEN’S 
PHILOLOGY OF RESISTANCE: 
CRAFT, MAGIC, 
AND IMAGINATIVE LIFEWORLDS 
 
In the Philosophical Investigations Ludwig Wittgenstein says, “To imagine a 
language means to imagine a life-form”.420 To effectively make claims about the 
imaginative project of J. R. R. Tolkien (1892-1973), we must pay close attention to the 
meaning of this statement. I aim to show that Tolkien’s enjoyable yet seemingly 
innocuous fantasy, found in The Silmarillion, The Hobbit, and The Lord of the Rings, is 
actually an expression of a complex and subversive sensibility where ones practice of 
human imagining is characterized as a philological practice of praxeological 
recovery tied to the fabric of day-to-day existence; it can be coupled –and is so 
coupled in Tolkien to– a call to confront, resist and transform the occupation of 
lifeworlds by living out recovered forms of life. Imaginative resistance and revealing is 
constructed upon J. R. R. Tolkien’s (theological) belief that imaginative craft is not a 
dreamer’s flight from the ‘real world’ but, as Tolkien himself says, is an ‘escape into 
reality’421 to excavate clarity of vision and to allow us to see everyday life-forms and 
comportments “as we are (or were) meant to see them.”422 This ‘Philological 
Imagination’ deals –through language, in its way– with past, present and possible forms 
of life.  Imagination brings these together and enables our dealings with them –both 
‘literary’ and practical, and even potentially practical. The history of this 
                                                
420 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 7e. 
421 Tolkien’s radical, yet unsophisticated, insight must ultimately be rearticulated. I should also note 
that in Chapter 5 I will endeavor to show the relationship between this and Bresson's picture that 
“all that is not true in the real must be jettisoned.” Robert Bresson, Notes on the Cinematographer, 
trans. Jonathan Griffin (Københaven: Green Integer, 1997), 139. 
422 J. R .R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays, ed. 
Christopher Tolkien (London: Harper Collins, 1997), 146. 
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characterization of a “corporeal philology” begins, at least, with 18th-century 
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744); and, with a more direct 
influence on Tolkien, its broader interests are felt in another way through the work of 
English artist, businessman, and political philosopher William Morris. There is no room 
to fully investigate these unique voices and, for broader detail, the reader is directed to 
Appendices 2 and 3. 
To bring out broader and deeper insights into Tolkien’s description and his own 
practice of imaginative craft –and their implications for daily existence– I will first 
investigate philology as a practice of imaginative recovery in Tolkien’s work. Only 
then will I begin to deploy my central thesis: to unpack Tolkien’s project of mythopoeic 
resistance and address similarities in it with philosophical contemporaries such as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, to build upon work covered in chapter 3. 
 
PHILOLOGY423 
It was a line from Cynewulf’s Crist which initially set Tolkien’s legendarium in 
motion: eala earendil / engla beorhtast / monum sended (Hail, earendel, brightest of 
angels, above the middle-earth sent unto men). What or who was earendil was the 
question from which Tolkien's saga of Middle-earth was born. “I felt a curious thrill,” 
Tolkien later wrote, “as if something had stirred in me, half wakened from sleep. There 
was something very remote and strange and beautiful behind those words, if I could 
                                                
423 This section will deal with a highly specialized –or better– a ‘rarified’ characterization of 
philology described in the OED as: the ‘love of logos’ –of learning, of deep understanding; certainly 
as expressed in literature, but also more broadly and deeply. This built up picture of philology in 
the ‘old sense’ can be traced through and seen in the work of Nietzsche, Coleridge, Grundtvig, 
Hamann, Herder and Vico. It rests on a particular characterization of ‘literae humaniorous’ –
‘classics’– that involve the study of history, philosophy, and culture. While this characterization –
on a whole– was ‘outmoded’ by the modern understanding of philology as something more like 
‘linguistics’, this ‘old sense’ is to be deployed here as a part of an anti-Cartesian mode of moving 
forward. 
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grasp it, far beyond ancient English.”424 This characterization of the nature of language 
as life and people ‘behind’ words is what will be taken up here and will be further 
developed in the remaining chapters. Much of Tolkien’s life-long work on his 
legendarium was a project of recovery through poetic verse, mythology and his own 
invented languages prompted by a search for answers or clues to what turns out to be a 
very basic philological question; who or what was éarendel? This admittedly 
hypothetical question was one of a well-trained student of philology, near the turn of 
the 20th century, using a technique developed in the 19th century by the German 
philological scholar August Schleicher (1821-1868) called ‘asterisk-reality’ (or ‘*- 
reality’); the asterisk indicates the recovery and reconstruction of a word, a language, 
and even an entire life-world, “never recorded, but nevertheless could, [and] is even on 
the whole likely to have existed”.425 Having lexically glossed éarendel as light, a 
celestial body and a person, Tolkien philologically sub-created an originary life-world –
an ‘asterisk-reality’– which poetically held all three meanings in one. 
Tom Shippey was the first Tolkien scholar to insist that philology is “the only 
proper guide to a view of Middle-earth”.426 Since the publication of his essay “Creation 
from Philology” (1975), and his book The Road to Middle-earth (1982), much has been 
written about Tolkien as philologist. Without retracing steps, then, the question relevant 
to this discussion is: what role, if any, does philology play –specifically Tolkien’s 
                                                
424 Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 64. 
425 Tom Shippey, The Road to Middle-Earth: How J. R. R. Tolkien Created a New Mythology (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 15-21, 52-54. Schleicher was a 19th-century German linguist 
responsible for the first attempts to reconstruct the Proto-Indo-European language and the 
1861 publication Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen translated 
into English as A Compendium of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European Languages. 
426 Tom Shippey, The Road to Middle-earth 8. It should be noted however that Shippey is also very 
critical of Tolkien's 'mis-use' of philology. He argues that Tolkien overreaches and goes beyond 
what can and should be done with philology. It is my assertion that Shippey's critical stance on 
Tolkien, while he is the first to recognize Tolkien' philological technique, reflects this divide 
between a more 'rare' practice of philology –now, on a whole, abandoned– and a picture of 
philological practice in the 'old sense' which we will see in the work of Vico. 
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characterization and practice of philology– in lending insight into the colonization of 
human forms of life and the possibility of acts of resistance as discussed thus far? In 
order to answer this question both a brief history of philology, as an academic 
discipline, and more broadly and uniquely as fitting in with a praxeological approach 
to world, along with the circumstances surrounding its fall from favor in Western 
academia, is necessary.  
Tolkien battled fiercely throughout his academic career to keep philology a 
relevant field of study at Oxford. In his “Valedictory Address to the University of 
Oxford” in 1959, Tolkien’s departing salvo to the Oxford English department, he 
referred to philology as “the foundation of humane letters”.427 Tolkien’s explicit 
reference to the literae humaniores is to say that philology is more than simply a 
scientific study of grammar, morphology, syntax, phonology and semantics but is in 
fact the foundation of all classical scholarship, and the Humanities in the West. As the 
bedrock of Western scholarship the philologist also represents a particular kind of 
scholar. A philologist is a practitioner of interdisciplinary scholarship –a literary 
paleontologist; not only attentive to the study of language, but to the broader literary 
meanings, history, anthropology, and philosophy; in short, the philologist should be 
attentive to the complex life-forms in which the language was situated. This 
interdisciplinary description of the philologist –whose characterization of language 
hearkens to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations– is echoed in The Ring of 
Words: Tolkien and the Oxford English Dictionary:  
Trying to make sense of an enigmatic word-form requires the 
exercise of linguistic skills, but this very activity leads the 
researcher into a wider realm of history or of legend (imagined 
history): it calls upon the interplay of the imagination with the 
                                                
427 J. R. R. Tolkien, “Valedictory Address to the University of Oxford,” in The Monsters and the 
Critics, ed. Christopher Tolkien (London: Harper Collins, 1997), 225. 
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known facts. The reconstruction of word-forms goes hand in 
hand with the imaginative recreation of the lost world in which 
they are supposed to have been used.428 
 
Philology, then, as Tolkien practiced it, includes the recovery and reconstruction of lost 
forms of life through language, specific words, broader literary expressions, and, of 
course, literature and its contexts: language in use (and here Tolkien's practice links up 
with what has been described earlier about Wittgenstein and the praxeological 
approach). Although Tolkien’s philological views were a minority opinion in the early 
20th-century they certainly were in a distinguished 19th-century company. During the 
preceding century Jacob and Wilhem Grimm (1785-1863 and 1786-1859) prodigiously 
compiled and wrote books on German grammar and word meanings, mythology, heroic 
legends and fairy tales. Nikolai Grundtvig (1783-1872) saw an essential relationship 
between his philology and theology. He wove his philological study of Iceleandic and 
Anglo-Saxon poetry into his interpretations of Christianity and his hymns, as well as 
writing the first modern Beowulf translation which helped spur a revival of Danish 
nationalism. Like Grundtvig, the Finn Elias Lönnrot (1802-1884) created the ‘asterisk 
epic’ *The Kalevala based on Finnish poems and folklore.429 For good –and in some 
cases for ill– this particularly mythological focus of philology was supported and 
spurred by the work of comparative philology. As early as 1786, Sir William Jones 
argued for a common Indo-European (IE) language source of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, 
Gothic, and Celtic. The comparative study of phonological and morphological shifts in 
                                                
428 Peter Gilliver et. al., The Ring of Words: Tolkien and the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 52. 
429 Tom Shippey, J. R. R. Tolkien: Author of the Century (London: Harper Collins, 2001), xv. 
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these disparate languages served as the foundation for the Grimm-Grundtvig-Lönrot 
work and is one of the fields of which Tolkien was an ‘inheritor’.430 
It is of primary significance that the relevance of philology, at least as Tolkien 
practiced it, went into virtual extinction and was replaced in academic departments with 
distinct ‘literature’ and ‘linguistics’ disciplines during the same nexus of time in 
Western civilization already noted by Mumford, Boorstin and Baudrillard –from the 
dawn of the second industrial revolution c. 1870 through the blooming of the media 
age, which for arguments sake we can identify as the year of Tolkien’s Valedictory 
Address and one year before the televised Kennedy/Nixon debates, c. 1959. Christiana 
Scull and Wayne Hammond note that the first OED definition of philology circa 1906 
                                                
430 Tom Shippey, J. R. R. Tolkien: Author of the Century, 10-13. It is important to mention that 
comparative philology associated with mythic nationalism also came with problems and it should 
be noted that this particular branching of philology had its detractors. Max Müller, the first Chair 
of Comparative Philology at Oxford, described myth as a problematic disease of language. Carlos 
Riobo notes that Ezra Pound, who profoundly influenced Modernism, rejected the 19th-century 
‘Romantic Philology’ that lead to “cultural identity, defined in part through national texts 
purported to reflect essential and transcendent qualities of the nation, and created rivalries both 
among their own inhabitants and with neighboring nations.” In its stead, Pound chose to identify 
his poetry with the ‘Philology of Dante’ described by Riobo as “a discipline based on the intrinsic 
value of the literary work regardless of temporal constraint or national affiliation”. Carlos Riobo, 
“The Spirit of Ezra Pound's Romance Philology: Dante's Ironic Legacy of the Contingencies of 
Value,” Comparative Literature Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2002): 201-222. Similarly, Umberto Eco 
expresses his own concerns, in The Search for the Perfect Language, trans. James Fentress (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1995), for the particular use made of broad philological work tied to ideas about nation 
(‘monogenetic’ and ‘nationalist hypothesis’). The ‘virtual’ Indo-European language didn’t claim to 
be the root of all languages, only the ‘Aryan’ language. Eco says, “we know only too well that the 
Aryan myth had political consequences that were profoundly tragic. …At the end of a thousand-
year long ideal voyage to the East in search of roots, Europe had at last found some ideal reasons 
to turn that virtual voyage into a real one –for the purposes not of intellectual discovery, however, 
but of conquest.” (Umberto Eco, ibid., 104-106). Considering Pound’s fascist sympathies, 
however, it seems the ‘Philology of Dante’ was no less susceptible to corruptions of power. 
Equally, while Eco wants to maintain a sensitivity to “side-effects” he concedes that Indo-
European scholars were right “at the level of linguistic science”. (Umberto Eco, ibid., 105) All the 
more then, to make a direct link between 19th-century comparative philology enamored of 
culturally and geographically contingent myths, and the horrors of 20th-century conflicts (to Eco’s 
credit he in no way is attempting to make this link but to emphasize the need to explore ‘poly-
genetic’ aspects of language), is not only a certain mischaracterizations of Tolkien’s philology but 
historically naive. Tolkien most certainly knew well that these things (like all human practices) can 
be misused. “The right to ‘freedom’ of the sub-creator is no guarantee among fallen men that it 
will not be used as wickedly as is Free Will.” J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, ed. 
Humphrey Carpenter and Christopher Tolkien, comp. Christopher Tolkien (Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin, 1981), 194. Furthermore, what is accomplished in Tolkien’s hands certainly undermines 
the strength of these critiques. 
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already considered the definition of the broad discipline, which included the study of 
literature in the ‘wide sense’ and classical scholarship, “now rare in general sense”.431 
The development of semiotic theory by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-
1913) and the American mathematician-philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-
1914) came into academic prominence throughout Europe, slowly making diachronic432 
philological studies démodé and defining them, too, as a part of 'theoretical linguistics'. 
Indeed, the first holder of the Merton Professorship of English Language and Literature 
at Oxford (established in 1885), A.S. Napier, was partially responsible for the 
bifurcation of the English syllabus in 1908.433 The language is revealing: “Napier stated 
that ‘the [Oxford English School] has to provide for the needs of two classes of 
students –those who are primarily students of language, and those who are primarily 
students of literature”.434 Napier’s use of ‘language’ here is also very telling. Tolkien 
referred to those in the English School who decried ‘language’ as pompous epigones 
who lacked imagination. Furthermore, the very title, The School of English Language 
and Literature, was a misused “bogey”, said Tolkien: 
the word English is not an adjective, but a noun in loose 
composition. …And if any should say ‘English what?’, I 
would answer: ‘For a thousand recorded years English as a 
noun has meant only one thing: the English Language.’ 
…Nonetheless I think that it was a mistake to intrude 
Language into our title in order to mark this difference, or to 
warn those who are ignorant of their own ignorance. Not least 
because Language is thus given, as indeed I suspect was 
                                                
431 Wayne G. Hammond and Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide: Reader’s Guide 
(London: Harper Collins, 2006), 754. “Love of learning and literature; the study of literature in a 
wide sense, including grammar, literary criticism and interpretation, the relation of literature and 
written records to history etc.; literary or classical scholarship; polite learning”. 
432 What de Saussure referred to as the historical analysis of ‘linguistic system’. 
433 Wayne G. Hammond and Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide: Reader’s Guide, 
627. 
434 Wayne G. Hammond and Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide: Reader’s Guide, 
729. (emphasis mine) 
 152 
intended, an artificially limited and pseudo-technical sense 
which separates this technical thing from Literature. This 
separation is false, and this use of the word ‘language’ is 
false.435 
 
Rather than “degrade” language or literature, Tolkien preferred the terms Lang. and 
Lit. when speaking of these artificially divided, ‘specialized’, “limited and pseudo-
technical” subjects.436 Through the influence of Saussureian semiotics and other 
linguistic approaches, then, Lang. was focused on synchronic (and diachronic, in its 
own way) analysis of language –linguistics– while Lit. was remanded to the care of 
‘critics’.  
Although Tolkien witnessed the ‘death’ of the broad interdisciplinary approach 
to the field of philology in his lifetime, nineteenth century philology had a profound 
impact in the field of continental philosophy. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was 
trained as a classical philologist at Leipzig and taught at the university of Basel from 
1869-1879 as professor of classical philology. James Porter makes the strong case in 
Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future (2000) that not only did Nietzsche never 
abandon his philological training but that his philosophical writings were indeed a 
complex extension of his philological training –“a form of philology. … [P]hilology as 
a form of cultural criticism … [in which] he embodi[ed] the theory directly in his 
writing.”437 Although it is clear from Nietzsche’s posthumously published essay “We 
Philologists” that he grew to become disgusted with the direction the academic 
profession took, his philosophy drew on, and developed around, philology’s 
interdisciplinary techniques of recovery and reconstruction to shed light on the 
                                                
435 J. R. R. Tolkien, “Valedictory Address to the University of Oxford,” in The Monsters and the 
Critics, ed. Christopher Tolkien, 231-232. 
436 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 230. 
437 James I. Porter, Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
4-5, 11. 
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present.438 In his inaugural address, “Homer and Classical Philology”, given at Basel in 
May of 1869, Nietzsche closes by inverting a quote from Seneca: “Philosophia facta 
est quae philologia fuit.” In this way he “wish[ed] to signify that all philological 
activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a philosophical view of things”.439 
Nietzsche desired a broader characterization of philology –one far more philosophical, 
relevant, and immediate. His first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), came as a shock 
to his philological colleagues at Basel and was equally problematic to the ‘academic’ 
philosophers of the time. Tragedy is both a decidedly philological (as Nietzsche 
understood it) exploration of Greek Tragedy, and –following in the tradition of Arthur 
Schopenhauer– a critique of Western philosophical traditions which emphasize the 
rational over the aesthetic, the eternal over the immanent, and the ideal over activity; 
Nietzsche viewed such philosophies as a pox on the Prussian society of his day. Later, 
works such as Human, All Too Human (1878) and On The Genealogy of Morals (1887) 
draw on interdisciplinary philological techniques with the express philosophical 
purpose of commenting on Nietzsche’s historical context.  
                                                
438 Friedrich Nietzsche, “We Philologists,” trans. by J. M. Kennedy, in The Complete Works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 8, ed. Dr. Oscar Levy (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911), 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18267/18267-h/18267-h.htm#WE_PHILOLOGISTS. In 
aphorism 94 Nietzsche offers a simplistic and childish, although insightful, list of comparisons 
between ‘The Greeks’ and ‘The Philologists’: “The Greeks render homage to beauty” while The 
Philologists are “babblers and triflers”; “The Greeks develop the body” while the Philologists are 
“ugly looking creatures”; “The Greeks speak clearly” while The Philologists are “stammerers”; 
“The Greeks are religious transfigurers of everyday occurrences” while The Philologists are “filthy 
pedants”; “The Greeks are listeners and observers” while The Philologists are “quibblers and 
scarecrows”; the list goes on. (153) And yet, however vehement Nietzsche’s critique may appear, 
“We Philologists” is still very philological in its praise of Greek culture. Rather than the ‘scientific’ 
philology of his day, Nietzsche championed the ‘poetic-philology’ of Goethe: “Goethe as a 
German poet-philologist; Wagner as a still higher stage: his clear glance for the only worthy 
position of art. No ancient work has ever had so powerful an effect as the Orestes had on Wagner. 
The objective, emasculated philologist, who is but a philistine of culture and a worker in ‘pure 
science,’ is, however, a sad spectacle.”(181) Of Goethe, Nietzsche later says, “Goethe grasped 
antiquity in the right way · invariably with an emulative soul. But who else did so?” (183) 
439 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Homer and Classical Philology," trans. J. M. Kennedy, Wikisource, The Free 
Library, 
http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Homer_and_Classical_Philology&oldid=599935. 
(emphasis mine) 
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Although not a philologist by training, aspects of the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) could certainly be described as ‘philological’ in this broad 
‘Nietzschian’ sense. Although Heidegger develops his own ‘cultural critique’ later in 
his writings, he concerns himself early on with the philosophical ‘forgetting of Being’ 
and a phenomenological methodology required to address such a forgetting. Among his 
many early influences, Heidegger cites the lectures of German theologian Carl Braig 
(1853-1923) and specifically Braig’s text, On Being: Outline of Ontology (1896). 
Regarding the text Heidegger says, “the larger sections of the work give extensive text 
passages from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Suarez, always at the end, and in 
addition the etymology for fundamental ontological concepts.”440 Dermot Moran notes 
that Braig’s On Being even contained the phrase ‘the Being of beings’ which surfaces 
in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit as a central feature.441 This etymological tracing is quite 
revealing because central to Heidegger’s thesis in Sein und Zeit is the forgetting of the 
meaning of Being –from Plato to Nietzsche– and the need to exhume an originary 
understanding. Heidegger's link between a broad form of philology and a philosophy 
with broader ontological concerns echoes the praxeological concerns which go back at 
least to the work of the 18thcentury philosopher Giambattista Vico. For Heidegger, 
there was also a relationship between a philological approach to philosophy, and a 
move away from a particular built-up picture of subjective humanism, towards this 
ontological description of human living in a new, existential and phenomenological 
sense –a view, I will argue, Tolkien shares. It should be noted that Tolkien scholars 
such as Verlyn Flieger argue that Tolkien’s closest and ‘primary’ philological influence 
                                                
440 Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, trans. J. L. Mehta (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul: London 1977), 10. 
441 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (Routledge: Milton Park 2000), 201. 
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was Owen Barfield. The reader is directed to Appendix 4 to see how that assertion is 
connected to my broader thesis. 
 
TOLKIEN’S MYTHOPOEIA 
This broad characterization of philology was established in order to better 
understand the complex philological exploration of forgotten life-worlds in the work of 
J. R. R. Tolkien. As was suggested, we know from Tolkien’s letters that Owen 
Barfield’s Poetic Diction confirmed his instincts to move beyond the perceived limits 
of his classical training in comparative philology and towards a broader and deeper 
Vichian-like philology. While some of Barfield’s work is echoed in much of Tolkien’s 
characterizations about philology, it is also the recovery, craft and protest of William 
Morris that might best reflect Tolkien’s broader praxeological impulses. Tolkien, 
however, a devout Roman Catholic, deploys his philological project to theological ends 
in a way not explicitly set forth by Morris or Barfield. The effect, either intentional or 
not, is the articulation of a unique theology of being, craft, and imagining that defines 
his work –both academically and artistically– after 1931. Tolkien’s first major 
articulation of this broader philology project was the poem Mythopoeia (1931).442 
… man, sub-creator, the refracted light 
through whom is splintered from a single White 
to many hues, and endlessly combined 
in living shapes that move from mind to mind. 
Though all the crannies of the world we filled 
with elves and goblins, though we dared to build 
gods and their houses out of dark and light, 
and sow the seed of dragons, ’twas not decayed. 
                                                
442 In 1931 Tolkien also wrote A Secret Vice, in which he reveals the importance of invented 
languages –specifically his own invented languages– to the practice of Philology and the human 
imagination. We should also note a distinction between Tolkien’s poem and ‘mythopoeia’ as a 
concept. The former will be indicated by italics and the later by being un-italicized. 
 156 
We make still by the law in which we’re made.443 
 
In Mythopoeia, it is apparent that Tolkien has taken his private philological 
musings and connected them to –or better still, transformed them into– a proto-
theological anthropology of human imagining, which reached its full completion with 
the essay “On Fairy-Stories” (1939 referenced as OFS), further explored in the The 
Lord of the Rings (1954-55 referenced as LOTR), and was succinctly summarized in the 
playful short story Smith of Wooton Major (1967). The integral relationship between 
the works of the imagination, who we are as human beings, and how we comport 
ourselves is captured by Tolkien in his concept of sub-creation. If the philological 
basis for Tolkien’s scholarly project of imaginative fiction is clearly laid out in OFS, 
then Mythopoeia is his philosophical treatise on the ‘ontology’ of imaginative craft. 
Written for his friend C. S. Lewis in response to a heated theological discussion 
between the two regarding the relationship of ancient myth and true myth, Mythopoeia 
is a poem surprisingly not so much about ‘myth’ per se as it is about a theology of 
poïesis (ποίησις) –a theology of making, creating and bringing forth.444  
Tolkien’s articulation of a theological anthropology that characterizes humanity 
as creative-being made to refract the light of God through the creative imagination is a 
significant development in his work. Throughout his legendarium, light is an originary 
substance by which all things are made, and it is the responsibility of those who inhabit 
Middle-earth to refract this originary light in the endless battle against the horrors of 
darkness. In Tolkien’s view, the activity of sub-creation binds human beings, the land 
                                                
443 J. R. R. Tolkien, “Mythopoeia,” in Tree and Leaf (London: Harper Collins, 2001), 87. (emphasis 
mine) 
444 This view is contrary to most who argue that Mythopoeia is about myth and how myth functions. 
(See “The Great Chain of Reading” by Gergely Nagy in Tolkien the Medievalist edited by Jane 
Chance London: Routledge, 2008) While that aspect of mythopoeia is indeed important, to miss 
the anthropological / ontological statement Tolkien makes in his poem is to miss the point 
entirely.  
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(topology), and artistic craft into an Elvish harmony –a mode of poetic dwelling in 
creation. Corruption, however, has caused us to lose sight of this originary mode of 
Being-in-the-world. Echoing Barfield’s archaism, it is Tolkien’s hope that we may 
recover, through sub-creation, a living sensibility of the integral relationship between 
Being-in-the-world as creative beings, creating, and the way we live our lives.  
You look at trees and label them just so, 
(for trees are ‘trees’, and growing is ‘to 
grow’); 
. . . a star’s a star, some matter in a ball 
compelled to courses mathematical 
amid the regimented, cold, Inane, 
where destined atoms are each moment 
slain.445 
 
The wisdom of this living sensibility is evident in Tolkien’s critique in the opening 
stanza where he rejects the ‘materialism’ so prevalent in the scientism and industrialism 
of his age. There is simply more to reality than just matter, insists Tolkien. Indeed, the 
material realm is far deeper and broader than the sum total of its parts. This picture is 
echoed years later in C. S. Lewis’s The Voyage of the Dawn Treader. Tolkien’s 
mythopoeic is no doubt an inspiration for the conversation between Edmund, Eustace 
and Ramandu: “In our world,” said Eustace, “a star is a huge ball of flaming gas.” 
Ramandu –a retired star reminiscent of Tolkien’s éarendel– answers, saying, “even in 
your world, my son, that is not what a star is but only what it is made of.” 446  
Tolkien’s unique philological response to the problem raised in the opening 
stanza goes far beyond the conventions expected of academic comparative philology.  
Yet trees are not ‘trees’, until so named and seen — 
and never were so named, till those had been 
who speech’s involuted breath unfurled, 
                                                
445 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 85. 
446 C. S. Lewis, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (New York: Harper Collins, 1980), 209. 
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faint echo and dim picture of the world, 
. . . digging the foreknown from experience 
and panning the vein of spirit out of sense.447 
 
This image of panning the vein of spirit out of sense is a metaphor that works on 
multiple levels. Tolkien’s fundamental claim is that there is an implicit (theological) 
relationship between language, reality, and imagining. His rejection of what he saw as 
enemies of life –fascism, abject materialism, and modernism– demands a ‘recovery’, 
not a nostalgic retrieval for the novelty of what once was, but because it is the purpose 
of human existence. Here we can draw parallels to Martin Heidegger’s ‘philological’ 
retrieval of an originary characterization of truth –as in the Heraclitian fragment– and 
his re-articulation of the dwelling of Dasein in truth (aletheia), which Heidegger 
translates as unhiddenness (Unverborgenheit). To speak and act truthfully is to dig and 
pan from hiddnness, and –one might also add– to do the inverse is also true. 
There is, then, a definite change in Tolkien’s work after Mythopoeia. All 
through the thirties, Tolkien made great strides in his academic output, crafting some of 
his finest and most lasting papers. In 1932 Tolkien completed a rough and incomplete 
draft of The Hobbit448 and wrote the first part of the Vichian Sigelwara Land. Verlyn 
Flieger’s description of Sigelwara Land as a combination of “philology with a leap of 
imagination . . . the penetration into a lost attitude of mind, the participation of his own 
imaginative faculty with that of a people long gone” certainly resonates with what has 
been said thus far.449 Tolkien wrote the second part of Sigelwara Land in 1934 and 
published another scholarly investigation of language with “Chaucer as a Philologist: 
                                                
447 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 86. (emphasis mine) 
448 Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien: The Authorized Biography. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 177. 
449 Verlyn Flieger, Splintered Light: Logos and Language in Tolkien’s World (Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
University Press, 2002), 8. 
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The Reeve’s Tale”.450 It is clear by this period that Tolkien was in full pursuit of the 
ability to penetrate “beyond normal human perception into another reality, one always 
present but not readily accessible”451, and recover new understanding through language. 
Although there is no evidence of a direct connection, it should be pointed out that 
Tolkien’s characterizations of language are strikingly similar to those of Wittgenstein. 
Indeed, when Wittgenstein says that language is like a city –some of which is in a state 
of disuse– this matches up nicely to Tolkien’s ‘archaeological’ digs into the past, 
through language, to recover ‘lost’ forms of life. This is never more apparent than in 
Tolkien’s lasting essay “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics”. 
 Presented as the Sir Israel Gollancz Memorial Lecture to the British Academy, 
in “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics” (1936) we sense yet another monumental 
development in Tolkien’s craft. Tolkien fuses his ever-transforming thoughts on 
philology, myth and their ability to reveal something true about ‘reality’. Tolkien 
begins his classic essay with this simple allegory: 
A man inherited a field in which was an accumulation of 
old stone, part of an older hall. Of the old stone some had 
already been used in building the house in which he actually 
lived, not far from the old house of his fathers. Of the rest he 
took some and built a tower. But his friends coming perceived 
at once (without troubling to climb the steps) that these stones 
had formerly belonged to a more ancient building. So they 
pushed the tower over, with no little labour, in order to look 
for hidden carvings and inscriptions, or to discover whence the 
man’s distant forefathers had obtained their building material. 
Some suspecting a deposit of coal under the soil began to dig 
for it, and forgot even the stones. They all said: ‘This tower is 
most interesting.’ But they also said (after pushing it over): 
                                                
450 Actually “read to the Philological Society in 1931”; see Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien: The 
Authorized Biography, 38. 
451 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 9. 
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‘What a muddle it is in!’ And even the man’s own 
descendants, who might have been expected to consider what 
he had been about, were heard to murmur: ‘He is such an odd 
fellow! Imagine his using these old stones just to build a 
nonsensical tower! Why did not he restore the old house? He 
had no sense of proportion.’ But from the top of that tower the 
man had been able to look out upon the sea.452 
 
Drawing on Tolkien’s philological strategy of ‘getting inside words’, Flieger explains 
that “the old stone is the myth-infused Old English language . . . [and] the older hall 
from which the stones originally came can be read as the ancient heritage of myth, 
legend, and history that informed the poet’s diction [. . .]. The house in which he 
actually lived, for which some of the old stone had been used, would be the living 
language that he spoke. [. . .] The tower, of course, is the poem itself” where Tolkien 
says we can look out upon the sea.453 At the moment, however, when Flieger seems 
poised to tie her exegetical reading of the ‘Tower Allegory’ together she missteps and 
says, “there is no allegorical correlative to the sea, and the vision thus suggested cannot 
be tied to any specific meaning.”454 She goes on to cite a tower/sea reference in LOTR 
and some unnamed references in The Silmarillion. But even this attempt to make a 
correlation is unnecessary, she says. The reader 
does not need to know that history in order for the passage to 
be effective [effective for whom, I ask!]. The episode invites 
comparison with the final line of the allegory in the Beowulf 
essay. In both instances, the effect comes less from the images 
of the tower and sea than from the stated or implied desire to 
climb up and look outward to the immense unknown. 
Tolkien’s use of this idea in both the essay and [LOTR] 
suggests that for him it transcended allegory to express an 
                                                
452 J. R. R. Tolkien, “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics,” The Monsters & The Critics and Other 
Essays (London: Harper Collins, 1997), 8. 
453 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 15. 
454 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 15. 
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indefinable but very real attribute of the human psyche: the 
desire to seek something without knowing what it is.455 
 
While on a whole it seems she correctly interprets Tolkien’s project and his tower 
allegory, her bungling of the ending reveals a fatal flaw. Ultimately, Flieger is too 
Cartesian in her own reading of Tolkien. Indeed, it is precisely what Tolkien looks out 
from the tower to see that makes his project so significant; the very fact that Tolkien 
looks out to the sea, and how he looks out to the sea leads us to understand that Tolkien 
is not simply writing imaginative tales of fancy but is making claims about the nature 
of language, imagination and our Umwelt. Words are not ‘containers’ that hold myth 
but are pieces of a form of life in disrepair –in the Wittgensteinian sense– from whose 
vantage point we can see the world anew. This position naturally results from and leads 
to a radically different reading of the Beowulf lecture than Flieger would suggest.456 
                                                
455 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 16. 
456  There is an important theological reading that must be added to my critique of Flieger, 
however. In the context of Tolkien and Barfield I will summarize it in footnote form. I would 
suggest that the tension Flieger senses –between light and dark / OFS and BMC– would be more 
accurately characterized as the tension between fallen existential finitude and the in-breaking of 
Christ’s eschatological reality. The so called darkness and the light can be delineated but cannot be 
separated because the whole of creation –for good and for ill– is held together by Providence. In the 
language of the Silmarillion, Providence is Eru (“who in Arda is called Ilúvatar”) incorporating the 
discord (negation of heart) of Melkor into the grand divine harmony.  
Theologically we can say that darkness is, but it never has the final say nor does it ever exist 
independently of God’s final yes to life. So, in the appropriate reinterpretation of BMC and OFS 
would be that BMC reveals that –paraphrasing Tolkien—whether the gods go or come the 
monsters remain and what is required of humanity is to remain of good cheer and have courage in 
the face of that fallen reality. This is in stark contrast to Flieger’s vainglorious interpretation of 
BMC that “the point of the poem is the beauty and doomed glory of such a battle, made more 
beautiful and more glorious precisely because its inevitable end is death.” (14) Death is not 
beautiful for Tolkien, rather, it is courage driven by hope in the face of death –a reality exemplified by 
the imaginative monsters in the story– which is beautiful. OFS then, is a theological statement which 
takes place in the world of BMC. While a fallen world suffers a “long defeat” there are moments 
when we can glimpse (and often taste and smell) a different reality. This joy, this sentimental 
longing, this Sehnsucht (as deployed by Rudolf Otto) is the nostalgia, which accompanies a glimpse 
of the way things ought to be, but are not yet; Tolkien calls this the evangelium or eucatastrophe. 
OFS is not a new reading of BMC but an extended meditation on the nature of a story such as 
Beowulf . 
 Ultimately Flieger gets it right when she quotes Tolkien from BMC, saying that despite the 
presence of monsters the Beowulf poet “is still concerned primarily with man on earth” and “the 
phrase ‘man on earth,’ with its emphatic italics, is the key to Tolkien’s reading of the meeting of 
paganism and Christianity in the poem and in his own philosophy as well.” (18) Tolkien is 
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The sea, in fact, has a tremendous personal symbolic significance to Tolkien, 
and any time he mentions it, it cannot be taken lightly. Carpenter notes that Tolkien 
was plagued as a child by a recurring dream of the sea –a Great Wave– devouring the 
land.457 The Great Wave is later incorporated into the myth of the destruction of 
Númenor and in the landing of the survivors of Númenor at the Gulf of Lune where the 
Elves and Men of the West keep an ever vigilant watch over the waters to the Undying 
Lands. But the waters of the sea are not just mere water … as though there was ever 
such a thing. Tolkien notes in the Ainulindalë: 
But the other Ainur looked upon this habitation set within the 
vast spaces of the World, which the Elves call Arda, the Earth; 
and their hearts rejoiced in light, and their eyes beholding 
many colours were filled with gladness; but because of the 
roaring of the sea they felt a great unquiet. And they observed 
the winds and the air, and the matters of which Arda was 
made, of iron, and stone and silver and gold and many 
substances: but of all these water they most greatly praised. 
And it is said by the Eldar that in water there lives yet the echo 
of the Music of the Ainur more than in any substance else that 
is in this Earth; and many of the Children of Ilúvatar hearken 
still unsated to the voices of the Sea, and yet know not for 
what they listen.458 
 
Over these waters Ælfwine sails to Tol Eressëa (The Lonely Island) and hears the Lost 
Tales of the Elves. And of course, there is Eärendil the Mariner who sails the straight 
path across the seas to Valinor to plead and intercede for the safety of Middle-earth. To 
Tolkien the waters of the sea are life giving and life taking, they represent order and 
                                                                                                                                         
concerned with the Christian life in light of existential despair and how imaginative narrative serves 
as an effective theological response to that crisis. 
457 Humphrey Carpenter, ibid., 170. 
458 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion, ed. Christopher Tolkien (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 19. 
(emphasis mine) 
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chaos, but most importantly the waters of the sea contain the hypnotic music of the 
earliest notes of creation.  
Against this reading, Flieger’s assertion that “there is no allegorical correlative 
to the sea” has undoubtedly missed the mark. On the contrary, the sea plays a crucial 
and primeval role in Tolkien’s allegory of the Tower, not only to get inside of words, 
but –as Vico postulated– to ponder a reality (a life-world) now lost in a prosaic age. 
When we stand atop the tower and look out unto the sea we sense the trace of the way 
things could be, and in many cases, ought to be. There is then an intense ethical 
element to Tolkien’s philological and literary craft that must now be addressed. This 
ethical element echoes much that has already been said regarding the ordering of 
human forms of life and the possibilities of resistance. 
 
MYTHOPOEIC RESISTANCE: RECOVERY, ESCAPE, CONSOLATION 
The Thirties culminate in Tolkien’s definitive manifesto of his philological 
project, the OFS lecture in 1939.459 The lecture is intimately linked to Tolkien’s 
development of the idea of mythopoeia –the culmination of his thoughts on language, 
myth and imagination before his major work on LOTR–460 and presents the most 
systematic treatise available in Tolkien’s vast corpus of imaginative work for 
                                                
459 “[OFS] was revised and expanded for inclusion in Essays Presented to Charles Williams, reissued 
together with Leaf by Niggle in Tree and Leaf in 1964, which volume was subsequently folded into The 
Tolkien Reader.” Verlyn Flieger, Splintered Light, 11. 
460 Bradley J. Birzer notes, in his excellent study entitled J. R. R. Tolkien’s Sanctifying Myth 
(Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2004), that Tolkien “considered this essay especially explicative 
of his own thinking and analysis on a range of subjects. In fact, he later claimed that he had written 
[LOTR] to demonstrate much of the argument presented in ‘On Fairy-Stories’.” (Birzer 33) What 
Birzer is referring to are several letters found in the Humphrey Carpenter edited collection The 
Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien. See letters 163 (to W.H. Auden), 165, 181 and letter 234 where Tolkien 
says, “I had to think about [the contemporary delusions about ‘fairy-stories’], however, before I 
gave an ‘Andrew Lang’ lecture at St Andrews on Fairy-stories; and I must say I think the result was 
entirely beneficial to The Lord of the Rings, which was a practical demonstration of the views that I 
expressed.” (Carpenter 310) This in no way implies that Tolkien’s motivation for writing LOTR 
can be reduced to simple ‘demonstration’. Indeed, its origins are far more complex! The point to 
be taken here is that LOTR is an ‘embodiment’, a ‘fleshing out’ in literary practice, of the theory 
found in OFS.  
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deciphering a discernable project of Faërie.461 Primarily concerned with the nature of 
artistic creation and consequently its possible philosophical and theological 
implications, Tolkien develops ideas established in his 1936 Beowulf lecture. 
The fairy-story, or Fantasy, “is a natural human activity”, claims Tolkien.462 
While fairy-story is an exploration of a perilous yet enchanted land –which Tolkien 
refers to as Faërie– its primary concern is always with the practices of human beings in 
the real or primary world. “Faërie”, Tolkien argues, “contains many things besides 
elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, 
the sun, the moon, the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, 
water and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are 
enchanted.”463 Tolkien believed that fairy-story would aid in the “re-enchantment” of 
the real world and provide a more authentic mediation of reality than the Modernist 
“Robot-Age” in which he and the rest of his shell-shocked generation found 
themselves. Tolkien’s concerns about the nature of language, reality, the human 
imagination, and human forms of life culminate in the penultimate rubric of Tolkien’s 
OFS entitled Recovery, Escape, Consolation. 
                                                
461 Tolkien offers no explanation for his spelling of Faërie. There is a direct reference in OFS to the 
first instance of Fairy in the OED: a poem by 14th-century poet John Gower: “as he were of fairie”, 
which Tolkien immediately re-interprets as, “as if he were come from Faërie”.  One possible 
source may be William Morris. In the prologue to The Earthly Paradise Morris writes of wanderers 
finding “a nameless city in a distant sea / White as the changing walls of Faërie.” As pointed out in 
Appendix 3, The Earthly Paradise is a possible source for Tolkien’s earliest complete work The Book 
of Lost Tales. Whatever the source of the spelling, Tolkien’s point is twofold. Faërie is not a subject 
but a place (a ‘real’ place in time) and its spelling is an integral reference to Tolkien’s distinction 
between what he is arguing for in OFS and the traditional Victorian notion of Fairy which was 
relegated to a status of diminutive fancy. “The definition of a fairy-story”, says Tolkien, “what it is, 
or what it should be—does not, then depend on any definition or historical account of elf or fairy, 
but upon the nature of Faërie: the Perilous Realm itself, and the air that blows in that 
country.”(OFS 114) 
462 J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” The Monsters & The Critics and Other Essays, 113. (emphasis 
mine) 
463 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 113. 
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RECOVERY 
To understand what Tolkien means exactly by ‘recovery’ requires some 
investigation. On the surface, we know that Tolkien views fairy-story as a means of 
recovering the enchantment of creation because it is concerned, not with other worlds, 
but with our real world. “Fantasy is made out of the Primary World, but a good 
craftsman loves his material [. . .]. It was in fairy-stories that I first divined the potency 
of the words, and the wonder of things, such as stone, and wood, and iron; tree and 
grass; house and fire; bread and wine”, he says.464  However, ‘recovery’ is not simply a 
linguistic recognition of the real world –it is philological. Here we must momentarily 
diverge, on principle, from Vichian philological recovery. It is fair to make a direct 
parallel with Vico’s description of recovery and Platonic anamnesis which Vico 
certainly inherited through his reading of Renaissance natural philosophy.465 However, 
to attempt to make the same parallel between Tolkienian recovery and Platonic 
anamnesis (or even suggest Tolkien was a Platonist), as Verlyn Flieger attempts to do 
in Splintered Light,466 simply because his characterization of recovery ‘resembles’ it, 
would be incorrect. Tolkien’s recovery is not a concern for an external and eternal 
nature of ‘words’ and ‘things’ but with their use in particular forms of life. To clarify 
what this means we are well served to recall Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, “to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form”.467 This is not to 
say that –to the other extreme– recovery simply serves or can be reduced to didactic 
purposes as R. J. Reilly or Paul Kocher attempt to claim. Recovery is far broader and 
                                                
464 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 147. 
465 The exception to be made, of course, would be the influence of philosophy of Baruch Spinoza 
on Vico, as suggested by Isaiah Berlin. 
466 Verlyn Flieger, Splintered Light, 25; Unfortunately, Scull and Hammond’s dependence on Flieger 
in their usually thorough Reader’s Guide renders the entry on Recovery useless. 
467 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 7e. 
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deeper than seeing “morality as morality by prescinding from this or that moral act”468 
or than gaining “fresh knowledge of ourselves and the world about us, and of the kindly 
insight we once had into other species, other minds.”469  Tolkien was concerned with 
the recovery of a more poetic –better yet, a mythopoeic– form of life with its own 
ethical and moral characterizations contrary to what he perceived to be prevalent in the 
early 20th-century Europe. Tolkien argued that fairy-story could enliven us to a more 
authentic encounter with the alienating world which this prosaic “Robot-Age” offered, 
and aid in the “re-enchantment” of the real world –which includes food, music, water, 
rocks, trees, architecture, sunsets, and the like. Perhaps this is what Tolkien means 
when he says that recovery includes a “return and renewal of health” and a freedom 
from “triteness”, “familiarity”, and a “possessiveness” of the everyday world.470 In 
Heideggarian terms we could say more broadly that recovery is a continual excavation 
and return to a relationship with the hiddenness of the world lost in forms of life that no 
longer participate in, and with, creation but rather overwrite and truncate intended 
interconnectedness on the procrustean bed of technological alienation. 
 
ESCAPE 
The second ultimate aim of fairy-story is to provide a means of ‘escape’. The 
first inclination may be to ask, “Escape from and to where?” It is important to 
immediately make the distinction that Tolkien is not talking about a pleasant lie or 
falsehood which is an erroneous view taken up by Nicholas Wolterstorff in his book Art 
in Action. In reference to Tolkien’s project Wolterstorff says, “Sometimes we prize the 
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469 Paul Kocher, ibid., 156. See also Paul Kocher, Master of Middle-Earth: The Achievement of J. R. R. 
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world of a work of art for its falsehood in various respects to what we believe actuality 
to be like. We want for a while to burrow into a world significantly different from our 
actual world. We want for a while to escape the drudgery and pain, the boredom, 
perplexity, and disorder of real life.”471 Here, Wolterstorff completely misses the point; 
Faërie is not a falsehood, but a land just as problematic and complicated as any other 
life-world. If anything, Middle-earth is more real than the world in which we live! 
After spending months in the rat-and lice-infested trenches of World War One, 
Tolkien –and many of his generation– realized the mechanized and prosaic counterfeit 
projection of the modern world has robbed us of the possibility to express authentic 
lifeworlds and have an encounter with the enchanting “magic” of the reality of this 
world which is God's creation. Tolkien says, “a real taste for fairy-stories was wakened 
by philology on the threshold of manhood, and quickened to full life by war.”472 With 
Romantic exploration in the shadow of Modernist collapse, Tolkien proposes a project 
of restoring human vision and forms of life –ways of being a person, of living, of 
living-together. He says we are called to see “things as we are (or were) meant to see 
them” by rejecting “possessiveness” and “appropriation” so evident in “the Robot 
Age”.473 In imaginative escape “we still deal with life and death, comfort and 
discomfort. We merely escape progressivism and the progressive dream, which reduces 
all of complex reality to a mere shadow of creation’s true wonders.”474 Escape is not an 
escape from reality –or as Tolkien calls it, the “flight of the deserter”– but is an escape 
into reality from the prison that is the Post-Cartesian preoccupation with appropriation 
(manifest as ‘taking over’ taking ‘possession’ and consuming as capital utility), which 
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reduces the land and the people to physical commodity and cogs of a “robot age”. 
Tolkien harshly critiques such activity as would confound this significant distinction 
when he says, “they would seem to prefer the acquiescence of the ‘quisling’ to the 
resistance of the patriot. To such thinking you have only to say ‘the land you loved is 
doomed’ to excuse any treachery, indeed to glorify it.”475 
The implications for possibilities and imagination in our “Escape” are 
astounding. “For creative Fantasy”, says Tolkien, “is founded upon the hard recognition 
that things are so in the world as it appears under the sun; on a recognition of fact, but 
not a slavery to it.”476 What is ‘real’ is not only what can be verified, but sometimes 
what is ‘verified’ is often much less ‘real’ that what we imagined. “The maddest castle 
that ever came out of a giant’s bag in a wild Gaelic story is not only much less ugly 
than a robot-factory,” comments Tolkien, “it is also (to use a very modern phrase) ‘in a 
very real sense’ a great deal more real.”477 As with the case of the Christian prophetic 
tradition, often what is imagined is more real than what can be verified. Trevor Hart 
explores this connection in his essay “Imagination for the Kingdom of God?”. “It is 
precisely imagination,” he says, “the capacity which is able to take the known and to 
modify it in striking and unexpected ways, which offers us the opportunity to think 
beyond the limits of the given”.478 We can project Hart’s insight even further: the 
‘known’ includes the ‘possible’, or that which is beyond the limits of the given. Using 
terms already discussed we can say that imaginative understanding (Verstehen) 
includes the projection of the possibilities of being; the philological imagination 
(asterisk reality) reveals that the ‘known’ and the ‘possible’ are indeed given in 
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everyday human life. The radical proposal from Tolkien, then, is the belief that the 
human imagination can enliven our perception. And even more radical, he claimed 
there is connection between a renewal of perception and a transformation of action –
that finally, there is the hope to enliven our actions to shape the world around us. 
 
CONSOLATION 
Tolkien describes consolation as the “oldest and deepest desire, the Great 
Escape: The Escape from Death”.479 Fairy-Story, Myth, and the Gospels collide in an 
in-breaking of eschatological hope; Tolkien explains the production of this collision: 
“The consolation of fairy-stories, the joy of the happy ending: or more correctly of the 
good catastrophe, the sudden joyous ‘turn’”480 –in his one word: eucatastrophe. The 
developing relationship between the imaginative, the theological and the primary world 
will be addressed in at the end of the chapter, but, it is important to note the 
significance of Tolkien’s eucatastrophe. Ultimately, Tolkien is concerned with the 
anthropology, the sociology and ethics of Christian hope –or the way in which humans 
experience Christian hope in the complex weave of the human lifeworld. “It seems that 
for protean people it is difficult to believe that the hope, goodness, and love which they 
so avidly imagine could be actual in and true of the primary-world.”481 Here, Tolkien’s 
claim about the imaginative and mythopoeic also functions theologically. As Trevor 
Hart echoed earlier, as in the case of the Jewish prophetic tradition and the anticipatory 
witness of Christian eschatology, the ‘known’ and the ‘possible’ are not only given but 
transform the primary world. When the heavy clouds of sorrow envelope us in the 
midst of dyscatastrophe, the ‘happy ending’ functions as an in-breaking of fleeting 
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“Joy beyond the walls of the world”.482 By this point in OFS it is clear that Tolkien’s 
mythopoeic project –his philological discussion of Faërie, ‘reality’ and language, is at 
the very least, a powerful anti-modern ethical philosophy, and at its highest aspirations, 
a unique theological claim. “But in the ‘eucatastrophe’” Tolkien says, “we see in a brief 
vision that the answer may be greater –it may be a far-off gleam or echo of evangelium 
in the real world.”483 To Tolkien, the prophetic function of fairy-story is eucatastrophe, 
which challenges what some people take to be the sum total of the “facts” of this world 
by denying nihilistic doom to have the final say. This is an extension of his 
legendarium and extended to LOTR. A closer examination of the character of that life-
world is in order. 
 
SMITH OF WOOTTON MAJOR: PHILOLOGY AS WAYFINDING AND ELVISH CRAFT 
In the unheralded tale Smith of Wootton Major (1967 referenced as Smith), 
Tolkien writes a deceptively simple narrative of imaginative recovery, sub-creation and 
its relationship to human community and everyday life. Gifted with the fay-star, the 
villager Smith regularly visits the uncanny and perilous land of Faërie to explore and 
survey its wondrous sights. Villager Smith’s excursions are not mere fancy –or escape 
into a detached cognitive world– but are deeply transformative experiences. With each 
successive trip to Faërie, Smith returns with clarity of vision which he then incorporates 
into the everydayness of life back home. “The traveler in the realms of fantasy, as 
Tolkien insists in his doctrine of Recovery, is no mere dreamer but brings back a 
freshness of vision, which brightens and beautifies everything he sets his hand to.”484 
The key phrase here, “everything he sets his hand to”, suggests recovery is a practice 
                                                
482 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 153. 
483 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 155. 
484 Paul Kocher, Master of Middle-earth: The Achievement of J. R. R. Tolkien, 176. 
 171 
that informs the activities of agents-in-the-world. In the tale, there is little distinction 
between art, craft and disclosing the realities of Faërie for Smith, who creates practical 
tools and objects of delight with a new level of skill and aesthetic mastery, as a result of 
his travels in Faërie. Describing Smith’s works Tolkien says, “they were beautiful, for 
he could work iron into wonderful forms that looked as light and delicate as a spray of 
leaves and blossom, but kept the stern strength of iron, or seemed even stronger.”485 
Here is the heart of Tolkien’s philological imagination. 
Verlyn Flieger’s chapter on Smith, in her book A Question of Time: J. R. R. 
Tolkien’s Road to Faërie (1997), examines Tolkien’s final treatment of a human 
traveler “between the worlds” 486 and offers some unique insights that beg further 
discussion. The theme of traveling between worlds is as old as Tolkien’s legendarium 
and began with the traveler Eriol whose saga is collected in The Book of Lost Tales 
(1983, 1984). Drawing on a previously unpublished essay, Fleiger postulates that 
Tolkien still wrestled with the philosophy and theology involved in the relationship and 
interdependence between Faërie (now spelled by Tolkien as Faery487) and the everyday 
human world. Smith is his attempt to work out those questions one last time –a ‘farwell’ 
to Faery, says Paul Kocher, “a passport to his successors”.488  
What we find in Smith, and confirmed in Tolkien’s own words, is that Faërie –
or the philological imagination– is “necessary for the health and complete functioning 
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of the Human as is sunlight for physical life”.489 I quote Tolkien’s rare reflection on the 
imagination at length: 
Faery represents at its weakest a breaking out (at least in mind) 
from the iron ring of the familiar, still more from the 
adamantine ring of belief that it is known, possessed, 
controlled, and so (ultimately) all that is worth being 
considered –a constant awareness of the world beyond these 
rings. More strongly it represents love: that is, a love and 
respect for all things, ‘Inanimate’ and ‘animate,’ an 
unpossessive love of them as ‘other.’ This light will be 
respected, and they will also appear delightful, beautiful, 
wonderful even glorious. Faery might be said indeed to 
represent Imagination (without definition because taking in all 
the definitions of this word): esthetic, exploratory and 
receptive; and artistic; inventive, dynamic, (sub)creative. This 
compound –of awareness of a limitless world outside our 
domestic parish; a love (in ruth and admiration) for the things 
in it; and a desire for wonder, marvels, both perceived and 
conceived […].490 
 
This primordial interdependence of the imagination and everydayness is 
reflected in the topography of Smith. Drawing on Medieval and Renaissance narratives, 
the woods or forest is Tolkien’s topographical boundary for the Faërie world. Woods is 
glossed in OE as wudu but also notably as wode in ME which can also be glossed as 
‘mad’; the Anglo-Saxons translated the Norse god Oðinn (oð) as Woden –the god of 
poetry and madness.491 Indeed, the philology of ‘Wooton’ is literally from the OE as the 
town [tūn] in or by the wood. In fact, Wootton Major is a philological asterisk reality 
for the ‘real’ English town of Wootton in Oxfordshire. In Smith, Tolkien shows us two 
contiguous worlds; the human world dependent on the Faërie world for its spiritual and 
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physical wellbeing. Tolkien’s narrative device, says Flieger, allows him to “conceive a 
geography both magical and mappable … one gets there by walking”.492 Here we 
should take note of Flieger’s use of terms already discussed in chapter 3 (Ingold) and 
make sense of them in light of what has already been said. 
 
PHILOLOGY AND WAYFINDING 
 Flieger’s talk of ‘maps’ and travel are not unique. Tolkien’s penchant for 
topographic details and his hopes to create an inner consistency of ‘reality’ through 
them have been well documented. Tom Shippey dedicates a chapter of The Road to 
Middle-earth to Tolkien’s use of maps and place names in LOTR; this is what Shippey 
calls Tolkien’s “cartographic plot”. Tracing its development, Shippey estimates there 
are forty or fifty names in The Hobbit, whereas LOTR contains well over 600. Yes, 
there are maps in The Hobbit, but nothing like the topological maps of Middle-earth 
and various geographic details drafted by Tolkien for LOTR. Shippey also notes that 
characters in LOTR even “talk like maps”. To his point, Shippey cites an odd statement 
by Tolkien in one of his letters: “I wisely started with a map, and made the story fit.”493 
In light of all that has been said and all that Tolkien has said about the philological 
origins of his legendarium, how is this to be read? Shippey’s explanation, that the 
purpose of such devices is to make such places “isomorphic with reality”, is 
unsatisfactory. “In the modern world we take [place names] as labels, as things 
accordingly in a very close one-to-one relationship with whatever they label.”494 Not 
only unsatisfactory, Shippey’s explanation reeks of exactly the representational 
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mapmaking and navigation we are trying to move away from and is hardly in keeping 
with Tolkien’s philological sensibilities. 
In offering an alternate characterization we should begin by recalling Tim 
Ingold’s admonition that “every map is necessarily embedded in a ‘form of life’.”495 
Contrary to this, Shippey’s explanation (and use of ‘isomorphic’) attempts to 
artificially divide the languages, people and activities of middle earth from their 
topography. This is precisely the definition of colonization established in chapter 3. 
Maps and globes, says Ingold, share a common trait, “[they present] us with the idea of 
a preformed surface waiting to be occupied, to be colonized first by living things and 
later by human (usually meaning Western) civilization.”496 There is an alternate reading 
available for Tolkien’s use of place names and the ‘map-like’ speech of his characters. 
We begin by benefiting from Heidegger’s description of Dasein, das Rede and ‘reality’. 
Remember, language is a tool used in a shared context and, in the midst of activity, the 
world is already infused with meaning. So, while there may be a ‘reality’ or an 
‘external world’, the only ‘world’ we are ever in is this nexus of shared meaning. Here 
we may graciously relent from our assault on Shippey and momentarily consider what 
he later says regarding the ‘catographic plot’. Shippey points out that Tolkien’s 
narrative ‘plot’, in the Modernist sense of the word, takes a back seat to maps, names 
and languages.497 While this certainly doesn’t let Shippey off the hook it does offer us 
more insight into our re-reading of the ‘cartographic plot’. 
Ingold suggests that the ‘cartographic’ equivalent to the literary plot is the 
tourist route-plan across the surface of a map.498 The plot is a point-to-point-to-point 
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journey over a prescribed and surveyed territory. Alternately, the line on the sketch map 
is similar to storytelling. The storytelling line travels along, and the places, characters 
and events of a story do not ‘exist’ but ‘occur’ as events in the midst of an activity.499 
Ingold references studies done on the storytelling of the Siberian Khanty whose 
translation of story as way reflects their practice of never finishing a story but allowing 
the story to go on until all who are listening have fallen asleep. Or the Orochon hunters 
who are more interested in the events of their hunting journey than the actual killing of 
the prey (climax and conclusion in a plot).  The story listeners then do not navigate the 
plot, per se, but are wayfinders –what Ingold calls the originary mode of dwelling– 
along the meandering line of the story. Although these are examples of oral 
transmission, Ingold says that there is an equivalent in the Ancient and Medieval 
written tradition –and here, there are two significant points to be made. Congruently, 
they are that Ancient and Medieval writers and readers were not ‘tourist navigators’ but 
wayfinders.500  
Ingold cites Michel de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life (1984), in which 
he compares the modern writer to the isolated Cartesian subject.501 The external world 
is something to be conquered and possessed, the surface is to be inscribed and 
constructed upon by the detached subject. “Just as a society is created in the space of 
colonial rule, or a city erected in the space encompassed by the plan, so the written text 
is produced in the space of the page.”502 While this treatment may not be entirely fair –
indeed, there has been much to champion in modern literature– the point to be made is 
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the manner in which writing and reading function in a larger nexus of practices that 
have proven to be detrimental to civilization on the whole. And in this we begin to 
understand the utter disdain for modern literature and literary criticism that prompted 
Tolkien’s retrieval of Medieval subject and form. The Medieval practice was wholly 
different; Medieval writing “was understood not as something made, but as something 
that speaks.”503 We read with our ears and listened with our eyes. De Certeau 
specifically has the Bible in mind, but Ingold shows that practice is detectable from 
Antiquity to the Renaissance. One practice particularly relevant to this chapter is the 
monastic practice of reading out of the voces paginarum, the ‘voices of the page’: 
If the reader were to begin to read this page out loud, or even at low murmur, 
they would begin to hear a ‘voice’. This voice, though it may sound your own is by no 
means yours; the voice is mine. You may attempt to dismiss this voice as a figment of 
the imagination but rest assured this voice is our conversation. We hear this 
conversation in the Anglo-Saxon verb ræd, to read, which means ‘giving advice or 
counsel’ and later extended, says Ingold, to “explaining something obscure” and finally 
“the interpretation of ordinary writing.504 
Here then is Tolkien’s philological wayfinding, sensed by Verlyn Flieger’s 
insight of “mapping” and “walking”, and reduced to a colonizing device in Tom 
Shippey’s “isomorphic”, “catographic plot”. Writing as navigation, and reading as 
tourist plot-following, is precisely the modern practice Tolkien sought to avoid in his 
philological craft. “In wayfaring, by contrast,” says Ingold, “one follows a path that one 
has previously traveled in the company of others, or in their footsteps, reconstructing 
the itinerary as on goes along.”505 This is why one walks to Faërie or, as Tom Shippey 
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crudely put it, why Tolkien’s characters “speak like maps”; Tolkien’s characters are 
mapping and wayfinding –and we are called to do likewise.  
 
THE PHILOLOGY OF ELVISH CRAFT 
At the heart of Tolkien’s legendarium is the relationship between Elves 
(described by Tolkien as the first-born of Middle-earth) and humans in their ongoing 
struggle with the seduction of Middle-earth by Melkor. Whereas Tolkien argued that by 
the early twentieth century human beings had lost their greatness of life and civilization 
(a claim he shared with many other scholars of his time: Oswald Spengler, Christopher 
Dawson, Romano Guardini), there was once a day –many ages ago– when they more 
closely resembled the great mandate of mythopoeic sub-creation. Through craft, song, 
and sub-creative imagination, the Elves of Tolkien’s legendarium built, dwelled, and 
lived with a meaningfulness that elevated the lives of men but is now lost. Tolkien 
describes this tragedy in his ‘recovery’ of the greatness and downfall of the 
Númenórian civilization, which at one time held close council with Elves before being 
seduced by the deceiver Melkor.506 To Tolkien, the Elves characterize all that was once 
great, noble, and whole in humanity. “The Elves,” Tolkien comments in one letter, 
represent, as it were, the artistic aesthetic, and purely scientific 
aspects of Human nature raised to a higher level than is 
actually seen in men. That is: they have a devoted love of the 
physical world, and a desire to observe and understand it for its 
own sake and as ‘other’ – sc. as a reality derived from God in 
the same degree as themselves – not as a material for use or as 
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 178 
a power-platform. They also possess a ‘subcreational’ or 
artistic faculty of great excellence.507 
 
‘Elvish craft’, then, seems to be the greatest indication of an authentic and embodied 
mode of being-in-the world as sub-creator for Tolkien: as those who fully dwell in their 
environment, craft with a high level of embodied and aesthetic skill (as extolled by 
Ruskin and Morris before him), and who –through their craft, song and imagining– 
resist and transform unhealthy imaginings of human existence that manifest as 
colonization of space and practice.  
As mentioned before, in Smith of Wooton Major, Smith recovers this authentic 
and embodied ‘craft’ when he journeys to Faërie. We should not be tempted to fall for 
the Victorian (if not malnourished) picture Verlyn Flieger paints of Smith being 
‘enriched’ by his experiences.508 If indeed Faërie is like “sun for physical life”, as 
Tolkien insists it is, then we are far more than ‘enriched’ by our journey; we are 
enlivened to transform the everyday. This reading of Elvish craft in Smith, then, is 
confirmed elsewhere in Tolkien’s writings where he refers to ‘craft’, ‘magic’ and 
‘technology’ all as modes of revealing –to echo Heidegger. Tolkien calls ‘Elvish 
Magic’ “Enchantment”: it resembles a tool, or more precisely a characterization of a 
particular kind of tool-use, a type of art used in the service of his doctrine of recovery, 
escape and consolation. “Faëire itself may perhaps most nearly be translated by Magic 
–but it is magic of a peculiar mood and power, at the furthest pole from the vulgar 
devices of the laborious, scientific, magician.”509 The ‘Magic’ of the Elves is an artistic 
craft free from the seduction of ‘Power’ and the desire to dominate the Primary World, 
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and it is used in the service of unconcealment –it reveals something true about 
ourselves and the world which may have been obfuscated or occluded. 
There is another form of Magic which Tolkien links to a privation and 
corruption of the sub-creator. This ‘Sauronic’ form of magic is used to further a sub-
creator’s possessive love of the primary-world, power and technological immediacy. It 
is a degraded or commodified form of art, a technique510 concerned with power and 
domination of the primary world. Whereas Sauronic magic seeks to control and alter 
the primary world (i.e. Saruman the White or the Modern ‘Robot Age’) for one’s own 
ends, Elvish Enchantment “lies, open or concealed, pure or alloyed, the desire for a 
living, realized sub-creative art, which (however much it may outwardly resemble it) is 
inwardly wholly different from the greed for self-centered power which is the mark of 
the mere Magician.”511 An echo of Tolkien’s poem Mythopoeia can be heard in these 
words and in the characterization of humanity as sub-creator who is called to refract (to 
open up, reveal, disclose, and unconceal) the light of God through the activity of the 
human imagination intimately involved in the world –in forms of life.  
We can say, then, that there are two modes of revealing available to a sub-
creator: one mode opens and reveals the other closes, calcifies and possesses.512 
Tolkien’s response to the dehumanizing effects of a rapidly emerging technological 20th 
century is a philology of life-forms –exemplified in Elvish dwelling, song, craft and 
imagination. Tolkien’s life work is concerned with the ways in which we are to respond 
                                                
510 From the Greek τέχνη (techne) literally meaning craftsmanship but from which we also get the 
word technology. 
511 J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” The Monsters & The Critics and Other Essays, 143. 
512 In letter number 155 (probably dated some time in 1954) Tolkien further divides his conceptual 
understanding of magic between magia and goetia yet adds the caveat that both ‘sides’ use both types 
of magic –what is important is the motive or the purpose. Magia is the Latin root for ‘magic’ and 
according to a footnote by editor Humphrey Carpenter goetia (γοητεια) is the Greek word from 
which we get Sorcerer (γοης). Magia, Tolkien says, is used by the enemy to “bulldoze” and by the 
Elves and Gandalf for beneficial purposes, while the evil uses of goetia are linked to power and 
terror. The Elvish goetia, by contrast, is described as artistic and used in the service of 
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to Sauronic powers, the wraithing of goodness and the transformation of humanity into 
orcs. There are serious implications in Tolkien’s Mythopoeia about a relationship 
between who we are, what we create, where we live and how we live. Tolkien believed 
a poetic habitus –exemplified in the lives of Elves and to a lesser and more problematic 
degree in the race of Men in his legendarium– is required to resist the dehumanizing 
forces he encountered in his context. 
 
THE ETHICS OF PHILOLOGICAL RESISTANCE 
“MAN IS BOTH A SEED AND ON SOME DEGREE A GARDENER, FOR GOOD OR ILL.”513 
J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien 
 
It is clear from Tolkien’s personal correspondences that by the dawn of World 
War Two Tolkien’s philological practice and literary craft was actively fused to, what 
might be described as, an ethics of philological resistance. The remainder of this 
chapter, then, will trace –in Tolkien’s own words (mostly from his revealing letters)– 
the relationship between his philological project and the ethical concerns raised in 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Humphrey Carpenter, editor of Tolkien’s letters, notes that 
unfortunately between 1918 and 1937 very few of Tolkien’s letters survive. However, 
beginning in the turbulent latter years of the 1930’s and continuing until his death in 
1972, we do have, says Carpenter, a long uninterrupted stream of letters. Rather than 
biographical, an approach we know Tolkien detested, my excavation through Tolkien’s 
letters might be broadly described as philological. These letters reveal the very 
important religious and moral issues inextricably tied up with his life, work, and world. 
This approach to philology is commensurate with the characterizations made earlier in 
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the chapter and the reader should tie the themes in Tolkien’s letters back to what has 
already been said by Tim Ingold and Lewis Mumford.514 
Of particular concern in understanding the letters is Tolkien’s idiosyncratic 
language. His consistent application of the term Orc (and Orc-like), for instance, is in 
fact quite Augustinian. A reference to people who have not only been corrupted, and 
turned into something they originally were not, “Orc” becomes a favorite descriptive 
term for Tolkien to put a finger on people whose lives and persons have been  
‘colonized’, and who in turn attempt to colonize others, with forms of life which are 
counterfeit, dehumanizing, and more or less evil. Tolkien confesses, however, that all 
too often stories are too ‘clear cut’ when it comes to putting a finger on Evil. In real 
life, he says, “we started out with a great many Orcs on our side.”515 Again, in another 
letter, he insists that he considers Orcs “as real a creation as anything in ‘realistic’ 
fiction … only in real life [exterior life] they are on both sides. … which means a 
motley alliance of orcs, beasts, demons, plain naturally honest men, and angels.”516 His 
colorful and imaginative language is evident in such passages. Similarly, he uses 
‘hobbit’ for good people of a certain character.  
And even more important (and potentially more misleading) is his idiosyncratic 
use of the term ‘Machine’. In a letter to Milton Waldman, Tolkien says: “By [the 
Machine] I intend all use of external plans or devices (apparatus) instead of 
development of inherent inner powers or talents –or even the use of these talents with 
the corrupted motive of dominating: bulldozing the real world, or coercing other wills. 
The Machine is our more oblivious modern form though more closely related to Magic 
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than is usually recognized.”517 And in relation to what has already been suggested about 
Tolkien’s view on the different expressions of magic in Middle-earth, he says: “The 
Enemy, or those who have become like him, go in for ‘machinery’ –with destructive 
and evil effects– because ‘magicians’, who have become chiefly concerned to use 
magia for their own power, would do so (do do so). The basic motive for magia –quite 
apart form any philosophic consideration of how it would work– is immediacy: speed, 
reduction of labour, and reduction also to a minimum (or vanishing point) of the gap 
between the idea or desire and the result or effect.”518 In yet another letter, this time to 
his son Christopher, Tolkien wrote: “Well the first War of the Machines seems to be 
drawing to its final inconclusive chapter –leaving, alas, everyone the poorer, many 
bereaved or maimed and millions dead, and only one thing triumphant: the Machines. 
As the servants of the Machines are becoming a privileged class, the Machines are 
going to be enormously more powerful.”519 Tolkien’s concerns about the Machine do 
not end there, however. In his letters Tolkien reveals a “tragedy and despair” in all 
machinery laid bare. Citing Victorian author Samuel Butler520 –and again echoing 
Morris, and seemingly Jevons paradox521– Tolkien warns that attempts to actualize 
desire and create power go wholly unsatisfied; “labour-saving machinery only creates 
endless and worse labour.”522 The impotent modern striving for satisfaction, then, is 
thoroughly complicated by the theological reality of ‘the Fall’. Once again, Tolkien’s 
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522 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, 88. 
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ethical concerns reveal an intensely theological preoccupation: the failures of our 
desires to be satisfied using the machine are compounded by turns “to new and horrible 
evil.”523 Here Tolkien shares similar concerns, suspicions, and a radical disillusionment 
also expressed in the work of Lewis Mumford after World War Two where Tolkien’s 
terms of “mass planning, organizing, and regimentation” are to be taken in the sense of 
‘ordering’ at the cost of living ‘organizing’. Tolkien viewed ‘imposed visions’ of forms 
of life as a significant challenge to the moral efficacy of sub-creation. 
This, then, also raises another related, and more complex, theme in his letters: 
Tolkien’s struggle to articulate the relationship between the secondary world of his 
stories and the primary world of everyday life –which he refers to as ‘real life’ or the 
‘external world’. Tolkien’s struggle to articulate the ‘real’, through the language of his 
stories, however, provides us with a ‘philological key’ to his letters and work. This 
struggle to articulate is one of two legs of –what might best be called– the double-
transfer of imaginative craft: this double-transfer is central to understanding Tolkien’s 
ethics of philological resistance. This characterization will be explored more fully in 
the conclusion; however, in short, the double-transfer of imaginative craft is simply 
this: the realization that the craftsman is one who draws on ‘real life’ and can put it into 
his work (in Tolkien’s case his story); but conversely, the work now has the ‘power’ to 
transfer the forms and values which it portrays back to the everyday-lifeworld of the 
craftsman. This concern is echoed in Iris Murdoch’s postulate that, “Man is a creature 
who makes pictures of himself, and then comes to resemble that picture”.  
The primary and integral relationship between being and activity, then –both in 
personal comportment, in making and doing, and in the negative case of imposed forms 
of life, and the active living relationship between these, and imaging and sub-creation– 
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is evident in all of Tolkien’s subsequent letters. Specifically, as the writing of LOTR 
progressed, there was an ever increasing emphasis on the everydayness of the hobbits. 
And in general, the hobbits are major representatives of one kind ordinary human living 
and of its informal and very human organization. This insistence on everyday life is 
never felt more powerfully than when years later in 1951, in summation to an extensive 
summary of his work to Milton Waldman, Tolkien reflects on “the theme of the relation 
of ordinary life (breathing, eating, working, begetting) and quests, sacrifice, causes, 
and the ‘longing for Elves’, and sheer beauty” seen in the simple ‘rustic’ love of Sam 
and Rosie as “absolutely essential” to the character of the chief Hero (Sam).524  
But after 1940 Tolkien’s letters become preoccupied with the troubling and 
rapidly transforming state of the world around him, its effects on everyday life, and the 
articulation of a ‘resistance’. They often have a very dark and pessimistic cast in the 
way he shows up evil in particularly stark ways. Later, he begins to be concerned about, 
and to criticize, forms of life already developing during the war, and likely to continue 
afterwards. He fears for the future of good ways of life. 
Tolkien’s objections to the many developments of the Modern post-war world 
need to be seen in relation to his own self-imposed limits (moral and theological) on 
sub-creation, however. As vehement as were his objections to the changing landscape, 
‘living in the past’ is certainly beyond one of those limits. In a very revealing letter to 
Naomi Mitchison, Tolkien says,  
I am not a reformer nor an ‘embalmer’! I am not a ‘reformer’ 
(by exercise of power) since it seems doomed to Sarumanism 
[using the Machine to impose reforming plans by coercion]. 
But ‘embalming’ has its own punishments. … [T]he Elves are 
not wholly good or in the right … because with or without 
[Sauron’s] assistance they were ‘embalmers’. They wanted to 
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have their cake and eat it: to live in the mortal historical 
Middle-earth because they had become fond of it (and perhaps 
because they there had the advantages of superior caste), and 
so tried to stop its change and history, stop its growth, keep it 
as a pleasaunce, even largely a desert, where they could be 
‘artists’ –and they were overburdened with sadness and 
nostalgic regret.525  
 
Mentioned numerous times in this chapter, and the last, Tolkien was not a luddite and 
did not fear ‘machines’, or suffer from a sentimental longing for what has been ‘lost’.526  
In the earlier letters Tolkien mixes personal foibles and dislikes with generally 
thought-out comments and dislikes. In a very regional yet effective example that would 
be right at home in Mumford’s work, Tolkien was quite vocal about his dislike of 
‘planning’ and ‘planners’; he was specifically disheartened about the “design of 
destroying Oxford” after World War Two in order to accommodate growing 
automobile traffic.527 As early as 1943 Tolkien began to sense and express a great 
dislike for what he called the emerging imposition of “American sanitation, morale-
pep, feminism, and mass production” which he tries to summarize with the phrase  
“americo-cosmopolitanism”.528 There are other very concrete critiques. On a trip to 
Birmingham –where Tolkien went to Prep-school– Tolkien was pleased to report that 
the only real damage the city has sustained, thus far in the war, “has been the growth of 
great flat featureless modern buildings.”529 And although “wireless” technology (radio?) 
had some potential for good, Tolkien exclaims “it has in fact in the main become a 
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528 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 65. 
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weapon for the fool, the savage, and the villain to afflict the minority with, and to 
destroy thought.”530 Echoing Heidegger, he laments; “listening in has killed 
listening.”531 Much like Tolkien’s lament of the uses of wireless technology, his disdain 
for “the infernal combustion engine” is followed by the unfulfilled wish, “(more 
difficult still since humanity and engineers in special are both nitwitted and malicious 
as a rule) that [the internal combustion engine] could have been put to rational uses –if 
any.”532 By ‘rational’, we will see, that Tolkien meant, by the end of the war, (echoing 
William Morris and Mumford) the machine should be at service of humanity rather 
humanity reshaping its life and world for the machine.  
After almost five long years of conflict on the continent, Tolkien’s thoughts 
about the emerging industrial-militarized West break wide open in a May 6, 1944 letter 
to his son Christopher. The job of the War –which included all major characteristics of 
a Fallen world: including mass planning, organizing, and regimentation– was “an 
ultimately evil job”, lamented Tolkien.533 He certainly thought resistance to Hitler’s 
Third Reich was necessary534 but he was deeply concerned with the ‘how’ (the means) 
of resistance; and with the life-forms which followed. Tolkien believed the cost of all 
war was high; and in this last war the price of victory was not just in capital, or lives, 
but the very soul of the West: “we are attempting to conquer Sauron with the Ring [that 
is to conquer an evil tyrant with use of the same evil means he uses] … But the penalty 
is, as you will know, to breed new Saurons, and slowly turn Men and Elves into 
Orcs.”535 Indeed, in another letter he insists, “[y]ou can’t fight the Enemy with his own 
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Ring without turning into the Enemy; but unfortunately Gandalf’s wisdom seems long 
ago to have passed with him into the True West”.536 ‘Destruction’ in the form of 
degradation and the loss of valuable life-ways through design, control and dominance, 
then, is at the heart of the matter when Tolkien says that LOTR is about ‘Power’, 
‘Domination’, and to a greater degree, ‘Death’ and ‘Immortality’.537  
Tolkien has his own very distinctive way of involving the ethical and 
theological in the stories and myths he writes. In two letters to family friend Robert 
Murray, S. J. (1953 and 1954), Tolkien reveals a great deal about how he purposely 
kept theological concerns in his work within certain constraints.538 LOTR is “of course a 
fundamentally religious and Catholic work; unconsciously so at first, but consciously in 
the revision. That is why I have not put in, or have cut out, practically all references to 
anything like ‘religion’, to cults or practices, in the imaginary world. For the religious 
element [however] is absorbed into the story and symbolism.”539 This is not to say that 
Tolkien’s theological concerns were so subterranean that they were non-existent –on 
the contrary– the very structure of the life-world reveals its theological concerns as well 
as the occasional peep-hole (or bore-hole) which would allow “only the most attentive” 
to see.540 One key to Tolkien’s theological and ethical dimension can be seen by 
considering why he petitioned to Rayner Unwin, however futilely, to publish The 
Silmarillion with LOTR. As Tolkien explains in detail to Father Murray, there is a 
definite “mythological-theological situation” leading up to, and involving, that moment 
in history. In Heideggarian terms we might say that when we open to the first page of 
LOTR we enter into an always already involved world –complete and complicated. 
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(This will also be one the major themes to surface when we explore cinema in Chapter 
5.) Understanding, entering into, and using the story of the rings depends (as in real 
life) partly on entering into the living past. There is no room or time to fully explore the 
details of his linking of ethics and religion into story, but we may note at least some of 
his general comments on this. Of relevance is Tolkien’s insistence that, although 
monotheistic, the Third Age of Middle-earth is a world of ‘natural theology’.541 “The 
only criticism [by Harvey Breit in a 1955 New York Time Book Review] that annoyed 
me was one that it ‘contained no religion’”, writes Tolkien, “[…] It is a monotheistic 
world or ‘natural theology’. The odd fact that there are no churches, temples, or 
religious rites and ceremonies, is simply part of the historical climate depicted … I am 
in any case myself a Christian; but the ‘Third Age’ was not a Christian world.”542 The 
Númenóreans, for instance, worship Eru ‘the One’ at the summit of a mountain but 
they had no temple and, indeed, while Númenórean influence lasted there would be no 
temple.543 “The Númenóreans thus began a great new good, and as monotheists;” 
Tolkien explains, “but like the Jews (only more so) with only one physical centre of 
‘worship’; the summit of the mountain Meneltarma ‘Pillar of Heaven’ –literally, for 
they did not conceive of the sky as a divine residence– in the centre of Númenor”.544 
Tolkien’s summary is succinct and revealing; ‘truth’ is revealed historically and 
philosophically rather than ‘religiously’.545 Particularly in the later letters, we find page 
after page in which seriously ethical and religious discussion is conducted in and via 
discussion of his whole mythological and historical legendarium. 
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So, in the broad philological sense that has been discussed, Tolkien’s ethics of 
philological resistance took up theological and religious concerns without taking up its 
specialized –and sometime debilitating– language. This is never more apparent than 
when the War drew to a close and Tolkien began editing his OFS paper for publication 
–which Tolkien urges his son Christopher to read. Here we see his language briefly 
take on more traditional theological concepts –explicitly– to describe the full force of 
his philological project. In Tolkien’s conclusion in his earlier poem Mythopoeia the 
role allotted to sub-creation means that human artistry is the basic structure of what it 
means to be a human being. It is no wonder, concludes Tolkien, revisiting this tenet, 
that “man the story-teller would have to be redeemed in a manner consonant with his 
nature: by a moving story”.546 Here, Tolkien has the Easter narrative, and to a lesser 
extent the other miracles, in mind. As mentioned earlier, the story of ‘Eucatastrophe’ 
and ‘Consolation’, which has its climatic point in the resurrection of the “supreme 
Artist and Author of Reality”547 is felt in veiled forms, not only throughout history, but 
in our own sub-creation. After rereading The Hobbit he tells his son he  “had suddenly 
in a fairly strong measure the ‘eucatastrophic” emotion at Bilbo’s exclamation: ‘The 
Eagles! The Eagles are coming!’ …. And in the last chapter of The Ring that I have yet 
written I hope you’ll note, when you receive it (it’ll soon be on its way) that Frodo’s 
face goes livid and convinces Sam that he’s dead, just when Sam gives up hope.”548 We 
too live in ‘stories’ and are redeemed by a great living story. “All stories feel like that 
when you are in them. You are inside a very great story!”, exclaims Tolkien to his 
son.549  
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In the life-world of LOTR, then, is Tolkien’s ethics of philological resistance 
and it is thoroughly grounded in real events and the primary world. When asked in a 
letter if LOTR was about ‘Atomic power’ Tolkien offered up what he thought the 
central theme of the story was about. After a letter full of reflection, insights, and 
revisions he ultimately concluded by writing: “The story is really a story of what 
happened in B.C. year X, and it just happened to people who were like that!”550 In 
another letter Tolkien clarifies that “‘Middle-earth’, by the way, is not a name of a 
never-never land without relation to the world we live in […]. It is just a use of Middle 
English middle-erde (or erthe), altered from Old English Middangeard: the name for 
the inhabited lands of Men ‘between the seas’. … [I]maginatively this ‘history’ is 
supposed to take place in a period of the actual Old World of this planet.”551 Viewed in 
this way, we can say, that fundamentally, LOTR is a story about the cares, concerns and 
activities of particular peoples in a certain place at a certain time in history.  
In Tolkien’s ethics of philological resistance we see what is at stake in our 
characterization of the double-transfer as it operates in technologically sophisticated 
societies. Before moving on to Chapter 5, and the further complications and 
possibilities presented by the technological artifice of cinema, a note should be given in 
summary of the new methodology now established in Chapters 3 and 4. It is clear that 
the problem of the “ersatz city” is a far more complicated matter than Jean 
Baudrillard’s characterization of hyperreality captures. Rather than an imprisonment in 
the totalizing semiological structure of hyperreality, what is central in our view and 
understanding, now, is the colonization (and decolonization) of meaningful spaces and 
meaningful forms of life. Beyond this complex structure (or structures) of colonization 
are new clearings hewed and forged for meaningful forms of life and meaningful 
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spaces to flourish in a technological age. In Tolkien, we see the possibility and 
necessity of the corporeal imagination and its implicit theological function; and the 
primordial relationship between what we make and how we live. What is clear from 
Tolkien’s letters is how inextricably linked were his ethical and theological concerns 
about art, technology and the teeming swarm of human forms of life. It is in the 
detailed language, world, relationships, activities, and concerns of Middle-earth and in 
Tolkien’s act of crafting that life-world where we encounter his resistance to the 
encroaching colonization of the economy of consumption and communication whose 
structure comes out of the emerging mechanized world of the early 20th century. In a 
letter to publisher Milton Waldman Tolkien says:  
Anyway all this stuff [It is, I suppose, fundamentally 
concerned with the problem of the relation of Art (and Sub-
creation) and Primary Reality] is mainly concerned with Fall, 
Mortality, and the Machine. …It has various opportunities of 
‘Fall’. It may become possessive, clinging to the things made 
as ‘its own’, the sub-creator wishes to be the Lord and God of 
his private creation. He will rebel against the laws of the 
Creator –especially against mortality. Both of these (alone or 
together) will lead to the desire for Power …. 552 
However, in a post-industrial world we must now ask: what comes of this 
characterization of philological resistance when the medium is mechanized, digitized 
and altogether artificial? This is where Chapter 5 now turns. 
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Chapter 5 
CORPOREAL CINEMA: 
OVERCOMING MISGIVINGS ABOUT 
PETER JACKSON’S THE LORD OF THE RINGS 
IN THE CINEMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF GILLES DELEUZE 
AND TERRENCE MALICK’S THE NEW WORLD 
 
 ‘Give me a body then’: this is the formula of philosophical reversal. … Life will no longer be made to 
appear before the categories of thought; thought will be thrown into the categories of life … It is through 
the body (and no longer through the intermediary of the body) that cinema forms its alliance with the 
spirit, with thought. ‘Give me a body then’ is first to mount the camera on an everyday body. 
--GILLES DELEUZE 
 
Artificial light is simple. It is a specific color temperature and feel. But, natural light is complex and 
sometimes chaotic. 
--EMMANUEL LUBEZKI 
 
In this chapter I wish to push the picture of philological recovery to one of its 
greatest possible limits –that being a ‘cinematic philology’ which frees bodies, peoples 
and lives to new possible trajectories of activity. In so doing, I hope to show that certain 
approaches to the practice of cinema should be taken as an ethical activity inextricably 
and primordially linked to human imagining, everyday lifeworlds and the trajectories of 
bodies, people and lives throughout. There is the unique possibility in cinema (and 
more generally in the moving image) to see the scene of human living like never 
before;553 in cinema it is possible to tear down the colonizing non-places of 
supermodernity, and in turn, build up meaningful spaces and forms of life in resistance 
to the tendencies of colonization described thus far. In order to effectively make this 
point we must delve deep into the structure of cinema. 
Like Chapter 3, this chapter is divided in two parts. The first part will concern 
itself with the complications and negative effects of a cinema of representation. 
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Relevantly, this problem will be taken up in the shortcomings of Peter Jackson’s The 
Lord of the Rings films and their ultimate betrayal of Tolkien’s mythopoeic concerns 
discussed in Chapter 4. This critique will be further articulated in Gilles Deleuze’s 
characterizations of the nature of cinema and cinematic practice, through what he calls 
the Action-Image. Part II will follow Deleuze’s turn to a ‘beyond’ the cinema of the 
Action-Image, and follow his historical discussion of ‘the crisis of the action-image’ 
and the emergence of a ‘modern’ cinema in the wake of the Second World War. Part II 
will then conclude with an exploration of Terrence Malick’s 2005 feature film The New 
World, and explore its Deleuzian structure, and how Malick’s film is, in many ways, 
more faithful to Tolkien’s philological vision of mythopoeia than the actual cinematic 
adaptation of The Lord of the Rings.  
It should be noted that I spent the better part of two years working for Mr. 
Malick during the production of his most recent film The Tree of Life (2011). As one 
might expect, that experience has granted me a particularly close insight into how Mr. 
Malick works. However, my experience has also led me to realize how utterly 
inadiquate it is to approach cinema from primarily narrative and biographical 
trajectories. Speculations about ‘influences’ and  ‘thematic references’ are meaningless 
once the utter complexity of craft and imagination is considered. This is precisely the 
approach Gilles Deleuze takes in his two volume philosophy of cinema. Only when we 
come to see how cinema is about bodies (embodied people) and the chaotic teeming 
swarm of life can the power of cinema to return us to our bodies in-the-world be 
negotiated. 
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PART I: THE BETRAYAL OF A CINEMA OF REPRESENTATION 
 
Far from concerning ourselves with the nature of the cinematographic image or 
images, this chapter will focus on the activity and technique of cinema and our ability 
to experience and participate in interpenetrating lifeworlds. We will, then, address 
through the cinematic writings of Gilles Deleuze and the cinematic craft of Terrence 
Malick concerns about art, technology and how we, as human beings, dwell and project 
the possibilities of being in the world. Beyond simply seeking out ‘thematic’ and 
textual elements in film, my intention is to delve into how filmmakers craft (their 
technique) in order to unpack their concerns. Ultimately, this investigation will yield 
insight into how their craft and films function as models for corporeal imaginative 
resistance. Indeed, it is in exactly how filmmakers craft that we will find our turn 
towards a horizon of concerns that function as a project of poetic de-colonization of the 
possibilities of being in the perilous consumer atmosphere of the 21st-century West.  
 
THE PROBLEMS OF THE LORD OF THE RINGS AS FILM 
 
In 2001 New Line Cinema released The Fellowship of the Ring, the first of three 
films directed by Peter Jackson based on J. R. R. Tolkien’s epic The Lord of the Rings. 
Jackson’s films were a stunning cinematic achievement; after the final film, The Return 
of the King, released in 2003, the adaptation was over nine hours in length and eleven 
and a half hours in an extended DVD format. And despite Tolkien’s original fears –
voiced in response to a proposed 1958 film treatment which he found to be ‘careless’, 
‘reckless’, prone to ‘exaggeration’, “and in the intrusion of unwarranted matter owing 
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to not perceiving where the core of the original lies”554– Jackson’s films have been 
praised for being ‘faithful’, however flawed, realizations of Tolkien’s saga of Middle-
earth. Taking into consideration all that has been said up until this point about the 
colonization of human lifeworlds, the corporeal imagination and Tolkien’s mythopoeic 
philology of resistance, The Lord of the Rings as a motion picture trilogy offers an 
unexpected turn into the craft of cinema, which extends, broadens and deepens the 
possibilities of what has been discussed in previous chapters and, in many ways, was 
anticipated in Vico, Morris and Tolkien.  What is it exactly, then, that makes Jackon’s 
films ‘successful’; and in what ways, if any, does he come short in worlding the 
mythopoeic form of life? Most importantly, in what ways can we gain insight into what 
Tolkien’s mythopoeia looks like lived out daily in Middle-earth; and how can Jackson’s 
films and his cinematic craft inform our living of mythopoeia as a corporeal practice of 
resistance in our own lives? Working from the fact that LOTR is a cinematic adaptation 
of a text, it should be noted that there is a long and problematic tradition in film 
criticism –since at least the sixties– that continues to ‘read’ film semiologically as ‘text’ 
–rather than something other and new– which must be addressed here. This error of 
‘reading’, and subsequently valuing, cinema as text and representation is evident in 
Tom Shippey’s essay, “Another Road to Middle-earth: Jackson’s Movie Trilogy”. 
 
THE PERILS OF A CINEMATIC PHILOLOGY 
Shippey focuses on Jackson’s faithfulness to the ‘narrative core’ of LOTR and 
apologetically explains that any smaller changes and/or omissions (i.e. giving dialogue 
from one character to another, changing locations of an event, or compressing time 
sequences, etc.) are done in the spirit of the narrative, and quickly glosses over tenuous 
                                                
554 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter and Christopher Tolkien, 
comp. Christopher Tolkien (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 270. 
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terrain explaining how these differences should be taken as examples of the limitations 
and possibilities of differing media rather than as egregious alterations.555 Now, one 
must confess that on one level Tom Shippey is absolutely correct. Peter Jackson’s films 
are tremendously successful and manage to ‘say’ and ‘convey’ many of Tolkien’s 
‘messages’. The films are faithful to the story’s “narrative core”, while remaining 
sensitive to what Tolkien referred to as “the core of the original”, which is, as Shippey 
says, “the Ring and what we are told about it by Tolkien: Its effect is always 
corrupting; no-one, no matter how strong or virtuous, can be trusted with it; it cannot 
simply be buried or hidden but must be destroyed in the place of its forging.”556 There 
are questions of course with the suitability of a ‘narrative core’ of LOTR and one must 
take caution with Tolkien’s talk of the original (in other letters he specifies other 
‘cores’ or centers). Indeed, there are entire featurettes557 included in the extended DVD 
version of the film in which Jackson, Walsh and Boyens speak at length about 
Tolkien’s life, and their strategy to include, or be faithful to, as much of Tolkien’s story 
and themes ‘as possible’ in their ‘screenplay’. Jackson explains how he, Fran Walsh, 
and Philippa Boyens managed to ‘crack’ the story’s ‘code’ with an initial ninety-page 
film treatment. With this limited literary fidelity noted, however, Shippey’s essay 
ultimately exposes itself as an abandonment of reason for madness when it comes to the 
                                                
555 Tom Shippey, “Another Road to Middle-earth: Jackson’s Movie Trilogy,” in Understanding The 
Lord of the Rings: The Best of Tolkien Criticism, ed. Rose A. Zimbardo and Neil D. Isaacs (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 236. There is one unbalanced instance where Shippey critiques the films 
for missing “much of the philosophical ‘core of the original’” due to narrative omissions and 
constraints. But here, and this will be addressed shortly, Shippey is hopelessly focused on the 
limitations of cinema to tie together complex narrative threads to make deeper philosophical 
points. However, cinema does not rely on ‘narrative threads’ to create meaning. What of the use of 
music, sounds, and camera movement to reinforce meaning?  
556 Tom Shippey, ibid., 238. Actually, even here Shippey seems to miss the nuanced mark. Tolkien 
calls the ‘heart of the tale’: “the journey of the Ringbearers.”(see J.R.R. Tolkien, , The Letters of J. R. 
R. Tolkien, 271.)  
557 These featurettes function as part documentary of their creative process and part ‘propaganda’ 
package. Indeed, since proof of their fidelity to Tolkien is a paramount marketing strategy. It 
should be noted that Tom Shippey is one of many scholars who speak about Tolkien’s life and 
work. 
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craft of cinema. In an attempt to make the point that Jackson and company succeeded 
where Morton Zimmerman’s 1958 film proposal failed, Shippey falls prey to unhealthy 
assumptions about literature versus film. Referring to Tolkien’s slow pacing and 
unveiling of the story he says: 
Tolkien, however, set his adaptors a serious problem in the 
way that he communicates them. … In the narrative medium 
of prose this has many advantages […]. But whatever the 
cause or the effect, it must have been clear from very early on 
that the narrative medium of film could not cope with such a 
roundabout and leisurely unrolling.558 
 
There are, then, two common assumptions about the craft of cinema of which we 
should be highly suspicious in this summary and to which Shippey, based on the 
citation above, obviously falls prey in his essay: 1) the belief that the ‘possibilities’ of 
cinema are limited to the translation of ‘textual and narrative’ messages into narrative 
visual representations; 2) cinematic action and events should be expected to be easily 
marketed, sold, and consumed.  
In the case of Jackson’s LOTR trilogy, what Shippey manages to overlook 
altogether in his ‘textual and narrative’ reading of the films is how the viewer is made 
to sense and experience what is written, visually, through a faithfulness to the 
complexity of Tolkien’s lifeworlds. The films allow us to feel what it is to move –
however fleetingly– through a living Middle-earth. If all sound were removed from the 
films, and nothing was known about dialogue, the rich and complex interwoven 
tapestry of Middle-earth would still be felt from scene-to-scene through its wardrobe, 
props and sets. With the help of conceptual artists Alan Lee and John Howe, and an 
army of craftsmen, Jackson managed to ‘excavate’ and (re)create Middle-earth down to 
the smallest artistic details. Jackson recalls:  
                                                
558 Tom Shippey, ibid., 238-239. (emphasis mine) 
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I think one of the remarkable things about reading LOTR is 
that you go into this world which is, you know, fairy tale. 
There’s dragons, and there’s trolls, and there’s hobbits and 
there’s elves. And it’s amazing how authentic –genuinely 
authentic it feels that you start to believe that it could possibly 
be history. That somehow Tolkien found some lost parchment 
–some secret parchment that we don’t know about that he 
really took all this from a true historical events. It has that 
degree of believability about it. I guess the way that we tried to 
hint at the depth, which is all the film can really do, is partly in 
our design process. … I didn’t want ‘movie’ design. I didn’t 
want ‘fantasy’ movie ‘Hollywood’ sort of style of design. I 
wanted something authentic.559 
 
Jackson says he and his design team approached their research as though Middle-earth 
was a historical reality; locations were treated as through they were the ‘actual’ 
locations for the events described by Tolkien. Far from whimsical, this exhumation of 
the lost life-worlds of the third age of Middle-earth –a cinematic asterisk reality– was 
endeavored with philological complexity. The wardrobe, props, sets, and landscapes 
were all crafted with a special sensitivity to the unique expressions –including 
geography, language, comportments and craft of Middle-earth (of different peoples e.g. 
Númenóreans, Men, Elves, Hobbits, Dwarves, Orcs)– that arise from the diverse and 
complex life-worlds.560 “We wanted to make it look like you could look at a piece of 
architecture and tell if it was Dwarven or Elven immediately just by looking at it”, 
explains WETA Workshop designer and sculptor Daniel Falconer speaking about the 
                                                
559 Designing Middle-earth, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (Platinum Series Special 
Extended Edition), DVD, Directed by Peter Jackson, 2002; New Zealand: New Line Cinema, 
2002. 
560 Allan Lee, Designing Middle-earth, ibid. John Howe attributes this fact to the strength of the 
LOTR films. Rather than use props that have been created for other films, everything in Middle-
earth (furniture, textiles, pipes, weapons, etc.) was designed and crafted with special attention paid 
to the particular lifeworlds of each distinct culture and the history of art in Middle-earth. To 
accomplish this feat, craftsmen from around New Zealand were recruited to forge weapons, build 
furniture, cast ‘the one ring’, make saddles, blow glass, carve wood, make pottery, make barrels and 
buckets, and make wagon wheels, and etcetera. 
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design process,  “If you looked at a weapon and then you looked at the architect you 
could tell which cultures were the same and which were different”.561 Not just made to 
‘appear’ authentic, Jackson hired scores of local craftsmen –blacksmiths, wood 
workers, potters, furniture makers, and etcetera– to make the props and wardrobe by 
hand. 
On an entirely other level of detail, an additional layering of design was 
incorporated into the film to account for the history of art in Middle-earth. John Howe 
and Alan Lee, say:  
Much of Middle-earth was actually constructed by the 
Numenorians. So the bones of the architecture of Middle-earth 
were actually constructed by a people who are no longer there. 
So, some hint of this has to come through. The idea of layers 
of civilization going back over thousands of years is a very 
hard thing to do in a film or achieve on a film set. But just by 
layering much more design into the development, into every 
part of the film –whether its props or costumes, armor or 
buildings– that we would ever actually see in the film but its 
presence would be felt in a sort of strange way.562 
 
Although he was probably never conscious of the fact –it would certainly be 
appropriate here to describe the work of Peter Jackson and his art department as 
‘philological’ in the broad sense that has been discussed. “It’s almost as if you’re 
digging things out of the ground rather than actually creating them”, John Howe says 
later. Questions raised in Chapter 1 regarding Petit Hameau, the Getty Meuseum, and 
Old Bethpage Village unexpectedly return –but here with some clearer answers.  
Like the Petit Hameau, ‘Hobbiton’ is built to have the ‘appearance’ of 
authenticity and is sustained by an economy that –in many ways– betrays its purpose. 
                                                
561 Designing Middle-earth, ibid. 
562 John Howe and Alan Lee, Designing Middle-earth, ibid. 
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We might say the craftsmanship of Jackson’s Hobbiton pales in comparison to the Petit 
Hameau, since Hobbiton was built strictly as a temporary village of façades, rather than 
a working farm to be inhabited; in this way, Jackson’s Hobbiton is truly ersatz.  
  
 fig. 8 Hobbiton Set fig. 9 Hobbiton lifeworld 
If one were to visit the ‘set’563 of Hobbiton in New Zealand (as seen in fig. 8) today, it 
would have the appearance of stripped, gutted and abandoned ancient ruins. However 
(and this point will be carried through to the end of the chapter when the set design of 
Terrence Malick’s The New World is considered, through the craft of filmmaking –in 
the framing, shooting and cutting of the film), Hobbiton is transformed into a living and 
breathing lifeworld that is far more ‘real’ than life in the Petit Hameau. To what degree 
of success this is done throughout Jackson’s films, and the deeper implications of this 
cinematic lifeworld as a whole, will be taken up in the remaining pages of this chapter. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CINEMATIC TECHNIQUE 
On the level of camera framing, camera movement, and editing, Jackson’s 
treatment of Tolkien’s Middle-earth on the whole (especially the theatrical release) 
feels rather conventional. Through an insistence on conforming to a certain pre-
established formula of cinema as industry (dominated by a technique Deleuze describes 
as ‘The Action-Image’) Jackson’s films, in some ways, actually betray Tolkien’s epic. 
Shippey acknowledges the fact that Jackson’s films are in “some respects” (a very 
                                                
563 Tours available through www.hobbitontours.com. 
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conservative assessment), simply an “action movie” and a “special effects movie”. 
Shippey, however, apologetically explains this away as an inevitable consequence of 
the “nature of the differing media”. Shockingly, he says: 
an author –especially an amateur author like Tolkien, who 
never gave up his ‘day job’– invests nothing in the creation of 
his work except his own spare time, and loses nothing except 
his own time in the event of failure. A moviemaker, however, 
operating with a budget measurable in millions of dollars per 
day, very obviously has to consider recovering the return on 
his expenses, and is accordingly susceptible to ‘audience 
pressure’: he has to guess what his audience will like and 
won’t like and adjust his production accordingly.564  
 
This is pregnant with bias and assumption about the ‘economic’ value of activity and 
work and craft, the role of human artistry in the art/industry of cinema, and notions of 
entertainment and consumption; all of which affirms the relevance of this chapter 
within the schema of the dissertation as a whole.  
In a post-production featurette discussing the editing of the film, editor John 
Gilbert mentions, “New Line [Cinema] said early on they wanted a rollercoaster of a 
movie and that was always on the back of my mind constructing it.”565 The addition of 
the Midgewater Marsh566 sequence in the ‘extended cut’ is a fine example of how the 
filmmakers’ desire to include shots and sequences which only serve to expand our 
experience of Aragorn and the Hobbits’ journey to Rivendell –most notably Aragorn’s 
singing of the Lay of Luthien and his explanation of the Lay to Frodo– is ultimately 
imposed upon by a decision based on an economic/entertainment model of cinema, to 
                                                
564 Tom Shippey, ibid., 236-237. 
565 Editor John Gilbert, Post-Production: Putting All Together, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the 
Ring (Platinum Series Special Extended Edition), DVD, Directed by Peter Jackson. ‘New Line’ is a 
reference to New Line Cinema the production company whose money was used to film the three 
LOTR films. 
566 This is a particularly dreary interlude on the journey from Bree to Rivendell. 
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‘quicken the pace’ of the story for the theatrical release. These types of economically 
driven decisions –done in the name of nebulous terms such as ‘pace’ and 
‘entertaining’– are especially apparent in the exclusion of the ‘Scouring of the Shire’ in 
The Return of the King. To the point, however, there is no evidence in Jackson’s 
schlock horror background to suggest that there is any particularly careful thought on 
the nature of cinema and directing.567 While much has been made during the course of 
the three LOTR films of Jackson’s particular attention to the nuances of acting and the 
many multiple takes afforded each scene; yet, aside from ‘selling scale’ (making human 
actors appear hobbitish in size) no real attention is given to betraying the commercial 
formula. 
With this said, perhaps the finest and most effective element in Jackson’s 
trilogy was never seen in the cinema. Jackson’s extended meditation on what it means 
to be a Hobbit and the lifeworld of Hobbiton offer a particularly enticing glimpse into 
what exactly a mythopoeic cinema might look like. The shire sequence in the extended 
special feature edition of the film is far more effective and truthful than the theatrical 
release. In one movement, the camera glides over the map of Middle-earth and reveals 
Hobbiton situated in the Shire (fig. 10), then pulls back to reveal the ‘map’ (fig. 11) 
laying in the cluttered Hobbit hole of Bag End (fig. 12), and finally dollies in to reveal 
Bilbo Baggins dwelling comfortably in his Hobbit hole (fig. 13).568 With the aid of 
some off screen (o. s.) narration –a rough summary of Tolkien’s prologue– the 
lifeworld of the Hobbits is introduced to us. Through a series of non-linear (and non 
                                                
567 Bad Taste (1987), Meet the Feebles (1989), Braindead (1992), Heavenly Creatures (1994) 
568 In both the theatrical and the DVD extended special feature edition of the film Jackson 
introduces us to the landscape of the Shire through the map. Here we should recall all that has 
been said about lifeworlds and maps in chapter 3. Jackson, like Tolkien, understands that ‘mapping’ 
and ‘wayfinding’ is the way through Middle-earth rather than ‘navigating’ or appropriating a ‘map’. 
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narrative) cuts we see hobbits tending to their daily activities: farming, playing games, 
communing, smoking, gardening, and etcetera.  
 
  
 fig. 10 fig. 11 
  
 fig. 12  fig. 13 
The whole sequence –which includes the introduction of Frodo and Gandalf– is over 10 
minutes long and incorporates over 30 separate cuts to the Hobbit lifeworld alone (fig. 
14-19). It achieves a delicate yet resplendent balance of simplicity, nostalgia and 
Romanticism where time and space stand still.  
 
  
 fig. 14 fig. 15 
  
 fig. 16  fig. 17 
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 fig. 18 fig. 19 
But despite all the attention to faithfully re-creating and inhabiting the Hobbit 
lifeworld, questions still persist about Jackson’s films as a whole. Although it would be 
foolish to recognize Jackson’s LOTR as anything but a grand achievement in the art and 
craft of filmmaking we must ask: Why does mythopoeia ultimately feel so 
‘conventional’ in the hands of Jackson? Where is the ‘poetry’ and ‘unity of body, 
language and world’ that seems implicit in the corporeal imagination of Vico, Barfield 
and Tolkien? Ultimately, the concerns about a cinema beyond ‘text’, representation and 
illustration run far deeper and are far more pervasive than what has been critiqued in 
Tom Shippey’s assessment of Peter Jackson’s movies. The continuing burden of this 
chapter is to speak of a cinema that allows the viewer to experience a corporeal 
imagination lived in lifeworlds, to glimpse the mythopoeic life in action, and to free 
bodies to new meaningful trajectories of possibilities.  
 
DELEUZE, BERGSON, AND THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE 
 
 
Gilles Deleuze’s ‘cinematic philosophy’ laid out in Cinema 1: The Movement-
Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image wonderfully complements the poetry of the 
corporeal imagination and the various trajectories of resistance and decolonization of 
human forms of living discussed in the preceding pages. Specifically, Deleuze is 
concerned both with a direct challenge to structuralist readings of cinema which 
reduces film to semiological systems and linguistic patterns of ‘representation’, and 
with forwarding a cinema of immanence and hope that resists colonization by political 
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and commercial powers, which, in many ways, render Tolkien’s ‘mythopoeia’ impotent 
in Peter Jackson’s LOTR movie trilogy. In the preface to his book, Gilles Deleuze’s 
Time Machine, D. N. Rodowick traces a predominately Anglo-American semiological 
preoccupation with film theory back through the translation and publication of the 
1970s British film theory magazine, Screen. Rodowick points out that the literary 
semiotics, Lacanian psychology and Althusserian Marxism of the French Tel Quel 
group –which Jean Baudrillard also drew from– heavily influenced the editorial 
perspective of Screen.569 This then is significant because, indeed, Deleuze’s approach to 
cinema falls in perfectly well with the critique of Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’ detailed 
in the previous chapters. Deleuze –who in effect re-imagines how to approach cinema, 
and reassesses the possibilities of cinema– desires to move away from wrongheaded 
pictures of representation and false dualisms, and to return cinema back to human 
bodies in the world –back to immanence.  
Deleuze, however, does not take a strictly ‘phenomenological’ approach to this 
endeavor –and in many ways Deleuze could be considered ‘post-phenomenological’– 
but draws on Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) philosophy of time and movement to re-
characterize the cinematic artifact and cinematic practice.570 While the depth and 
breadth of Deleuze’s unique philosophical scaffolding on cinema is far too rich and 
expansive to give an adequate treatment here, his insistence on the ‘pre-linguistic’ 
hermeneutical possibilities of being-in-the-world echoes many of the concerns raised 
by Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Most significantly, Deleuze’s characterization of 
                                                
569 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), ix-xiii.  
570 It should be noted that Henri Bergson’s work on body and duration was extremely influential to 
the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty though it also attracted much criticism 
from them as well. 
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cinema as a craft of  “pre-verbal intelligent content”571 and “a new praxis of images and 
signs”572, which together ‘return’ bodies to world (through the cinema artifact), is 
indeed necessary and very useful in this final movement, and is the trace by which we 
will wayfind through his work. I will apologize ahead of time to the reader for what is 
often a complex taxonomy dependent on numerous specialized terms which encompass 
intricate schemas. Indeed, there is even a glossary of terms in the English edition of 
Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 to help keep track of the many formulae. 
In order to re-characterize cinema as a unique practice and craft which stands 
apart from the ‘logic’ of signs and narration, Deleuze essentially begins with a question 
famously posed by André Bazin: What is cinema? Deleuze, however, takes a wholly 
new trajectory. Cinema 1 begins with what Deleuze sees as the fundamental cinematic 
mechanism –the mechanical ‘decomposition’ and ‘recomposition’ of movement– and 
with the practice of crafting cinema at its most basic level –the frame, the ‘shot’573, 
camera movement and cutting. Because these two descriptions are vital in 
understanding Deleuze’s project, some time will be spent on them, before discussing 
how they are relevant to the movement-image and the time-image of volumes one and 
two respectively. Drawing heavily on Henri Bergson’s durée, or ‘duration’, a 
philosophical characterization of movement, time and being, Deleuze endeavors to 
reveal the relationship between what fundamentally appears to be a banal mechanical 
effect, and human being-in-the-world. For the purposes of this chapter we might 
loosely define duration as time immanent in the changing eventful world and woven 
                                                
571 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(London: Continuum, 2005), xi. 
572 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: 
Continuum, 2007), 269. 
573 Deleuze plays with the French word for shot, plan, which in another sense also means plane in 
order to disrupt any confusion with the English notion of ‘shot’ as a still image. 
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into its patterns of events and actions.574 But how to characterize, no less picture 
through cinema, this movement, without creating abstract images or illusory 
representations? Indeed, it is Deleuze’s “emphasis on categories of movement and 
temporality, in relation to visualization or imagining,” through which he will levy his 
“[…] critique of theories of signification in both contemporary philosophy and film 
theory.”575 Of particular interest to Deleuze, and to this chapter, is Bergson’s 
characterization of ‘duration’ as “a concept of time, which is not a transcendent 
category or an external measure, but is immanent to things.”576   
In duration, says Deleuze, “movement is distinct from the space covered. … 
[S]pace covered is divisible, whilst movement is indivisible … the spaces covered all 
belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, while the movements are 
heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.”577 In Time and Free Will (1889), and 
later modified in Matter and Memory (1896), Bergson uses music and musical notation 
to highlight the character of duration. Much more than the representation of individual 
notes on a page sequenced in time, music is the movement of indivisible, 
interconnected and heterogeneous notes, says Bergson. “In a word, pure duration might 
well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate 
one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves 
in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure 
                                                
574 This definition is crude and does no justice to Bergson’s élan vital which is the creative energy of 
all ‘Being’ or matter in the universe, nor to Bergson’s broader characterization of durée as the 
expansion and contraction of the Whole of the universe. However, since the trajectory of this 
section is crafted to characterize a philological cinema, rather than to unfold Bergsonian 
philosophy with great detail, I will proceed, with caution, in appropriating Bergson to those ends.  
575 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 6. 
576 Iain Munro, Information Warfare in Business: Strategies of Control and Resistance in the Network Society 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 168. (emphasis mine) 
577 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 1. 
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heterogeneity.”578 Movement, then, cannot be ‘reconstituted’ by adding together 
instants in time, positions in space or immobile sections. In doing this, says Deleuze, all 
you achieve is  “adding to the positions, or to the instants, the abstract idea of a 
succession, of a time which is mechanical”. Deleuze uses the shorthand equation 
immobile sections + abstract time equals movement to refer to this illusion. 579  
Although Deleuze desires to use Bergson’s picture of duration to forward his 
own characterizations of cinema, he must contend with the fact that at the end of 
Creative Evolution (1907) Bergson specifically condemns cinema, and the 
‘cinematographic illusion’, as the culmination of an illusion that replicates (and 
reinforces) the paradoxical fallacy of movement, space, and time –essentially a 
representation of movement via a dissection of space. 580 Rather than being 
contradictory, however, Deleuze feels this should only deepen our reading of Bergon’s 
thesis on movement and cinema in Creative Evolution. Drawing on Bergson’s earlier 
characterizations of duration, Deleuze points out that while the physical artifact of film 
may merely be a series of static images (or ‘photogrammes’), 581 cinema (from the 
Greek kinemo / movement) is something wholly new; cinema –like music– gives us an 
“intermediate-image” or ‘median image’ [l’image moyenne] apprehended as an 
“impression of continuity”582 at twenty-four frames per second. Cinema gives an 
impression which is in many (not all) ways very like our continuous ‘experiencing’ of 
‘the world’. “In short,” says Deleuze, “cinema does not give us an image to which 
                                                
578 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. 
Pogson (George Allen & Unwin: London, 1910), 104. 
579 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 1. (emphasis mine) 
580 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1944), 
331-333. 
581 Photogrammes can be a confusing choice of terminology. Perhaps ‘instants’ is a better word here 
since Deleuze rejects the idea that cinema is composed of separate ‘photographs’. Indeed, the 
closest cinema comes to the photograph is the long exposure photograph (photo de pose) which, he 
says, “belongs to the other lineage”. (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 5). 
582 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 5. Also see Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, trans. Alisa 
Hartz, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 8. 
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movement is added, it immediately gives us [an image-movement].”583 But how can he 
say this? According to Deleuze, the Bergson who wrote Creative Evolution, was well 
aware of the characterization of “mobile sections” or “image-movements” from his 
earlier musical picturing of duration in Matter and Memory. To what does Deleuze 
ascribe the discrepancy? To put this into a historical context, D. N. Rodowick points 
out that Bergson’s critique of cinema would have been directed towards the scientific 
motion analysis and single set-up camera work which dominated in the earliest days of 
‘cinema’. This ‘primitive cinema’, which drew from scientific observation of certain 
features of the mechanical powers, painterly perspectives and stage aesthetics, had little 
in common with the sophisticated techniques which Deleuze believes makes cinema a 
unique art form.584 Cinema, says Deleuze, conquered its own ‘essence’ and 
rediscovered the movement-image through its own evolution.  
The evolution of the cinema, the conquest of its own essence 
or novelty, was to take place through montage, the mobile 
camera and the emancipation of the view point, which became 
separate from projection. The shot would then stop being a 
spatial category and become a temporal one, and the section 
would no longer be immobile, but mobile.585  
 
This cinematic duration, then, is something wholly new –but how and to what effect? 
The questions that must be answered before moving on to examine the practices of 
filmmakers, and which lie in the scope of this chapter and the dissertation as a whole, 
                                                
583 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 2. (emphasis mine) I have also modified the English rendering of 
Deleuze’s l’image-mouvment from ‘movement-image’ to image-movement in order to respect the 
emphasis placed on the second part of the hyphenated word in the French.  
584 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 21. This period can be best summed up in the motion experiments of 
Edward Muybridge and physiologist Étienn-Jules Marey, the Eddison and Dickson Kinetograph 
(“the first true motion-picture camera” which used a perforated celluloid strip) in America and the 
Lumiere Cinématographe in France, and even the fantastical films of George Mélies.  And 
although Edwin Porter developed the first sophisticated use of intercutting and panning shots in 
The Great Train Robbery (1903) it was not until D. W. Griffith’s work began in 1908 that cinema as a 
wholly new art form was born. 
585 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 3. 
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are: 1) what is the significance of cinematic duration for a cinema of human bodies-in-
the-world; and 2) what techniques in the crafting of cinema (over other techniques) 
accomplish Deleuze’s imagining of cinema? 
Taking into account the ‘evolution of cinema’, Deleuze undoubtedly goes 
beyond Bergson through Bergson. Deleuze contends there is not one, but three 
Bergsonian theses on movement which must be taken into account in Creative 
Evolution; the first being only an introduction, whilst the second and third go hand-in-
hand. The second thesis  “makes possible another way of looking at the cinema” –a 
way which goes beyond cinema as the “apparatus of the oldest illusion”.586 Rather than 
reduce everything to the ‘same’ illusion, Bergson distinguishes between (generally 
speaking here) an ‘ancient’ philosophical and a ‘modern’ scientific theory of time and 
movement –both of which suffer from the same error in equating movement to 
“immobile sections + abstract time”. While there is no room to go into a detailed 
recounting of the history of theories of time and movement in the metaphysics of 
Western philosophy and the scientism of modern mathematics (indeed neither does 
Deleuze), in relation to the second thesis Deleuze points out the obvious: “to recompose 
movement with eternal poses [philosophical metaphysics] or with immobile sections 
[of immanent ‘any-instant-whatever’ (instant quelconques) materials as in modern 
mathematics, science and proto-cinema587] comes to the same thing: in both cases, one 
misses the movement because one constructs a Whole, one assumes that ‘all is given’, 
whilst movement only occurs if the whole is neither given nor giveable [sic].”588  As D. 
N. Rodowick puts it, in Bergson’s second thesis on movement, Deleuze “is to judge 
                                                
586 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 8. 
587 Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, Muybridge. Some of these concerns are 
evident in the creation of ‘non-standard analysis’ by Abraham Robinson. A theory of ‘hyperreal’ 
numbers, non-standard analysis contends with infinities of points.  
588 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 7. 
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whether the cinema is the perfection of the world’s oldest illusion (the Plato-machine of 
Jean-Louis Baudry), or the culmination of modern scientific thought, or finally, 
whether it augurs a new conception of movement and duration.”589 The third option 
here is what Deleuze seeks, and will become significant to this chapter and the 
dissertation as a whole.  
Generally speaking, Bergson holds that both ancient philosophical and modern 
scientific attempts to reconstitute movement suffer from the same (metaphysical) 
‘cinematographic’ failure; they both build up pictures of movement based on 
‘privileged instants’ or ‘immobile sections’ and “in so doing it perpetuates the illusion 
that temporal succession is only the unfolding of spatial juxtaposition”.590 In both 
approaches, duration, the movement of human being-in-the-world, is ‘missed’ in favor 
of an abstract representation of life in ‘time’ built up from spatial pictures, which “leads 
us to believe that time is nothing but the artificial setting into motion of a whole that is 
already given at once”.591 This point flows into Bergson’s third thesis. Movement as “a 
translation in space” is an expression of something ‘profound’, says Deleuze: 
movement “is a mobile section of duration … the change in duration or in the 
whole”.592 The ‘Whole’ –borrowed from Bergson– is the dimension of duration 
characterized as “the opening of time as change, the opening of the Universe or 
being.”593 To say, then, that movement-images are mobile sections of duration is to say 
that movement and time are congruent –thus, cinema, rather than being the culmination 
of an abstract metaphysical illusion, is indeed something wholly new. But what is 
movement in relation to duration?  
                                                
589 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 23. 
590 Paola Marrati, ibid., 15. 
591 Paola Marrati, ibid., 15. 
592 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 8. 
593 Paola Marrati, ibid., 17. 
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Deleuze then rearticulates duration as an open “Relation” (indeed the ‘whole’ 
does not imply ‘closed’, says Deleuze, but is constantly ‘open’ and in flux) between 
‘sets’ of mobile sections and the changing whole. “We can therefore say”, argues 
Deleuze, “that movement relates the objects of a closed system to open duration, and 
duration to the objects to the system which it forces to open up. … Through movement 
the whole is divided up into objects, and objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed 
between the two ‘the whole’ changes.”594 Through his rearticulated relationship 
between the ‘sets’ and the ‘whole’ of movement, Deleuze’s Bergsonian thesis allows 
him to move from the re-characterized cinema artifact to the actual crafting of cinema: 
the relationship between frame, the shot, cutting and cinematic film as a ‘whole’. 
 
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF THE ACTION-IMAGE 
With the unique characterization of the image-movement in place, Deleuze 
further describes its practical components: A) the frame –the art of choosing cinematic 
elements; B) the shot –which determines the image-movement and relates it to the 
whole; and C) montage, the process and technique by which image-movements are 
assembled and arranged. D. N. Rodowick points out that the same description of a 
“modulation of wholes and sets in the [image-movement]” is also applied to these three 
practical elements.595 Because of this, each practical element, with its own unique 
character, must be considered with some detail.  
 
THE FRAME AND OUT-OF-FIELD 
The cinematic frame, which is a mobile field ‘selected’ by the camera and 
includes actors, sets, props, different textures of light, different locations, etcetera, is 
                                                
594 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 11-12. 
595 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 44. 
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the basic organizing principle in cinema. As a unique set or ‘closed system’, the varied 
elements of the frame can be further broken down into ‘sub-sets’ revealing an 
insistence on legibility. Deleuze, however, is quick to point out that past comparisons 
between the legibility of the cinematic frame and ‘language’, or semiological readings 
(as in the cinema writings of Umberto Eco and Christian Metz), 596 are not justified. 
Rather, Deleuze draws on the principles of information systems in order to make sense 
of the varied and complex parts of the frame. While information systems have not been 
previously mentioned here, there is another picture of non-linguistic meaning that has 
been discussed, which can also lend insight into the ‘Deleuzian frame’. The complex 
Heideggarian characterization of das Rede, or ‘telling’, discussed with great detail in 
chapter 3, shares many of the characteristics of non-linguistic ‘distinguishing’ and 
‘making sense of’ to which Deleuze points.  
Returning to Heideggerian phenomenology is important in characterizing our 
ability to distinguish and make sense of a variety of phenomena and equipment (das 
Zeug) as a knowledge acquired through community, use, and activity. This description 
reveals a vital link between everyday human lifeworlds, the lifeworld of cinema and, 
more specifically, the lifeworld of the frame. To this end we should also add 
Heidegger’s characterizations of Sorge (care), Fürsorge (solicitude), and Besorgen 
(concern) to the lifeworld of the frame. Simply put, we are caught up in life and, rather 
than re-producing a phenomenon [mimesis], however skillfully accomplished, the 
elements of the frame are caught up in life as well. Not to be confused with a 
psychological state, ‘care’ is the characterization of human living in world –and all of 
the involvement-structure activities, comportments, projects and ‘concerns’– being an 
                                                
596 I am specifically referring to Umberto Eco’s “Articulations of the Cinematic Code” (1967) and 
Christian Metz’s essays “Cinema: Language or Langue?” (1964), “Some Points in the Semiotics of 
the Cinema” (1968), and “On the Notion of Cinematographic Language” (1971).  
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issue for human living in the world. As Heidegger once explained to Hubert Dreyfus, 
“Sein geht mich an”; “being gets to me.”597 There is more than simply ‘data’ or 
‘information’ within the frame; whether implicit or explicit, the lifeworld of the frame 
implies a vast array of activities, projects and concerns –a world of going-on– and of 
our involvements in it.  
The cinematic frame is not to be mistaken, then, with the frame of the 
‘photograph’; As André Bazin pointed out, the photographic frame “embalms time” as 
a mould, a “luminous imprint”, an “immobile section”.598 Although the frame itself (the 
cinema screen being “the frame of 
frames”) is a practice of artificial 
limitation, directors have sought different 
ways to work with this limitation, says 
Deleuze. Some directors saturate the 
frame to the point that the primary action 
takes place deep into the frame, a technique pioneered by Orson Wells in Citizen Kane 
(1941). “Thus,” notes David Cook writing about Welles’ deep focus framing, “in a 
single shot, Welles is able to communicate a large amount of narrative and thematic 
information which would require many shots in a conventionally edited scene.”599 In a 
frame pregnant with meaning (fig. 20) the young Charles Foster Kane plays with his 
sled “Rosebud” (the last words to come out of Kane’s mouth when he dies isolated and 
alone as an old man) in the background whilst his mother signs over guardianship of 
                                                
597 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division 1 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 239. 
598 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 25; see also André Bazin, What is Cinema? Volume 
1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005), 14, 96. 
599 David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 396; 
This comment makes apparent the character of the ‘shot’ as a fluid element of cinema that stands 
between the frame and montage. 
fig. 20 
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the boy to Mr. Thatcher, a representative of Kane’s estate executors, as a weak-willed 
father looks on in the foreground.  
Other directors have made efforts to rarify the frame. This technique is 
particularly evident in the films of Yasujiro Ozu (1903-1963) whose ‘empty frames’ 
and ‘voided frames’ correspond to the Zen aesthetic mu –the integral relationship 
between the flowers and empty spaces in Japanese flower arranging.600 “By showing us 
nothing, these shots draw our attention to the surrounding something in the same way 
[…]. It is generally true that the longer the screen remains empty, the more our 
attention is drawn to off-screen as opposed to on-screen space”, Cook reminds us.601 Far 
from a ‘photographic still’, Ozu’s technique is intended to expand the boundaries of the 
frame (fig. 21). 
 
 fig. 21 Tokyo Story (1953) 
What is significant to Deleuze is the fact that although framing is an act of 
limitation the frame is neither divisible nor indivisible but dividual [dividuel] –or 
                                                
600 David A Cook, ibid., 846. There is a very relevant connection between Zen aesthetic and the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which should be pointed out. Reinhard May’s, Heidegger’s Hidden 
Sources: East Asian Influences on his Work (London: Routledge, 1996), provides a fascinating look into 
Heidegger’s great interest in and certain indebtedness to German translations of Taoist and Zen 
Bhuddist literature. 
601 David A Cook, ibid., 847. 
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always sharing in the meaning of other frames through a qualitative change from one to 
the other. Although the frame can also be artificially divided ‘geometrically’ (both 
internally and in relation to the parts of the system), in a manner which precedes the 
elements of the frame, or dynamically through physical gradations, “the set”, says 
Deleuze, “cannot be divide into parts without qualitatively changing each time”.602 So 
unlike the photographic image, the cinematic frame is mobile and active –even when it 
attempts to isolate or rarify its environment as in Ozu’s empty set. Of significance, 
here, is the deframing of the frame through the ‘point of view’ of the camera. Because 
every ‘set’ is not a ‘closed set’ but opens up to the Whole, the selective points of view 
of the camera –whether it be the ‘empty’ framing of Ozu, Dreyer’s faces cut by the 
edge of the frame, or Bresson’s disconnected parts– “refer to another dimension of the 
image.”603 It is as if the camera ‘stands-in’ for our involved human being in the world 
and, even more, draws us in. The deframing of the frame is a technique which enables 
the camera to fill the frame with lifeworld and meaning, even beyond the artifice of the 
frame.  
 This combination of technique, image and lifeworld is developed even further 
in Deleuze’s observations on the out-of-field [hors-champ] element. “If framing’s 
operation is to choose the elements present in the image,” notes Paola Marrati in Gilles 
Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, “it necessarily gives the limits to this very image. 
But what do the limits of the frame open on to?”604 This out-of-field dimension, says 
Deleuze, “refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly 
present”605 and generates two further characterizations of framing. In one sense, the out-
of-field testifies to the homogeneous continuity of frame sets which form “a universe or 
                                                
602 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 16. 
603 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 16, 17. 
604 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 22. 
605 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 17. 
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plane [plan] of genuinely unlimited content”. Sets are ‘threaded’ together, as Deleuze 
describes it, although the connection does not necessarily need to be to another frame 
but can also be to ‘sound’, with its world connections.606 Here Deleuze singles out 
Bresson and points to his Notes on the Cinematographer. “A sound must never come to 
the rescue of an image,” says Bresson, “nor an image to the rescue of a sound. … 
Image and sound must not support each other, but must work each in turn through a 
sort of relay.”607 The brief opening sequence of single frame shots from Ozu’s final 
film, Autumn Afternoon (1962) (fig. 22-28), is an example of this threading Bresson 
suggests in his Notes. The story –like so many of Ozu’s films– is about one man’s 
dignified resignation to Japanese modernization and the eventual departure of his 
daughter after marriage. We begin with the selective framing of a baseball stadium in 
the evening and its coverage on television (a symbol of modernization), being watched 
by some young executives in a restaurant, all of which is ignored by three older men 
having a traditional dinner together in a secluded room. The disembodied voice of the 
stadium announcer and television commentator –a symbol of technological reach– relay 
and connect the spaces. 
                                                
606 ‘Sounds’, here, should be taken in a Heideggarian immersion sense [cf: Chapter 3]. 
607 Robert Bresson, Notes on the Cinematographer, trans. Jonathan Griffin (Københaven: Green 
Integer, 1997), 62. 
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 fig. 22 fig. 23 
  
 fig. 24 fig. 25 
  
 fig. 26 fig. 27 
 
fig. 28 
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In another sense the out-of-field testifies to a “more radical Elsewhere”. When 
the ‘thread’ which traverses and binds the out-of-field sets together into a whole is 
thick, or noticeable and apparent –indeed the whole is the thread– the series of closed 
systems are added together, space to space. “But”, argues Deleuze, “when the thread is 
very fine, it is not content to reinforce the closure of the frame or to eliminate the 
relation with the outside. … [T]he finer it is –the further duration descends into the 
system like a spider– the more effectively the out-of-field fulfills its other function 
which is that of introducing the transspatial and the spiritual into the system which is 
never perfectly closed.”608 Here Deleuze specifically cites the almost two 
dimensionality of Carl Theodore Dreyer’s ‘closed’ frames which open to immanent 
duration and possibly more.609 In Dreyer’s final film Gertrud (1964), a tragedy about 
the unfulfilled search for love, we can glimpse what Deleuze references (figs. 29 and 
30).  
  
 fig. 29 fig. 30 
Criticized as being ‘uncinematic’ and openly jeered when viewed at the 1964 New 
York Film Festival, Dreyer’s framing in Gertrud is static and closed. Throughout the 
film Gertrud is literally framed into an almost two dimensional space using preexisting 
geometric and dynamic limitations within the frame. Only the elegant yet spectral 
                                                
608 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 18-19. (emphasis mine) 
609 Here Deleuze is elusive. “Dreyer made this into an ascetic method: the more the image is 
spatially closed, even reduced to two dimensions, the greater is its capacity to open itself on to a 
fourth dimension which is time, and on to a fifth which is Spirit, the spiritual decision of Jeanne or 
Gertrude.” Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 19. 
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movement of the camera during extremely long takes provides framing variation; yet 
extending the frame into a larger out-of-field set is not Dreyer’s concern. As Deleuze 
says, “the more the image is spatially closed, even reduced to two dimensions, the 
greater is its capacity to open itself on to a fourth dimension which is time, and on to a 
fifth which is Spirit, the spiritual decisions of Jeanne [The Passion of Joan of Arc, 
1928] or Gertrud.”610 Nothing is perhaps more emblematic of this than the framing of 
the final shot of Gertrud (fig. 31). The film ends with an elderly Gertrud saying 
goodbye to her friend Axel Nygren one last time; she closes the door and ever so 
slowly bells begin to toll. Dreyer holds the empty frame an inordinate amount of time –
open to duration and, perhaps, to the eternal mystery that Gertrud sought and into 
which she has now passed. 
 
 fig. 31 
THE SHOT 
The ‘shot’ –for indeed there are many different kinds of ‘shots’ which share the 
same characterization– can most accurately be described as the image-movement, a 
mobile-section of duration that ‘extracts’ movement from moving bodies to provide a 
temporal perspective or relief. The shot “modifies the relative position of immobile sets 
… the translation of the parts of a set which spreads out in space” (frames), and 
expresses “change in the whole which is itself transmitted through these modifications” 
and “the change of a whole which is transformed in duration”.611 As hinted earlier, it 
                                                
610 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 19. 
611 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 20, 21. 
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was the emancipation of the shot from a single set-up, theatrical-like point of view 
(Melies) that rescued cinema from its own photographic ‘essence’. In the proto cinema 
of Melies, for example, there was not only “no communication of mutually referring 
variable sets” (frames) in the one camera set-up but movement remained ‘attached’ to 
bodies and things which pass “from one spatial shot/plane [plan] to another”, says 
Deleuze. Melies’ films were essentially filmed theatrical productions. In Melies’s A 
Trip to the Moon (1902), for example, when the plan to fly a rocket to the moon is 
‘described’ and mocked by the ‘president’s’ peers, there are no close-ups or cutaways, 
there is only a single master shot for entrance, explanation and ‘action’. The scene ends 
when the actors exit stage left and again enter stage left, via a simple editorial dissolve, 
for a new scene. It was for this reason Bergson critiqued proto-cinema as an image in 
movement.  
The development of the dynamic range of the mobile camera ‘shot’, what 
Bergson could not foresee, makes the ‘extraction’ of mobility possible. “This 
[‘extraction’] is not an abstraction,” says Deleuze, “but an emancipation. … By 
producing in this way a mobile section of movements, the shot is not content to express 
the duration of a whole which changes, but constantly puts bodies, parts, aspects, 
dimensions, distances and the respective positions of the bodies which make up a set in 
the image into variation.”612 Here then is the essence of the image-movement, 
movement is extracted from bodies in space.613 Somewhere between, but not equidistant 
from, the frame and montage, the shot circulates, sub-divides and reunites objects and 
sets “into a duration which is immanent to the whole of the universe.”614 The shot 
involves us in this duration in the world. Returning to Welles’ depth of field (figs. 32-
                                                
612 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 24. 
613 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 24. 
614 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21. 
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40) we see how a single shot camera movement –itself a form of in-camera montage– 
transforms the ‘frame’ into a mobile section of duration. In a single shot sequence we 
are granted a glimpse into the single most important event that sent Charles Foster 
Kane’s tragic life in motion. The young Kane is playing in the snow and sliding on his 
sled Rosebud. The camera begins to dolly back and reveals his mother who calls out, 
“be careful, Charles! Pull your muffler around your neck, Charles!”. The mother’s 
voice is interrupted by the voice of Walter Parks Thatcher, a banker who is attempting 
to secure guardianship of young Charles, “Mrs. Kane, I think we shall have to tell him 
now.” The voice of young Charles, who continues to play, can be heard in the ever 
increasing distance. “Yes, I’ll sign those papers now Mr. Thatcher”, says Mrs. Kane. 
With Mrs. Kane in the foreground, Mr. Kane, who is a weak-willed and violent 
character, launches into a pitiful protest. But Mrs. Kane’s mind is made up and, with 
the boy playing in the distant background while his innocent youth is about to be signed 
away, Mrs. Kane begins to finalize the deal. The tension escalates as the dialogue of all 
four characters overlap (a technique pioneered by Welles)615: Mr. Kane’s protest, Mrs. 
Kane’s resigned plea to Mr. Kane to “stop all this nonsense”, Mr. Thatcher’s cold and 
efficient explanation to Mr. Kane that he has no say in the matter, and the sounds of 
young Charles playing in the distance. Mr. Kane goes back to close the window and 
silence the sound of young Charles but Mrs. Kane goes and opens the window calling 
out to him one last time. 
                                                
615 David A. Cook, ibid., 397. 
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The shot, however, is not the only way movement is extracted and the image-
movement is crafted, says Deleuze. Editing (montage) –the assemblage and 
organization of shots in a particular sequence– can also extract movement from bodies 
and things to free the camera from constant movement and with this, it can extract and 
present much of the depth and complexity of a lifeworld. 
 
MONTAGE AND THE ACTION-IMAGE 
The ‘Whole’ of cinema –the change in duration which occurs between the 
beginning and end of the film– is ‘released’ from the image-movements of the shot 
through the craft of montage, or editing. “The only generality about montage”, Deleuze 
points out, “is that it puts the cinematographic image into a relationship with the whole; 
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that is, with time conceived as the Open.”616 Indeed, Deleuze points out that since the 
advent of classical cinema the image-movement has more often been associated with 
montage than camera movement alone.  
In fact, and here then is the second radical step in Deleuze’s philosophy of 
cinema, montage is a technique of ordering and organizing by which great directors 
express their own philosophical characterization of the everyday through their 
“technique” and “concrete practices”.617 Deleuze believes the image-movement reflects 
a particular grasp of existential immersion of human being-in-the-world, and 
specifically, the image-movement of ‘classic cinema’ in Cinema 1 is such a grasp that 
eventually comes to crisis after World War Two. In this way, a discussion of cinema 
plays out as part of the larger conversation, begun in Chapter 1, about how human 
beings ‘organize’ and ‘order’ forms of life and how it manifests in practices of ‘power’ 
or ‘creativity’.618 Furthermore, this insistence on the vital importance of montage as 
                                                
616 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 56. 
617 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 56. 
618 The coming together of ‘Hitler and Hollywood’ on a large scale in the propaganda machines of 
fascism is something to be considered, then, in relation to the ordering and organizing of cinema. 
“This was the death-knell for the ambitions of ‘old cinema’: not, or not only, the mediocrity and 
vulgarity of current production but rather Leni Riefenstahl, who was not mediocre”, says Deleuze. 
(Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 159.) Deleuze cites the work of Serge Daney [1944-1992] 
and Paul Virillio, who have theorized about the mises-en-scène of the everyday civil lifeworld; “what 
has brought the whole cinema of the movment-image into question are ‘the great political mises-en-
scène, state propaganda turned tableaux vivants, the first handling of mass humans’, and their 
backdrop, the camps”, says Deleuze citing Daney. (ibid., 159) “And the situation is still worse if we 
accept Virillio’s thesis: there has been no diversion or alienation in an art of the masses initially 
founded by the movement-image; on the contrary the movement-image was from the beginning 
linked to the organization of war, state propaganda, ordinary fascism, historically and essentially.” 
(159)  
 We can now add one more example of ‘the ersatz city’ to the discussion in chapter 1 –
Theresienstadt concentration camp in the Czech fortress city of Therezín. An 18th-century 
fortress and garrison town, the Gestapo turned Therezín into a Jewish ghetto during World War 
Two. Not only did the Gestapo reorder the purposed design of the fortress city –an act meant to 
constrict and regulate the organizing trajectories of those now trapped inside– but they also made a 
propaganda film show what life in the ‘model’ camp looked like. Ein Dokumentarfilm aus dem 
jüdischen Siedlungsgebiet (Terezin: A Documentary Film of the Jewish Resettlement, refered to by survivors as 
Der Führer schenkt den Juden eine Stadt (The Führer Gives the Jews a City), was filmed in 1944 to take 
advantage of an ersatz ‘beautification’ project in Therezín intended to dupe the Red Cross and the 
Danish government regarding the care and state of Jews in the ghetto. The camp was, in effect, 
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creating meaning in the cinematic craft is of great importance to directors such as 
Robert Bresson and Terrence Malick, who will be discussed towards the end of the 
chapter.  
“Montage is composition,” says Deleuze, and even more radically, montage is 
“the assemblage [agencement] of [image-movements] as constituting an indirect 
image of time. … [S]imultaneously in the individual movement-image and in the 
whole of the film.”619 Deleuze is quick to point out that an indirect image of time is not 
to be mistaken for the homogeneous time or spatialised duration critiqued by Bergson 
but is “an effective duration and time which flow from the articulation of the [image-
movements]”.620 As we shall soon see, the indirect image of time is built up from a 
certain organic and action-based characterization of the image-movement that is 
dependent on movement and montage. “The [image-movement] provides only an 
indirect image of time because time is reduced to intervals defined by movement and 
the linking of movements through montage.”621 Deleuze identifies another type of 
montage that emerges after World War Two, which produces a ‘direct image of time’ –
where “time pierces through the image itself directly and without the mediation of a 
succession of [image-movements]”622– but this will be discussed in the next section. It 
is for this reason, Deleuze generally refers to the pre-war technique of montage and its 
                                                                                                                                         
turned into a film set. A complete copy of the film no longer exists (only 25min of an 
approximately 90min film) but Susan Tegel’s erudite reconstruction in Nazis and the Cinema 
(Continuum: London, 2007) gives us a glimpse. “What we see”, says Tegel, “ are people leading 
active, purposeful lives, working hard, and engaged in sensible leisure activities such as reading, 
knitting, sports or enjoying themselves on sunny days, giving ‘an impression of a completely 
normal life’.” (Susan Tegel, Nazis and the Cinema, 223.) These ‘activities’ were of course completely 
fabricated for the camera –the mises-en-scène of a lifeworld. 
619 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 31, 56. (bold emphasis mine) 
620 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 31. 
621 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 11. Rodowick also points out that this organic 
image-movement is a projection of a particular characterization of Truth. “The noosigns of the 
movement-image”, he says, “derive from a belief in the possibility of action and the stability of 
Truth.” (12-13 bold emphasis mine) 
622 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 39. 
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cinema as ‘classical cinema’ (although instances of direct images of time can be found 
in classical cinema) to be distinguished from the ‘modern cinema’ which arises after 
World War Two. By highlighting four distinct pre-War editing styles which produce 
indirect images of time, Deleuze endeavors to describe how time and narrative emerge 
from the assemblage and composition of image-movements through the technique of 
editing. 
Deleuze points out four distinct schools of classical montage each expressing 
their own practical and philosophical compositions of the image-movement. The 
organico-active (or empirical) American montage established in the work of D. W. 
Griffith; the Soviet organico-dialectical montage of Sergi Eisenstein designed as a 
critique of Griffith’s bourgeois aesthetic;623 the prewar French poetic-quantitative (or 
quantitative movement) and the decidedly non-organic and non-psychological German 
expressionist montage. The latter three are indebted to, and attempt to break from, 
Griffith’s organico-active model. While there is no space to go into the rich details of 
each tradition, and Deleuze reminds us that this list in no way represents a hierarchy or 
evolution, it is their shared ‘organic’ characteristics of narration (gloss: simple sort of 
story line) and the efficacy of human actions to change given milieus (changing 
situation in a behaviorist style) that allows them to be grouped together as a description 
of ‘classical cinema’. Here, Deleuze makes a difficult transition; although these pre-war 
schools differ greatly in their approach and method of montage, what makes them all 
‘classical’ is a similar editorial logic of movement and space. The montage of classical 
cinema abides in a certain ‘Realism’ based on a shared philosophical belief in the 
efficacy of action coupled with a particular model of Truth. A character doesn’t go into 
                                                
623 It should be noted that the dialectical montage of Sergi Eisenstein (also Vsevolod Pudovkin and 
Alexander Dovzhenko) was heavily criticized by the Soviet ‘experimental director’ Dziga Vertov 
for “being carried along in Griffith’s wake, for imitating the American cinema, or for a bourgeois 
idealism.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 41.  
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a room and just end up on a ship. But that example –although a practical logic– is still 
too simplistic.  
 
 fig. 41 
D. N. Rodowick uses an example from Buster Keaton’s Sherlock Jr. (1924) to make 
Deleuze’s point clear. There is a short sequence in Sherlock Jr. where Keaton divides 
himself in a dream (fig. 41) and enters the cinema frame. Through a series of shots and 
match cuts (figs. 42-44) Keaton moves from space to space: a city street, a cliff, a 
jungle, a desert, an ocean, a snowy mountainside. “Keaton’s movements”, says 
Rodowick, “from one shot to the next link incommensurable spaces through what 
modern mathematics terms a ‘rational’ division. … [E]very division, no matter how 
unlikely and nonsensical, is mastered by this figure of rationality where the 
identification of movement with action assures the continuous unfolding of adjacent 
spaces.”624 That is, Keaton is to be taken to have made these transitions in this simple 
sequence. 
   
 fig. 42 fig. 43 fig. 44 
                                                
624 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 3. 
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Time, then, is subordinate to movement and activity in this editorial Realism. “What 
constitutes realism is simply this: milieux and modes of behaviour,” says Deleuze, 
“milieux which actualize and modes of behaviour which embody.”625 Deleuze refers to 
this ‘Realism’ as the action-image, which is “the relation between the two and all the 
varieties of this relation.”626 Because the realism of the action-image has most 
commonly been associated with American cinema, and although the other schools of 
pre-war cinema attempt responses to the organico-active innovations made by D. W. 
Griffith, the techniques of Griffith should be acknowledged before moving on to the 
structure of the action-image. 
American filmmaker D. W. Griffith (1875-1948), who almost single handedly 
transformed the proto-cinema of Dickson, Lumiere, Mélies and Porter into the 
‘American cinema’ we currently know today, is recognized as having originated the 
basic techniques of ‘organic’ narration which uses the logic of action and spatial 
continuity in the linking of image-movements. Griffith’s style was either embraced or 
reacted to by his contemporaries but his work and innovations were not to be ignored. 
Deleuze highlights three specific editing techniques developed by Griffith: the close-up 
(and a variation of the close-up known as the cut-in), parallel montage, and concurrent 
and convergent montage. The insertion of the close-up (the affection-image), Deleuze 
says, “does not merely involve the enlargement of a detail, but produces a 
miniaturisation of the set, a reduction of the scene … the close-up endows the objective 
set with a subjectivity which equals or even surpasses it”.627 In The Greaser’s Gauntlet 
(1908) Griffith match cuts from a medium long shot of a man at a hanging tree, who 
has been rescued from a lynch mob, to a full shot of the man thanking the woman who 
                                                
625 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 145. 
626 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 145. 
627 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 31, 32; this ‘psychological’ subjectivity will be questioned in the crystal-image 
of volume 2, which will forward the thesis of duration as subjectivity. 
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rescued him, to heighten the emotional impact of the event. Griffith also famously 
experimented with a close-up to heighten the emotional state of a wife waiting for her 
husband at a train station in Enoch Arden (1908).628 In both instances, Griffith discovers 
the emotional impact of alternating between long, medium and close-ups; this 
alternation “allow[s] the audience to move gradually into the emotional heart of the 
scene”.629 Parallel alternate montage is the alternation of parts in a binary relationship 
–men and women, rich and poor, town and country, North and South, interiors and 
exteriors, etc. – which succeed each other according to a rhythm. Film historian David 
Cook suggests that this technique was a prefiguring of a subjective camera later 
‘perfected’ by the German director F. W. Murnau. In After Many Years (1908) Griffith 
would cut between Annie Lee and her shipwrecked husband to emphasize “the 
psychological burden and uncertainty of their separation” and in A Corner in Wheat 
(1909) he cuts between a shot of a gorging wheat tycoon and hungry sharecroppers.630 
Concurrent and convergent montage, also known as crosscutting, is very similar to the 
aforementioned technique. Crosscutting is the alternation of fragmented but concurrent 
(and not always concurrent) action, which continues to alternate until the separate 
spatial and temporal realities climax –either together or missing each other.631  Widely 
known as the “Griffith last minute rescue” the crosscutting would continue to increase 
in tempo raising the tension of the action until resolution. These editorial techniques 
represent an ordering technique used to both shape meaning and elicit viewer response. 
                                                
628 Ken Dancyger notes an apocryphal story about how the Biograph executives (the production 
company Griffith was working for at the time) were worried that the audience would interpret the 
close-up as a decapitation. Dancyger points out that the almost immediate adoption of the close-up 
by other directors and the continued acceptance by the audience shows otherwise. Indeed, without 
any ‘training’ whatsoever by the audience, the close-up was understood as a smaller set of the 
whole. 
629 Ken Dancyger, The Technique of Film and Video Editing: history, theory, and practice (Burlington, MA: 
Focal Press, 2002), 6. 
630 David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film, 66. 
631 As early as Griffith’s eighth film, The Fatal Hour (1908), he attempted to crosscut between three 
separate actions. David A. Cook, ibid., 66. 
 230 
Importantly, Griffith’s techniques point to the varied nature of the shot which makes 
the action-image possible.  
While there is no space to go into great detail, what can be said is that the 
cinema of the image-movement is never made up of one kind of image but is an 
assemblage (a montage) of three distinct varieties –perception-images, affection-
images, and action-images.632 Deleuze takes these terms directly from the first chapter 
of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, describing and linking the cinema of the ‘frame’ to 
the meta-cinema of human living.633 “The action-image forms a set wherein 
perceptions, affections, and actions relate organically in a sensorimotor whole”, says 
Rodowick.634 The perception-image, associated with a wide angle ‘long-shot’, relates 
movement to ‘bodies’; the action-image, associated with a medium-shot, relates 
movement to ‘acts’; and the affection-image, or the close-up, which relates movement 
to a ‘quality’, bridges both.635 What binds them together as the action-image, and this is 
the central point which we’ve been making, is their adherence to a particular form (or 
in this case formula) of organic ‘action’ –a supposedly ‘realistic’ sequence of actions 
which we believe will change the milieu or situation(s) of the character. It is this 
‘action-schema’ Deleuze believes is overturned in post World War Two ‘modern’ 
cinema. 
Deleuze describes the formula of the action-image as SAS’ or, Situation 
addressed by Action which results in a new Situation (signified by the apostrophe). 
“Action properly speaking” claims Rodowick, “is motivated by a protagonist, whose 
actions and reactions are constituted as physical movements in a struggle with the 
                                                
632 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1:The Movement-Image, 72. 
633 “The operation under consideration”, argues Deleuze, “is no longer elimination, selection or 
framing, but the incurving of the universe, which simultaneously causes the virtual action of things 
on us and our possible action on things.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 67. 
634 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 72. 
635 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1:The Movement-Image, 67-72. 
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milieu.”636 Deleuze goes into great detail describing the role movement plays in the 
organic interlacing of actions and milieux, making room for all the different genres of 
cinema. What is of great importance however is that SAS’ is not simply a cinematic 
technique or a mere formula of entertainment but is also a complex philosophical 
expression. The Soviet filmmaker Sergi Eisenstein critiqued Griffith’s editorial 
techniques because he believed that Griffith’s films, and the formula by which they 
were made, were the result of a particular way of seeing the world. “Eisenstein’s 
strength thus lies in showing that the principal technical aspects of American montage 
since Griffith –the alternate parallel montage which makes up the situation, and the 
alternate concurrent montage which leads to the duel– relate back to this social and 
bourgeois historical conception.”637 Through a dialectical montage Eisenstein was able 
to change “the interval, as well as the whole [tout]”638 of cinema in a way that was 
completely distinct from what Eisenstein perceived as an American bourgeois mythos. 
In the end, however, Deleuze points out that whether the montage is crafted in an 
organico-active (Griffith) or organico-dialectic (Soviet/Eisenstein) style, their shared 
philosophical assumption is a belief in the efficacy of human actions to change given 
milieux. 
Finally, in some cases the action-image may be alternatively formulated as 
ASA’ or Action disclosing a Situation and moving to a new Action (signified by the 
apostrophe). Deleuze refers to this as the ‘small form’ of the action-image and is 
evidence of a unique possibility in the action-image –the possibility of going beyond 
the action-image.639 ASA’ is characterized by elliptical, or episodic, situations only 
partially disclosed as fragments by actions. “From action to action, the situation 
                                                
636D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 68. 
637 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 154. 
638 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 38. 
639 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 70. 
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gradually emerges, varies, and finally either becomes clear or retains its mystery”, says 
Deleuze.640 The small form of the action-image, then is characterized by both what is 
not given and by what is not directly given (specifically, slight differences in actions 
resulting in an infinite difference between situations); both rely on a breakdown in the 
logic of the behaviorist schema on which the ‘large form’ of the action-image is so 
dependent. Although the small form of the action-image is found in all of cinema (large 
productions, B-movies and low budgets films),641 Deleuze likes the example of Charlie 
Chaplin’s ‘burlesque’ cinema to make his point –“a genre which seems to be 
exclusively devoted to the small form”, says Deleuze.642 On the one hand Deleuze cites 
Chaplin’s A Woman of Paris [Public Opinion] (1923). A gap of a year in the life of 
Marie St. Clair is left blank whilst the audience is left to decipher by her new clothes 
and behavior what has happened (she has become the mistress of a wealthy man). 
Erotic images are inferred from the reaction of the spectator. And an arrival of a train is 
read on the passing lights on Marie’s face. Here it is interesting to note the role 
limitation (most often financial, but not always) plays in the need for cinematic 
innovation, which leads to the ASA’. So, for instance, Deleuze points out that Chaplin 
shows the arrival of the train through light and shadow because he didn’t have a real 
French train to show. This relationship between constraint and innovation, says 
Deleuze, is significant in post-war Europe and the developments of Italian Neorealismo 
and the French Nouvelle Vague –most notably, the birth of what Deleuze calls the 
time-image [l’image-temps]. Deleuze turns to other Chaplin films to highlight the 
                                                
640 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1:The Movement-Image, 164. 
641 Indeed movies can pass between the SAS’ and ASA’ (as was the case with Eisenstein) or 
directors can make one movie in the SAS’ form and then make the next in an ASA’ form (as was 
the case with John Ford). 
642 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 173. Deleuze makes the exception for the cinema of the American silent 
film star Buster Keaton (1895-1966), whose genius seems to be the insertion of the burlesque into 
the ‘large form’. Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 177-181. 
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second expression of the small form. We see a heartbroken Tramp appear to shake with 
grief because he was left by his love, but when he turns around we see him shaking a 
cocktail. In Soldier Arms (1918) the Tramp is in the trenches of World War One 
tallying points for himself, then the enemy, after every gunshot –as though he was 
playing a game of darts. The slight difference of action in these sequences reveals the 
enormous divide in situations. “For Chaplin knew how to select gestures which were 
close to each other and corresponding situations which were far apart, so as to make 
their relationship produce a particularly intense emotion at the same time as laughter, 
and to redouble the laughter through this emotion.”643 This was Chaplin’s originality 
and genius, claims Deleuze.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude this first part it is important to reiterate Deleuze’s characterization 
of cinema as a unique technology which has too often been complicit in the 
philosophical tendency to build up abstract representations of life. Indeed, the patterns 
of representation in the indirect image of time, rendered in the action-image, are 
susceptible to the colonizing tendencies described thus far. Not only susceptible, the 
action-image, dependent on organic and action-based characterization of movement 
and space, is complicit for the very reason that it must occlude its own preference for 
abstract representations of life.  More dramatically, the broader connection between the 
‘culmination’ of the mises-en-scène of the action-image in the cinema of Leni 
Reifenstal, and the totalitarian mises-en-scène of the Nazi lifeworld, connects the 
critique of Peter Jackson’s LOTR films to the larger ethical concerns that have been 
cited. This cinematic ‘illusion’ is of the same economy as the scopic desire to step 
                                                
643 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 174. 
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outside the human body and transform an external world into theoretical simulacrum. 
This is also the same economy of the mega machine and simulation that gives rise to a 
new economy of consumption and communication. However, because Deleuze is 
concerned with the cinematic artifact and varied cinematic practices he sees the 
possibility for other philosophical expression in other cinematic practices. We note with 
Deleuze that cinema has other possibilities and tendencies which oppose and make 
possible other philosophical tendencies: these are the possibilities of concreteness, 
particularity and detail. In this way it is not the technology, nor the artifice of cinema, 
that is in question, but the technique, use and values to which it is devoted. It is at this 
point where we can finally delineate between the disastrous economy of consumption 
and the economy of communication in a post-industrial age. All this goes with the 
cinema of the time-image to which we now turn. 
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PART II: BEYOND A CINEMA OF REPRESENTATION 
“The cinema does not just present images, it surrounds them with a world.”644 
CINEMA 2: THE TIME-IMAGE 
 
A radical transformation in the projection of the possibilities of cinema arises 
after the global societal failure culminating in, and continuing after, World War Two. 
These changes and assumptions about cinema have deep connections with what has 
been discussed in the previous chapters, about the characterization of human being-in-
the-world, and about how we order and organize lifeworlds through a projection of the 
possibilities of being. The crisis that Deleuze diagnoses in cinema relates deeply to 
philosophy and social understanding, and some of the problems he sees relate closely to 
those that have been noted in other chapters. Broadly speaking, this transformation in 
cinema stems from a general Western crisis, relating to an Enlightenment picture of 
knowledge of the world, and so too the Enlightenment picture of the world itself, 
including the faulty characterization of what was thought to be ‘progress’, and the 
faulty characterization of autonomous people controlling events in the world. This final 
point is, in many ways, the culmination of this crisis, which was manifested, in its most 
brutal possibility, in the Fascist and Communist blueprints of ‘order’. This 
philosophical crisis, anticipated long before World War Two, but certainly felt broadly 
after it, stems from “social, economic, political, moral, and [other issues] more internal 
to art, to literature and to the cinema in particular”, argues Deleuze; and all these issues, 
and the various responses to them, eventually surface in particular expressions of 
cinematic technique.645 In the world of art, particularly, Deleuze points out how this 
vast constellation of issues found a voice in American Lost Generation literature (John 
                                                
644 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 66. 
645 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 210. 
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Dos Passos) and in the French nouveau roman (Alain Robbe-Grillet), long before it 
made its way to film.646 Deleuze rightly asks whether or not this crisis of the action-
image can reasonably be presented as something new to cinema? As we have just seen, 
the action-image itself is a complex expression of classical cinema, which involves 
both this characterization and the desire of directors to “limit or even suppress the unity 
of action, to undo the action, the drama, the plot or the story” in the structure of the 
SAS’ and ASA’.647 Classical cinema had always been haunted by a beyond-the-image-
movement –a phantom Deleuze calls a direct time-image which takes body already in 
classical cinema, and is fully embodied in modern cinema.648 Deleuze describes five 
conditions which act as a sort of scaffolding –he describes them as an ‘envelope’– for 
the crisis of the action-image; and these conditions should be addressed before 
discussing a cinema beyond the image-movement, taken up by Deleuze in volume two 
of his cinema study –l’image-temps. 
 
                                                
646 Deleuze makes specific reference to the work of American John Dos Passos (1896-1970) and 
French novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet (1922-2008) in his attempts to articulate the crisis of the 
action-image. 
647 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 209-210; In his documentary Directed by John Ford (1971), American 
director Peter Bogdonovich recalls a story about the American director John Ford that speaks to 
this point. How Green Was My Valley (1941) was a film about a Welsh family’s struggle during the 
turn of the twentieth century in the South Wales coalfield. The context in which the story is told is 
how the old Hollywood studios would force directors to recut portions of their films or use certain 
shots. Ford had legendary low ‘shooting’ ratio –he would film just what he ‘needed’ and wanted, 
nothing more. So during the filming of a dramatic scene in which the new vicar, Mr. Gruffydd 
(Walter Pidgeon), marries away the eldest daughter of the Morgan family, Angharad (Maureen 
O'Hara) with whom he’s had a silent romance, to the mine owner’s son, Ford filmed her leaving 
the chapel in a long shot (perception-image). Angharad comes down the stairs with her new 
husband and the villagers bid them off with warm farewells. In the distance we see the lonely 
figure of the vicar watching his true love go away. Ford was then asked if he would like to shoot a 
close-up (affection-image) of the vicar to which his response was, “Why? They’ll just use it!” These 
craft decisions, then, change the potentialities of cinema. It enables us to ‘get into things’ and to 
more richly participate in lifeworld, a concern ‘modern cinema’ and Tolkien also shared. So, 
although ‘modern cinema’ may not be more beautiful or better than classical cinema, as Deleuze 
says, we might say that it is a more philological and mythopoeic practice of cinema –it allows us 
to dig deeper. 
648 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 40. 
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THE CRISIS OF THE ACTION-IMAGE649 
 Although SAS’ and ASA’ movies were still being made after World War Two –
and, as Deleuze points out, were still the most financially successful in the post-war 
West– the new ‘soul’ of cinema was, as he sees it, expressed in Italian Neorealism. In 
1942 Cesare Zavattini (screenwriter of Shoeshine 1946, Bicycle Theives 1948, and 
Umberto D 1952) proposed a new kind of Italian cinema, a cinema that did away with 
‘contrived plots’, sets, and professional actors, and returned to the concerns and 
textures of ‘everyday life’.650 In the midst of almost total societal collapse in Europe, 
the Italian neorealists raised new existential and social concerns through cinematic 
technique, and in the process brought cinema to a crisis –a crisis of the action-image. 
Deleuze roughly places and dates the beginning of the crisis of the action-image to 
1948 and the releases of Roberto Rossellini’s Germania, anno zero651 and Vittorio De 
Sica’s Ladri di biciclette, both of which represent Italian Neorealism at the height of its 
powers.652 It should also be noted that in Cinema 2, Deleuze highlights the pre-and post-
war cinema of Japanese director Yasujiru Ozu as significant to the crisis of the action 
image. Although Ozu did not directly influence the development of ‘crisis’ in European 
cinema, and was only returned to after his final film, An Autumn Afternoon (1962), 
                                                
649 The ‘crisis of the action image’ is a curious beast in Deleuze’s taxonomy of cinema and should 
be put into context. Although Deleuze dates the crisis of the action image after the second World 
War, the ‘crisis’ to which he speaks was already ‘felt’ in the late 19th century. Indeed, leading up to 
and after World War One, Eruopean culture was experiencing a crisis of Modernity. This crisis was 
reflected in the literature of Proust and Dostoevsky, the philosophy of Bergson and Heidegger, and 
of course, in the work of those who went through the trauma of World War One –Wittgenstein 
and Tolkien.  
650 David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film, 424. 
651 Credited with ‘starting’ Italian Neorealism, this was Rossellini’s third neorealist film after the 
tremendously influential Roma, città aperta (1945) and Paisà (1946). And although Roma, città aperta 
was recognized as something ‘new’ and innovative it still held onto a ‘melodrama’ consistent with 
the SAS’ and ASA’ form. 
652 Less famously Luchino Visconti’s La terra trema was also released that year. Deleuze’s rough 
timeline for the crisis of the action-image is Italy 1948; France 1958; Germany 1968. Gilles 
Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 215. 
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Deleuze dramatically points out that Ozu invented a cinema of seeing [optical 
situations] and hearing [sound situations].653  
Fundamentally, pure optical images [opsigns] and, later, with the development 
of synchronous sound, pure sound images [sonsigns] are distinct from the action-
schema of organic montage. Within the action-schema, situations [milieu] –usually 
shown with the perception-image or the long/wide shot– extend into action via the 
affection-image. This technique is visible in the formula SAS, which Deleuze says can 
be found, with some degree of variation, in most of ‘classical cinema’. Because “action 
floats” in the ether of the optical and sound situation, the logic of the action-schema is 
ruptured.654 “Daily life allows only weak sensory-motor connections to survive, and 
replaces the action-image by pure optical and sound images”, argues Deleuze.655 Ozu’s 
cinematic technique is built on this logic. It replaces activity with the banal, the 
ordinary, the everyday; we see and hear other ‘things’. Using a different technique to 
dwell on the banal particularity around us our sensitivity to them is richer and deeper. 
Ozu’s camera is usually fixed and low, and when the camera does move it is generally 
very slow. His editing favors, what Deleuze calls the montage-cut, “a purely optical 
passage or punctuation between images, working directly, sacrificing all synthetic 
effects.”656 One only needs to return to the opening sequence of An Autumn Afternoon, 
described earlier, to see these techniques come together. These techniques force us to 
wrestle with the image differently than we would the action-schema. Regarding the 
status of the image-movement, Deleuze claims it “has not disappeared, but now exists 
                                                
653 There is something to be followed up here; if, as was pointed out earlier, there is a relationship 
between the zen and Taoist expression in Ozu’s films and Heideggarian philosophy, then it should 
be of no surprise that Ozu was able to anticipate the crisis of the action image and the 
development of the time-image. 
654 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 4. 
655 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 15. 
656 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 13. 
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only as the first dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions.”657 The 
inclusion of Ozu, then, is significant because, although Italian neorealism returns to the 
textures of the everyday, Deleuze wants to go beyond the socio-economic descriptions 
of Italian neorealism given by other theorists, in order to address the way the structure 
of classical cinema, as a craft, was disrupted and changed as a result of this crisis.658  
Above all else, we should remember that the crisis of the action-image stems 
from a philosophical crisis [philosophy in its broadest human sense] of belief. “We 
hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give rise to an action which is 
capable of modifying it”, says Deleuze.659 This ‘philosophical crisis’, manifested in a 
                                                
657 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21. 
658 Referencing film critic and theorist André Bazin (1918-1958) Deleuze says, “neo-realism 
therefore invented a new type of image … and showed that [it] did not limit itself to the content of 
its earliest examples.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 1. 
659 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 211; Here, a more detailed explanation is 
warranted. On the surface, this statement may seem to suggest a current of nihilism running 
through Deleuze’s Cinema volumes. This may be the case. However, although he rules out the 
restoration of a belief in “another world” or the belief “in a transformed world”, Deleuze wants to 
make room for the belief in “body”, or bodies-in-the-world, and returning discourse to bodies-in-
the-world. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 167. Indeed, in Cinema 2 Deleuze insists on a 
return to belief through the cinema of image-time by giving words –discourse– back to flesh. Citing 
Roberto Rossellini, Deleuze says, “the less human the world is, the more it is the artist’s duty to 
believe and produce belief in a relation between man and the world.” Gilles Deleuze, ibid.,165. It is 
the power of ‘modern cinema’, says Deleuze, to restore our belief in the world –through the body. 
Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 166. And, although Deleuze is clear that this belief is ‘post-metaphysical’, he 
does cite Kierkegaard and Pascal as a model of faith that restores humanity and the world back to 
us. (Gilles Deleuze, ibid., n.301) When it comes to the arguments I have laid out in my own work, 
Deleuze’s return to belief by returning discourse to the body, through the techniques of ‘modern 
cinema’, seems to be on the same trajectory –that of a corporeal imagination in everyday life. So 
what is to be made of Deleuze’s ‘collapse of belief’ in light of what has been said thus far in the 
dissertation? 
 On the one hand we have already addressed the broader historical scope of this questioning, 
signs of which are found in the works of Proust, Nietzsche, and Tolkien for example. But on the 
other hand Deleuze’s insistence on a ‘collapse of belief in the efficacy of human action’ in the 
world must also be considered a highly contextualized phenomenon. This turn in cinema is dealing 
with a very specific time in the history of the Western World and the trajectory of that ‘turn’ in 
Japan and through Europe towards America is very specific. One might cite the massive efforts of 
reconstruction on the continent as proof to the contrary. But it seems that Deleuze sees something 
far deeper and more ominous –a collapse of the Cartesian belief in logic and action that has been 
addressed thus far. 
 So, I want to simultaneously and hesitantly affirm two points regarding this quote. What 
Deleuze is getting at is a crisis forged in the world. Regardless of what was to come after, this crisis 
was a crisis of what led to this point (including a World War only thirty years earlier). The belief in 
Christian empires bringing stability to the planet was revealed to be a myth. The world as they 
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new kind of cinematic ‘image’, brought into question the efficacy of action to transform 
particular situations (or milieux). “The soul of the cinema demands increasing thought, 
even if thought begins by undoing the system of action, perceptions and affections on 
which the cinema had fed up to that point.”660 Italian Neorealist cinema forged five 
particular characteristics by which this crisis (as noted on page 43) can be identified 
and the action-image brought into question. Deleuze makes clear that these 
characteristics only make possible (they “form an envelope” of “necessary external 
conditions”), but certainly do not constitute, the new cinematic image.661  
First, in line with what has been said in previous chapters, in the crisis of the 
action-image there is a turn away from ‘globalizing’ (or synthetic) situations 
towards more dispersive situations, which follow multiple characters that are 
sometimes only loosely related.662 Here, we should recall the distinction made in 
chapter 3 between the ordered map and its ‘artificial lines’ and the organizing of time 
and space through wayfaring. ‘Artificial lines’, or lines of occupation, are built up from 
straight surveyed lines and imperial nodes. The artificiality of this architecture usually 
ignores lines of habitation and the reticulate ‘archi-textural’ meshwork of human living. 
Whereas the lines of the ordered map “signify occupation, not habitation”, Ingold 
describes wayfinding as “a movement in Time” not unlike storytelling or playing 
music.663 Indeed, Michel de Certeau cites a practice of ‘mapping’ he calls touring 
carried out by tour describers. This evanescent sketch map, only ever intended for 
                                                                                                                                         
knew it had come to a devastating end, and the cinema that stood outside that context (early Ozu), 
or came out of those ruins (late Ozu and Italian neorealism), and the discussions that followed 
(French New Wave, German New Wave, and New American cinema) grew from those seismic 
shocks. But, what was discovered –a cinematic technique which allows for a richer and deeper 
experience of the everyday world– is not limited to such a crisis of belief. That is the direction in 
which this chapter hopes to push, and the manner in which Deleuze’s ‘crisis of belief’ is here taken. 
660 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 210-211. 
661 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 216-219. 
662 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 211. 
663 Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History, 85; Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in 
Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill, 238. 
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contextual use, emphasizes ‘re-enactment’ of a journey along, over and against 
‘representation’ of a movement across space. In keeping with the observations made by 
Tim Ingold, Michel de Certeau, and Henri Lefebvre in Chapter 3, ‘the city’, says 
Deleuze “ceases to be the city above, the upright city, with skyscrapers and low-angle 
shots, in order to become the recumbent city, the city as horizontal or at human height, 
where each gets on with his own business, on his own account.”664  
Second, when globalizing, generalizing and synthetic situations are abandoned 
there is a weakening, uncertainty and fragmentation of those links that make the SAS’ 
structure possible. Rather than the neat logic of situation giving way to action giving 
way to a new and changed situation, reality, in the crisis of the action image, plays out 
as “lacunary as much as dispersive” and “chance becomes the sole guiding thread”.665  
Third, the behaviorist sensory-motor logic of the classical action-image is 
replaced by what Deleuze calls the ‘stroll’ or the ‘voyage’ (c.f. Ingold’s wayfinding and 
de Certeau’s touring) –an activity detached from the logic of the action-schema.666 Here 
Deleuze draws on an urban studies term to describe this new cinematic phenomenon: 
the any-space-whatever (l’espace quelconque). Once again we run headlong into 
familiar concerns raised by de Certeau in Chapter 3 and Mumford in Chapter 1. The 
any-space-whatever is a ‘modern’ urban phenomenon associated with “the 
undifferentiated fabric of the city” and its effect on human being-in-the-world.667 
Inspired by Deleuze’s former student Pascal Augé and closely related to Marc Augé’s 
non-lieu (nonplace), the any-space-whatever is a characterization of particular 
                                                
664 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 211. (emphasis mine) 
665 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 211. 
666 Deleuze would want to say that the ‘stroll’ or ‘voyage’ in the crisis of the action image is an 
activity detached from its affective structure. While I agree with Deleuze, in the sense that this is 
indeed a what makes the crisis of the action image possible in Italian Neorealism and the French 
New Wave cinema, for the purposes of this dissertation as a whole I want to emphasize the 
historical contingency of this statement. 
667 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 212 .(emphasis mine) 
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depersonalized, transient, and ultimately alienating urban spaces, unique to 
‘supermodernity’, which are designed to be passed through rather than engaged and 
appropriated (e.g. airport terminals).668 Citing the American new wave director John 
Cassavettes, Deleuze says, “it is a question of undoing space, as well as the story, the 
plot or the action.”669  
Fourth, the most complex characteristic of the crisis of the action-image is what 
Deleuze refers to as an acute consciousness of cinematic clichés.  With the breakdown 
in a belief in the efficacy of human action after World War Two, and with the 
depersonalized any-space-whatevers of the modern urban landscape, also comes the 
breakdown of the action-schema of organic montage. What is left in its wake to 
maintain the whole –“without totality or linkage” – is a ‘melodrama’ in which we no 
longer believe.670 Deleuze is keen to point out that this dissatisfaction with the cliché is 
not simply a cinematic invention. Indeed, says Deleuze, the American Lost Generation 
novelist John Dos Passos (1896-1970) anticipated the problem of cinematic clichés, and 
the techniques to expose them, in his novels. Writing when cinema was still just 
emerging from its ‘proto form’, Dos Passos’s work characterized the post-World War 
One landscape as a “dispersive and lacunary reality, the swarming of characters with 
                                                
668 Augé, Marc, Non-places: introduction to an anthropology of Supermodernity, trans. John Howe London: 
Verso, 1995); also In the Metro, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002), xviii; see also the excellent post by Dr. William Brown (University of St. Andrews) 
http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=2232336063&topic=9891 (accessed 4 Nov. 2009 
10:45am cst); and the reference to the lecture in which l’espace quelconque may originate for Deleuze: 
http://www.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=174 (accessed 4 Nov. 2009 10:55am 
cst); Tim Ingold should also be referenced here. This ‘passing through’ space is very much akin to 
the way the traveler cuts ‘across’ surface in contrast to the wayfinder’s attuned passage ‘along’. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, Ingold makes it clear that the wayfarer and the transport traveler are not 
distinguished by technological sophistication but by the bonds between bodies, life-forms and topography. 
One inhabits the environment; the other is largely cocooned from the environment and travels 
across the surface from point-to-point-to-point. 
669 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 212. 
670 Reducing human activities to melodramatic incidents would be vastly too limiting. While clichés 
are certainly related to, and often manifest as, melodrama, this suspicion of clichés is philosophically 
more deep-seated. 
 243 
weak interferences, their capacity to become principal and revert to being secondary, 
events which descend on the characters and which do not belong to those who undergo 
or provoke them” and which manifest as sound and visual slogans.671 This 
dissatisfaction is precisely what Deleuze sees in the post- World War Two filmmakers 
on the Continent. Their radical dissatisfaction with the calamitous world around them 
was heightened by the false representation of those lifeworlds, linked together with 
clichés, and the radical abuse of those clichés by systems of power. The greater 
significance, then, is to understand that the devastating impact of the cinematic cliché is 
not just a concern about ‘hiding images’, but more importantly, a concern about hiding 
‘realities’ –lifeworlds– by using images in a certain way. 
There is a similarity between the way in which Deleuze characterizes the cliché 
and Heidegger’s description of Neugier –‘curiosity’. Neugier is a particular manner of 
encountering the world in the everydayness of being-in-the-world, which, when not 
being taken up with a concern for being-in-the-world, sees and acts in a detached, 
idling, and unrooted (from-life) way. “It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it 
anew to another novelty”.672 Closely related to ‘idle talk’ [Gerede], Heidegger describes 
the character of curiosity as uprooted, “never dwelling anywhere [Aufenthaltslosigkeit] 
… everywhere and nowhere.” If we remember from the previous discussion on the 
cinematic frame that das Rede (telling) and Heidegger’s characterizations of Sorge 
(care), Besorgen (concern) and Fürsorge (solicitude) describe the non-linguistic ways 
in which we make sense of the lifeworld of the frame, then we can now describe 
Neugier as a casual and shallow activity of ‘making sense’ of the lifeworld of the 
frame. So when Deleuze cites Bergson in his description of the cinematic cliché, 
saying, “we do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive 
                                                
671 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 212-214. 
672 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 216. 
 244 
less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in 
our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interest, ideological beliefs and 
psychological demands”, we hear echoes of Heidegger’s uprootedness.673 But there 
seems to be more in Deleuze’s cliché –something deeper and far more insidious. The 
crisis of the action image reveals “a civilization of the cliché where all the powers 
have an interest in hiding images from us … in hiding something in the image.”674 This 
ethical element in Deleuze’s description of the cliché as a tool of ordering human forms 
of life (which culminates in the Fascist cinema of World War Two) reveals his 
characterization of the crisis of the action image –as a response to the cinematic cliché– 
to have a similar trajectory of concerns to previous chapters.  
The fifth and final characteristic of the crisis of the action-image raises an 
important point moving into Deleuze’s second volume. Deleuze refers to this as the 
condemnation of the plot. On one level, as Rodowick observes, homogeneity in the 
action-image now takes the form of a ‘global plot’ or conspiracy [complot] in which the 
characters journey engulfed.675 As in De Sica’s Bicycle Thief, this conspiracy 
sometimes manifests as ironical, at other times as parodic (as in Godard’s Alphaville), 
or even as paranoiac (as often found American new wave films). There is, however, a 
more practical point to be made, which Deleuze alludes to in Cinema 1 and expands 
upon in Cinema 2. The ‘plot’ also suggests the conspiratorial difficulty cinema has in 
escaping the moral and aesthetic bankruptcy of the cinematic action-image.676 “But how 
can the cinema attack the dark organization of clichés,” asks Deleuze “when it 
participates in their fabrication and propagation, as much as magazines or 
                                                
673 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 19-20. 
674 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 20. (bold emphasis mine) 
675 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 77; see also Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image, 214. 
676 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 62-65. 
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television?”677 In Cinema 2 Deleuze later says of the cinematic ‘industry’ and what he 
describes as its “internalized relation with money”: “the cinema as art itself lives in a 
direct relation with a permanent plot [complot], an international conspiracy which 
conditions it from within, as the most intimate and most indispensable enemy.”678 
Cinema had only managed to parody, and would continue to do so until a beyond the 
movement-image was made possible.  
 With these five descriptive framing principles, Deleuze goes on to include in his 
characterization of the crisis of the action-image (as expressed in Italian neorealism, 
and separately, in the post-war films of Yasojiru Ozu) the general development of 
‘purely optical’ and ‘sound’ situations, which were described earlier in the work of 
Ozu. As a reminder, optical and sound situations are cinematic techniques that do not 
extend into action nor are induced by action.679 When montage becomes irrational and 
the logic of conflict and action erodes, then we are dependent on “seeing and hearing as 
decipherment rather than following an action”.680 In Roberto Rossellini’s Germania 
Anno Zero (1948), the young boy Edmund Koeler strolls the devastated streets of post-
war Berlin (figs. 45-47), his lifeworld devastated, and his activities seemingly impotent, 
his family life broken. 
                                                
677 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 214; Deleuze’s metaphors are notoriously fluid 
(e.g. the nomadic war machine), mixing biological and technological descriptions, and should not 
be confused with the distinction between ordering and organizing established in chapter one. We 
should also recall Daniel Boorstin’s The Image, and the ‘conspiracy’ of the pseudo-event. 
678 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 75. 
679 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 2, 17. 
680 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 74-75. 
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 fig. 45 fig. 46 fig. 47 
Through street after street of rubble, abandoned buildings, and construction –a 
menagerie of any-space-whatever– neither the boy (nor we) no longer believes in the 
efficacy of action to affect milieu. Robbed of the logic of sensory motor linkages, the 
cinematic lifeworld no longer articulates its logic through activity and SAS’; we are left 
to “grasp” at the vast complexity of the sights and sounds of the post-war German 
lifeworld.681 “In neo-realism, the sensory-motor connections are now valid only by 
virtue of the upsets that affect, loosen, unbalance, or uncouple them: the crisis of the 
action-image.”682 But the rubble of post-war Europe is of course a dramatic and raw 
example of the any-space-whatever, and the social content of Italian neorealism may 
mislead the radical changes in technique, perhaps a more reserved and less Western 
example may help the point. 
The common concern in all of the films of Yasujiro Ozu is the everyday 
banality of Japanese home life. There is a stillness and emptiness in Ozu’s films that 
resists convention. His camera work has very little movement, there are long ‘still life’ 
codas, and the only punctuation is a simple cutting technique emphasizing optical 
passages rather than action. In Ozu’s films, says Deleuze, “the action-image disappears 
in favour of the purely visual image of what a character is, and the sound image of what 
he says, completely banal nature and conservation constituting the essentials of the 
                                                
681 Gilles Deleuze, ibid.,17. 
682 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 5-6. 
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script. … Daily life allows only weak sensory-motor connections to survive, and 
replaces the action-image by pure optical and sound images”.683 Seeing and hearing 
replaces action in Ozu’s films, and because the sensory motor links are weak “there is 
no universal line which connects moments of decision … spaces are raised to the state 
of any-space-whatevers, whether by disconnection, or vacuity”.684 But if the action-
image is undone what is the character of this new cinematic image? 
 
THE CRYSTALLINE STRUCTURE OF THE TIME -IMAGE 
"The past is never dead. It's not even past." 
WILLIAM FAULKNER 
REQUIEM FOR A NUN 
 
 
fig. 48 
 
Demonstrating both the structure and depth of classical cinema in Cinema 1: 
The Movement-Image, Deleuze’s characterization of the crisis of the action-image 
brings volume 1 of his philosophy of cinema to a close. Central to understanding 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image, then, is the disclosure of the crisis of the action-image as 
                                                
683 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 13-15. “this is why”, says Deleuze, “the only things that count are the 
choice of actors according to their physical and moral appearance, and the establishment of any 
dialogue whatever, apparently without a precise subject-matter”. This is certainly true for a director 
like Robert Bresson who does not use the term ‘actor’ but ‘models’. 
684 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 15. 
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more than simply a stylistic change in ‘taste’, but as a philosophical response to the 
power and devastating ruin of what has just been described as the cinematic cliché –
which culminated in the fascist cinema of the 30’s and 40’s– and an attempt to find a 
beyond the image-movement. Ultimately, however, and although significant, the crisis 
of the action-image alone does not constitute a beyond the image-movement Deleuze 
seeks. The move beyond is characterized by a triple reversal in the structure of classical 
cinema –the first two movements Deleuze addressed in the crisis of the action image. 
First, the cinematic image is freed from its dependence on sensory motor links; and 
second, the logic of the action-image is replaced by pure optical [opsigns] and sound 
[sonsigns] situations –a cinema of seeing and hearing. The third move, says Deleuze, 
and this is what ultimately frees the cinematic image from the destructive power of 
clichés and towards a truly ‘modern cinema’, the cinematic image had to become open 
to direct image-time (chronosigns), ‘readable’ images (lectosigns), and ‘thinking’ 
images (noosigns) –the character of which are inextricably linked to bodies, time 
and memory.685 In the place of the organic representation of the action-image comes, 
what Deleuze calls, the crystalline image characterized by an explicit focus on time and 
a rethinking of the craft of montage.  
 A beyond the image-movement does not mean the end of the image-movement, 
per se, nor does it imply a ‘progression’ towards something “more beautiful”, “more 
profound”, or “more true”, says Deleuze. But indeed, there is a different quality 
altogether in a beyond the image-movement of modern cinema –most significantly, it is 
not grasped as action-schema..686 It is important to note, once again, that although 
“pure optical and sound images, the fixed shot, and the montage-cut do define and 
                                                
685 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 22. 
686 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 39. It is of course not shackled either by conventions of narrative or 
‘story’. 
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imply a beyond of movement”; time is still subordinated to movement (an indirect 
image of time dependent on montage) and does not constitute a direct image of time.687 
What Deleuze addresses in Cinema 2 is how time is freed from its subordination to 
movement in the action-schema of the cinematic image-movement wherefore 
movement becomes a perspective of time (here Deleuze specifically has Welles and 
Renais in mind) creating a situation where the visual and sound elements must be ‘read’ 
not just seen and heard.688 This shift, and its characterization, must now be explored. 
Deleuze returns to the craft of montage to continue his characterization of time 
free from a subordination to movement, and to re-characterize movement as a 
perspective of time. Why montage? D. N. Rodowick helps clarify: “Deleuze’s 
definition of montage is broad, as befits an expression of the whole. More than style of 
cutting, montage expresses a logic of composition … that informs the system of the 
film both globally and in each of its parts. … Montage indicates a particular organizing 
principle or agencement of images”.689 So, in D. W. Griffith, Sergi Eisentein and Pier 
Pasolini we see how these different organizing principles are integrally linked to 
conceptions of time.690 While Deleuze mentions four unique styles of montage in 
classical cinema –the previously mentioned organico-active (or empirical); the Soviet 
organico-dialectical; the prewar French poetic-quantitative (or quantitative movement) 
and the decidedly non-organic and non-psychological German expressionist– it is now 
clear that these unique organizations of images represent two very different 
“chronosigns” of the movement-image, as Rodowick says.691 We should recall 
Deleuze’s generality about montage; montage puts the cinematographic image in 
                                                
687 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21. 
688 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21. 
689 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 51. 
690 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 66; D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 52.  
691 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 52. 
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relationship with the whole.692 One aspect is time as the immensity of past and future, 
the other presents time as interval –the variability of the present.693 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, there are two discernable sides to the image-
movement. On one side, there is the frame, which opens towards objects whose relative 
positions are in space. The other, montage, is in relation to the whole –which expresses 
change– and is in time, argues Deleuze. The shot, then, is divided between these two 
‘sides’ –the frame towards objects and montage towards the whole. Deleuze’s first 
thesis here is that because montage constitutes the ‘whole’, as described earlier, it 
“gives us the image of time.”694 However, says Deleuze, in classical cinema montage 
only yields an indirect image of time precisely because time flows from montage and 
the linking of one present image-movement to another. Montage, then, is more than 
juxtaposing ‘images’ it is “an activity of selection and coordination, in order to give 
time real dimension, and the whole its consistency”.695 The nature of the practice of 
montage in the action-image implies that the image-movement always ever is in the 
present.696 Deleuze adds one more seemingly contradictory element –because montage 
is dependent on the nature of the image-movement as a whole that changes– “the shot 
must therefore already be a potential montage, and the movement-image, a matrix or 
cell of time.”697 Cinematic time is, then, both dependent on the image-movement and 
flows from montage. “According to Pasolini,” says Deleuze, “‘the present is 
transformed into past’ by virtue of montage, but this past ‘still appears as a present’ by 
                                                
692 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 56. 
693 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 56-57; D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 52. 
694 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 33. 
695 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 33. 
696 There is an illusion in the montage of the action-image that you are always in the now and what 
came before is in the past and the current now will soon pass into the past replaced by a new now. 
697 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 34. 
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virtue of the nature of the image.”698 These are the poles of the indirect representation of 
time in classical montage. Each movement-image can only subordinate time if 
movement is ‘normal’. Here Deleuze defines ‘normal’ as the presence of an 
equilibrium, which grants the viewer the ability to assign and recognize movement in 
order to make sense of the story. 
 ‘Normal’ movement also implies the possibility of aberrant movement in 
cinema –movement that lacks a center-of-observation, or what Deleuze calls 
equilibrium.699 Aberrant movement in a ‘beyond the image-movement’ does not mean, 
however, that movement comes to an end and the subordination of time to movment is 
called into question; indeed, although it was avoided in practice, aberrant cinematic 
movement is as old as cinema itself.700 This aberrant movement can often be felt in the 
‘unsophisticated’ cuts, or false continuity cuts, in the proto cinema of the Lumières and 
                                                
698 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 34; we should also note that elsewhere Deleuze makes a philosophical 
comparison between Pasolini, who might be called post-Kantian since “the conditions of 
legitimacy are the conditions of reality itself”, while the semiological school of Chrstian Metz 
would be Kantian. It is this post-Kantian tradition that we continue to pursue. Gilles Deleuze, 
ibid., 276 n. 8. 
699 The deeper implications of Deleuze’s aberrant movement is evident in Nathaniel Dorsky’s 
characterization of intermittence in his long essay Devotional Cinema (Berkley: Tuumba Press, 2003). 
Dorsky’s title comes from his belief that cinema can act as an interruption of our everyday or, as 
Dorsky says, “it subverts our absorption in the temporal and reveals the depths of our own reality; 
it opens us to a fuller sense of ourselves and the world.” Nathaniel Dorsky, Devotional Cinema, 16. 
As we have seen, the error of cinematic mimesis (the false representation of reality in the organic 
action-schema) is our absorption into the temporal / material – the illusion of a ‘solid continuum’. 
What Dorsky tries to describe, and what Deleuze has shown, is that film is greater than the sum of 
its parts, but only, however, when we consider the parts separately. The importance of 
intermittence, then, is that it inextricably links the artifact of cinema to the way we experience 
human existence. So, for instance, a technique as simple as the camera pan often feels artificial 
because we do not experience the everyday in that manner. I am sitting at my desk typing and I see 
each word come forth. My attention is then drawn to my coming into the room –and now back to 
the monitor and then quickly to the words themselves as I type. Again, like Deleuze, Dorsky says 
that this puts a radical emphasis on the technique of montage. Rather than filling the gaps with the 
illusion of continuity, we might say that a technique of intermittence, or what is often called jump-
cuts, is actually more ‘true’. 
700 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 38; There is a fascinating journal article in The Moving Image (v. 3, no. 1, 
Spring 2003) entitled “Fragmentation and Segmentation in the Lumière Animated Views”, by 
André Gaudreault with the assistance of Jean-Marc Lamotte, which reports on the presence of this 
phenomenon in Lumiére and Edison films. The false continuity cut was not limited to proto 
cinema, however, as Deleuze points out in Cinema 1. 
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Edison; it can also be taken for granted in watching someone run a mile and the runner 
always stays in front of you. However, Deleuze anticipates the importance of aberrant 
movement to a beyond the movement-image in his description of the false continuity 
cut early on in Cinema 1.  
The whole intervenes elsewhere and in another order, as that 
which prevents sets from closing in on themselves or on each 
other –that which testifies to an opening which is irreducible to 
continuities as well as to their ruptures. It appears in the 
dimension of a duration which changes and never ceases to 
change. It appears in false continuities [faux raccords] as an 
essential pole of cinema. … False continuity is neither a 
connection of continuity, nor a rupture or a discontinuity in the 
connection. False continuity is in its own right a dimension of 
the Open, which escapes sets and their parts. It realises the 
other power of the out-of-field, this elsewhere or this empty 
zone, this ‘white on white which is impossible to film’.701 
 
‘Aberrant movement’, then, is an ironic term. Rather than being ‘aberrant’, it really 
calls into question and undermines the false picture of time subordinate to movement 
through indirect representation, and makes room for a direct presentation of time to 
surface, by promoting the validity and ‘everydayness’ of aberrant movement. “What 
aberrant movement reveals is time as everything, as ‘infinite opening’,” Deleuze states, 
“as anteriority over all normal movement defined by motivity [motricité]: time has to 
be anterior to the controlled flow of every action, there must be ‘a birth of the world 
that is not completely restricted to the experience of our motivity’ …if normal 
movement subordinates the time of which it gives us an indirect representation, 
aberrant movement speaks up for an anteriority of time that it presents to us directly”.702 
With the sensory-motor schema no longer functioning to select and coordinate 
                                                
701 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 29. 
702 Gilles Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 36. (emphasis mine) 
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perception-images and action-images, montage takes on a new function: the concern for 
‘linking’ images by way of sensory motor logic –what happens in an image– is now 
replaced by a concern for what an image shows. A new-found insistence on the shot 
then opens the direct image of time to, what Deleuze calls, “that Proustian dimension 
where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one 
they have in space.”703 And of significance in the crystalline image is how direct images 
of time function in the cinematic image. 
 Here Deleuze returns to Bergson to further characterize the time-image.  
Bergson describes two different kinds of ‘recognition’ in Matter and Memory. The first 
is an automatic or habitual recognition. This always already involved recognition is a 
sensory-motor recognition that functions through, and is extended by, movement (e.g. 
“the cow moves from one clump of grass to another, and, with my friend Peter, I move 
from one subject of conversation to another”).704 In cinematic terms, Deleuze 
introduced this concept in volume 1 with the relationship between the close-up (the 
affection-image), the medium shot (the action-image) and the long or point-of-view 
shot (the perception-image). The habitual sensory-motor recognition ‘extended’ by 
movement links the perception-image to the action-image.  
The second Bergsonian ‘recognition’ is attentive recognition. Rather than 
‘extending’ recognition through movement, says Deleuze, with attentive recognition we 
constantly return to an object, each time emphasizing new contours and characteristics, 
anew. Whereas, in automatic or habitual recognition objects of recognition are 
constantly extended through movement –cinematically associated with the sensory 
motor image– the object of attentive recognition remains the same but constantly passes 
through different planes of time. Cinematically Deleuze associates this with pure 
                                                
703 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 37. 
704 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 42-43. 
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optical and sound images. Although initially it may seem that the pure optical image is 
poorer, as compared to the sensory-motor image, because it constitutes an abstract 
description rather than ‘the thing itself’, Deleuze says this is false. Related to the 
previous characterization of the cliché, Deleuze contends that the ‘objective’ sensory-
motor image retains an emphasis mainly on that which interests us about the object 
whereas the more ‘subjective’ attentive recognition, through restraint of image, 
emphasizes “the inexhaustible, endlessly referring to other descriptions”.705 Indeed, our 
attentiveness and recollection (here Deleuze introduces the term “recollection-image”) 
forms an ever widening and rich ‘circuit’. Bergson’s classic illustration below helps to 
elucidate.  
 
 
fig. 49 The ever expanding ‘circuit’ of attentive recognition 
 
Whereas O is the object of recognition, Circle A is the immediate recollection of the 
object. As reflection expands –here represented by circles B, C, and D– so do the ever-
rich planes of the object (B’, C’, D’). One of the examples Deleuze likes to use when 
describing Bergson’s thesis is from Roberto Rossellini’s Europa 51. Martin Scorsese 
described Europa 51 as a secular hagiography –The Flowers of St. Francis told in post-
                                                
705 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 43. 
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war Europe.706 Ingrid Bergman plays a wealthy and materialistic socialite living a 
cocooned existence in post-war Rome, whose life is devastated after the death of her 
son. In order to regain a purpose for living she goes to the poorer parts of Rome to help 
those in need. Her journey takes her through the any-space-whatevers of Rome’s post-
war tenements where she learns to become a ‘seer’. Absolutely alienated from her 
environment she no longer recognizes a ‘factory’ when standing before it: “I thought I 
was seeing convicts”. Becoming a ‘seer’ she (and we) now ‘see’ differently, or better, 
she sees for the first time. 
 It should be made clear at this point that the subjectivity of the recollection-
image is not an attempt to describe a psychological state of mind. Deleuze wants to 
offer a new sense and characterization of subjectivity, distinct from that associated with 
the organic montage established in the movement-image. In the latter sense of 
subjectivity, it was the affection-image (the close-up) that bridged the gap between the 
‘stimulation’ (perception-image) and the ‘response’ (action-image). The affection-
image functions as the psychology of the character’s action or the action of the event –
as he says, it ‘fills’ the gap (in the sensory-motor logic). “Now, on the contrary,” 
Deleuze goes on to explain, “the recollection-image comes to fill the gap and really 
does fulfill it, in such a way that it leads us back individually to perception, instead of 
extending this into generic movement.”707 We turn then from ‘recollection’ as time in us 
(that needs to come out to explain), towards a characterization of ‘recollection’ as an 
ever deepening experience of us being in time.708 The question that persists in order to 
fully characterize the direct time image is to reconcile the status of the cinematic 
                                                
706 My Voyage To Italy, DVD, Directed by Martin Scorsese, 2001; New York: Miramax, 1999. 
707 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 46. As noted earlier in the chapter, the recollection-
image is introduced along with attentive recognition. 
708 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 72. 
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‘present’ in relation to time and recollection.  Here Deleuze draws on Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory one last time. 
Marrati notes, “for Bergson, at least, just as movement cannot be made of 
immobilities, the past cannot be ‘made’ with the present.”709 The first thesis is that 
although the actual image is in the present it never passes into the past axis but always 
ever coexists, as a different modality, with its own past –a virtual image. What is the 
necessity of a ‘virtual image’? It undermines the subordination of time to the action-
schema and an illusion of a measurable temporal present by revealing the present to be 
co-existent with the past. To elucidate this paradoxical description Deleuze utilizes a 
second Bergsonian thesis and diagram from Matter and Memory (fig. 50). If ‘point’ S 
in the inverted cone represents the actual present, or better, “the most extreme 
condensation of the past”, then sections AB, A’B’, and A”B” represent the coexistent 
dilation of the ‘past’ virtual–image.  
 
fig. 50 The ‘sheets’ of the past coexistent with the present 
 
The present passes but the past does not ‘pass’; the past always ever is preserved as a 
virtual image, or, as Bergson refers to it, pure memory. “Every moment of our life 
presents the two aspects,” says Deleuze, citing Bergson, “it is actual and virtual, 
                                                
709 Paola Marrati, ibid., 74. 
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perception on the one side and recollection on the other”.710 We have a crystal-image, 
then, when there ceases to be a chronological distinction between the ‘present’ 
actual-image and its own temporally ‘past’ virtual-images. “What constitutes the 
crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time […]. Time has to split at the 
same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmertirical jets, one 
of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time 
consists of this split and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal.”711 This non-
chronological coexistence in time and its crystallization is the ontological structure of 
the direct time image. And now that time is disclosed in a ‘direct image’, the technique 
of montage –which previously sought and still sometimes seeks to show time through 
the action-schema– completes the changes begun during the crisis of the action-image. 
Dispensing with the crucial link between the affection-image and the action-image, the 
emphasis in the direct time-image is on a new characterization of subjectivity –
durations revealed as ontological rather than psychological. With its closest artistic 
kinship to be found in the literature of Marcel Proust, the direct time-image reveals that 
“the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it 
is we who are internal to time, not the other way round.”712  
                                                
710 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 77. 
711 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 78-79. 
712 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 78-79. 
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FILMMAKERS OF THE TIME-IMAGE 
“You see Thompson, it isn’t enough to tell us what a man did. You have to tell us who he was.” 
CITIZEN KANE DIRECTED BY ORSON WELLES (1941) 
 
We can then classify filmmakers of time as being particularly emblematic of 
this characterization of cinema –Ozu, Welles, Godard, Resnais, Tarkovsky; I might also 
include contemporary directors such as Alexander Sokurov, Béla Tarr and Terrence 
Malick. For Deleuze, Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane is the first great film of a cinema of 
time. Citizen Kane is a journey through the sheets of time, not to discover what a man 
did, but who he was. “Here time became out of joint and reversed its dependent relation 
to movement; temporality showed itself as it really was for the first time, but in the 
form of a coexistence of large regions to be explored.”713 The film opens (figs. 51-59) 
with all the paradoxical characteristics of non-chronological time –the crystalline 
structure of event and memory. These are, as Deleuze describes them: “the pre-
existence of a past in general; the coexistence of all the sheets of past; and the existence 
of a most contracted degree.”714 Snow fills the environment (milieu) of a dying man’s 
death chamber and slowly fills the frame, only to reveal a small cabin in a new 
environment. Soon, the snow and the small cabin will be our entrance into the first 
flashback into Kane’s childhood. The snow, then, ‘signifies’ the thoughts and memories 
of a dying man about his childhood. Just as quickly the second environment is 
contained within a small globe in the man’s hand. He whispers the word, “Rosebud”. 
“The signifiers of memory or virtuality (snow, the ornament) crystallize around the 
moment of Kane’s death and last word –“Rosebud”. But at the same time, the actual 
dissolves into the virtual. The moment this word is spoken it becomes opaque and 
                                                
713 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 102. 
714 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 96. 
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mysterious; its meaning disappears among the layers of memory superimposed in the 
image.”715 The globe falls and breaks. Two shots –one of the broken snow globe–break 
the crystal and return us to the ‘objective’ or ‘actual’. 
   
 fig. 51 fig. 52 fig. 53 
   
 fig. 54 fig. 55 fig. 56 
   
 fig. 57 fig. 58 fig. 59 
After Kane’s death we travel through the sheets of time in Kane’s life through a 
newsreel only to re-emerge in a small movie theater filled with reporters. The editor 
wants more. “You see Thompson,” says the editor, “it isn’t enough to tell us what a 
man did. You have to tell us who he was.” This of course is the manifesto of Cinema 1 
and Cinema 2 in a nutshell –the move away from the action-schema to the ontology of 
the time-image. The film’s structure, of discontinuous leaps through time, is captured at 
the end of the film as Kane’s life unravels after his second wife has left him. He walks 
past two great mirrors in a hallway revealing the many sheets of time we have explored 
                                                
715 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 93. 
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in his life (fig. 60). We might imagine Bergson’s ‘cone’ superimposed over the time-
image; it is the last time we see Charles Foster Kane in the film.  
 
fig. 60 
Finally, then, it was Welles’s development and use of depth-of-field –and its 
‘cone-like’ use of the lens– that stands apart for Deleuze. Although there has been the 
use of ‘depth’ in cinema since it’s earliest days’ it was artificially produced by 
compositing two separate images, but was generally not the norm of the studio system 
of the 1930’s and ’40’s, when Kane was made. Welles, and cinematographer Greg 
Toland, developed cameras, lenses, and lighting techniques to increase depth-of-field in 
ways more akin to how the human eye works, allowing multiple regions or planes to 
interact. Deleuze, however, wants to be clear that Welles’s use of depth of field was 
more than simply an aesthetic decision, tool or technique. Rather than depth-of-‘space’, 
Welles –argues Deleuze citing Bergson and French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-
Ponty– emphasizes depth-of-duration. So, for instance, when Kane goes to see Jed 
Leland –his former partner with whom he started his newspaper– to finally fire him, 
Deleuze say that his walk to the office is the break with Leland. Kane delves into the 
past, one last time, to rid himself of his former partner (and his conscience). Deleuze 
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says, “The hero acts, walks and moves; but it is the past that he plunges himself into 
and moves in: time is no longer subordinated to movement, but movement to time […]. 
This is the function of depth of field: to explore each time a region of past, a 
continuum.”716 
 
fig. 61 
This is not to say however that depth-of-field is the only way to show a direct time-
image, or that the direct time-image is the only use of depth-of-field, Deleuze later re-
affirms. But what Welles did accomplish is the use of depth-of-field as a tool to explore 
memory by passing through multiple ‘sheets of the past’.  
In the opening pages of Cinema 1 Deleuze says “the great directors of the 
cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and 
musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images 
instead of concepts.”717 To conclude Cinema 2 Deleuze articulates this picture further; 
the great cinema authors become “philosophers or theoreticians”718 –albeit in new 
ways– in the practice of their craft. As is now apparent, the great directors do not 
merely ‘think’ in movement and time-images but they also explain, discover, express 
                                                
716 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 103. 
717 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, xix. 
718 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 269. 
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and show with their ‘tools’ through the body. There is nothing –no referential ‘sign’ or 
‘metaphysical reality’– ‘behind’ the cinematic image. Meaning is in the activities and 
lifeworld of cinema. Citing Bergson, Paola Marrati speaks of “the problem with a 
philosophical and theoretical attitude to generalization [of cinema] that misses the 
specificity of its objects of inquiry. … What must be grasped are cinema’s own 
characteristics.”719 We are implored to ask, then, as Fergus Kerr does in Theology after 
Wittgenstein: why is what we say and do not ‘significant’ enough … “why do we 
retreat from our world; why do we withdraw from the body in the hope that more direct 
illumination about our minds and about the gods is to be found by gaining access to 
something other than what we say and do?”720 By undoing space and freeing characters 
to “stroll” and “voyage” through the cinematic lifeworlds we see the scene of Ingold’s 
wayfinder or de Certeau’s touring tactician in the crisis of the action image. The time-
image has no “surface” to be colonized. In the crystalline structure of the time-image 
we see, and experience, the complexity of embodied corporeality with trajectories, like 
Ingold’s lines, that dissolve surfaces and run through space. All of this is accomplished 
despite some potentialities and tendencies, but because of others, in the nature of 
cinematic technology and its explicit artifice. The chapter now turns to a contemporary 
practitioner of the cinematic craft –Terrence Malick– whose insistence on an 
exploration of the mysteries and poetry of changing, moving, and living bodies in the 
world will help bring this chapter and this investigation to a conclusion. 
                                                
719 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 49. 
720 Fergus Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein (London: SPCK, 1997), 147. 
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TERRENCE MALICK’S THE NEW WORLD AS PHILOLOGICAL CINEMA 
 
“Your film will have the beauty, or the sadness, or what have you, that one finds in a town, in a 
countryside, in a house, and not the beauty, sadness, etc. that one finds in the photograph of a town, a 
countryside, or a house.” 
ROBERT BRESSON721 
We now return to where this chapter began, with the possibilities and failures of 
a cinematic adaptation of J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings. The exploration of a 
new characterization of cinema, and cinematic practice, in this chapter, was intended to 
enable us to assess the greater possibilities of ‘seeing’ and ‘living’ the mythopoeic 
concerns of Tolkien’s saga, in a way which Peter Jackson’s films largely failed to do. 
In short, Jackson’s films failed to return the ethics of philological resistance (implicit in 
Tolkien’s work and explicit in his letters) back to our bodies; what, then, would it look 
like for that to happen? This new characterization of cinema takes up the philological 
and phenomenological concerns outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. Cinema, however, takes 
up these concerns in a new way –rather than being dependent on words, cinema shows. 
Rather than simply illustrating, cinema draws us in to experience and participate in its 
lifeworld subjectively. Through the cinematic frame we delve into life: the world is 
there, people are there and relationships are there in a way unimaginable before the 
advent of the movement-image. In short, through cinema we are caught up in a 
lifeworld.  
The concern from the beginning, however, has been the possibilities of human 
imagining and human forms of life in a technological age, and what unique problems 
and concerns arise from such an age. And in many ways, with cinema, the enemy is 
already in the gates. As has been noted, cinema is a tool that has been used to colonize 
                                                
721 Robert Bresson, Notes on the Cinematographer, trans. Jonathan Griffin (København: Green Integer, 
1997), 70. (emphasis mine) 
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in both the most banal manners (e.g. Disneyfication and the Hollywood image 
machine) and the most horrendous ways (totalitarian propaganda and the 
“aestheticisation of politics”722) possible. In its specific and broad ethical implications, 
this is a concern of which Jean Baudrillard was well aware. And yet, I have 
endeavoured to show that a more sophisticated apparatus of diagnosis, critique, and 
response was needed –and this also applies to cinema. We might say, then, that through 
an over reliance on the ‘illustration’ and visual ‘representation’ of Tolkien’s written 
word and his story, through basic and clichéd uses of the action-schema, for the express 
purposes of producing an easily consumed and digestible ‘story’ and entertainment 
spectacle in order to maximize financial gain, Peter Jackson’s LOTR films fail to 
deepen our experience of the everyday and to enable us to enter into Tolkien’s 
mythopoeic landscape in a way that restores a deeper sense of ourselves in the world as 
corporeal creatures. Not only do they fail in this regard, but they also contribute to the 
problem of belief in the 21st-century West, as already suggested by Deleuze, and serve 
as a tool of colonization (through appeals to sentimentality and nostalgia) despite their 
best intentions.723 
To conclude this chapter, I propose that American director Terrence Malick’s 
The New World (2005) is a film that accomplishes what Peter Jackson could only have 
hoped to do. Malick’s The New World is a film that not only “restores belief” –
returning discourse to things, people, and life in-the-world, “before or beyond words”– 
in a way we would recognize from Deleuze’s assessment and characterization of 
cinematic craft and technique, but it also broadens and deepens our experience of the 
                                                
722 See Walter Benjamin “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in 
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt. (New York: Schocken Books, 1969) and Paul Virilio Art and Fear, 
trans. Julie Rose (London: Continuum, 2006); Negative Horizon, trans. Michael Degener (London: 
Continuum, 2008); War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: 
Verso, 2000) for starters. 
723 The road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
 265 
everyday through a cinematic technique that honors the philological and mythopoeic 
concerns described in Chapters 3 and 4.724 Like Italian director Roberto Rossellini, 
Malick’s films reject a sorrowful and infantile art that revels in the loss of world, and 
seek to craft with “a morality which would restore a belief capable of perpetuating 
life”.725 As with J. R. R. Tolkien, Malick is a scholarly figure who has chosen to express 
his erudition through artistic craft. He studied philosophy with Stanley Cavell at 
Harvard before going to Magdalen College in 1965 as an Oxford Rhodes scholar. 
Although he left before completion, Malick worked with Gilbert Ryle on the concept of 
world in Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Kierkegaard –a topic that sits well with the 
methodological approach of this thesis.726 Malick visited philosopher Martin Heidegger 
in Germany and published a scholarly translation of Vom Wesen des Grundes in 
English as The Essence of Reasons (1969). He later wrote for Life, The New Yorker and 
Newsweek, and also taught a year-long seminar on Kierkegaard and Heidegger for 
Hubert Dreyfus at MIT, before entering the American Film Institute (AFI) in 1969. 
Although Malick and Tolkien (and Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Mumford) share similar 
concerns about what it means to be a human being, and how that vision is endangered 
                                                
724 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 166-167. 
725 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 166. 
726  In the introduction to his scholarly translation of Heidegger’s Vom Wesen des Grundes, Malick 
acknowledges the similarity between Heidegger’s conception of ‘world’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘form of 
life’. While I have briefly addressed this connection in Chapter 3, and have adopted their approach 
in my investigation of Tolkien’s mythopoeia, one can only speculate how Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
would have played into Malick’s investigation. Indeed, we are offered a glimpse when Deleuze cites 
the existential theology of Kierkegaard in Cinema 2. Deleuze briefly cites the theology and 
philosophy of Kierkegaard and Pascal as a model of ‘corporeal’ faith (belief) that restores humanity 
and the world back to us, which is consistent with Deleuze’s cinema of body and world. (n.301) 
This, of course, is built on the reasonable assumption that Malick did not jettison his philosophical 
questioning and concerns when he left Oxford. Indeed his meeting with Heidegger, translation of 
Heidegger’s paper, and notation of the similarities between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, all 
occurred after leaving Oxford and were concurrent with his entrance into the American Film 
Institute in 1969. This move is a rejection of philosopher Robert Sinnerbrink’s weak assertion that 
1) “we should be wary of reading [The Thin Red Line] solely through the lens of Malick’s biography” 
and 2) “the fact that Malick was a teacher of philosophy and translator of Heidegger shouldn’t 
automatically prompt us to assume that he makes ‘Heideggarian’ films”. Both points seem to fly in 
the face of a phenomenological picture of a person’s thrownness, and existence as In-der-Welt-Sein and 
Mitsein –all of which is well shown in Malick’s films. 
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in a technological era, with Malick we complete the move away from semiological 
models of representation and correlation, towards lived forms of life that the craft of 
cinema explores in its own ways. Malick, moreover, also engages with the ethical 
considerations raised thus far –the colonization of human forms of life through the 
illusory ordering of daily life which ignores the complexity of human corporeality– and 
manages to craft an intensely ethical cinema without being reductionistic, simplistic or 
moralistic. In Malick’s hands the craft of cinema becomes a reflexive and ‘philological’ 
tool; through the techniques of ‘modern cinema’ he reawakens the question of human 
existence, shows us communities in depth by investigating and showing the depth and 
breadth of the human lifeworld.  
 On the surface, The New World (2005) is a retelling of the American 
foundational myth and the stories of Captain John Smith, Pocahontas (the daughter of 
the native King Wahunsenacawh of the Powhatan Confederacy), tobacco farmer John 
Rolfe and the founding of the Jamestown colony (1607) –but, far more significantly, 
Malick’s The New World is also a triumphant example of cinema as myth and myth as 
cinema. Thematically similar to The Lord of the Rings (and fitting the characterizations 
made in chapters 4 and 5 of Tolkien and his work), The New World is a historical 
meditation on the complex interconnectedness of people, place, and living; how that 
balance is transformed by colonization using power and technology; and the 
possibilities of new life and reawakening. More broadly, many of the issues raised and 
lines-of-(in)sight developed in Chapters 1 and 3 are also present in Malick’s The New 
World.  
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 fig. 62 wayfinders encounter navigators fig. 63 ordered flag of colonization 
  
 fig. 64 razing to impose order fig. 65 dwellers of the forest encounter the colony 
So for example, as evident in these frame stills from The New World, we see (fig. 62) 
dwellers and wayfinders who move along versus the English ships of Christopher 
Newport (in the distance) which literally move across; we see (fig. 63) the flag of 
colonizing conquest (whose very shape is that of an imposed order) set above the 
organic new world landscape; (fig. 64) the axe of domination clearing the landscape; 
and finally, (fig. 65) the fortress upon the razed landscape that artificially re-orders and 
excludes the lifeworld of the dweller. However, far from offering a theoretical 
exposition of what his films are about, or making an attempt to give an biographical 
explanation of Malick’s concerns through an overly simplistic journalistic analysis, it is 
his technique –and what his technique shows and reveals– that ‘speaks’ legion, and will 
be the focus here on out. 
Because Malick’s films resist psychological, cognitive and narrative reduction, 
favoring a delving into and revealing the kind of personal and life details that 
Heidegger includes with Befindlichkeit, Stimmung and Verstehen, and, as Deleuze 
points out, favor direct images of time over an action-schema, we can characterize his 
films as ‘modern’ in the Deleuzian sense. The observations of Carina Chocano’s 
December 23rd Los Angeles Times film review confirm this Deleuzian preoccupation: 
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The New World “doesn't resist interpretation so much as it wanders away from it in an 
incandescent brume of wonder, dread and awe [. . .]. What we get is not an ‘objective’ 
or dispassionate view of the world but rather a series of subjective, experiential 
perspectives. He neither strives for verisimilitude nor spectacle but for an alchemic 
blend of both”.727 Of course, Chocano’s insight isn’t entirely accurate because the very 
concept of ‘interpretation’ is under question and actively undermined. It doesn’t quite 
‘wander away’ from interpretation as so much as go for something else altogether. 
Remaining true to this kind of insight, however, attention must be paid to the opposing 
poles of the frame and montage in Malick’s film craft in order to reveal a cinema that 
both ‘restores’ and ‘de-colonizes’. It is the possibility of both restoration and 
decolonization, then, that we want to see emerge clearly in what follows. 
 
FRAME 
The teeming swarm of life felt in Malick’s cinema begins with the crafting of 
the frame –the basic organizing principle in cinema. Far from embalming time, Malick 
simultaneously fills the frame with the energies of life, and works to expand its 
boundaries. In The New World, Malick’s crafting of the frame begins, however, with 
both light, and depth-of-field. The crafting of a particular shot or a scene, as a whole, is 
dependent on camera movement, lens selection, film stock and how a scene is lit. 
Malick’s most recent collaborator Emmanuel Lubezki, director of photography (DP) 
for The New World (2005), and upcoming The Tree of Life (2010), lends further insight 
into their cinematographic methodology. “We, in the camera department, would think 
of ourselves as the 5 o’clock news team,” he says, “capturing reality in front of us. It 
                                                
727 Chocano, Carina, The New World movie review December 23, 2005 
http://www.calendarlive.com/movies/chocano/cl-et-world23dec23,0,3965530.  
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would just happen to be the reality of a different century.”728 One should not mistake, 
however, what Lubezski suggests as ‘5 o’clock news team’ for a style and technique of 
‘critical distance’ or even ‘objectivity’. Rather, it is the techniques of the nature 
documentaries of David Attenborough or the war correspondence of Fergal Keane –a 
ready and fluid camera that allows us to enter into a space and capture the unexpected 
energy of light and life rather than the pre-ordered set up of classical cinema– that are 
more relevant to what Lubezski suggests.  
Initially, Malick and Lubezski were to embark on a biopic about the Argentine 
revolutionary Ernesto ‘El Che’ Guevara, which was to be filmed in Bolivia following a 
very specific ‘dogma’ established by the collaborators.729 In many ways a continuation 
and culmination of Malick’s approach to cinematography, the two decided on a 
subjective approach –personal in the sense of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Deleuze 
(in the body, in presentation, in life) rather than biased, ‘internal’ and Cartesian– that 
would, amongst other things, shed the use of cranes, rigs and artificial lights (for the 
most part) relying only on natural daylight; and shed much that can be anticipated in a 
more controlled setting. This stripped-down documentary approach also relies on the 
freedom to shoot all 360 degrees at a moment’s notice, and move from location to 
location as the light dictates.730 Although the Che movie was scrapped, the naturalist 
                                                
728 Pauline Rogers, “Once Upon A Time in America: Emmanuel Lubezki, ASC and Team Recreate 
the Early 17th Century for The New World,” International Cinematographers Guild, November 2005, 
http://www.cameraguild.com/magazine/stoo1105.htm. 
729 The term ‘dogma’ is the shorthand term used by Malick to refer to what amounts to a complex 
philosophically informed approach, and a methodology involving hand held cameras, natural light, 
back lit characters and subjects, and a deep field of focus and movement. 
730 Although Lubezki’s comments are specifically referring to The New World, they are very much 
valid for his second collaboration with Malick where the same cinematographic ‘dogma’ was 
applied. On the main set of The Tree of Life –which was a very different kind of production from 
much of The New World, situated in the ordered space of an actual neighborhood in rural Texas– 
equipment, vehicles and crew were constantly camouflaged, obstructed or in motion to allow the 
camera (handheld or ‘steadicam’) the 360-degree freedom to capture the topography of the 
meetings, encounters and relationships in the fullness of its depth and texture. Scenes were 
scheduled according to the position of the sun and production shifted from location to location as 
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‘dogma’ was immediately applied to Malick’s The New World. This attention to light, 
and the opening up of the contingent and spontaneous elements in the world, is 
described by Lubezski with greater clarity and detail: 
[Terry] is always looking for those moments that are 
unplanned –those happy accidents that breathe reality into a 
story. For him, the behavior of the people, nature, even where 
the wind blows are all moments to capture. These are ‘happy 
accidents’ that can’t happen on the stage because you are 
always restricted to walls or props. And, to artificial light 
[sic.]. 
Artificial light is simple. It is a specific color temperature 
and feel. But, natural light is complex and sometimes chaotic. 
A bounce from the floor or a reflection from the sky can do so 
much. 
Terry’s desire to free the actor also freed us from the 
artificial. The many elements and feelings that the natural 
environment and light evoked contributed to our desire to 
capture this story in a different way. When you stop using 
artificial light, it’s hard to say let’s just ‘turn something on’ 
and match the feeling.731 
 
What becomes obvious, then, is not just the concern with artificial light but the 
artificialities of the classical form.732 Malick desires to free the energies of life –from 
the simple, predictable and ordered techniques of classical cinema– and reveal the 
spontaneous elements and moments of the real through the ‘chaos’ of natural light and 
the natural world, and the freedom of the camera to record the spontaneity of everyday 
                                                                                                                                         
the light changed throughout the day. Exterior shots were done in the early morning and late 
afternoon light while interior shots were saved for the noon hours while the sun was overhead. 
731 Pauline Rogers, ibid., 
732 This move away from artificialities also extends to the work of the art department and longtime 
collaborator Jack Fisk. Having worked with Malick since his first film Badlands, Fisk is the person 
most responsible for the physical space within Malick’s films. Fisk builds ‘reality’ for the camera 
frame. In the construction of the Jamestown fort and the Natural’s village, for instance, Fisk used 
all local materials that would have been used in the original construction –the wood, the clay, etc.– 
and built according to archived drawings and descriptions in order to overcome artificialities of 
classic set design. 
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reality.733 The favoring of this ‘complex’ and ‘chaotic’ energy over simple schematic 
and representational substitutes is reminiscent of Fergus Kerr’s characterization of 
Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations. Kerr relevantly says, 
“The prejudice of a crystal-clear analysis of reality [cf. PI 108] has given way to seeing 
life as an immensely intricate carpet, and, if that is still too static an image, as a teeming 
swarm . . . the swarming carpet of human activity, cannot be captured in any 
representation.”734 Q’Orianka Kilcher, who plays Pocahontas in The New World, recalls 
Malick as a “very spur-of-the-moment kind of director”. “He would see a tall funnel 
field”, she continues, “or a tall grass from somewhere over there and he’d be like, ‘Oh, 
oh, Q’Orianka, can you take your shoes off and just run through the field? Be the wind! 
Be the wind! Good, good.’”735 In this way, then, even ‘objective narrative’ is seen as 
artificial in the course of film production. A moment such as the one described by 
Q’Orianka Kilcher may not be ‘scripted’, per se, but is a moment where the ‘poetry 
presents itself’ to fill the frame with an energy and meaningfulness which would 
otherwise be lost to a more ordered and literally dogmatic approach. In another instance 
during the production of Malick’s 1998 return to cinema, The Thin Red Line, actor Nick 
Nolte recalls a pivotal scene with fellow actor John Cusack: 
I shot a scene with John Cusack maybe 10 times . . . I said, 
“Terry, I think we have it.” He said, “Wait, didn’t you tell me 
                                                
733 To put this in historical perspective, when Malick was filming Days of Heaven with the great 
French New Wave cinematographer Nestor Almendros in 1970 he ran into a considerable amount 
of resistance and derision from his union film crew who came out of the practices of the classical 
Hollywood cinema machine. Days of Heaven was also shot, for the most part, in natural light and 
was one of the first films to make extensive use of the handheld panaglide system. Almendros, who 
made films with François Truffaut and Eric Rhomer recalls in his autobiography that the technique 
he and Malick used was to ensure that the frame remained “as close to reality as possible”. 
(Almendros 20) These techniques were consistent with ‘modern cinema’ and the Italian neorealist, 
and various new wave, desires to escape the inauthenticity of the studio system. 
734 Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 65. 
735 Daniel Garrett, “The American Sublime, The Sublime American: The New World by Terrence 
Malick,” Cinetext: Film & Philosophy (July8, 2006), 
http://cinetext.philo.at/magazine/garrett/thenewworld.html. (emphasis mine) 
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you once did 75 takes for James L. Brooks?” We ended up 
shooting that scene with me and John for the rest of the day. It 
went from scripted-dialogue scene to me making up dialogue 
to total silence to John making up dialogue to Terry shouting 
dialogue at us during pauses.736 
 
Far from a day of wasted takes, as someone used to the ordered structure of classical 
cinema might think, this is a day of capturing a wide spectrum of ‘moods’, attunements 
and energies of particular life settings in the world. Every take and frame can then be 
sifted during the editing process to construct the scene. The depths of life and time are 
far more complex than the ‘classical’ narrative form of cinematic craft can capture. 
As Deleuze points out, like many directors of the time-image Malick also makes 
extensive use of a deep-field of focus. The combination of natural light and depth-of-
field allows us to see what the eye sees in the hopes of removing attention away from 
the explicit artificiality of the medium and draw us further into the frame. And resisting 
its ‘pictorialness’, Malick largely confines the movement in the frame away from the 
camera or towards the camera on a kind of z-axis plane. As though the cone of the 
crystal image was turned horizontally, this z-axis plane of the camera makes possible 
direct images of time within the frame. For example, when the English ships arrive the 
camera steadicams with the naturals (fig. 66-68) as they rush from their village to the 
shore, to glimpse the uncanny arrival. 
However, as Deleuze says of Welles’s depth-of-field movement, Malick’s z-
axis movements “carry out a temporalization of the image or form a direct time-image 
… where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the 
one they have in space.”737 We are not simply traveling through space but traveling 
through time. We travel out of a primeval forest with its archaic inhabitants –who dwell 
                                                
736 People Magazine January 18, 1999 
737 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 37. 
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with corporeal imaginations– from an undefined past into the ‘future’ and the arrival of 
the technologically advanced Europeans. 
 
 
fig. 66 
 
fig. 67 
 
fig. 68 
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The Naturals run like deer through the forest –their movements teeming with life and 
nobility. Although some critics have disregarded Malick’s portrayal of the Naturals as 
being overly stylized, he expands the possibilities of cinema by having them literally 
tell their story through their bodies in a way which Deleuze and Tolkien might 
recognize.738 Choreographer Raoul Trujillo (himself a Native American) 739 reflects on 
Malick’s approach to the movement of the Naturals:  
The most important thing that came out of this is how 
important it is to bring the body language of the Indian people 
into this, to speak the language of memory and just 
remembering that we can tell the story our own way through 
our bodies . . . What Terry wants to see more than anything 
else,” says Trujillo, “is that . . . what separates you guys from 
the English is that you people are in complete harmony with 
the earth and the universe and everything that exists.”740 
 
This, then, has been one of the major themes of the dissertation from the beginning: 
Malick imagines and retrieves the life-form of a people in harmony with their 
landscape through 21st-century corporeality. Because bodies matter to Malick, before 
discourse and before language, his cinema is able to be a practice of decolonization. 
Extending the possibilities of cinema, it restores back to us the dignity and wholeness 
of dwelling, wayfaring and imagining discussed in earlier chapters, thus leading onto 
the possibility of decolonization. 
                                                
738 Amy Taubin, “Birth of a Nation,” Sight & Sound, February 2006. 
739 And chosen because he is a Native American. 
740 The Making of the New World, The New World, DVD, Directed by Terrence Malick, 2006; Virginia: 
New Line Cinema, 2005. (emphasis mine) 
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MONTAGE 
The other pole of Malick’s craft of ‘modern cinema’, then, is montage. Chris 
Wisniewski offers some insight into Malick’s editing craft in an article entitled “A 
Stitch in Time”. Both reaffirming and missing what Deleuze has said about montage in 
‘modern cinema’, Wisniewski notes, “the relationship of each scene and shot to the 
narrative is frequently indeterminate; images, moments, and sequences don’t so much 
build as accumulate. … Sound and image conspire to upend our sense of time and story 
in The New World”.741 In these failures to understand and the points they miss, 
Wisniewski’s comments are obversely revealing. Rather than building what we would 
classically understand as a cinematic narrative through the organic structure of the 
SAS’, on the one hand, Malick’s frames and scenes are far deeper and richer than 
simply the ‘accumulation’ of images and the telling of a story; on the other, they reveal, 
relate, show and express the complexity of both world and the experience of world 
through the body … or in this case the experience of a new world. Wisniewski points 
out one particular sequence in The New World, which I will appropriate to illustrate 
Malick’s montage. After John Smith’s return from ‘captivity’ to the Jamestown colony, 
and after suffering a long winter of want, and separation from the ‘Princess’, Smith 
makes a bartering expedition back into the deep forest (fig. 70). The seasons change in 
but an instant. His return to the Edenic topography is heralded by the one shot transition 
from a windswept snowdrift over an icy pond to a peaceful dogwood in bloom (fig. 69), 
which begins the sequence. We hear birds singing, the sounds of the oars in the water, 
and finally the un-translated voice of a shaman pre-lapped over Smith landing on shore. 
These should be recognized, from our earlier discussion of the crisis of the action-
image, as pure optical and sound images. Malick uses the frame to open up aspects and 
                                                
741 Chris Wisniewski, “Terrence Malick: A Stitch in Time,” Reverse Shot 22, 
http://www.reverseshot.com/article/terrence_malick. (emphasis mine) 
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prospects of understanding; and to make connections far deeper than narrative 
exposition, or a frame in service of the action schema, could ever allow. 
 
  
 fig. 69 fig. 70 
Initially the scene has a conventional mix of close-ups and over-the-shoulder 
return shots which is to set up Smith’s emotional conflict (figs. 71, 72). As Deleuze 
points out in Cinema 1, in classical cinema the close-up (affection-image) is a basic tool 
of editing that allows the viewers to situate themselves within the lived and expressed 
psychology of a character during a scene; and it bridges perception of the milieu to 
action which changes the milieu. The underlying structure has been described as the 
SAS’ and ASA’ formula of the action-schema. The close-up also sets up the “eyeline 
match” cut which –especially during a conversation between two characters– allows us 
to see a character psychologically grow (or resist growth) throughout the duration of 
the scene. Edward Dmytryk says in his classic text on Hollywood editing, On Film: 
Editing, “good drama is . . . always cause and effect, action and reaction, even when no 
physical activity is involved [. . .]. [I]n all good films it is essential that the characters 
grow . . . through their reactions either to physical crises or to verbal stimuli. These are 
the ‘moments of transition’ . . . [and] such moments contain two elements . . . ‘delivery’ 
and the ‘reaction’.”742 
 
                                                
742 Edward Dmytryk, On Film Editing: An Introduction to the Art of Film Construction (Boston: Focal 
Press, 1984), 47. 
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 fig. 71 fig. 72 
With Malick it is very different. He resists this formula and effracts the classical 
form –expanding the depths and possibilities of the scene– with a brief insert of 
Pocahontas in the past (fig. 73), in a deep field of vision, and then a close-up of John 
Smith (fig.74) as the shaman’s voice continues to pre-lap and post-lap the shots in an 
untranslated language we do not understand. Is this a memory?  
  
 fig. 73 fig. 74 
Yet again Pocahontas breaks into the scene (fig. 75) and then we return to John Smith –
who this time is close to tears (fig. 76).  
  
 fig. 75 fig. 76 
We return one last time to Pocahontas and John Smith –the voice of the Shaman gone, 
and the characters are finally in a two-shot to signal their proximity– where the 
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sequence now stays. Malick uses these separate events, and their ability to be 
simultaneously present to Smith (recall Deleuze’s circuit of ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’), in 
order to expand his relatings –between Pocahontas and Smith, between her ‘world’ and 
‘Smith’s world’– and to give depth to Smith’s own life and situation. 
 
fig. 77 
For a moment it seems as though the two may kiss (fig. 78) and just as suddenly that 
moment is revealed to be just as evanescent as the previous. Malick quickly jump-cuts 
to Pocahontas walking towards John Smith (fig. 79) –moving not simply through space 
but time. 
  
 fig. 78 fig. 79 
The sequence continues on, for several more shots, but now with a sound bridge 
provided by John Smith’s voice-over. Everything comes to an end as we abruptly cut to 
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Smith again –presumably during the initial bartering scene although there is no 
indication– his face is now hot with tears (fig. 80). The sequence finally concludes with 
Smith’s boat returning to Jamestown fort; only the back of Pocahontas is visible in the 
foreground (fig.81).  
  
 Fig. 80 Fig. 81 
Once again Wisniewski is provocative yet misses the mark, when he says, “it becomes 
evident by the end of the sequence that Malick is actually cutting between two separate 
events, allowing them to flow into one another without establishing how they relate to 
one another in the chronology of the narrative . . . sound and image conspire to upend 
our sense of time and story”.743 Yet, while separate in the simplistic sense of narrative, 
they are far from separate in life and experience –they are joined in Smith. Time is the 
only subjectivity afforded us. The affection-image yields no insight into a simplistic 
schematic cognitive realm, nor the illusory access to the causes and resolutions of the 
picture; we only encounter the tender complexity of relational bodies in time. By 
expanding the possibilities of cinema Malick helps us make connections we might 
otherwise miss, blow over, or force into ‘standard’ patterns of ‘world shaping’ by 
imposing a kind of narrative order. 
                                                
743 Chris Wisniewski, ibid., 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The New World begins with the sky and earth meeting over the surface of the 
waters. Out of the rich sounds of the forest there is an invocation: “Come Spirit. Help 
us sing the story of our land. You are our Mother. We a field of corn. We rise from out 
of the soul of you.” Like Tolkien’s description of the theological and religious in his 
own work, Lloyd Michaels recognizes the “natural religion” embodied in Pocahontas 
and her journey.744 The possibilities of this natural religion are glimpsed fleetingly in 
Malick’s Days of Heaven; and its uncertainty in an age of the machine is explored in 
The Thin Red Line. However, in a way reminiscent of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, 
the mytho-historical nature of The New World affords Malick the opportunity to 
explore the rich depths and truth of this natural religion, and to explore and apprehend 
how its truth lays claim on our everyday lives.  
Unlike Jackson’s betrayal of Tolkien’s vision, Malick is not dependent on 
narrative and the psychological artifice of the action-schema for his own exploration; 
rather, Malick explores lifeworlds –bodies (embodied people with life-ways) in time. 
Indeed, drawing on a point Deleuze makes in Cinema 1, D. N. Rodowick makes a 
fascinating comparison that is helpful here. While the indirect image of time, which 
subordinates time to the variable present, is similar to the Newtonian modernist 
conception of time, the open duration in the direct time-image is akin to exploring the 
Western theological conception of time.745 This insistence on exploring the infinite 
(and) depth of worlds rather than pictures, or representations, is echoed in the 
notebooks of French filmmaker Robert Bresson whose cinematic explorations were 
also motivated theologically. “Your film will have the beauty, or the sadness, or what 
                                                
744 Lloyd Michaels, Terrence Malick (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 91. 
745 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 52, 53. 
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have you, that one finds in a town, in a countryside, in a house, and not the beauty, 
sadness, et. [sic] that one finds in the photograph of a town, a countryside, or a 
house.”746 
What we have then is a brief picture of Terrence Malick as a craftsman 
painfully aware of the inadequacies of, and negative relationships between, cinematic 
illustration, representation and human forms of life; but creatively aware of hitherto 
largely untapped possibilities in the craft, and of how they can be used. He actively 
works against certain classical theories and practices of the craft, and, in some ways, 
against the very nature of the craft as an entertainment commodity and industry, to 
open the depths of the scene of human living through the complexity of his new 
conception of the craft. In Malick’s cinema we see both an inherent understanding of 
the human situation, which fits well with what has been described in the work of 
Mumford, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Ingold, de Certeau, Tolkien and Deleuze, and the 
quest to ‘uncover the real’, ‘restore’ and ‘de-colonize’ through ‘poetic’ craft. Malick’s 
cinema is ‘poetry’ crafted by a ‘poet’ working in destitute times; but though we may 
use the word ‘poetry’ for this, let us not lose sight of the fact that Malick is working 
with a different craft and in a different medium; and with these, Malick’s cinema 
becomes a project of radical de-colonization of the human imagination (encompassing 
and exploring the possibilities of human living) from the ordering so prevalent in the 
20th-and 21st-century media-consumed West. Fully aware of the inherent problems of 
the craft of cinema, Malick’s craft does not reduce the imaginative possibilities of 
cinema to simple and commodifiable image-pictures, narratives, or schematics of 
human causation. Malick’s films are not films about subjects but are the subjects; his 
films are not containers for some message but are constructed as lived and personal 
                                                
746 Robert Bresson, Notes on the Cinematographer, 70. (emphasis mine) 
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projections of the realities and possibilities of human living –“a visual investigation of 
the human situation, of our living in the world”.747 Stanley Cavell reflects on all of this 
eloquently, “I think one feels that one has never quite seen the scene of human 
existence –call it the arena between earth (or days) and heaven– quite realized this way 
on film before.”748 This livable encounter is fundamental to the de-colonization of the 
human imagination and human forms of life, and is a first step towards that de-
colonization. 
                                                
747 Marc Furstenau and Leslie MacAvoy, “Terrence Malick’s Heideggerian Cinema: War and the 
Question of being in The Thin Red Line,” in The Cinema of Terrence Malick: Poetic Visions of America, ed. 
Hannah Patterson (London: Wallflower, 2007), 176. (emphasis mine) 
748 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1979), xiv-xv. 
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CONCLUSION: 
CATHEDRAL BUILDING, 
THE CRAFTSMAN, 
AND PRAXEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE 
 
 
 
 
The great Swedish director Ingmar Bergman (1918-2007) once lamented how 
art had lost its “basic creative drive” when it became separated from worship. “It 
severed an umbilical cord”, says Bergman, “and now lives its own sterile life, 
generating and degenerating itself.”749 Rather than the modern cult of the singular 
‘virtuoso’ and the “ruthlessly efficient sausage machine” of the film industry cults, 
Bergman wanted the aim of his films to be associated with something more like the 
building of a cathedral, and to imagine himself working as an anonymous artist –simply 
playing his part– crafting nothing more than a “a dragons’ head, an angel, a devil –or 
perhaps a saint– out of stone”.750 When lightning struck the great cathedral of Chartres 
and burnt it to the ground, recalls, Bergman, “master builders, artists, laborers, clowns, 
                                                
749 Ingmar Bergman, Four Screenplays of Ingmar Bergman, trans. Lars Malmstrom and David Kushner 
(New York: Touchstone Book, 1989), 22. 
750 Ingmar Bergman, ibid., 22. Bergman’s allusion to the Cathedral is apropos to the 
phenomenological concerns of this work as well. We should note Heidegger’s reading of the Greek 
Temple in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Echoing what has already been discussed about 
‘world’ in Being and Time, Heidegger reveals how both the “work-being” of the temple life-world 
and the actual work of building the temple (including the materials and tools used in that work) 
“opens up a world”. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, 
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Perennial, 1975), 44, 41-48. 
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noblemen, priests, burghers” came from all over France to help rebuild the cathedral on 
its Romanesque foundation.751 Otto von Simson’s account of Gothic architecture and 
the aesthetic concerns of the Medieval lifeworld adds insight and complexity to 
Bergman’s rumination. The anonymity of the builders of Chartres reflects the desire of 
the Medieval lifeworld to create a meaningful space that would reflect a theological 
reality. “After all,” writes von Simson, “the ‘analogical’ interpretation to which the 
church might lend itself was a function of the edifice as legitimate and nearly as 
important as the liturgical one. The beauty of the basilica was experienced in terms of 
such analogical significance. Man’s thinking and experience are never divided into 
airtight compartments. Just as our own art and taste are related to our view of the world, 
so the design of the medieval cathedral builder and its impressions upon 
contemporaries were colored, and indeed inspired, by the metaphysical vision that 
dominated medieval life.”752 The cathedral grows out of, and in turn forms and feeds 
into, the lives of the forgotten people who built it and their contemporaries. These 
‘anonymous’ craftsmen made nothing short of a ‘symbol’ of heaven, and a high water 
mark for human artistry, which reflected back on Western civilization for the next 500 
years.  
Whilst the ‘gothic’ expressions of architecture came to an end, and other 
expressions took their place, in Bergman’s desire, and von Simson’s account, we 
glimpse a fragment of the creative ‘energy’ Henry Adams feared would eventually be 
lost to the cult of the ‘dynamo’ after the World’s Fair of 1900. Of course, Bergman will 
never be remembered simply as an anonymous artist, but rather, as one of the great 
‘cathedral builders’ of the Western world. However, what Bergman’s wistful hope for a 
                                                
751 Ingmar Bergman, ibid., 21-22. 
752 Otto von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral: Origins of Gothic Architecture and the Medieval Concept of Order, 
Bollingen Series XLVIII (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 197. 
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meaningful cinematic craftsmanship and von Simson’s insight does accomplish in light 
of Adams’ concern is to put the trajectory of this dissertation into (a theological) 
perspective: making is an existentially primordial activity that opens up, or imposes 
upon, lifeworlds and meaningful forms of life. 
As Henry Adams suspected, and as has been the contention of this dissertation, 
we live in the light of what we make. In Chapter 4 this existentially involved and cyclic 
structure, between human artistry and lifeworld building, is described as the double-
transfer. Simply put, we can put life in its everydayness into our work; but conversely, 
the work crafted now has the ‘power’ to transfer back to the everyday-lifeworld of the 
craftsman and his or her fellow people. Lewis Mumford shows us that even the way we 
build cities and arrange societies falls under the double-transfer (Baudrillard shows this 
too, but, as is now clear, in more extreme ways). Mumford came to realize after World 
War Two our ever-growing servitude to ‘the Machine’ and the ‘mechanization’ of the 
Western lifeworld. Mumford’s life-work was focused on revealing how that servitude 
was reflected in the way we build the world around: the way we lay out roads, build 
buildings, and order those spaces for people, all fall under the scope of the double-
transfer. Mumford, however, reveals this modern use of the double-transfer to be 
nothing more than a procrustean bed bent on truncating life rather than allowing it to 
flourish. 
There is, then, the ethical and theological element to be considered: living in the 
world we both encounter, and foster, expressions of both the good and counterfeit (and 
variously ‘evil’) forms of life. These powers, on the one hand, have made possible bad, 
evil, ersatz, anesthetic life ways, and on the other, good, flourishing, sub-creative, and 
kind. There has been no space in this thesis to discuss these values (good and bad) in a 
more detached, analytic, and critical way, but they have been constantly been calling 
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out, albeit tactically. They appear in the weave of the narrative and the surrounding 
shrubbery along the trace. Always spoken from the margins, this tactical theological 
concern has been addressed through the active resistance found in the work of Lewis 
Mumford, Jean Baudrillard, Tim Ingold, J. R. R. Tolkien and Terrence Malick to 
‘recover’ us from less meaningful (and often sub-human) forms of life, which 
constantly threaten our lives and life-ways in minor and major ways. In wayfinding 
with these people we have seen how the power of the double-transfer, especially in 
mythopoeic literature and cinema, opens up (or constricts) life space.  
The task of this dissertation has been to make an intelligible clearing for “active 
resistance” in light of the ethical and theological concerns described thus far. It is worth 
noting how J. R. R. Tolkien’s mythopoeic project is dependent on the tactical 
implementation of greater ethical and theological concerns. These concerns are present 
in his personal letters which reveal his broader moral and theological question realized 
by his writings. “Myth and fairy-story must, as all art, reflect and contain in solution 
elements of moral and religious truth (or error)”.753 Indeed, we must take Tolkien’s 
explicit mythopoeic project of sub-creation to heart. We are created and called to 
create, but because we are always already involved in an interdependent world of 
significance (our lifeworld), ignoring this mandate, and the fundamental structure of 
what it means to be a human being-in-the-world, is done at great peril. We are both 
gardener and seed, says Tolkien. His own mythopoeic lifeworld, recorded in the 
various sagas of Middle-earth, stands as a meaningful space for us to dwell and to 
reclaim what it means to dwell meaningfully in an industrialized world. One may not 
agree entirely with his particular tactical decision but it indicates the power of this kind 
of tactical craft. 
                                                
753 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, 144. 
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We might, in conclusion, then, put forward a primordial question which inhabits 
this tactical work: Am I the keeper of ways of life? The ethical burden of the Judeo-
Christian tradition makes room for only one answer: by all means, yes! Dreaming of 
the world we want to live in –out loud; at a ‘higher volume’– is not just the burden of 
prophets. It is the burden of us all. It is not only the claim that God’s coming kingdom 
has on the present, and not only the claim that this world matters; but, as Tolkien so 
eloquently realized, it is the claim that we are made and called as living craftsmen to 
participate in God’s reconciliation with creation. We must take human artistry seriously 
because everything we make, and the world we build, lays claim on us. And even 
something as grand as a city or as banal as a spoon is included in that work. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER JANUARY 17, 1961 FAREWELL ADDRESS: 
 
My fellow Americans: 
 
Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down 
the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the 
Presidency is vested in my successor. 
 
This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a 
few final thoughts with you, my countrymen. 
 
Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, 
Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for 
all. 
 
Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on 
issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the 
Nation. 
 
My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, 
long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the 
intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually 
interdependent during these past eight years. 
 
In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital 
issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so 
have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official 
relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have 
been able to do so much together. 
 
II. 
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We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major 
wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these 
holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive 
nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that 
America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material 
progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of 
world peace and human betterment. 
 
III. 
 
Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to 
keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, 
dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be 
unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack 
of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at 
home and abroad. 
 
Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now 
engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We 
face a hostile ideology--global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and 
insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite 
duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and 
transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, 
surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle--with 
liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted 
course toward permanent peace and human betterment. 
 
Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or 
small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action 
could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in 
newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in 
agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research--these and many other 
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possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the 
road we wish to travel. 
 
But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to 
maintain balance in and among national programs-balance between the private and the 
public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage--balance between the 
clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential 
requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; 
balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good 
judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and 
frustration. 
 
The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, 
in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of 
stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two 
only. 
 
IV. 
 
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be 
mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk 
his own destruction. 
 
Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my 
predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. 
 
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. 
American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. 
But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have 
been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added 
to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense 
establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all 
United States corporations. 
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This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is 
new in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even 
spiritual--is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal 
government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not 
fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all 
involved; so is the very structure of our society. 
 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The 
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic 
processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable 
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery 
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may 
prosper together. 
 
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military 
posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. 
 
In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, 
complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction 
of, the Federal government. 
 
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task 
forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free 
university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has 
experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs 
involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. 
For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers. 
 
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project 
allocations, and the power of money is ever present--and is gravely to be regarded. 
 
 292 
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also 
be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the 
captive of a scientific-technological elite. 
 
It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other 
forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system--ever aiming 
toward the supreme goals of our free society. 
 
V. 
 
Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into 
society's future, we--you and I, and our government-must avoid the impulse to live only 
for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of 
tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking 
the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for 
all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow. 
 
VI. 
 
Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of 
ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and 
hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. 
 
Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference 
table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, 
and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be 
abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield. 
 
Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together 
we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent 
purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my 
official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who 
has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war--as one who knows that 
another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and 
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painfully built over thousands of years--I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is 
in sight. 
 
Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal 
has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never 
cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road. 
 
VII. 
 
So--in this my last good night to you as your President--I thank you for the many 
opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that 
service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to 
improve performance in the future. 
 
You and I--my fellow citizens--need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under 
God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion 
to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great 
goals. 
 
To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and 
continuing aspiration: 
 
We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human 
needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that 
all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have 
freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to 
the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and 
ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, 
all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of 
mutual respect and love. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
GIAMBATTISTA VICO: THE PHILOLOGY OF THE CORPOREAL IMAGINATION 
 
 
The ‘philological’ work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Tolkien all echo aspects of 
the complex theory of poetic forms of life anticipated by the early 18th-century 
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744). To label his work as ‘ahead of 
its time’ would be an understatement; historian Isaiah Berlin credits Vico with being 
the first scholar in the West to launch an assault on theoretical pictures and descriptions 
of human knowing, acting, and living built up from certain strands of Enlightenment 
logic and reasoning in the late 17th and early 18th century. Although he anticipates 
Johann Georg Hamann by fifty years or more, much of Vico’s unique work –“which 
embraces social anthropology, the comparative and historical studies of philology, 
linguistics, ethnology, jurisprudence, literature, mythology, in effect the history of 
civilization in the broadest sense”754 –was largely overlooked; like Kierkegaard in 
provincial Copenhagen, Vico was never read, nor understood, in his time and was 
quickly forgotten in the backwater Kingdom of Naples.755 As will become apparent, the 
view developed in Vico’s later work –primarily the Third Edition of The New Science 
(1744)– closely resembles certain phenomenological views on language, imagination 
and human practice in the world associated with Heidegger and Wittgenstein as 
discussed in the previous chapter.756 It is also not a far stretch to describe Vico as a 
philologist –among other things. His characterization of history, language, story and 
                                                
754 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 22. 
755 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 47, 60. 
756 The description of Verstehen suggested by Isaiah Berlin is a direct reference to the originary 
characterization by Wilhelm Dilthey. For the purposes of the dissertation, this further specialized 
characterization of Verstehen by Martin Heidegger will be drawn into the conversation. 
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practice anticipate descriptions of philology offered thus far. Concerned with how 
humans live and know, Vico’s work –which was out of step with his time– is an 
example of the complex interdisciplinary practice of the litterae humaniores mentioned 
by Tolkien in his 1959 “Valedictory Address”. “He was steeped in the literature of 
humanism,” says Berlin, “in the classical authors and antiquities . . . . His mind was not 
analytical or scientific but literary and intuitive.”757 A student and professor of 
rhetoric758, Vico’s earliest work was a defense of imagination, rhetoric and the classics 
–the essential elements of a humanist education– which had become passé in the light 
of their wholesale rejection by Descartes in Discourse on Method.759 At stake for Vico 
was the preservation of the classical techniques of learning, thinking and imagining as 
he conceived them. Vico writes in his Autobiography that he endeavored to cultivate 
good Latin prose so he could enter “into their spirit, by means of philosophical 
                                                
757 Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current, ed. Henry Hardy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 93. It 
should be clarified that ‘literary’, here, is not to be taken in the sense of ‘linguistic’ or ‘textual’ but 
as literae as in literae humaniores. 
758 Vico’s work in rhetoric is well documented and will subsequently be omitted in favor of  
establishing a ‘Vichian philology’ and noting its precedence to the practice of Tolkien. For more on 
Vico and the tradition of rhetoric see: Michael Mooney’s Vico in the Tradition of Rhetoric (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985); John D. Schaeffer’s Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits 
of Relativism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Ernesto Grassi’s Heidegger and the Question of 
Renaissance Humanism: Four Studies (Binghamton: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance 
Studies, 1983); Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1980); Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, Heidegger, and Rhetoric, Emory Vico 
Studies, vol. 3 (New York: Peter Lang, 1990); also see Nancy S. Struever’s “Rhetoric and 
Philosophy in Vichian Inquiry,” New Vico Studies, vol. 3, 1985. 
759 Alexander Bertland, “Giambattista Vico”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
heep://www.iep.utm.edu/v/vico.htm. Also see Giambattista Vico’s Autobiography. In it Vico 
recalls: “[Vico] heard that the physics of René Descartes had eclipsed all preceding systems [. . .]. 
[R]eturning to Naples at the time when the Cartesian physics was most in vogue, Vico heard this 
assertion [that Descartes’s metaphysics would drive Aristotle’s from the cloisters]. . . . But in 
respect of the unity of its parts the philosophy of Descartes is not at all a consistent system [. . .]. 
With this learning and erudition Vico returned to Naples a stranger in his own land and found the 
physics of Descartes at the height of its renown among the established men of letters. . . . [B]ut in 
the Meditations of René Descartes and its companion piece his book On Method, wherein he 
disapproves the study of languages, orators, historians, and poets”. Giambattista Vico, The 
Autobiography of Giambattista Vico (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1975), 128-137. 
 296 
criticism, just as the Latin authors of the sixteenth century had done.”760 It will soon 
become apparent that Vico’s ‘philology’ in The New Science shares many similarities 
with Tolkien’s own philological project (although I should note that there is no hard 
evidence to support a claim that Tolkien had any knowledge of Vico’s work).761 It will 
be useful to our understanding of philology, then, to investigate Vico’s theories if we 
are to adapt and develop Tolkien’s philological work beyond recent scholarship and to 
the purposes of the dissertation as a whole. 
As has been stated, Vico’s concerns and pictures are similar in many respects to 
those of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Tolkien in that they ask: what is the nature and 
relationship of human forms of life, language and the world? For Vico, language, 
myths, history and institutional behavior were the lines to follow for a broader and 
deeper human understanding of self and the world.762 Most significant to Vico’s 
complex philology is his “master key” –the assertion that there was a time when 
humans lived and expressed a poetic mode of being in the world, or as Vico calls it, a 
“wholly corporeal imagination”.763 In the third edition (1744) of The New Science, 
                                                
760 Giambattista Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1975), 
134. 
761 While there are no specific records, it is certainly possible that Tolkien could have had contact 
with Vico’s work through his Oxford colleague R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) who translated 
Benedetto Croce’s The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico into English. Scull and Hammond note in an 
online addenda to their detailed The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide Vol. 1: Chronology (2006): 
By 14 January 1936 Tolkien assists R. G. Collingwood, the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical 
Philosophy at Oxford and a colleague at Pembroke College, “untiringly with problems of Celtic 
philology”, as Collingwood will write in the preface (dated 14 January 1936) to Books I–IV of 
Roman Britain and the English Settlements by Collingwood and J. N. L. Myres (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1936; 2nd ed., 1937), vii. On 264, Collingwood mentions in a footnote regarding Sulis, the 
goddess of the hot springs at Bath, that ‘she is traditionally called Sul; but Professor Tolkien points 
out to me that the Celtic nominative can only be Sulis, and our authority for believing that even the 
Romans made a nominative Sul on the analogy of their own word sol – perhaps meaning the same 
– is not good. The Celtic sulis may mean “the eye”, and this again may mean the sun.’ 
http://mysite.verizon.net/wghammond/addenda/chronology.html (accessed 12/07/09) 
762 Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy, 93-97. 
763 Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max 
Harold Fisch (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1984), 117. (emphasis mine) See also Isaiah Berlin, 
Against the Current, 97. This emphasis on corporeal imagination, Vico’s ‘master key’, is central to my 
re-reading of Tolkien in Chapter 4, its application to cinema in Chapter 5. 
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Vico argued that humans in the “first age” of humanity expressed themselves in a more 
originary way, what Homer calls, “the language of the gods”;764 with much irony Vico 
claims,  
From these first men, stupid, insensate, and horrible beasts, all 
the philosophers and philologians should have begun their 
investigations of the wisdom of the ancient gentiles. . . . . 
Hence poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world, 
must have begun with a metaphysics not rational and abstract 
like that of learned men now, but felt and imagined as that of 
these first men must have been, who, without power of 
ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous 
imagination.765  
 
By corporeal imagination, then, Vico means a sensibility wholly enfleshed, proximally 
situated (to borrow a term from Heidegger) in the world, living a ‘poetic’ unity of 
word, act and thing.766 As Vico says, humans lived ‘poetic’ lives because “the first 
poets were such by nature [not art].”767 Here Vico’s characterization of corporeal 
imagination shares much in common with the characterization of language and human 
forms of life in Heidegger and Wittgenstein, described in the previous chapter. 
Specifically, we should recall Heidegger’s characterization of Befindlichkeit, 
Verstehen, and das Rede.  
Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and das Rede are all, as Heidegger points out, 
equiprimordially constitutions of human being in the world. The latter –das Rede– 
articulates both Befindlichkeit and Verstehen in our everyday connections and activity 
in the world. Befindlichkeit –which has been roughly translated as “the state in which 
                                                
764 Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, 69.  
765 Giambattista Vico, ibid., 116. 
766 Sandra Rudnick Luft, Vico’s Uncanny Humanism: Reading the ‘New Science’ between Modern 
and Postmodern, (Ithica: Cornell University Press), 109. 
767 Giambattista Vico, ibid., 75. 
 298 
one founds oneself”– is a ‘recognition’ of our attunement (die Stimmung) to the 
phenomena of our everyday human living in the world and with and through that, our 
attunement to ‘the world’. This corporal and holistic mode of being literally implies the 
tuning of an instrument and runs far deeper than simple characterizations of cognition –
a point Vico’s work would resonate with; our attunement is not something we ‘have’, 
then, but is a state we are always ‘in’. With Verstehen we are exposed to a unique 
characterization of cognitive activity which reveals the existentially originary link 
between world, activity, and possibility. This cognitive comportment –often translated 
as ‘understanding’– is inextricably linked (‘poetically’ we might say in Vichian terms) 
to an ‘attunement’ to our being in our environment, and our ‘telling’ (both linguistic 
and non-linguistic) in and through our bodies, and our environment. This ‘telling’, das 
Rede, reveals that all of this activity occurs ‘pre-linguistically’. We articulate through 
activity long before, and always along side, what we formulate and construct with 
‘language’. 
By the publication of the Third Edition of Scienza Nuova (1744), then, Vico had 
virtually dismantled the Enlightenment assumptions of his time and created a wholly 
new methodology for humane studies centered on a philological reading of human 
activity, historical context and human imaginative understanding. To Vico, the field of 
‘history’ (first addressed by Vico in Diritto universale 1720-2768) was understanding 
through philology769 –a recovery and reconstruction of previous or other forms of life 
through the human imagination. Benedetto Croce notes, “Cartesianism … confined to 
universalizing and abstractive forms, ignored the individualizing … [and] shrank in 
                                                
768 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 47. 
769 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 165. 
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horror from the tangled forest of history: Vico plunged eagerly into that department”.770 
Berlin’s assessment of Vico’s historical practice echoes elements of Wittgenstein and 
Tolkien. Through wrongheaded illusory pictures of human living and language we have 
‘forgotten’ our originary mode of being. It is our task to exhume and recovery those 
lifeworlds: 
Gradually, as human experience changed, this once natural, 
speech, which Vico calls poetical, lingered on as turns of 
phrase in common [prosaic] speech whose origins had been 
forgotten or at least were no longer felt, or as conventions and 
ornament used by sophisticated versifiers. … the task before 
those who wish to grasp what kinds of lives have in the past 
been led in societies different from their own is to understand 
their [life] worlds: that is, to conceive what kind of vision of 
the world men who used a particular kind of language must 
have had for this type of language to be a natural expression of 
it.771 
 
This philological exploration and recovery was vital to Vico’s rejection of Cartesian 
anthropology because he believed, and this is the point that Luft argues has been 
greatly misunderstood in Vico, that humans being-in-the-world as poetic creatures is an 
anthropological truth in every age.772 In Heideggarian terms we might say that it is a 
primordial facet of what it means to be a human being immersed in the world. In The 
New Science Vico describes three distinct ages of human creativity: the age of the poet 
God who creates and binds together language, action, and world; the second age of the 
natural poets who live, move and have their being with a ‘corporeal imagination’; and 
then there is the ‘third age’ –our modern age. Although the corporeal imagination is 
                                                
770 Bendetto Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, trans. R. G. Collingwood (London: Howard 
Latimer, 1913), 45. 
771 Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current, 97-98. (brackets and emphasis mine) 
772 Sandra Rudnick ibid., 9, 12. 
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present in the third age, its ‘truth’ has been obfuscated by the illusory project of the 
Cartesian subjective subject/knower.773 What Vico’s picture of an originary poetic 
mode of being affords us, then, is the possibility of exhuming this originary lifeworld –
not unlike Heidegger’s hope in Sein und Zeit, Wittgenstein’s hope in his Philosophical 
Investigations and Tolkien’s belief in the power of philological recovery– revealing it 
to be an essential part of what it means to be human. 
Rather than ‘conscious records’, then, mythology and language are the favored 
tools of imaginative philology –they are troves that embody the unique expression of 
each civilization’s form of life and characterizations of reality.774 Vico argued history to 
be the crown jewel of all humane disciplines; keeping in line with his views of human 
activity in the world, his characterization of history is “a collective, social experience 
extended through time . . . a perpetual ‘intentional’ activity”.775  Berlin adds, “the 
successive patterns of civilization differ from other temporal processes –say, 
geological– by the fact that it is men –ourselves– who play a crucial part in creating 
them”.776 To Vico, the study of history, as also of myth and language, allows us to 
‘enter into’777 (imaginatively participate in) the activities of past human lifeworlds and 
                                                
773 Sandra Rudnick Luft, ibid.,9. 
774 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 106-112, 167. 
775 Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current, 45. 
776 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 106-107. 
777 Berlin reminds us of the close link between Vico and Renaissance natural philosophy which, 
Vico says, “contributed so much to poetry, history, and eloquence that all Greece in the time of its 
utmost learning and grace of speech seemed to have risen again in Italy”. Giambattista Vico, The 
Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, 132. A form of verum/factum resurfaces the Renaissance 
humanism “belief in magic as the acquisition of power by the subject over the object by re-entering 
it, immersing oneself in it, and so re-assimilating it to oneself” (Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the 
Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 34) –specifically in the work of Pico della Mirandol (1463-
1494). We also hear it in Venetian philosopher Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597): “to know is to be 
united [Coitio] with what one knows”. (Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, 
Herder 33; ‘cognitio, nihil [est] aliud, quam Coitio quaedam cum suo cognobili.’) And in Tommaso 
Campanella (1568-1639): “to know is to become what is known”.(Berlin 33) And again in Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) –with whom Berlin says Vico was certainly familiar: “If we could demonstrate 
physics, we would make it.”(Berlin 33; ‘Si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus.’) 
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gain a greater knowing of what it means to be human.778  Through the humane studies, 
then, we can exhume lost modes of human activity throughout history; through the 
unique human capacity of “reconstructive fantasia”. This kind of understanding is only 
possible per caussas –“through causes”.779 Not to be confused with a correlation of 
events or an observational knowledge, as we would understand it, knowledge per 
caussas is a deliberate activity oriented knowledge that allows us to attend to “those 
internal relationships and interconnections between thought and action, observation, 
theory, motivation, [and] practice, which is precisely what observation of the external 
world, or mere compresences and successions, fails to give us.”780 To exercise 
knowledge per caussas we must attend to a modificazioni of our minds [mente] –which 
is the unique ‘attention’ each person brings to the hermeneutical process. Although 
Berlin wholly ignores the term corporeal imagination in his writings on Vico, he does 
make the bold connection between Vico’s imaginative activity of fantasia and what 
Berlin elsewhere describes as “imaginative understanding”; rather than an “Absolute 
Idealism”, argues Berlin, Vico’s modificazioni of the mente is mandated on humanity’s 
vivid and “unique capacity for imaginative insight and reconstruction”–or what has 
                                                                                                                                         
Indeed, Vico’s philosophical and philological concerns regarding ‘the true’ and ‘the made’ are 
echoed some 150 years later in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. In the earlier cited “We 
Philologists” Nietzsche too confronts the ‘a priori’ rationalism which crept back into philological 
studies: “To overcome Greek antiquity through our own deeds: this would be the right task. But 
before we can do this we must first know it!—There is a thoroughness which is merely an excuse 
for inaction. Let it be recollected how much Goethe knew of antiquity: certainly not so much as a 
philologist, and yet sufficient to contend with it in such a way as to bring about fruitful results. 
One should not even know more about a thing than one could create. Moreover, the only time 
when we can actually recognise something is when we endeavour to make it. Let people but 
attempt to live after the manner of antiquity, and they will at once come hundreds of miles nearer 
to antiquity than they can do with all their erudition.—Our philologists never show that they strive 
to emulate antiquity in any way, and thus their antiquity remains without any effect on the 
schools.” Friedrich Nietzsche, We Philologists, 179. (bold emphasis mine) 
778 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 47-49, 123-131. 
779 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 31. 
780 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 129. 
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already been characterized as Verstehen.781 Although Berlin more than likely has 
Dilthey’s historicism in mind when he mentions Verstehen, he misses the opportunity 
(as does Luft) to connect Vico’s corporeal imagination to Heidegger’s radical 
characterization of Verstehen as a radically unique species of ‘knowing’.  
Problematically, Luft is forced into a narrow reading of Heidegger, specifically 
Heidegger’s relationship to ‘language’, because of her strong dependence on Derrida’s 
characterizations of language, writing and ontology.782 This is primarily evident early 
on in her book when she agrees with the idea that “What Heidegger calls the forgetting 
of Being is simply the forgetting of Writing”.783 In contrast to the approach taken by 
Luft, I appropriate Vico’s work to my reading of Tolkien and philology resting on the 
methodology already deployed in Chapter 3. 
                                                
781 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 47-49, 50, 123-131. 
782 See specifically Luft’s chapter 2, ‘Verum-Factum and the Poetic Ontology of the Hebrews’, 97-110. 
783 Sandra Rudnick Luft, ibi., xiv. Also see Luft’s, "Derrida, Vico, Genesis, and the Originary Power 
of Language," The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation, Vol. 34, No.1 (1993): 65-84. 
(emphasis mine) 
 303 
APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
WILLIAM MORRIS: PHILOLOGICAL CRAFT AS PRAXEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE 
 
The influence of William Morris, Pre-Raphaelite artist and leading figure in the 
Arts and Crafts Movement, on J. R. R. Tolkien’s views of artistic craft and literature 
are well documented in Tolkien scholarship, and to cover them in detail would be 
impractical.784 The pressing questions about Morris and Tolkien that are so vital for this 
chapter are: what does a 19th-century painter, writer, architect and craftsman of 
furniture and textiles have to do with what has been described, thus far, as a 
'philological imagination' and how does it manifest as human praxis in everyday life? 
What is of significance to this chapter, and the dissertation as a whole, is Morris’s 
specific spirit of praxeological resistance –to the industrialized colonization of the 
English landscape and 19th-century English forms of life– through the recovery of a 
particular picture of how artistic craft, history and myth relate to everyday life. When 
considered abstractly, Morris and Tolkien appear as radically different species. Morris 
was a 19th-century artist and active socialist; Tolkien was a 20th-century conservative, 
                                                
784 cf: J. R. R. Tolkien: Artist and Illustrator (London: Harper Collins, 1998) and The J. R. R. Tolkien 
Companion Guide: Reader’s Guide (London: Harper Collins, 2006); Tolkien’s son and literary executor, 
Christopher Tolkien, recalls that “his father owned nearly all of Morris’s works”. [Hammond, 
Wayne G. and Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide: Reader’s Guide, 600; citing 
Richard Matthews, Fantasy: The Liberation of the Imagination, 87) Christopher Tolkien was bequeathed 
eleven Morris books, and at least seven other Morris works and translations are known to have 
been in Tolkien’s library by the mid-1920s. We know that as early as 1914 Tolkien used a portion 
of his Skeat Prize from the St. Edward’s School to purchase Morris’s translation of the Völsunga 
Saga, the long poem The Life and Death of Jason, and The House of the Wolfings –which Christopher 
Tolkien recalls “a distant but clear recollection of having been read”. [Hammond, Wayne G. and 
Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide: Reader’s Guide, 600; citing Richard 
Matthews, Fantasy: The Liberation of the Imagination, 87] According to the minute book of the Exeter 
College Essay Club, after a reading of The Fall of Gondolin in March 1920 the members noted 
Tolkien’s stylistic indebtedness to Romantic authors such as William Morris. [Hammond, Wayne 
G. and Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide: Reader’s Guide, 600; citing the Exeter 
College archives.]  
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pre-Vatican II, Roman Catholic785, Oxford philologist and professor of Anglo-Saxon. 
However, both Morris and Tolkien saw colonization by a market-driven industrialized 
form of life as morally reprehensible, and as students of past lifeworlds –specifically 
the lifeworlds of the Western European and Nordic Medieval epoch– “saw in them 
clues to an alternative way of living, different from the shabby, materialist, and 
industrialized world around them’.”786 In contrast to the modern industrialized 
sensibilities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Morris and Tolkien’s 
artistic sensibilities not only drew inspiration from the medieval epochs but worked 
from its picture of art as a practice thoroughly embedded in human forms of life and 
inextricably linked to an applied praxis.787  
 
A PHILOLOGICAL INTEREST 
It should be briefly noted that Tolkien’s rejection of early 20th century 
industrialized forms of life, and Modernism788as a whole, was predicated on his belief 
that the appropriate response to the ‘trauma’ of industrialized warfare was a protest and 
resistance built on the recovery of past sensibilities, practices and forms rather than a 
rejection of them (such as that found in the absurd abstraction of the Dadaists, the 
rejection of history and embrace of mechanization by the Bauhaus architects, and the 
                                                
785 This is a label which should immediately be qualified since Tolkien described his political 
opinions as leaning towards “Anarchy”, “abolition of control” or “to 'unconstitutional' Monarchy” 
(Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien no. 52), and his economic views held much in common with Roman 
Catholic Distributist thought which had its origins in Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum. 
786 Wayne G. Hammond and Christina Scull, The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion Guide: Reader’s Guide, 
603; citing Chester N. Scoville “Pastoralia and Perfectability [sic] in William Morris and J. R. R. 
Tolkien,” in Tolkien’s Modern Middle Ages, ed. Jane Chance and Alfred K. Siewers (New York:  
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). (emphasis mine) 
787 Reno E Lauro, “Of Spiders and (the Medieval Aesthetics of) Light: Hope and Action in the 
Horrors of Shelob’s Lair,” in The Mirror Crack’d: Fear and Horror in J. R. R. Tolkien’s Major Works, ed. 
Lynn Forest-Hill (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008). 
788Francis Frascina et al., Modernity and Modernism: French Painting in the Nineteenth Century (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 9; “This attitude is related by Baudelaire to a particular 
experience of modernity … an experience which is always changing, which does not remain static 
and which is most clearly felt in the metropolitan center of the city.” (9,10); See Charles 
Baudelaire’s 1863 essay The painter of modern life and his use of the term modernité. 
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disjointed narratives, psychological introspection, and individualism of 20th century 
Modernist literature).789 Opposed to the usual and wholly unsophisticated claim of 
luddism or worse, a sentimental nostalgia for the past, Tolkien’s 'philological art' was a 
sophisticated philosophical and theological statement on the nature and purpose of 
human imagining, human craft, and human living. “Unlike many others shocked by the 
explosion of 1914-1918,” says John Garth, author of Tolkien and The Great War, 
“[Tolkien] did not discard the old ways of writing, the classicism or medievalism 
championed by Lord Tennyson and William Morris.”790 Indeed, Tolkien lost two of his 
three best friends in combat (G.B. Smith and Rob Gilson), all of whom, together with 
Christopher Weisman, formed the ‘Tea Club and Barrovian Society’791 at the King 
Edward’s School in Birmingham; a group, whose values Tolkien likened to the 
medieval and romantic concerns of the Pre-Raphelite Brotherhood (to be discussed 
later).792 This sense of loss and strong desire for recovery are detectable in one of 
Tolkien’s earliest poems related to his legendarium –Kôr: In a City Lost and Dead– a 
fourteen-line rhyming couplet expanded to the 140-line Kortirion Among the Trees, 
written while Tolkien was on a week-long leave in November 1915. “Tolkien struck the 
first note of the mood that underpins his entire legendarium: a wistful nostalgia for the 
world slipping away”, says John Garth, “[…] a ‘wistful song of things that were, and 
could be yet’.”793 We might say, then, that Tolkien was drawn to the Pre-Raphaelite 
                                                
789 I should note here that this statement by no means implies that Modernism can be reduced to 
simply a traumatic response to World War I. Indeed, we might well include the effects of Darwin’s 
The Origins of the Species, Einstein’s theory of ‘Relativity’, heavier than air flight, Marx, Freud, Jung, 
Nietzsche, Bergson –and the list goes on. All of which, of course, lie outside the scope of this 
chapter. Here World War I is focused on because we know from Tolkien’s own letters that, aside 
from the crude effect of Industrialism, the War had a tremendous impact on his thinking. 
790 John Garth, Tolkien and the Great War (London: Harper Collins, 2003), 109. 
791 This is a reference to English writer, traveler, and student of languages George Borrow (1803-
1881). 
792 John Garth, ibid., 14. 
793 John Garth, ibid., 109; Also see Reno E. Lauro, “Poems by Tolkien: The History of Middle-
earth”. 
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sensibilities of someone like William Morris because of the shared recognition that art 
in the lifeworld of the Medieval epoch revealed something missing in their own 
industrialized times.  
Art in the medieval epoch knew no distinction between the artist and the 
craftsman, simply because the duty and attention of the artist was never detached from 
the comportments of daily life. “Art in those times was still wrapped up in life”, says 
historian Johan Huizinga succinctly, for “ [. . .] it had to be enjoyed as an element of 
life itself, as the expression of life’s significance.”794 Morris believed the feudal 
craftsman to be an artist of the highest and most fulfilled caliber, whose work was 
summed up in architecture; in the ability to take care of a basic need and “express the 
thoughts and aspirations that stir in us. …”, says Morris, “architecture would lead us to 
all the arts”.795 Indeed, for a thousand years, declares Morris, Medieval craftsmanship, 
dreams and hopes spread across Europe.796 Drawing on the strategy he so admired in 
Morris, Tolkien applied this recovery of a lost artistic praxis (sensibilities, activities, 
and possibilities) towards a resistance of the dehumanizing mechanization –indeed the 
colonization– of everyday life. 
 
NO WEALTH BUT LIFE 
Fifty years prior, William Morris’s disdain for, and resistance of, capitalist mass 
production and societal mechanization drew his attention to the everydayness of the so-
called ‘lesser Decorative Arts’. Drawing on the more holistic –and in Morris’s opinion 
more dignified– Medieval picture of art, Morris’s life-work is a case for the necessity 
                                                
794 J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), 233-34. 
795 William Morris, “The Beauty of Life” in William Morris on Art and Socialism, ed. Norman Kelvin 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), 51. 
796 William Morris, “The Art of the People” in William Morris on Art and Socialism, ed. Norman 
Kelvin, 22. 
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of mending of the modern industrialized unraveling of the Fine Arts, or Great Arts 
(architecture, painting and sculpting; what we now commonly refer to as Art), and the 
so-called Decorative Arts which, as Morris says, gave the ‘great arts’ a mooring to 
everyday life. The Decorative Arts (“house-building, painting, joinery and carpentry, 
smiths’ work, pottery and glass-making, weaving”797, etc.) are concerned with proximal 
matters –to borrow a word from Heidegger, or our everyday use and activity in the 
world– and enrich everyday living with beauty, truth, and pleasure. However, warns 
Morris, the separation of the ‘Great Arts’ from the Decorative Arts is, on the whole 
disastrous for the ‘Arts’ and subsequently for human living: 
[T]he lesser ones become trivial, mechanical, unintelligent, 
incapable of resisting the changes pressed upon them by 
fashion or dishonesty;” says Morris, “while the greater, 
however they may be practiced for a while by men of great 
minds and wonder-working hands, unhelped by the lesser, 
unhelped by each other, are sure to lose their dignity of 
popular arts, and become nothing but dull adjuncts to 
unmeaning pomp, or ingenious toys for a few rich and idle 
men.798 
 
Concerned with the dignity and ‘happiness’ of the user and craftsman, Morris, privy to 
the horrors of late 19th-century industrialized England, already anticipates the disastrous 
consequences Tolkien will experience in his lifetime: science in the service of “the 
counting-house and the drill-sergeant”, the greed of modern commerce leveling 
“venerable buildings”, blackening rivers and hiding the sun with the belching of 
industry.799 In How We Live and How We Might Live, Morris laments the machinery, 
war and inequality produced by commerce –the result of which is the attempted 
                                                
797 William Morris, “The Lesser Arts,” in William Morris: Prose, Verse, Lectures and Essays ed. G. D. H. 
Cole (London: Nonesuch Press, 1934), 495. 
798 William Morris, ibid., 494-495. 
799 William Morris, ibid., 513, 514. 
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‘mechanization’ of humanity.800 Again, in The Aims of Art, Morris laments the 
reduction of the craftsman to a ‘workman’, along with the reduction of the workman to 
‘machine’ –in short, to a condition of slavery. “It is necessary for the system which 
keeps them in their position as an inferior class that they should either be themselves 
machines or be the servants to machines,” claims Morris, “in no case having any 
interest in the work which they run out. To their employers they are, so far as they are 
workmen, a part of the machinery of the workshop or the factory”.801 Here we should 
attend to Heidegger’s warning of the reduction of Being to gestell or a standing reserve 
/ ‘inventory’; rather than being used in the service of increasing life, mechanization is 
in service of “profit-bearing wares”. In The Lesser Arts moreover, Morris laments, “it is 
[by] allowing machines to be our masters and not our servants that so injures the beauty 
of life nowadays. […] [I]t is the token of the terrible crime we have fallen into of using 
our control of the powers of Nature for the purpose of enslaving people”.802 But like 
Tolkien, it would be a seductive mistake to label and dismiss Morris as a luddite. His, 
How A Factory Might Be and Useful Work versus Useless Toil, reveals that he desires, 
again like Tolkien, to reclaim wisdom to wield such power. 
Jeffrey Skoblow’s Paradise Dislocated: Morris, Politics, Art, for example, 
brings to light what he calls Morris’s “aesthetics of immersion”. By this he means an 
aesthetics which is radically attuned to physical details because its concern is life in the 
world, “an imagination of habitation, a nontranscendental, sensuous mode of praxis”.803  
Citing John Reed’s Victorian Conventions (1975), Skoblow writes that Morris “resisted 
                                                
800 William Morris, “How We Live and How We Might Live,” in William Morris: Prose, Verse, Lectures 
and Essays ed. G. D. H. Cole, 567, 574-577. 
801 William Morris, “The Aims of Art,” in William Morris: Prose, Verse, Lectures and Essays ed. G. D. 
H. Cole, 595. 
802 William Morris, “The Lesser Arts,” in William Morris: Prose, Verse, Lectures and Essays ed. G. D. H. 
Cole, 585; also cf: 580. 
803 Jeffery Skoblow, Paradise Dislocated: Morris, Politics, Art (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1993), 2- 4. 
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the decadent impulse to fashion a world of memory within the imagination, and sought 
instead to draw the racial [sic] memory back from the self to be applied to the world of 
the present at large”.804 Here, of course, the term ‘imagination’ is used to describe the 
illusory, solipsistic Victorian fancy; as J. R. R. Tolkien referred to it: imagination as a 
work of quislings –the flight of the deserters.805 
Echoing his mentor John Ruskin, history and nature must be the two teachers of 
the artisan if this undoing is to be mended. Here, Morris specifically references 
Ruskin’s The Nature of the Gothic; on one level, Morris believes the study of history is 
to educate the craftsmen to identify beautiful forms. “If you can really fill your minds 
with memories of great works of art, and great times of art” he writes, “you will, I 
think, be able to a certain extent to look through the aforesaid ugly surroundings”.806 
This is not, however, a matter of copying the forms of the past, claims Morris: “if we 
do not study the ancient work directly and learn to understand it, we shall find 
ourselves influenced by the feeble work all round us, and shall be copying the better 
work through the copyists and without understanding it”.807 Rather than simply a noetic 
response, Morris has a wholly other level of interest; he believes the historical study of 
the decorative arts is a way into, and an act of retrieving the life of the past. In Morris’s 
Romantic vision of ‘the art that is life’, the small-scale hand building of medieval 
furniture, for example, is more than simply an act of fancy and mimicry, it is the 
highest form of protest imaginable –the recovery of a ‘systematic’, “careful and 
laborious practice” attuned to life and immersed in the world; and the recovery of 
                                                
804 Jeffery Skoblow, ibid, 4. (emphasis mine) 
805 J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in The Monsters & the Critics and Other Essays, ed. 
Christopher Tolkien (London: Harper Collins, 1997). 
806 William Morris, ibid., 506. 
807 William Morris, ibid., 505. 
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various expressions of that immersed life from ages past.808 “I say when I think of all 
this,” Morris contemplates, “I hardly know how to say that this interweaving of the 
Decorative Arts with the history of the past is of less importance than their dealings 
with the life of the present: for should not these memories also be a part of our daily 
life?”809 Once again, this concern with daily life –past, present and presumably the 
legacy left for life in the future– is not simply a matter of nostalgia for past forms of 
life, but is an ethical mandate. This ethic begins, for Morris, with the study of Nature. 
That is to say, “everything made by man’s hands has a form, which must be either 
beautiful or ugly; beautiful if it is in accord with Nature, and helps her; ugly if it is 
discordant with Nature, and thwarts her; it cannot be indifferent”.810 Here seems to be 
the radical shift in Morris’s work from a private and personal art to a public and social; 
the craftsman, says Morris, is not simply to imitate nature, but on a more holistic level 
of corporeal imagination, “the hand of the craftsman is guided to work in the way that 
[nature] does”.811 This vision of craftsmanship and art is reminiscent of Tolkien’s elves 
–“the web, the cup, or the knife, look as natural, nay as lovely, as the green field, the 
river bank, or the mountain flint”.812 It is for these reasons then that Morris believed 
that it was impossible to separate art from morality, politics, and religion,813 and which 
led to –or at the very least informed– his socialism and his eventual founding of the 
Socialist League in 1884.  
In a short essay entitled How I Became A Socialist, Morris writes, “the study of 
history and the love and practice of art forced me into a hatred of the civilization which, 
                                                
808 William Morris, ibid., 509. 
809 William Morris, ibid., 498. (emphasis mine) 
810 William Morris, ibid., 495. (emphasis mine) 
811 William Morris, ibid., 496. 
812 William Morris, ibid., 496. 
813 William Morris, “The Art of the People,” in William Morris: On Art and Socialism, ed. Norman 
Kelvin (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), 32. 
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if things were to stop as they are, would turn history into inconsequent nonsense, and 
make art a collection of the curiosities of the past, which would have no serious relation 
to the life of the present.”814 To this end, Morris started his own practices and built his 
own ‘factories’ which stood outside of the sphere of “the great intangible machine of 
commercial tyranny which oppresses the lives of us all”, as he once remarked 
presciently, echoing Lewis Mumford’s megamachine. There was ‘The Firm’ at Red 
House (Morris, Marshall, Faulkner & Co.), a company of artists and craftsmen which 
consisted of the Pre-Raphelite Brotherhood. When work expanded to Merton Abbey, 
writes the distinguished Socialist historian E. P. Thompson, in William Morris: 
Romantic to Revolutionary, “a method of work was built up distinct from normal 
commercial practices.”815 Morris attempted to create an environment where the pleasure 
and creative life of the craftsman would flourish, rather than enabling servitude to the 
machine. Some thirty years later Morris added Kelmscott Press to his endeavors. It 
should be said, without irony, that there was a gulf between how Morris believed a 
factory should be run and how his companies were run in actuality. Morris, himself, 
laments in 1892: 
Except with a small part of the more artistic side of the work, 
[…] I could not do anything (or at least but little) to give this 
pleasure to the workman, because I should have had to change 
their methods of work so utterly that I should have disqualified 
them from earning their living elsewhere. You see I have got 
to understand thoroughly the manner of work under which the 
art of the Middle Ages was done, and that is the only manner 
of work which can turn out popular art, only to discover that it 
                                                
814 William Morris, “How I Became A Socialist.” in William Morris: Prose, Verse, Lectures and Essays 
ed. G. D. H. Cole, 658. 
815 E. P. Thompson, William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 
104. 
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is impossible to work in that manner in this profit-grinding 
society.816 
 
Count Harry Kessler, who set up Cranach Press, noted that Morris’s Press “looked like 
any printing works, just that, since only hand-presses are used, there is neither steam 
nor smoke, so everything can be kept cleaner”.817 Perhaps it was this inability to fully 
retrieve that form of life –despite his rigor of study and authenticity of practice– that 
leads Thompson to suggest the true target of Morris’s ire was not ‘the machine’ but the 
unbridled capitalist system that made men slaves of profit and mechanized forms of 
life.818 It must certainly have been the reason why Morris embraced socialism as a 
necessary alternative to the capitalist machine of his day. Fiona MacCarthy offers 
generous insight in William Morris: A Life for our Time. Although Merton Abbey and 
Kelmscott Press were far from ‘revolutionary workshops’ of Morris’s socialist theory: 
pressmen were given an extra five shillings a week for blistered hands, the workmen 
were paid higher than average wages, Morris was generous with time which was 
afforded to the workers to do the best job possible, and the Press had its own 
celebrations and outings called ‘Wayzegooses’.819 Perhaps it was from this struggle, 
between doing and knowing how things could be, that Morris found outlet in his own 
imaginative literature: The Earthly Paradise (1868-1870), his translation of The Story 
of Sigurd the Volsung and the Fall of the Niblungs (1876), The Dream of John Ball 
(1888), A Tale of the House of the Wolfings and All the Kindreds of the Mark (1889) 
and News from Nowhere (1890). There is no room to explore this conjecture here, 
however; instead, the point to be made in regards to Tolkien is this: Morris and Tolkien 
share unique projects of cultural resistance –a praxeological resistance– built on the 
                                                
816 E. P. Thompson, ibid., 105; citing Clarion, November 19th, 1892. 
817 Fiona MacCarthy, William Morris: A Life for our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 622. 
818 E. P. Thompson, ibid., 649. 
819 Fiona MacCarthy, ibid., 621-622. 
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recovery of a lost artistic praxis (sensibilities, activities, and possibilities), and aimed at 
resisting and decreasing dehumanizing mechanization, and what has been described as 
the colonization of everyday life.820  
                                                
820 In terms of ‘hyperreality’ we may also include ‘digitization’ and ‘virtualization’ of everyday life. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
OWEN BARFIELD AND TOLKIEN: ANCEINT VERSUS ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTIC UNITY 
 
Owen Barfield’s Poetic Diction (1928) has been widely credited with being a 
great influence on J. R. R. Tolkien’s philological project, so a few words should be 
given to examine the strength of that thesis. Admittedly, there is very little reference to 
Barfield in Tolkien’s writings. Humphrey Carpenter mentions in The Inklings that, “not 
long after [Poetic Diction’s] publication, [C. S.] Lewis reported to Barfield: ‘You might 
like to know that when Tolkien dined with me the other night he said á propos of 
something quite different that your conception of the ancient semantic unity had 
modified his whole outlook and that he was always just going to say something in a 
lecture when your conception stopped him in time’.”821 We also know from a 
September 1937 letter to Tolkien’s publisher, Allen & Unwin, that Tolkien reveals a 
philological remark credited to Owen Barfield in The Hobbit.822 He says, “the only 
philological remark (I think) in The Hobbit is on p.221 (lines 6-7 from the end): an odd 
mythological way of referring to linguistic philosophy,823 and a point that will (happily) 
be missed by any who have not read Barfield (few have), and probably by those who 
                                                
821 Humphrey Carpenter, The Inklings (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 42. (emphasis 
mine). Colin Duriez, J. R. R. Tolkien and C. S. Lewis: The Story of a Friendship (Gloucestershire: Sutton 
Publishing, 2005), 48. Colin Duriez speculates 1929. In September of 1931, Tolkien and C. S. 
Lewis have their fateful stroll down Addison’s Walk which ultimately leads to Tolkien’s 
composition of the poem Mythopoeia –a monumental step for Tolkien, who lays out a broader 
philosophical and theological implication for his work. Humphrey Carpenter notes that the writing 
of The Hobbit began “in 1930 or 1931” which would coincide with –but is not necessarily directly 
related to-- his reading of Poetic Diction. Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien: The Authorized Biography, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 177. 
822 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, eds. Humphrey Carpenter and Christopher 
Tolkien, comp. Humphrey Carpenter, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), 19-22. 
823 One should also take into account the rich tradition of ‘ordinary langauge’ of J. L. Austin and 
Gilbert Ryle in the Oxford of the 1940s and ’50s. To think that Tolkien’s was simply a ‘linguistic 
philosophy’ would miss how broad and deep that tradition was, and perhaps allow one to see the 
links between it and Tolkien’s own work, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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have.”824 However, because J. R. R. Tolkien was a subtle and enigmatic figure, it is 
difficult to accurately extrapolate the extent and the details of any influence that Owen 
Barfield’s Poetic Diction had on his project. While these letters are certainly valuable 
in pointing out that Tolkien had read Poetic Diction, and indeed had sympathy with 
Barfield’s project, there is certainly a gulf between being empowered to say something 
(as Tolkien was according to Lewis’ letter), and exactly how one articulates what one 
feels empowered to say.  
On the one hand we might point out how this seemingly throw away comment 
is a testament to Tolkien’s subtlety; the ‘lone’ philological remark825 by Bilbo is far 
from disposable; in fact, it deals with the entire structure of Tolkien’s invented world 
and should not be taken lightly. Here we can certainly see that Tolkien felt a great 
sympathy with Barfield’s conception of language. However, on the other hand, we 
must be cautious when we speak of Tolkien, his imaginative project, and his 
characterization about life and ‘language’. Barfield’s characterizations about language 
are ultimately far too Cartesian to assert the claim that his theory is “the very 
foundation and basis of [Tolkien’s] invented world … central to the theme of the 
Silmarillion”, as does Verlyn Flieger.826  
Owen Barfield’s Poetic Diction is a striking work of genius buried under the 
weight of 20th century Modernism, linguistics and semiotics. Echoing the Vichian 
concerns that have been addressed thus far, Barfield describes his book as “not merely 
a theory of poetic diction, but a theory of poetry: and not merely a theory of poetry, but 
                                                
824 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, 22. 
825 “To say that Bilbo’s breath was taken away is no description at all. There are no words left to 
express his staggerment, since Men changed the language that they learned of elves in the days 
when all the world was wonderful.” (The Hobbit chapter 12) We should also note the Vichian ‘three 
ages of the world’ here, and the ‘forgetting’ and ‘obfuscating’ that occurs in the third age of man.  
826 Verlyn Flieger, Splintered Light: Logos and Language in Tolkien’s World (Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
University Press, 2002), xxi-xxii. 
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a theory of knowledge”.827 In Poetic Diction, Barfield endeavors to recover an originary 
(although not necessarily existentially primordial) relationship between poetry, living, 
and understanding. Briefly, and problematically, Barfield describes his work as a theory 
of ancient semantic unity. The ‘ancient’ here refers to his belief that there was an 
originary epoch in which humans dwelt, expressed, and acted in a poetic unity with 
their environment. This ‘alpha-thinking’, as Barfield would later call it, slowly became 
desiccated as human sophistication grew. As the ‘purely rational’ and ‘anti-poetic’ took 
hold in humanity, language began to fracture through the “birth of hitherto unknown 
antitheses,” Barfield says, “such as those between truth and myth, between prose and 
poetry, and again between an objective and a subjective world”.828 Similar to Vico, 
Barfield argues that through the imagination we can once again see these “forgotten 
relationships" –the poetry between human existence and the world around us. However, 
this is where the ‘philological’ similarities with Vico end, and our move towards what 
Tolkien found relevant in Barfield begins. A brief critique of Barfield is necessary to 
separate Tolkien from Barfield’s work before we highlight the deeper corporeal, 
praxeological, and phenomenological significance of Tolkien’s mythopoeia in chapter 
5. 
In the foreword to the second edition of LOTR, Tolkien testifies that his work 
on the developing Silmarillion –the foundational work of both The Hobbit and LOTR—
“was primarily linguistic in inspiration”.829 The question that has been raised thus far, 
however, focuses on what Tolkien means when he deploys the term ‘linguistic’. 
Elsewhere Tolkien says, “a real taste for fairy-stories was wakened by philology on the 
                                                
827 Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1973), 14. 
828 Owen Barfield, ibid., 94. 
829 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings (London: Harper Collins, 2004), xxii. 
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threshold of manhood, and quickened to full life by war”.830 Here a fuller picture begins 
to emerge. It would be reckless to assume that Tolkien’s work was “primarily 
linguistic” simply because it was philological.831 We begin to see a clear admission by 
Tolkien that because his questions originated with philology they were driven by 
broader existential and theological questions that the rapid and radical transformation 
of a lifeworld can bring to bear. Precisely because his work was philological, in the 
sense deployed in this chapter and in the sense I propose Tolkien built up, we can begin 
to see that his characterization of ‘language’, and his own philological work, were far 
broader than the narrow definition of ‘linguistic’ one might try to pigeonhole Tolkien 
into. I have stated earlier that this is the error Tom Shippey makes in The Road to 
Middle-Earth and in his assessment of Tolkien’s craft; and one from which Verlyn 
Flieger, in her Splintered Light: Logos and Language in Tolkien’s World, thinks she 
has found an escape through Owen Barfield.  
 
 
ARCHAISM AND STRANGENESS 
Two particular characterizations in Poetic Diction with which Tolkien no doubt 
had some sympathy, and which should be taken up in the rest of this chapter are 
Archaism and Strangeness. Although sympathetic, Tolkien differs greatly from 
Barfield’s characterizations in his own work. Whereas noted Tolkien scholar Verlyn 
Flieger quickly attempts to cement ‘linguistic’ and ‘philological’ similarities between 
Barfield’s project and Tolkien’s, it is clear (and is apparent in Chapter 4) that Tolkien 
had a much broader conception of language and philology than Barfield or Flieger give 
                                                
830 J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in The Monsters & The Critics and Other Essays, ed. 
Christopher Tolkien, 135. (emphasis mine) 
831 Aside from the broad understanding of ‘philological’ established in this chapter, Tolkien’s 
influence by the Anglo-Catholic revival of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries must be 
taken into account.  
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account of –one that actively concerns the body and human forms of living.832 
Barfield’s ‘archaism’, drawn from the philological work of Max Müller, is built on the 
picture that there is a historical ‘progression’, or ‘digression’, of language in human 
history from the poetic to the prosaic.833 It is the task of the poet to recover, and return 
us to, what has been lost in an age dominated by prosaic thinking. A return, says 
Barfield, is a turn away from a sophistication that cauterizes the senses and the soul –
either transforming words and meaning beyond recognition of their original power and 
intent, or discarding them altogether. The classic literary example of this archaism, one 
which certainly caught Tolkien’s attention, was the Romantic Revival’s attention to 
nature, and the use of outmoded Medieval phrases or words which had not gone 
through the 18th-and 19th-century ‘industrialization’ and ‘abstraction’.834 Indeed, 
Barfield proudly notes, “archaism chooses, not old words, but young ones.”835  
The defining feature of the ‘poetic mind’ in Barfield’s archaic ‘poetic age’ is 
the ‘true-metaphor’ –an originary state of poetic unity and participation with world. 
Rather than an age of heroic bards saturating the world with meaning –as philologist 
Max Müller suggests– the people of the ‘poetic age’ walked in the ‘footsteps of nature’ 
never ‘conscious’ of the ‘true metaphor’ they wielded. However, we should also note 
that Barfield’s concern with archaism reveals, not a preoccupation with body, but a 
preoccupation with mind. Tolkien’s excitement no doubt swelled when Barfield wrote: 
                                                
832 Much could be made here of Flieger and Barfield’s Cartesian conception of ‘perception’ and 
how that differs from the phenomenological characterization made by French philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, which is intractably linked to the body. While there is no time to persue Merleau-
Ponty’s description, we may point out that it is rooted in the Heideggarian phenomenology 
outlined in chapter 3.  
833 Barfield notes in an afterword written in 1972: “If the book does anything, it erects a structure of 
thought on the basis of a felt difference between what it calls ‘the Prosaic’ and ‘the Poetic’. ... It 
should be noted [however] that Poetic Diction does not simply exalt the Poetic at the expense of the 
Prosaic, but emphasizes their essential relation, their dependence on each other, and indeed their 
interprenetration.” (Poetic Diction, 221-222) 
834 Owen Barfield, ibid., 164. 
835 Owen Barfield, ibid., 165. 
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“Our sophistication, like Odin’s, has cost us an eye; and now it is the language of poets, 
in so far as they create true metaphors, which must restore this unity …”.836  And 
indeed, as Barfield goes on to describe (in the tradition of Percy Bysshe Shelley) how 
forgotten –yet before-unapphrehended– relationships can once again be seen with the 
imagination, one can certainly see how Verlyn Flieger too quickly attempts to connect 
this originary use of language to Tolkien’s own philological project, which she hinges 
on a ‘changing of perception’ and ‘creating a world with language’. But we should not 
be quickly seduced by Barfield’s own emphasis on “restore”. Barfield’s complete 
sentence reads thus: “Our sophistication, like Odin’s, has cost us an eye; and now it is 
the language of poets, in so far as they create true metaphors, which must restore this 
unity conceptually, after it has been lost from perception.”837 ‘True archaism’, then, as 
Barfield points it out, is a return to a particular conceptual understanding which is an 
extension of Romantic philosophical Idealism.838 As will become apparent in chapter 5, 
although Tolkien’s project may be situated along a trajectory that comes out of 
Coleridge’s Romantic project, Tolkien’s philological project is concerned with 
something very different: a primordial quality of being, a return to an originary 
lifeworld much as characterized in chapter 3 and, more particularly, as in Vichian 
corporeal imagination, or the philological craft of William Morris.839 
Similarly, strangeness is very much related to archaism, in that it is a new and 
transformative mode of seeing. Ultimately, however, as becomes apparent with 
Barfield’s description of ‘archaism’, without an attention to the body in the world, we 
                                                
836 Owen Barfield, ibid., 87. 
837 Owen Barfield, ibid., 87. (bold emphasis mine) 
838 By this I mean to imply aspects of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism by way of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge and William Wordsworth. 
839 Owen Barfield, ibid., 163. Barfield later notes: “The view that human perception is not simply 
reception of impacts on the physical organism, but involves an unconscious activity of the mind, is 
at least as old as Coleridge’s ‘primary imagination’.”(Poetic Diction, 217.) 
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can say that Barfield’s strangeness is most unlike anything in Tolkien’s project. 
Barfield’s characterization of strangeness is concerned with the poet’s ability to draw 
out from a ‘different plane’ that which “arouses wonder when we do not understand; 
aesthetic imagination when we do.”840 Tolkien would have recognized this 
characterization from the work of G. K. Chesterton, whom both Barfield and Tolkien 
acknowledge. Indeed, in his epic essay, On Fairy-Stories, Tolkien cites Chesterton’s 
Mooreeffoc –or Coffee-room –as seen by Dickens. Tolkien, however, believed there 
was only a limited power in Chestertonian Fantasy –a power which revealed the 
queerness of those things in our world that have become trite and familiar– because it 
was limited. Here, Tolkien’s ‘theological turn’ –missing in Flieger’s enthusiastic 
promotion of a Barfield-Tolkien connection– takes Tolkien in a different direction with 
a ‘recovery’ of that which is lost. Indeed, a freshness of vision was the ‘only’ virtue of 
Chestertonian Fantasy, argues Tolkien.841 As is apparent in Chapter 4, to which we now 
turn, Tolkien will take this characterization of a strangeness that arises from a different 
plane and apply it to the power of Creative Fantasy –based on the principles of 
Recovery, Escape, and Consolation– to make things ‘new’ … an echo of “evangelium 
in the real world.”842  
                                                
840 Owen Barfield, ibid., 177. 
841 J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in The Monsters & the Critics and Other Essays, ed. 
Christopher Tolkien, 145-147. 
842 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 153-157. 
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